The Sultanate of Delhi, 711–1526 A.D. c8.s15: Causes of the eventual Arab failure in Sindh
The Sultanate of Delhi, 711–1526 A.D. c8.s15
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Causes of the eventual Arab failure in Sindh
c8.s15.1
The provinces of Sindh and Multan remained parts of the Khalifa's wide empire a little over 150 years, after which they severed their connections with the Caliphate. Even during that period the Arab rule witnessed a gradual decline. Governor was appointed to succeed governor. The inefficiency and weakness of the administration continued as before. Under an energetic governor there was a temporary activity and sometimes an expedition was undertaken against the neighbouring Hindu kingdoms, but this was followed by relapse into sloth and lethargy. Under Umar II, who became Khalifa in 717 A.D., an intense religious propaganda was launched. Many Hindu chiefs, notably Jai Singh, son of Dahir and ruler of Brahmanabad, were compelled to renounce their ancestral faith and become converts to Islam. The energetic governor named Junaid carried the Arab arms into the heart of Kutch, but the expedition was a mere raid and not a war of conquest. Eventually the Arabs found their influence languishing and were obliged to build two strongholds for their protection. They were *al-Mahfuzah*, ‘the guarded’, and *Mansura*, a few miles to the north-east of Brahmanabad. In 750 A.D. there was a revolution in Damascus as a result of which the Umayyaids were overthrown and a new Caliphate was established at Baghdad under Abbasid Khalifa. The quarrel between these two houses affected Sindh badly. The Abbasid Caliphs sent their own officers to Sindh with orders to expel the Umayyaid governor and officers. The result was a long and bitter quarrel which undermined the already waning prestige of the Arabs in that province. After this date the governors and chiefs of Sindh became more or less semi-independent rulers. In 871 A.D. Sindh cut off its relations with the Caliph and declared its independence in fact, though not in name. Two local Arab chiefs established themselves at Multan and Mansura which became, for all practical purposes, independent kingdoms. The kingdom of Multan comprised the upper valley of the Indus as far as Aror, while that of Mansura embraced Sindh proper. The rulers of these dynasties associated the natives with the administration and granted toleration to the Hindus and the Buddhists.
c8.s15.2
The late Stanely Lane-poole expressed the opinion that the Arab conquest of Sindh was “an episode in the history of India and Islam, a triumph without results.” This has been accepted as correct by many writers of Indian history. The history of the Arabs in Sindh, according to them, shows that the Arab adventure “led to nothing.” The province, of course, remained in their hands till its conquest and annexation by the Turks; but the Arabs, who had a glorious record of conquest elsewhere, never succeeded in making a concentrated effort to conquer any other province, to say nothing of a major portion of our country. They had, no doubt, made a promising beginning, but their success, whatever it was, did not lead them beyond the frontiers of Sindh and Multan, except for a stray raid here and there. Hence the verdict of historians that the Arab conquest of Sindh was a mere episode in the history of Islam. As far as India was concerned, it learnt no lesson, and our people did not pause to consider the necessity of making a combined attempt to drive away the Arab invader from Sindh, nor did they make any attempt to close their ranks and to guard their north-western frontier from any future danger from that side. They were found as unprepared and as indifferent to the happenings outside three centuries later when the Turks began hammering the gates of their frontiers as in the early years of the eighth century A.D. when Muhammad bin Qasim took Dahir by surprise. It is for this reason that the Arab conquest of Sindh is an episode in the history of India. Historians have attributed the impermanence of the Arab regime to many causes. They can conveniently be divided into two, namely, internal causes and external causes. Among the internal causes the most important was the internal weakness of the Khalifa's empire. As has already been shown, a revolution at Damascus in 750 A.D. led to the overthrow of the Umayyaids by the Abbasids which greatly weakened the power and prestige of the Caliphate. The quarrel between the two ruling houses was carried into Sindh and dealt a mortal blow to the Arab prestige there. Secondly, in the wake of this revolution there occurred a still greater revolution in Baghdad which transformed the character and mode of life of the Arabs. Under Harun-al-Rashid the Arabs forgot their old vigour and "lost touch with everything original and vital in Islam." They became fond of a luxurious way of life and preferred speculative philosophy to the "Quranic orthodoxy and Arabian simplicity." This led to their eventual demoralization, making the Arabs unfit for any great military exploit or for an adventure in the field of administration. Thirdly, a wave of nationalism swept over the Muslim world and rent the primitive Islamic brotherhood into factions. Religious schism, too, raised its head high. A number of heretical sects appeared on the scene. Fourthly, under the religious impulse the Arabs had accomplished the conquest of Sindh. After their success, however, when they had consolidated their position in the province and their religious enthusiasm died out, their unity disappeared and they showed themselves incapable of coalescing into a system of concord and subordination. Fifthly, the Arab domination received a rude shock at the hands of the Turkish ambition which usurped power and reduced the Khalifa's empire to a mere phantom. Under these circumstances the Arab rulers could take little interest in the fortunes of their agents in Sindh. Sixthly, owing to these internal convulsions the Arabs could not spare adequate forces without which Sindh could not be retained in their possession and further conquests in India were unthinkable.
c8.s15.3
Among the external causes mention may be made of the presence of powerful Rajput kingdoms, particularly those on the north and the east. The Rajput dynasties, which ruled over these parts of the country, were more than a match for the Arabs and they were prepared to contest every inch of the ground against foreign encroachment. In the second place, there existed throughout India a powerful Hindu priesthood which exercised an irresistible influence over the people and was deadly opposed to foreign ways of life and thought. The generality of the Hindus, under the influence of this priestly class, considered themselves and their culture greatly superior to that of the Arabs, who were, in their eyes, nothing more than unclean barbarians. Thirdly, Sindh was then, as now, almost a desert land and its financial resources were inadequate to meet the expenditure of a top-heavy administration. It was, therefore, financially a deficit province and was an unremunerative part of the Caliphate. The Arabs of Sindh, left to their own resources, found themselves powerless against their richer neighbours. Finally, Sindh is situated in the wrong corner of India and it does not offer a geographical key to the rest of the country. It was not possible for any power starting from Sindh and making that as the base of its operations to succeed in conquering the rest of India.