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History of Mediaeval Hindu India (being a History of India from 600 to 1200 A.D.) v3.c36.s2: Note:-2 Mahomedan Tactics at the Last Battle

History of Mediaeval Hindu India (being a History of India from 600 to 1200 A.D.) v3.c36.s2

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Note:-2 Mahomedan Tactics at the Last Battle

v3.c36.s2.1

The translation of the Tabakat by Raverty gives the following somewhat different version of the fighting in the last battle with Prithvirāja (p. 467). "The Sultan made the disposition of his forces. The centre division of the army, baggage, banners, canopy and elephants were left several miles behind. He marshalled his ranks and advanced leisurely. The light-armed and unencumbered horsemen he had divided into four divisions and had appointed them to act against the infidels on four sides saying "on the right and left, front and rear, 10,000 mounted archers should keep the infidel force in play and when their elephants, horsemen and foot advanced to the attack, you are to face about and keep the distance of a horse's course in front of them. The Mussalman force kept the instructions and having wearied the unbelievers' force, Almighty God gave the victory to Islam and the infidel host was overthrown."

v3.c36.s2.2

Major Raverty, a military officer remarks on this that the tactics above described are not quite clear. It is impossible for us to make any comment from the military point. But it is necessary to remark that in all the three great battles which Mahomedans won (two by Mahmud and one by Shihabuddin) the Mahomedan cavalry did great execution. The Hindus usually relied on their elephant force. Indeed in inscriptions, the usual praise is that the warriors broke open the temples of elephants. But from the days of Alexander elephants in India could not withstand trained cavalry. Elephants were used no doubt by Mahmud against the Turks of Turkestan but their cavalry was unaccustomed to the sight of elephants. Secondly, harassing and attacking the enemy both in front and rear is a great factor in securing victory. Shihabuddin purposely advanced slowly so as to allow his cavalry divisions to reach the enemy's front and rear. The ancient Hindu mode of fighting including Vyūhas of the Mahābhārata has yet to be studied by modern experts but we may remark that the Hindus were straight fighters and did not adopt deceptions or even surprises. Lastly a strong reserve and a final attack in the centre by such reserve is often effective. Elephants, moreover, when defeated are a source of terror and destruction to their own force. Shihabuddin in this battle kept his elephants several miles behind.

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NOTE :-3 THE RASA ACCOUNT OF THE LAST BATTLE.

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It would be interesting to give here a summary of the account given in the Prithvīrāj Rāsā of the final fatal fight of Prithvīrāja with Shihabuddin Ghori, almost wholly imaginary as it is. We have often said that the Rāsā is plainly modelled after the Mahābhārata. Following it, it first gives the numerous evil omens that preceded the fight; it tells even of a curse on Prithvīrāja. It speaks further of Prithvīrāja having entirely neglected state affairs in his infatuation over his new queen Sanyogitā. Also it states that Prithvīrāja had affronted his sardar Hāhulirai who consequently left him, went to Kangra and induced Shihabuddin to attack Prithvīrāja. There is no corroboration of this in Mahomedan accounts. The whole description of this battle seems to indicate that the Rajputs were already overpowered with a sense of the impending doom like the Marathas at Panipat. This is not what Mahomedan accounts would lead us to believe. Prithvīrāja had conquered in the first battle and in overweening confidence had even released Ghori. The fort of Sirhind had also just fallen. But the Rāsā misrepresents the whole story and gives a different time and place to this conflict. We have seen that the battle was fought in the very next year while Prithvīrāj was still before Sirhind. The Rāsā makes the battle come after some years after the capture of Shihabuddin and while Prithvīrāj was whiling away his time with Sanyogitā in Delhi. The place is given as the plain of Panipat; the whole Kurukshetra may be called the plain of Panipat; but though near enough, the battle cannot be called a battle of Panipat.

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The forces of Shihabuddin are described as numbering one lakh horse, nine lakh foot and ten thousand elephants. This is plainly an exaggeration. The Hindu army is estimated once at 80 thousand and again at 70 thousand. This is probably a correct estimate. Prithvīrāja's force must have been reduced by fatalities in the previous fight and also in the investiture of the fort of Sirhind. It seems that in this fight the Mahomedan army given as 125 thousand horse by their own writers outnumbered the Hindu army.

v3.c36.s2.6

The disposition of the Hindu army, imaginary as it is, is given as follows:—Samarasinha on the left with 33 thousand supported by many sardars; on the right was Jaitrao Paramāra with 21; in the van was Chāmundarai with 19, and in the centre was Prithvīrāja overlooking the battle with 10 thousand. This is also a description in the Mahābhārata fashion; and many names of noted ancestors of modern Rajput families are given as being with one or other army, a detail which is of perennial interest to the Rajput clans of India.

v3.c36.s2.7

The practice of sending proposals of peace at the final moment and making recriminations, old as the Mahābhārata and recent as the modern European war, has also not been neglected. But the unhistorical nature of the messages is apparent when Shihabuddin demands half the Panjab only and delivery of the heir-apparent as hostage. The whole of the Panjab was already in the possession of Ghori. Indeed that province with Lahore was in the possession of the Mahomedans for nearly two hundred years before this battle.

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The actual fight goes on for three or four days and different Vyūhas described in the Mahābhārata are also mentioned. Usually the fight resolves itself into duels between the different chiefs on both sides. In detail of imaginary fighting the Rāsā equals the Mahābhārata. And it follows it even in making repetitions. Prithvīrāja is four times described as captured. Prithvīrāja slays many with his arrows, his sword and finally his dagger before he is seized. He is taken to Ghazni and there kept in prison and blinded. The story of Prithvīrāja killing Shihabuddin even in his blindness by his unerring aim, hearing the mere voice of Shihabuddin is the final embellishment of the Rāsā story which we have already disbelieved as a vengeance story likely to be concocted.

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It may be added that, as in the Mahābhārata fight, all the leading generals on the side of Prithvīrāja are shown as killed in battle after deeds of great heroism. The date of the fight is, however, given correctly as Ānanda Vikrama Samvat 1158 which is equivalent to 1192 A. D.

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