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The Sultanate of Delhi, 711–1526 A.D. c24.s4: The Army

The Sultanate of Delhi, 711–1526 A.D. c24.s4

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The Army

c24.s4.1

As the Sultanate of Delhi was based primarily on force and not on the willing consent of the people, it had to maintain a much larger army than was necessary for the needs of an indigenous national State. During most of the period the army consisted of four classes : (1) regular soldiers permanently employed in the Sultan’s service, (2) troops permanently employed in the service of the provincial governors and nobles, (3) recruits particularly employed in times of war and (4) Muslim volunteers enlisted for fighting what was called *jihad* or holy war.

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The Sultan’s troops at Delhi were called *hashm-i-qalb*. They consisted of two categories of troops, namely, those belonging to the Sultan and those that were in the service of the nobles at Delhi, such as, ministers of the court and other high officials. The troops in royal service were known as *khasah khail* and comprised royal slaves, guards called *jandars* and *afwaj-i-qalb* or the troops directly under royal command. Though these troops were in the permanent employment of the Sultan, they could not be said to have constituted a standing army. Their number was small, and it was not possible for the Sultan to depend upon them entirely in times of danger or war. For the first time in the history of the Sultanate, Ala-ud-din Khalji laid the foundation of a standing army which was directly recruited, paid and officered by the central government. It numbered 4,75,000 horse, besides a vast number of footmen. The institution continued till the time of Muhammad bin Tughluq. Firoz Tughluq converted the army into a feudal organisation. The Lodi army was organised on clannish basis and consisted of tribal hordes of the Lodis, the Qarmalis, the Lohanis, the Surs, and other Afghan tribes. It was ill-organised and weak.

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The contingents of the troops maintained by the nobles and provincial governors were placed at the disposal of *diwan-i-ariz* in times of war. Their organisation, discipline and payment was a matter for the individual governor. There were no uniform rules for their recruitment, training and promotion. The recruits specially employed in the time of war were irregular troops. There was no fixed rule for their payment. Muslim volunteers were encouraged to join the Sultan's army whenever it had to fight with a Hindu ruler. The *maulvis* and the *ulema* were sent round the country to exhort the Muslim population to participate in a holy war against a Hindu chief. The volunteers were not paid from the royal treasury; they were allowed a share of the booty.

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The army was not a national army, as it consisted of soldiers of diverse nationalities, such as, the Turks of various tribes, the Tajiks, the Persians, the Mongols, the Afghans, the Arabs, the Abyssinians, the Indian Musalmans and the Hindus. It was a mercenary body which worked for money and whose only bond was the person of the Sultan. Being a heterogeneous body, it was not inspired by national sentiment. But, as most of its members and all its officers were Muslims, it was animated by a feeling of religious solidarity and fanaticism. Inspite of the exaggerated praise lavished on it by Dr. I. H. Qureshi, the army of the Sultans was not a homogeneous, scientifically trained and efficient force like that of Charles VIII of France or of Frederick William I of Prussia.

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The army consisted of cavalry, infantry and elephants. The cavalry was the most valued arm and formed the backbone of the military establishment. Each horseman was armed with two swords, a dagger, and a bow and arrows. Sometimes he carried a mace also. The troopers wore coats of mail and the horses were caprisoned with steel. As the value of a trooper depended upon his horse, many a cavalryman had an additional horse. In fact, the cavalry was divided into three grades, namely, (1) the *murattab*, that is, the trooper who had two horses, (2) the *sawar*, that is, the cavalryman with one horse, and (3) the *do-aspa*, that is, a soldier who had a led horse and was not a cavalryman properly so-called. Great care had, of necessity, to be bestowed on the supply of good horses which were imported from Arabia, Turkistan and, sometimes, even from Russia.

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The Sultan’s stables had many thousands of extra horses ready for service.

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The next section of the army was the infantry. The foot-soldiers were called *payaks*. Most of them were the Indian Musalmans, the Hindus and the slaves. They were armed with swords, spears and bows and arrows. The archers were called *dhanuks*, a corruption of the Sanskrit word *dhanush*.

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Then there were the elephants which were highly valued by the Sultans. It is said that Balban considered a single elephant as effective in a battle as five hundred horsemen. Muhammad bin Tughluq had 3,000 elephants. Firoz had almost an equal number. The possession of elephants was considered a royal prerogative. Sometimes permission was given to a great noble to keep an elephant which was a rare mark of honour. An elephant carried several armed soldiers who were seated inside a fort-like wooden structure, called *hauda*, placed upon the elephant’s back. The elephants were clad in plates of steel and armed with scythes attached to their trunks and tusks. They were trained to fight. There was an officer in charge of elephants, known as *shahna-i-fil*.

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There was nothing like modern artillery, but incendiary arrows, javelins and pots full of combustibles were used in battle. Hand grenades, fireworks, rockets and naptha balls were also common. There was a machine for discharging balls by the force of gun powder. Besides, there were *manjaniqs* or *mangonels* and *mangons* (a sort of mechanical artillery) through which fire balls, fire arrows and pieces of stones and rock and even iron balls were thrown. Sometimes poisonous snakes and scorpions were hurled against the enemy. The Sultan maintained a considerable number of boats for the transport of the troops and for use in river battles.

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The Sultan was the commander-in-chief of his force. He paid personal attention to its organisation and upkeep. There was, however, an army minister, known as *diwan-i-ariz*, who was in charge of recruitment of troops, their organisation and discipline and promotion. The army seemed to have been organised on decimal basis. A unit of cavalry was formed by ten troopers at whose head there was a *sar-i-khail*. The next rank was that of *sipahsalar* who had ten *sar-i-khails* under him. The third higher rank was that of *amir* who had ten *sipahsalars* under him. The next higher authority was *malik* with ten *amirs* under him, and at the head of ten *maliks* there was a *khan*. Probably, this arrangement existed only on paper and was never strictly adhered to during the reign of any of the Sultans of our period. By the time of Balban, most of the offices in the army had become hereditary. Many of the soldiers sent proxies in a battle or at a military review. Ala-ud-din Khalji took steps to do away with corruption by introducing the system of branding (*dagh*) horses so as to prevent a horse from being brought twice at a review or from being substituted by a worthless pony. He also ordered the descriptive roll (*huliya*) of each soldier to be taken and recorded in registers, so that no soldier or officer in his army could send a proxy. These reforms restored discipline in the army. But, in the time of Firoz Tughluq, they were disregarded and soldiers were allowed to send substitutes to the musters. The army continued to be disorganised and ill-disciplined till the time of Sikandar Lodi who insisted on the registration of *huliya* or *chehra* and the branding of the horses.

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The central government could be strict about the organisation and discipline of the army at the capital, but, so far as the contingents of the provincial governors were concerned, the centre had little control over them. They were brought to muster once a year, and it was only at that time that the *diwan-i-ariz* could enforce the regulations devised by him.

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A part of the army used to be stationed at strategic places in the provinces. Forts on the frontier were garrisoned with seasoned troops. It was the duty of the commandants of the forts to see that there were adequate provisions including fodder for the animals in the forts in their charge.

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The Sultans were adept in military strategy. The art of ambushing and surprise attacks were commonly resorted to. Before the army engaged in war, the general or officer-commanding almost invariably surveyed the prospective theatre of war and took geography into account in fixing a battle-field. There was the traditional practice of dividing the army into several divisions on a field of battle. There were, for example, the advance guard, the centre, the right wing, the left wing and the rear guard or reserve. Elephants were stationed in the front. They were preceded by armed infantry. According to Qureshi, there were flanking parties on either flank of an army, which seems to me to be doubtful. There was no flanking party in Ibrahim Lodi's army in the battle of Panipat. Their presence in Babur's army was a main reason of Ibrahim's defeat. Scouts and sepoys were attached to the army. The duty of the scouts was to reconnoitre and to bring news. They rendered useful service.

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The military officers were paid by assignment of land revenue, while the individual troops seem to have been paid in cash. The soldiers' pay varied from time to time. In Ala-ud-din's reign the salary of a well-equipped trooper was 234 *tankas* per annum. Muhammad Tughluq paid him 500 *tankas*. Soldiers were given food, dress and fodder free during the time of a campaign. The salary of the officers, too, varied from time to time. A *khan* was paid one lakh of *tankas* a year, and a *malik* fifty to sixty thousand *tankas* annually. Smaller officers received from one to ten thousand *tankas* a year. These included the pay of the troops under their command. The irregular troops, called *ghair-wajhis*, who were employed for short periods, were, sometimes, paid by an order on some local treasury and sometimes in cash from the central treasury. Firoz Tughluq revived payment by assignment for the soldiers also. The emoluments of the fighting forces were, on the whole, not only adequate, but also handsome.