History of Mediaeval Hindu India (being a History of India from 600 to 1200 A.D.) v1.c11: Chapter VII
History of Mediaeval Hindu India (being a History of India from 600 to 1200 A.D.) v1.c11
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Chapter VII
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Sir Vincent Smith observes at page 357 of his ‘Early history of India’ 3rd Edition, that when “the wholesome despotism of Harsha terminated by his death, India instantly returned to her normal condition of anarchical autonomy.” This is, I am afraid, a wrong and an unhistorical view. To those who look upon India as one country and who consider a despotic imperial rule as the only remedy for her political ills, the political condition which usually obtained in ancient India may appear as one of anarchical autonomy. But it must be remembered that India never was one kingdom at any time except the present, when the British rule has brought the whole country under subjection. India may indeed be called one country from certain aspects of race, religion and tradition, but it cannot be denied that it never was, at least in ancient history, one country politically. It generally consisted of a number of kingdoms and these were usually at war with one another. To apply to this condition the term anarchical autonomy would be improper.
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For what was the condition of Europe at this time or for that matter at any time in its history? Europe may fitly be compared to India in every respect. Exclusive of Russia, Europe is almost equal to India in extent and population and its people are practically of one race, namely, Aryan and of one religion, namely, Roman Christianity. In the seventh century Hiuen Tsang describes India as divided into about seventy kingdoms (Watters’ Vol. I p. 140). Europe in the seventh century could not have been divided into less. England itself was divided into five kingdoms, France, Germany and Italy into many more. Indeed the condition of society, civilization and the means of communication in ancient times prevented the formation of kingdoms larger than those that existed in India or Europe at that time. And history shows that these kingdoms of Europe were constantly at war with one another. European history is indeed a terrible history detailing the constant and usually sanguinary wars waged by the several kingdoms with one another. Now would it be proper to describe this condition of Europe as one of anarchical autonomy, or to make the comparison still more complete, to say that when the Empire of Charlemagne fell to pieces after his death, Europe reverted to her usual condition of anarchical autonomy? Even now when railways and telegraphs have made the growth of large kingdoms possible, Europe is still divided into a number of small kingdoms which are not larger than the kingdoms in India described by Hiuen Tsang. If we take 6000 li or 1200 miles as the average circumference of a large Indian kingdom like Mahārāshtra the area of an average large kingdom in square miles comes to about 1,20,000 sq. miles. Or we may make calcuation in another way and divide the total present area of India viz. 18,02,629 sq. miles, by 70 and arrive at the area 25,752 sq. miles of an average kingdom in India as it existed in the seventh century. The smaller kingdoms existing in Europe at this day, Belgium ( 11,373 sq. ms. ), Holland ( 12,582 ), Portugal ( 32,000 ), Italy ( 1,10,632 ), Bulgaria ( 33,645 ), Roumania ( 53,489 ) and Greece ( 25,014 ), not to speak of the small states of which the German Empire is composed, are not thus larger than the kingdoms existing in India in Hiuen Tsang's days, and these states of Europe are normally in a condition of war. A decade does not pass without a fight somewhere, and yet these small states are alive and flourishing; and history cannot describe the normal condition of Europe as one of ‘anarchical autonomy’. The mistake lies in looking upon India as one country or a territory that deserved to be one country under one rule and hence, I apprehend, the use of the word anarchical.
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The question for the historian is why did the small kingdoms of India succumb to the Mahomedans in the 12th century? Why did they not live and develop into strong kingdoms like the states of Europe? It is usually suggested that the Indian kingdoms ought to have foreseen the danger of foreign invasions and that they should have laid aside mutual feuds in order to gather strength against them. It is argued, for example, that after the defeat of the Huns, under Mihirkula in 528 A. D. India was free from foreign invasion till the invasion of Mahmud of Ghazni about 1000 A. D., and she was free to work out her destiny. This involves not only the previous misconception that India was one country but also the further misconception that such foreign invasions could have been foreseen. In fact we usually look upon the condition of the seventh century, from our state of knowledge in the twentieth century. But the invasions of Mahmud could not have been foreseen by any the wisest man, in the seventh century. No body in those days or even later could have dreamt that the Turks, fired with the fanaticism of a new creed and cursed with the barbarism of new invaders, would devastate India in the 11th and the 12th centuries. Even the loss of Sind in the beginning of the 8th century could not have served as a warning. The conquest of Sind, in India, by the Arabs may fitly be compared to the conquest of Constantinople in Europe by the Turks. The Turks have remained in Europe like a thorn in the side of Europe for these five centuries in the same way as the Arabs remained in Sind for five centuries before the 13th. The Arabs from Sind molested the Hindus east, north and south much in the same way as the Turks harassed Europe in the west, north and south. Yet Europe never thought of laying aside her internal animosities and combining under one empire. Why should then the kingdoms of India have thought of combining under one sceptre to drive away the Arabs? Nay, the parallel goes much further. Mr. Sardesai accuses the Rāṣṭrakūṭas of having actually taken the assistance of these Arab foreigners in their fights with the Gurjaras. But it must be remembered that in advanced Europe the same thing was done and is being done. History tells us that Francis I of France excited the Turks against the Germans in his war with Charles V, Emperor of Germany, in the 16th century. And curiously enough the debt has been paid back in the present 20th century by the last Emperor of Germany by raising the Turks against the French and their allies although the latter are of the same religion, race and civilization as the Germans. The reason is, that in political struggles, even religion and race are not of much account. The Bulgars are at present fighting against the Russians though of the same race and even of the same religious church. We need not, then, feel wonder if the Rāshṭrakūṭas sought the assistance of the Arabs, against their own co-religionists. We must remember that the Gurjaras and Rāshṭrakūṭas formed two distinct kingdoms with distinct political interests. The real difference between Europe and India lies in the fact that while both the Gurjaras and the Rāshṭrakūṭas have eventually succumbed before the Arabs, the French and the Germans are still alive and not likely to succumb to the Turks. The real question, therefore, for the historian is why did the Gurjaras and the Rāshṭrakūṭas succumb? In other words why did the kingdoms in India not develop into strong nations? What was the political condition in the seventh and the preceding centuries which led to her decline and downfall? That is the question which we really have to solve and which requires to be carefully tackled in the light of western and easten history past and present.
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The main cause of this difference in the vitality of the nations in the west and the nations in the east appears to be the complete divergence in the development of their political ideas. While in the west the highest ideal of a state was evolved at a very ancient date in Greece, in India the Indo-Aryan intellect not only failed to grasp the essentials of a perfect state but developed ideas which were diametrically opposed to them. Perhaps the Indo-Aryan intellect was, as said before, engrossed with the idea of the nothingness of this world's prosperity and devoting itself to spirtual speculation spurned the limitations of a limited state and concerned itself with the welfare of the whole world, man and beast, animate and inanimate. In Europe the small citizen states of Greece were led by the Hellenic intellect to a very high political development and the Romans by their legal temperament carried it to the farthest limits. The duties and the dignities of a citizen of the Roman Empire, a word which still reminds us of the ancient develpment of city-states, were now clearly understood and defined and they in their turn moulded the development of political ideas in the Germanic peoples who added their own political instincts and notions to the ideas inherited from the civilizations of Greece and Rome. The German states were, indeed, not republics like the ancient states of Greece and Rome, but the power of the king in these was limited by institutions of states-general or representative assemblies of the people; and these have developed into the modern kingdoms of Europe with their limited monarchies. The rights and duties of the citizens or rather members of a state have further been developed by French thinkers preceding the French Revolution and their ideas have now permeated to the lowest class in each and every state of Europe. Under their influence each individual citizen in the western states believes that he is a partner in the political partnership of the state and is thus both its master and servant in his own small capacity. Each citizen again is bound to the state not only by ties of affection or patriotism but also by the ties of self-interest, for each one shares in the prosperity of the state or its adversity and is thus ready to make any sacrifice for it by self-interest as well as by patriotism. Such a state must necessarily be a strong organisation and cannot be suppressed or killed except by the greatest exertion of enemies. Nay, it has come to be a maxim with political philosophers in the west that no people, however few, imbued with the instincts of true citizenship, can ever be suppressed by force.
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The development of political ideas in India was exactly in the opposite direction. The Indo-Aryans were indeed in the beginning imbued with the same racial tendencies as their brethren in the west. The sovereignty so to speak belonged to the people and the king was merely their leader and agent. There were public assemblies of the people which advised the king on all important matters. Taxation was levied apparently with the consent of the people. The later tradition that the people promised Manu 1/6th of their land produce in consideration of his accepting their kingship contains the germ of this principle. Kings were often elected and in some tribes there were no kings at all, the people themselves regulating their affairs by a council of elders. In short, in the earliest period of Indian history the political condition of the people was developing in the same direction as in the west. Indeed the union of the people with the state and the king was so complete in ancient times that the names of the three were identical. The state was still tribal and the same word in the plural indicated the state and the people, while in the singular it meant the king. In the Vedic and even in Epic times this was the rule. For example the Kurus, the Madras, the Pāñchālas, the Kosalas and so on meant both the people and the country; and the singular Kuru, Madra, Pāñchāla and Kosala and so on meant the king. A similar state of things obtained in the west. The land was there also called after the people and the king was called by the same name. France was the land of the Franks, England of the Angles and Saxony of the Saxons; and France, England and Saxony meant also the kings of those lands. Thus the name of the people gave the name to the country and the king, both in the east and the west.
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Such was the state of things in India down to Buddha's time. In the succeeding centuries this condition gradually changed. The people gradually receded from view, probably because they were now composed largely of Śūdras and not of the Aryans as in previous times. The kings who were often non-Aryan and sometimes even foreigners, gradually assumed absolute power. The people thus became accustomed to the rule of kings who were not of their own race and of the Kshatriya caste. They gradually ceased to take interest in politics, being less or never consulted and eventually came to believe that it was none of their business to meddle with state affairs. Particular persons of the three higher castes, Brahmins, Kshatriyas and Vaiśyas did take some interest in politics being soldiers and officials, but the generality of the people being Śūdra, was debarred from all participation in political activities. And eventually the people lost all idea as to their possessing any rights of participation in the government of the country.
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In this way diverged the political development of the Aryans in the east and in the west. Not that in the west the factor of a lower class did not arise. In Greece there were the Helots; in Rome the Plebeins; in France the Gauls; in England the Britons. In Germany alone, perhaps, the people were homogeneous. But in all these cases the lower classes were not racially very distinct from the higher and not very inferior in physical and mental capacities. In all these countries, therefore, they struggled to obtain political rights. For instance the persistent efforts of the Plebeians in Rome to obtain political and even social equality are well known and these struggles themselves were an education to the people. In India, on the other hand, especially in the north, the Dravidian lower classes were very inferior in capacities, and being different in complexion, features and habits remained distinct in position, social and political, and never struggled for equality of rights. Political power, therefore, gradually centered primarily in the higher classes, especially in the Kshatriyas and in the kings next. The king was invested with divine attributes in public estimation by superstition as well as by craft, and the despotic power of kings without any restriction by popular assemblies was eventually firmly established during the Buddhist period of Indian history.
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Such remained the political condition of India in the seventh century. The king was absolute and possessed of despotic power unrestricted by the voice of any public assemblies. The kingdom and the people belonged to him, so to speak, as his private property. The kingdom naturally ceased to be called by the name of the people. Among the seventy or so kingdoms mentioned by Hiuen Tsang only a few bear the name of the people. The old names of Kuru, Pāñchāla, Anga, Vanga &c. are gone and we have the names of Thanesar, Kanauj, Karnasuvarna, Tamralipti and so on. They are names taken generally after the capital town or some physical feature of the country. The kings are not named after the people but after a Vanśa or family as the Vardhanas, the Maukharis, the Guptas and so on.
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And these families did not attain to kingly position by the consent or approbation of the people or by hereditary rights of several generations even, but by divine favour obtained, it was believed, by reason of austerities performed by certain individuals in their past lives. Under this superstitious view any body might become king or had the right to become king if only he succeeded in establishing himself on the throne by hook or crook. For, the people's consent or acceptance was never thought of as having anything to do with the affair. The story related by Kalhana about how Ranāditya (Raj. III) became king is typical of this popular superstition. The Harsha Charita also relates how Pusyabhūti obtained a boon by assisting in a Pāśupata sacrifice, that a Chakravarti would be born in his family. When the Brahmin Chacha usurped the throne of Sind, he is said in the Chachanāma to have observed "It is written in the books of Hind that whenever a person who has trained his soul to austerities dies, his soul transmigrates to the child of a king or a great man in return for his good deeds." The people thus had not only no political rights but had no hand whatever in the acceptance of kings, as persons became kings by reason of their austerities performed in former lives. Under such a view of the organization of a state, there can scarcely be born that national vitality which is the essential factor in the strength of nations. Naturally enough patriotism was a virtue which never arose in India. There are, in Indian history, no noble examples of patriotic sacrifices such as are to be found in Greek, or Roman history or in the later history of the European nations. The feeling of love of the country or the nation cannot arise when the nation itself has no existence. The place of patriotism was supplied by the feeling of loyalty. The king being the absolute master of the state or the people, appointed by divine will, the people could naturally be actuated only by the feeling of loyalty or love to the divine king. Loyalty has been the distinguishing characteristic of the people of this country from the most ancient times. In the Harsha Charita we find many such examples recorded by Bāṇa and in these servants or officers give up their lives simply for the grief they felt on the death of their sovereign. And if the royal family continued steady on the throne for generations it did so not by the patriotism of the people but by the loyalty of their servants and officers. The people generally were also loyal to the reigning king. But their loyalty must always have been lukewarm and they were generally willing, or felt no concern, when one rule was substituted by another.
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What the condition was in individual kingdoms also obtained in empires. Harsha's empire was the culminating point of the Buddhist period of Indian history which was passing away. He founded and maintained an empire as strong as the Gupta empire and in the history of the following mediæval period no kingdom approached either the extent or the solidarity of Harsha's rule. Harsha again was one of the most righteous emperors in the history of the world, conscientiously endeavouring to secure the happiness of the people. And yet the political conceptions of the people remaining the same, he could not infuse into his empire any national vitality. On the contrary the very extent of this mass of kingdoms held together by force, increased its aptitude to topple down at the slightest shock, like a pile of stones heaped one upon another without any cement. Of course, we cannot blame Harsha for not introducing the cement. For, India had not then evolved representative institutions nor had the Indian intellect evolved proper conceptions of a political state. That department of enquiry remained a blank in the Indian intellectual activity. Harsha, therefore, could never have thought of giving to the people any rights of participation in the government of the country. His maintenance of order by sheer force but confirmed the current opinions about the absolute power of kings, and of God's favour as the origin of all kingly power.
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Under such a view, kingdoms and even empires could not have any vitality. Harsha's empire fell to pieces, immediately his strong arm was removed from the administration. The subject kingdoms immediately became independent while Kanauj itself fell into disorder, Harsha having left no son. For in such a state of political views not only the virtue of patriotism cannot be fostered, but the contrary vice namely treason cannot but have ample scope to flourish. Every ambitious person who can by force or treachery seize the throne has the assurance that the people's allegiance will be transferred to him as a matter of course. The people having no voice in the matter or rather believing that they had no voice were naturally held of no account in such revolutions and the successful usurper was always accepted without demur. Traitors were, therefore, not uncommon. The punishment for unsuccessful rebellion or treachery was indeed drastic, then as now, traitors being imprisoned for life and 'dead or alive nobody took any account of them' as Hiuen Tsang observes. But such drastic punishment did not deter ambitious and bold persons, especially as success was not very difficult when opportunities offered. These revolutions or rebellions were never of the people but of a few individuals only. Ministers and commanders-in-chief, were generally the usurpers in such revolutions and they were usually successful whenever the reigning king died without issue, or was an incapable person. Such has indeed been the trend of Indian history from the days of the Śungas down to the days of the Peshwas and their lieutenants, even throughout the Mahomedan times. Had the people had a proper conception of their duties as citizens of a state they would not have tolerated such revolutions nor would the ministers have dared to seize thrones. Only since the establishment of the British rule are we getting accustomed to the sight of ministers never aspiring to place themselves in the position of their masters.
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We have discussed, heretofore, at length what in our opinion was the main cause of the weakness of Indian states. To put it shortly, the absence of representative political institutions prevented the people from feeling self-interest in the maintenance of the state intact and the belief that kings were appointed from heaven in reward for their austerities in past lives made the people thoroughly unconcerned as to who ruled them. The king enjoyed absolute power and was the master of the state or kingdom as if it were an item of private property. Patriotism was naturally absent and though its place was tolerably supplied by the feeling of loyalty, disloyal and treasonable persons were not uncommon, those who were successful in their usurpation being accepted by the people without demur. This state of things continued down to the latest period of Indian history, for we find in the last successful usurpation by Rāghoba, hundreds and thousands came forward to support his cause. Had the people a proper conception of their rights and duties as members of the Maratha state, not a man would have been found to stand by that misguided person in creating the unfortunate cleft in the solidarity of the Maratha state which eventually destroyed it. The greatest benefit of the British rule in India is the awakening of the people to a sense of their essential rights and duties as citizens of the British Empire. And it will be wise for the British government to take note of this awakening and to admit people to their due share in the government of the country. British statesmen should remember that even the British government in India is comparatively weak if it is not supported by the co-operation of the people rendered not merely by the sentiment of loyalty but by the feeling of self-interest engendered by self-government through representative institutions.
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The question why nations fall is one of extreme complexity and difficulty. But there can be no doubt that representative government creates a feeling of self-interest in the people which is the great backbone of a nation's strength. History indeed records the fall of the brilliant city-states of Greece and of Rome inspite of such national sentiment. But we must remember that that sentiment had been completely undermined in Greece and Rome by demoralization and luxury and hence it was that these states succumbed and fell. But they rose again when the same sentiment became strong. The Indian states on the other hand never developed the national sentiment at all and hence were never strong. They could not have developed into strong states in the succeeding centuries. On the contrary, coming under the influence of certain causes which we shall discuss in another place they gradually became enervated and hence fell easily before the advancing tide of Mahomedan invasions.
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It is, however, necessary to state before concluding this chapter that the despotic states of India of the seventh century were certainly strong as compared with the contemporary despotic kingdoms of Asia and it is hence that they could beat back the Huns who in Europe could not be beat away. The physical and moral capacities of a people are also an important factor in the vitality of nations. Even a vegetarian people inured to arms and abstemious in habits can hold their own in the struggle of nations. In the seventh century the people of India were habituated to the use of arms owing to the constant warfare waged by the different kingdoms. They were also, as Hiuen Tsang testifies, simple and abstemious in habits. The Indian states of the seventh century were strong and warlike in spite of their despotic constitutions and were neither enervated by luxury nor enfeebled by want of martial exercises. The prominent index of the enervation of a people is their employment of mercenary forces and neither Hiuen Tsang nor Bāṇa mentions any mercenary troops in the army of Harsha.
Linked texts (1)
- Harṣacarita — Bāṇabhaṭṭa, Sanskrit