History of Mediaeval Hindu India (being a History of India from 600 to 1200 A.D.) v3.c33.s2: Note—Mohyal Brahmins.
History of Mediaeval Hindu India (being a History of India from 600 to 1200 A.D.) v3.c33.s2
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Note—Mohyal Brahmins.
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The Mohyals who are a subset of the Sārasvata Brahmins and who are found all over the Panjab, the North-Western Frontier Province and even Afghanistan claim with justice and propriety that Jaipal and Ānanda-pāla were Mohyal Brahmins. The Mohyal Brahmins throughout Mahomedan, Sikh and British times have undoubtedly distinguished themselves as great generals and soldiers. Indeed these Brahmins hold that begging or trading is prohibited to them. They believe that they are descended from Aśvatthāmā and other Brahmin heroes of the Mahābhārata. Whatever this may be, it is probable that this Brahmin subcaste became Kshatriya or military caste and attained to fame in the days of the Shahi Brahmin kings of Kabul. Indeed their case is similar to the case, in later times, of the Chitpawan Brahmins. From the days of Balaji Vishwanath, first Peshwa, the Chitpawans became a military caste and in the time of the Peshwas they were employed both as military and civil officers. Under the British they are employed only in civil services naturally enough.
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The Mohyals are divided into seven exogamous families; Datta, Vaid, Bāli, Chhibbar, Mohan, Bamwal and Lawa. Jaipal is said by Mohyals to be a Datta with Bhāradvāja gotra. It may be mentioned that Rambhuj Datta Chowdhari of Amritsar was a Mohyal Datta and the revenue minister to the late Amir of Afghanistan, Dewan Narayandas of Bhera now aged 90, is a Mohyal Chhibbar. It is not necessary here to mention the noted Mohyal commanders who distinguished themselves in Mahomedan, Sikh and British times.
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SABUKTAGIN AND JAIPAL.
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The history of the conflicts of Turks and Hindus and especially of the invasions of India by Mahmud has been written in detail by Mahomedan historians from Al-Utbi a contemporary of Mahmud to Firishta who lived about 1500 A. D. in the Deccan and by European writers from gifted Gibbon down to Elliot, Elphinstone &c. and Lane-Poole and Smith, as also by noted German and French writers. Dr. Vincent Smith further has brought to bear upon this history his extensive knowledge of Indian epigraphic and numismatic evidence. Yet the history requires to be sifted and reconsidered from the Indian point of view and in the light of modern Indian research. It requires to be examined in the crucible of historical probabilities and tested by the fire of historical criticism. It is no doubt impossible to add many new facts but it is possible to reject some absurd stories and ideas. We shall try to do this in the succeeding chapters, as far as can be done by bringing to bear upon this history the light derived from modern Indian research and by looking at it from the view-point of the Hindus. It may be pointed out that even contemporary historians like Utbi who are more to be relied upon than any later writers have to be subjected to the usual criticism; much more so later writers like Firishta.
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Sabuktagin having established himself in the principality of Ghazni naturally tried to extend his dominion. This small principality was like a drop of oil on the surface of the expanse of Hindu waters. But the oil expanded on all sides till it spread, in the days of his son, over the whole expanse of Afghanistan and the Panjab. Sabuktagin first conquered Kandahar and Bust, capital of the Rajput country, as stated before. He also conquered and annexed Al-Rukhaj or Arachosia of the Greeks which was called "White India" by the Parthians (Vol. I. p. 191). Conquering Kasdar the capital and its king he made him a tributary using the coin and name of Sabuktagin (Utbi p. 33). Having thus secured his rear, Sabuktagin aspired to conquer east and north and naturally came into conflict with Jaipal king of Kabul and Wahind.
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It is needless to enquire who was the aggressor, for the law among kings and even nations or peoples not only in ancient times but even in the twentieth century was and is the law of the brute, viz. that the strong should despoil and even destroy the weak. Utbi simply says "Having completed the conquest of Kasdār, Sabuktagin directed his thoughts towards the conquest of the infidels". "To the desire of conquest was added the zeal of the true believer". "With sincere fervour and pure design of pleasing God he undertook the hardship of that sacred war and possessed himself of many castles and strongholds of those far lands". "By these fortified places and territories he augmented the boundaries of his kingdom". "But when Jaipal king of Hindustan marked these things and saw the line of his frontier continually diminishing and the losses caused every moment in his states, that grievance rendered him inconsolable" (Utbi. p. 34). He, therefore, attempted to muster his full force to oppose Sabuktagin. Utbi relates that a strong force composed of many allies entered into the territory of Sabuktagin who advanced from Ghazni to meet it. There was a terrible conflict lasting for many days. "Eventually Mahmud suggested to his father that in the region where the encampment of the accursed lay, the water of a spring was clean and bright, but whenever any impure thing was thrown into it, furious winds arose and a bitter cold succeeded. Nasiruddin, therefore, commanded that they should cast some wine flasks into the fountain. Immediately a grey mist spread over the land, extreme cold came and the soldiers of Jaipal could not endure their sufferings. He therefore sued for peace and on his threatening that all the Rajputs would die the death of despair on their swords, peace was granted on condition that a large sum of money was given and a number of elephants, as also certain fortresses in the country of Jaipal were handed over to the Moslems. Thereupon Jaipal retired but eventually when in his country he refused to hand over the fortresses and imprisoned the men who had come to take possession. Sabuktagin who had marched back to Ghazni again set out with his army and plundered Jaipal's territory, massacred the inhabitants and carried away the children and cattle as booty" (Utbi. p. 39). He made the territory of Lamghan entirely stript and bare and destroying the temples built mosques in their place.
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"When Jaipal witnessed the destruction of his kingdom and the consequences of his treacherous infraction of the treaty he found himself powerless to do anything. He, therefore, despatched letters to the various princes of India imploring aid". "An innumerable army assembled and advanced. The Amir, whose forces were comparatively few, ordered that successive attacks by cohorts of his horsemen should be made and in this way they forced their onward march and terrified the infidels. Then they made one simultaneous charge and made some prisoners while the rest fled throwing away their weapons and incumbrances". "The judgment of God is upon those who stray away from Him and this judgment cannot be evaded". "The Hindus did not invade again and this territory was entirely annexed to the land of Islam and the inhabitants brought beneath the wings of his prosperous care". "And whenever he needed, a thousand horsemen attended his stirrup".
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Such is the account given by Utbi of the conflicts between the Amir Sabuktagin and Jaipal. They were two in number and until the end of his reign Sabuktagin does not appear to have had any further conflicts with Jaipal worth mentioning, his attention being engaged towards the west in succouring his overlord Mansur bin Nuh, the Samani king, in increasing his influence at his court and in acquiring provinces, so to speak, in Jaghir. Mahmud is said to have assisted his father in both these conflicts as also in his activities in the west in the Samani empire.
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Subsequent Mahomedan historians have added to this account many more details which may be neglected; but this account itself requires to be subjected to the test of probability and historical criticism. Utbi has not given the dates of these events and Utbi's dates are often faulty (Elliot II). Sabuktagin ruled from 977 to 997 A. D. and these events may be taken to have happened about 980 to 985 A. D. If the date of Mahmud's birth be taken as October 971, he would be too young to take part in these wars but if it be taken four years earlier, he would be then from 14 to 17 years of age and a young prince of this age in the east is considered fit, and is allowed, to take part in actual fighting. But he can not be taken to be able to give counsel to his father or to insist on continuing hostilities to the bitter end, as later Mahomedan historians represent. Then again, the supernatural element in the account has to be given up and we may believe that the intense cold and mist or snowfall which came to discomfit the Hindus in the first battle was a natural phenomenon and was not caused by any supernatural agency. The story of the water of the fountain in the Hindu camp being defiled may, however, be believed in as the Rajputs of those days, at least the reigning kings, abstained from wine, as even Arab writers testify (See Vol. II p. 185). Especially Jaipal being a Brahmin must certainly have abstained from wine. The spoiling again of the water from which the enemy drinks is a measure which is often resorted to in war. It is advocated even in the Mahābhārata. It was practised in ancient western fights and was resorted to even in the last European War. Handicapped for want of pure water to drink and harassed by the intense cold of the inclement adventitious weather to which the soldiers of the plains of Northern India were not accustomed, this confederacy of Indian princes failed to achieve its object. But it was not defeated and the Rajputs were ready to sell their lives dearly if necessary. It seems probable that the negotiations for peace at this first battle must have ended in honourable terms of peace, viz: the payment of an indemnity and the present of a number of elephants. And the allies must have returned home.
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This view is further supported by Indian epigraphic evidence (as already stated in Vol. II p. 127) which shows that the Chandella king Dhanga who appears to have taken part in this confederacy of Indian princes is declared to be "the equal of Hammīra". This battle was most probably a drawn one and the Indian allies returned in consequence of inclement weather. The battle may be taken to have been fought in 980 A. D. Dhanga began his reign about 950 and ruled long till about 1000 A. D. and died when he was above a hundred years old.
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When Firishta and other later historians write that kings of Delhi, Ajmer, Kanauj and Kalanjar took part in this war, they certainly exaggerate and bring kings of later renown into the affair. We know and have seen that Delhi was insignificant in 980 A. D.; it is not even mentioned by Al-Beruni in his geographical chapter on India. And Ajmer had not even been founded; and the Chauhan kings of Sambhar were not so strong as to send a contingent. Bhoja of Malwa came later still, i. e. in 1010 A. D. to the throne. Al-Utbi has not given the names of the countries in India whose kings took part in this general endeavour. And Indian epigraphic evidence speaks of Dhanga only. Kanauj or the imperial Hindu kingdom of Northern India might have taken part in the confederacy. From the Chamba Gazetteer we find that its king Sāhila-varman took part in this religious war.
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Utbi’s account of the second battle seems to be of more doubtful credibility. In the first place the first defeat of the Hindus was only nominal and the delivery of fortresses in Jaipal’s territory was a condition too exacting. Secondly, if it had been agreed upon, Jaipal was not the man treacherously to break it as soon as he was safe within his own country. The Brahmin kings of Kabul, like in fact the Rajput kings of the whole of India at this time, were men of honour. Even Al-Beruni praises this high character; Mahomedan though he was, he was a truthful observer of the Hindus and their character and he gives a very flattering description of the probity and goodness of these kings of Kabul “In all their grandeur” he remarks (Vol. II Sachau p. 10) “they never slackened their ardent desire for doing what was good and right; they are men of noble sentiment and noble bearing.” Thirdly, it is not possible that kings of different countries in India would again combine so soon after their first attempt had failed. Lastly, if the combined army was so vast as to number about one lakh of men and included several hundreds of elephants, the tactics of Sabuktagin in attacking them incessantly with bodies of 500 horsemen could not have succeeded and the Hindus could not have been so signally defeated. Sir Vincent Smith mentions here the fact that Alexander had adopted the same tactics in his battle with Porus. But Alexander’s cavalry was disciplined and Sabuktagin’s cavalry could not have been a disciplined force in the sense that Alexander's cavalry was. The Rajputs too were not less known for their cavalry and it is impossible to believe that in such a vast force there was no cavalry with the Hindus. The Pratihāras of Kanauj were, even according to Arab writers, known for their numerous and efficient cavalry. And the Kanauj monarch, the foremost king and emperor in Middle India contiguous to the kingdom of Jaipal, must have been one of the allies assembled to assist Jaipal and he is actually mentioned as taking part. The probability is that this account of the second battle is an exaggerated one containing a repetition of the story of the assembling of allies with a vast force. It seems that Sabuktagin must again have invaded the territory of Jaipal after some time on one pretext or another or on no pretext whatever for reasons stated in the beginning. And Jaipal must have opposed him with such force as he could muster from his own kingdom and he was signally defeated. He lost much of his territory upto the Indus but not the whole of Gāndhāra. He may have lost the southern part of it including Bannu, for he still appears to be ruling in Parshawar and Wahind as we shall presently see.
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Sabuktagin appears to have thoroughly incorporated the conquered territory with his own kingdom, by forcible conversion of the people to Mahomedanism. Elliot thinks that both the battles may have been fought in the valley of Lamghan or Jalalabad (II. p. 436). And Lamghan south and north of Kabul river must have been lost to Jaipal. The story of the conversion of the Aspahdad of Kabul, incidently related by Al-Beruni, must have belonged to this period and not to the time of Alptagin as is supposed by some (Elliot II p. 420), as it appears that Jaipal was long called king of Kabul also.
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After this affair, according to Utbi, Sabuktagin's attention was absorbed by his affairs in the Samani empire, and this was feasible as his eastern frontier up to the moutain range to the west of the Indus was now safe. Mansur died about this time and he was succeeded by his son Nuh who called upon his services in crushing certain rebellions in his provinces and Sabuktagin gladly and loyally gave this assistance and quelled the rebellions. He was rewarded with the governorship of Khorasan and Sabuktagin appointed Mahmud to that post.
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Mahmud was here attacked by a rebel, Abu Ali, and in the fierce battle fought with him Mahmud distinguished himself by his personal bravery. In this battle Hindu soldiers and elephants were used by Mahmud. As we shall have to explain elsewhere, Hindu soldiers had no objection to fight for anyone who paid them. But the chief thing to be pointed out here is that Mahmud could use elephants with great advantage and the cavalry of the enemy could not do any thing against them. "The war elephants seized the horsemen with their trunks and broke their backs beneath their feet until innumerable people perished on that battle-field". (Utbi p. 162).
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Eventually Sabuktagin became so powerful in the Samani empire by means of his powerful and disciplined army that he could make and unmake viziers at Bokhara the capital of the Samani kings, as Shahaji could make and unmake kings in Nizamshahi and even kept the Samani emperor Nuh in fear of himself as Shahaji was feared at Bijapur. Sabuktagin usually resided at Balkh and not at Ghazni latterly and eventually died there He intended to return to Ghazni but that was not to be. He left the Ghazni kingdom to his son Ismail by will, probably thinking that Mahmud would be satisfied with his governorship of Khorasan at the capital of which viz: Nishapur he resided. This was again something like what happened to Shivaji. Shahaji left his own acquisitions at Bangalore to his other son and left Shivaji to remain content with the Poona Jaghir. Apparently Mahmud and Shivaji, though more capable, were less favourite with their fathers than their brothers. However in both cases the more capable son asserted himself and eventually became the master of the whole estate. It is needless to relate at length how Mahmud laid claim to Ghazni and the treasure amassed there and being opposed advanced on Ghazni, fought a battle with Ismail before its walls, defeated him and eventually took him prisoner. In this battle "black masses of elephants fought on the side of Ismail but to no avail". Elephants were useful within certain limits and Sabuktagin like other Mahomedan kings kept elephants and used them in fighting. Naturally these were at this time in the hands of Ismail whose incapacity, however, prevented him from using them with effect. By this battle Mahmud became the master of the Ghaznavide kingdom in 997 A. D.
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MAHMUD AND JAIPAL.
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After coming to the throne, Mahmud’s attention was for a time directed towards the west. From the Samani emperor Nuh, he requested investiture with his father’s dignities and Nuh confirmed him in the government of Balkh, Herat, Bost and Sarmadh. As to the governorship of Nishapur (Khorasan) and the generalship of the army the new emperor Mansur, Nuh’s son, thought they might remain with Bektuzun a loyal and capable servant of the state who had meanwhile been entrusted with them. But Mahmud would not tolerate this and moved with his army against Bektuzun; but when Mansur himself advanced against him, he was loyal enough not to attack his master and retired to a safe distance. But the Samani kingdom was now nearing its end and certain unscrupulous officers seized the young emperor Mansur and put out the eyes of that young and handsome prince. Mahmud in rage moved against these rebellious officers who fled with the new king whom they had raised to the throne in place of Mansur. Mahmud refused allegiance to this puppet and declared himself independent king of Khorasan and Ghazni. The Khalif Kadir Billa of Baghdad acknowledged him as sovereign ruler and sent him a robe of investiture and conferred upon him the title Yaminud-daulat-va-Aminulmillat (right hand of the empire and guardian of religion). Mahmud received the messenger with great honour and the title assumed by him as independent king was not Amir which he and his father used already but Sultan a title never used before him by any Mahomedan king. This title after him became general and Amir came down to signify a subordinate Sardar. Utbi records that Mahmud ruled justly and wisely in Khorasan and secured happiness to the people. As to the Samani capital Bokhara, as already stated, it was subsequently seized by Ilekkhan the Turkish king of Kashgar who imprisoned and eventually probably put to death all the representatives of the Samani dynasty which thus came to an end in the beginning of the reign of Mahmud. This was just like what happened at Bijapur. Shivaji proclaimed himself king by his Rājyābhisheka or religious ceremony of coronation at the hands of Gāgābhatta who gave him the new title of Chhatrapati, as the Mahomedan religious head at Baghdad gave the necessary religious sanction to the assumption of independence by Mahmud and gave the new title of Sultan. And Shivaji's overlord, the Bijapur Sultan, was soon overthrown after this by Aurangjeb, the Ilekkhan of India, who removed the last claimant of Bijapur to Delhi and annexed the remaining territory of Bijapur to the Mogul empire. The actions of destiny working through human nature which is the same every where must necessarily be usually similar.
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These events happened between 997 and 1000 A. D. (the Samani kingdom ending five years later in 1005 A. D.) and Mahmud became the master of a large portion of the Samani kingdom including Khorasan. He was engaged in conquering Sistan, another province of the Samani kingdom when news reached him that Jaipal was arming himself; probably Mahmud's generals had attacked Jaipal's dominions and he was preparing for a conflict. With the suddenness of resolve and celerity of movement which distinguished this great vanquisher as also Shivaji, Mahmud moved from the west and entered the territory of Jaipal at the head of 15,000 cavalry. For such sudden movements, cavalry is best suited and we find both Mahmud and Shivaji using cavalry on such occasions. "Pershawar (Peshawar) was in the midst of the land of Hindustan" (Utbi p. 280) which means that Jaipal was still master of this part west of the Indus, with his capital at Wahind. It appears that Jaipal's preparations were not complete. He delayed the commencement of the battle in order that those men of his army who were coming up should arrive (Utbi p. 81). But the Sultan saw his opportunity and at once attacked Jaipal. The battle was bloody and by mid-day 5000 of the infidels were cut in half by the sword. And Jaipal with all his family and children and several officers was taken prisoner. "The booty in ornaments was incalculable. So many necklaces were found on the necks of the princely prisoners and of the wounded and the slain, set with rubies and pearls and diamonds, that the army of Islam obtained unlimited riches". The rage of Hindu kings and nobles for ornaments has been marked even by Arab travellers (See Vol. II, p. 187); but it is strange that Jaipal and his Sardars and even soldiers should have gone to the battle-field, bedecked as if for a marriage procession. It seems probable that they were not prepared for battle and were attacked when encamped. "Thousands of children and young people and girls were obtained from that country and all those provinces of India which were on the side of Khorasan (i. e. on the west of the Indus) submitted to the Sultan." This victory took place on the 8th of Mohorrum in the year 392 H. (1001 A. D.) and "the news of it spread to the most distant horizon." (Utbi p. 283).
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Such was the memorable battle fought on the plains of Peshawar in 1001 A. D. which put an end to the dominion of the Hindus to the west of the Indus and even their future existence there. For the Sultan finished his victory by pushing on to Wahind the capital of Jaipal and conquered and captured that place. This place could not be Bhatinda as is supposed by some as the latter would be too distant from Peshawar, being on the south of the Sutlej. Mahmud could not have traversed the whole of the Panjab with his limited force as stated already and as pointed out long ago by Elliot (II p. 438). The whole country to the west of the Indus, or on the side of Khorasan in the words of Utbi, was annexed and not only brought under Mahomedan rule but entirely "purified from filthy ungodliness" by the forcible conversion of the people. "The soldiers of India in the hills and castles of these frontiers who stirred up violence and wickedness were made the food of swords and the subject of justice". The frontier tribes gave trouble to Mahmud as they do now and he punished them severely. Their conversion and the conversion of the people to the west of the Indus generally belongs to this period. Mahmud thus not only knew how to annex provinces but also knew how to cement his annexations by forcible conversion, a subject on which we shall have to speak at length later on.
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With regard to Jaipal and his family, Mahmud is said to have ordered their detention in a fortress in Khorasan. Whether Jaipal was taken to such a distant place or not, it appears that Mahmud soon released him, taking from him 50 elephants as ransom and his son as hostage and dismissed him to his kingdom which now lay to the east of the Indus. Instead of returning to it, Jaipal, feeling deeply the ignominy of his capture and imprisonment and being perhaps very old, thought himself unfit to rule and burnt himself on a pyre as many Hindus, even kings, in those days did. Utbi says that a letter was received by his son who was a hostage with Mahmud announcing this self-immolation and this son who was Ānandapāla himself, the successor of Jaipal, Mahmud set at liberty and allowed peacefully to go and rule his kingdom. The tragic end of Jaipal and his long life, unfortunate throughout its length, cannot but raise our pity and admiration for his dignified death.
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Mahmud after this event consolidated his power in the west by entering into a formal alliance with Ilekkhan the Turk who had taken Bokhara by this time. Mahmud obtained the southern provinces of the Samani kingdom, Khorasan and others, while Ilekkhan retained Mawarun-nahar the province to the north of the Oxus, with Bokhara the principal city of the Samani kingdom. Mahmud appears to have strengthened this peace with Ilekkhan by marrying his daughter to his son. Thus secure in the west of his kingdom, Mahmud was free to devote his attention to Hindustan the riches and idols of which tempted his desire and offended his religious zeal. It need not be supposed, however, that India was the sole or chief subject of thought with Mahmud henceforward. For his activities and his energies required, and found scope in, watching the west as well as the east and are described with equal detail by Utbi. We will, however, properly enough confine our attention now to Mahmud’s doings in reference to India. It is sometimes represented that Mahmud made a vow to make every year a religious expedition to India. This is, however, not only not correct in fact but is also an afterthought of Mahmud’s later chroniclers and Utbi mentions no such vow.
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EXPEDITION TO BHATIA.
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Later Mahomedan historians have counted these expeditions as twelve and this number has become traditional even with European historians. That they were more than twelve cannot be doubted and Elliot enumerates seventeen expeditions in a detailed note in an appendix to his second volume. It is not necessary to discuss here the question of the number of these expeditions which is more academic than important and we will describe these expeditions in detail without numbering them. The next expedition which Mahmud undertook was against Bhatia. Unfortunately the exact position of Bhatia cannot yet be fixed as historians differ most materially on this subject and as we find no arguments strong enough to decide in favour of any particular place. We will first give the description of this expedition as per Utbi (p. 322-24). "When the Sultan concluded the settlement of the affairs of Sistan, he determined on executing his design for the conquest of Bahatia. He passed over the Sihun (Indus) and the province of Multan and encamped before Bahatia. The city had walls which could be reached only by eagles and the watchman on it, if he liked, might give kisses on the lips of the planet Venus (!!!). It had a moat like the girdling sea with a deep and wide abyss. The king relying on his migthy heroes came out of the city and gave engagement. For three days the Sultan fought and on the fourth when the sun arrived in the middle of the ocean of the sky, the cry of 'God is great'. rose to the heavens and the Moslems made a charge which wiped out the blackness of those infidels. Most of the enemy fled into the fortress, but the champions of religion seized upon the passage to the fort. Young men of the army filled up the moat and widened the passage. Bijairai escaped by a rope from the fortress into a fissure of the mountain and sought refuge in a wood, where he was pursued; but he drew his khanjar and killed himself with it. As for his army the greater part passed through the sword. A hundred and sixty elephants were captured. The Sultan made that place a station in order that the country might be cleansed from the odiousness of idolatry. And he drew the people under the bond of Islam, arranged the construction of mosques and appointed Imams. During his return many misfortunes befell the army, men and baggage were destroyed, many suffered from disgrace and fear; but the precious life of the Sultan was saved. Abul-Fath Bosti, Mahmud's confidante, gave him excellent counsel and refused his consent to such aims and enterprizes but the Sultan did not accept his advice”.
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We have given this long description from the pen of Utbi both to show his poetical manner of description and the difficulties which consequently arise. Utbi was not an eye-witness of these events and he, a secretary of Mahmud, wrote from information. It is first difficult to understand why this expedition to a distant place was resolved upon. Utbi assigns no reason. Subsequent historians have stated that Bijairai was a subordinate of Jaipal and did not pay his quota of the tribute to be paid to Mahmud. But that was no reason for Mahmud to attack Bijairai. Moreover it does not appear that any tribute was promised to be paid by Jaipal when he was released by Mahmud. Nor was Ānandapāla allowed to depart on condition of payment of tribute. In fact Mahmud had despoiled a large portion of Jaipal's territory and that was sufficient compensation. The cause of this war was, therefore, some thing else than this and Utbi gives no clue. The Bhatia king was perhaps a powerful independent king to the south-west of Multan who laid claim to territory on the western side of the Indus and incited the people there. The Bhattis were originally masters of Zabulistan as we have already seen. The surmise that Jaipal, Ānandapāla and others were not Brahmins but were Bhattis is not correct according to our view. Though the name-ending changed here from deva to pāla in the Brahmin Shahi line, it does not indicate a change of dynasty for deva is as much taken by Kshatriya kings as pāla and the Shahi kings though Brahmins were practically Kshatriyas, marrying Kshatriya princesses and giving daughters to Kshatriya princes. In fine, it does not appear that Mahmud determined to march against Bhatia because the king of the place was an offending relation of Jaipal.
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Whatever the reason which induced Mahmud to undertake this difficult and distant expedition, he executed it with his usual vigour and completeness. Bijairai (Vijayarāja) also appears to have fought bravely and refused to become a prisoner and killed himself before the same disgrace as befell Jaipal could overtake him. The fighting inhabitants of Bhatia probably mostly died on the battle-field and the others accepted Islam. No mention is made of persons taken into captivity, or of any plunder. This expedition, therefore, does not appear to have been undertaken for the sake of plunder or the destruction of any famous idol. The place and the people were in dangerous proximity to the territory of Ghazni on the west bank of the Indus and hence probably its complete subjugation and conversion.
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Where was this place? That it was an important place there is no doubt; for Al-Beruni mentions Bhatia in his geography as a place further than Multan which was to the west of Bazan. Now Multan itself is not to the west of Bazan exactly, but a little to the north-west and Bhatia may be to the south-west of Multan and not to the north-west of it. Thus it cannot be Bahawalpur which has further no mountain near it. But it may be mentioned that the description of the fort or city of Bhatia shows that it was not in the immediate vicinity of a mountain. For a mountain fort cannot have a deep moat round it, though it may have a wall reaching the heavens. Plainly Utbi writes poetically and without personal knowledge, Mahmud is said to have passed the territory of Multan and therefore he must have come to the south-west of Multan. He is described as crossing the Indus only and not any other river; so that this town may have been to the south-west of Multan between the Indus and the Sutlej which agrees with its situation given by Al-Beruni. Firishta, when stating that Bijairai took shelter in the wood on the bank of the Indus, may be right, if we take this Bhatia as situated between the Sutlej and the Indus.
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Elliot, however, is for correcting the reading and instead of Bahatia would read Bhera and place it in the north-west (?) of Multan, somewhere under the Salt Range on the left bank of the Jhelum (p. 440). He would look upon the Pālas of Wahind, Jaipāl and Ānandapāla as Bhattis and relations of Bijairai.
v3.c33.s2.29
But this guess is not correct as stated above and is also not necessary. Elliot, no doubt, rightly observes that for this expedition Mahmud came via Bannu through Kurram valley, crossed the Indus and came to Bhatia by the border of Multan without entering it. As we shall presently see, Mahmud did not like to create difficulties by entering foreign and also hostile territory viz. that of Ānandapāla or of Multan and he took the most circuitous road. But this does not fix the position of Bhatia to the north-west of Multan, for in that case Mahmud would not have had to even go along the border of Multan territory. The difficulty created by Utbi's statement that Bijairai took refuge in a mountain-wood would be removed by looking upon it as an hyperbolical description and by holding that there were only hills in the neighbourhood of Bhatia. In any case no modern town can be fixed upon as representing this Bhatia and we must leave it unidentified, simply stating that it was a town well-known in the days of Al-Beruni south-west of Multan and between the Indus and the Sutlej.
Linked texts (1)
- Mahābhārata — Vyāsa, Sanskrit