The Early History of the Deccan (Parts I–XI) v2.c14.s1.t7: Rāmachandra
The Early History of the Deccan (Parts I–XI) v2.c14.s1.t7
- Language
- English
Rāmachandra
v2.c14.s1.t7.1
(A.D. 1271–1311)
v2.c14.s1.t7.2
Rāmachandra’s accession took place in the latter half of A.D. 1271.⁴ Public opinion seems to have felt that he was perfectly justified in using force and stratagem to secure the throne which rightfully belonged to him. Whether it approved of the subsequent blinding (and murder?) of Ammaṇa we do not know. Most of the trusted ministers of Mahādeva were disinclined to champion the cause of his son. They almost immediately transferred their allegiance to Rāmachandra and began to serve him loyally and zealously.
v2.c14.s1.t7.3
⁴ Fleet, *Dynasties*, p. 329. Some late records (e.g. *EC*, viii, Sb. 209) of Rāmachandra suggest that his reign began in A.D. 1270. This may be due to a desire to ignore the short reign of Ammaṇa, whom the partisans of Rāmachandra regarded as a usurper.
v2.c14.s1.t7.4
Rāmachandra signalized his accession by organizing an expedition to Mālwā. Arjunavarman II had recently ascended the Paramāra throne (in c. 1270) and a dispute had arisen between him and his minister, which resulted in a bloodthirsty conflict and eventually led to the division of the kingdom between the two disputants.⁵ Rāmachandra therefore found it an easy matter to overwhelm and scatter the attenuated and demoralized Mālwā army.⁶ It seems that in the course of the same campaign certain inconclusive frontier skirmishes occurred between the Yādavas and Gurjaras. We find each side equally claiming victory in these.⁷ The Yādava army returned to its base before the end of A.D. 1271 after a short campaign of four or five months.¹
v2.c14.s1.t7.5
⁵ Elliot, iii, 24.
v2.c14.s1.t7.6
⁶ Udari Inscription, *MASR*, 1929, p. 143.
v2.c14.s1.t7.7
⁷ The Thana plates claim victory for the Yādavas while the Cintra *praśasti* do so for the Gurjaras.
v2.c14.s1.t7.8
¹ The victory over the Mālavas is mentioned in the Paithan plates issued in January 1272.
v2.c14.s1.t7.9
We have already seen how the Yādava forces were signally defeated by the Hoysaḷas when Mahādeva led an expedition in person against that southern kingdom. This defeat had long rankled in Rāmacandra’s heart and he now decided to organize a powerful expedition to avenge it. Two or three years were devoted to making thorough preparations, which were entrusted to the seasoned soldier and general Saḷuva Tikkamarasa. Joyideva and Harapāla,² who were also experienced generals, were deputed to help Tikkamarasa.
v2.c14.s1.t7.10
² Later on we shall come across another Harapāla, the son-in-law of Rāmacandra. Since the latter was only a youth of about twenty-five in A.D. 1275, it does not seem possible that he could have had any son-in-law at the time of this Hoysaḷa expedition.
v2.c14.s1.t7.11
Moving from its bases at Banavāsi and Noḷambavāḍi, the expeditionary force entered Hoysaḷa territory in the autumn of 1275. It carried everything before it and eventually reached Belavāḍi, not far from the Hoysaḷa capital, Dvārāsamudra. Tikkamarasa halted here for a while in order to complete his plans for the siege and capture of Dvārāsamudra. In the meantime the Hoysaḷa king Narasimha sent out an army under the command of his youthful and energetic generals Anka and Māideva to drive back the invader. These efforts proved all unavailing and the Hoysaḷa army was defeated with great slaughter about the end of January 1276. Encouraged by these victories, Tikkamarasa advanced to the capital and laid siege to it. The besieged forces now fought bravely for their capital and king. A number of Hoysaḷa generals including Nanjeya and Gullaya were killed in action. Eventually, on the 25th of April 1276, Aṅkeya Nāyaka, the son of the Hoysaḷa commander-in-chief, led a determined attack and drove back the invaders. “I will take Dvārāsamudra in a single minute” was the boast of Tikkamarasa’, says a Hoysaḷa record; ‘but when brave Aṅkeya fell upon the Yādava forces, Haripāla was afraid, Saḷuva Tikkama fled, and Joyideva beat his mouth. . . . Though Saḷuva had spread over the whole country of Belavāḍi, Aṅkeya gave him time neither to remove his last encampment nor to take food, and drove him back as far as Dhummi.³
v2.c14.s1.t7.12
³ EC, v, Belur nos. 120, 165, 167.
v2.c14.s1.t7.13
Saḷuva Tikkamarasa was no doubt ultimately foiled in his attempt to capture the Hoysaḷa capital and had to raise the siege and return home at the beginning of the summer of 1276. But he none the less brought back with him a vast plunder, including a large number of horses and elephants.
v2.c14.s1.t7.14
Occasional skirmishes did take place between the Yādavas and Hoysaḷas during the next fifteen years, but there was no further major encounter. An internecine war was in progress between the two brother Hoysaḷa rulers, Narasimha and Rāmanātha, although their father had divided the kingdom between them expressly in order to avoid this. They therefore were in no position to avenge the humiliation inflicted upon them in the siege of their capital by the Yādavas. Rāmachandra on the other hand was fully occupied by military campaigns elsewhere, and had then no further time to follow up his victories on the southern frontiers of his domain.
v2.c14.s1.t7.15
Directly he was freed from his commitments in the south, however, Rāmachandra planned an expansion of his kingdom in the north-east.¹ He first attacked the kings of Vajrākara (probably Vairagarh, eighty miles north-east of Chanda) and Bhaṇḍāgāra (Bhandara, thirty-eight miles east of Nagpur) and brought their territories under his sphere of influence. Then he marched northwards to Tripuri near Jabalpur, which had once been the capital of the defunct Kalachuri kingdom, and occupied it without any difficulty. With this city as his base of operations, he resolved on a bold invasion of the Muslim empire. He was anxious to restore Banaras to Hindu rule, marched straight upon that city, and occupied it. Since Purushottamapuri plates state that he built a temple at Banaras after its conquest, which was dedicated to the god Śāraṅdhara, we may well presume that Rāmachandra not only took possession of Banaras but also occupied it for at least two or three years. This must have been after the death of Balban in A.D. 1286 and before the accession of Jalal-ud-Din Khalji; we know that during this interval Delhi was for a while unable to hold and protect the outlying provinces. It is further claimed that Rāmachandra defeated the king of Kanauj and penetrated as far as the Kailāsa range, but there does not seem to be much truth in these assertions.² Clashes doubtless took place between the Yādava forces and the Subedar of Kara near Allahabad; there is, however, no reliable evidence to show that Rāmachandra was able to advance to Kanauj or the Himalayas.
v2.c14.s1.t7.16
¹ The following paragraph is based upon the data furnished by the Purushottamapuri plates of Rāmachandra; EI, xxv, 199.
v2.c14.s1.t7.17
² Love of alliteration, rather than the desire to mention the actual incidents, seems to be responsible for the mention of Kānyakubja and Kailāsa in verse no. 17 of the Purushottamapuri plates.
v2.c14.s1.t7.18
Rāmachandra was not able to retain his hold over Banaras for very long. With the advent of ‘Alā-ud-Din at Kara as its governor, his forces had to withdraw southwards, probably not later than about A.D. 1291.
v2.c14.s1.t7.19
While the imperial forces were engaged in the Gangetic plain, feudatory chiefs in the Konkan ruling at Sangameshvar and Khed (in the Ratnagiri District) and Mahim (near Bombay) rebelled against Rāmachandra. Rāmachandra sent his son to chastise them and he successfully accomplished his mission.³
v2.c14.s1.t7.20
³ Purushottamapuri plates, v. 17 and BG, 1, ii, 27. A record from the Sorab tāluk dated A.D. 1294 refers to an officer as ‘hunter of hostile Konkaṇakas’ (EC, viii, Sb. 502). This person may have recently returned from the Konkan campaign.
v2.c14.s1.t7.21
The Yādavas were undoubtedly at the height of their glory in A.D. 1292. Their hereditary enemies, the Hoysalas, had been crushed and they had succeeded in penetrating as far as Banaras. But their power soon declined and after about twenty years the kingdom was annexed to the north-Indian Islamic empire.
v2.c14.s1.t7.22
The daring raid of 'Alā-ud-Dīn, the then governor of Kara-Manikpur, undertaken in A.D. 1294, marked the first stage in the decline of the Yādava power. It is usually assumed that the raid was dictated primarily by the desire of the governor to acquire the resources he so badly needed, by the judicious use of which he hoped one day to pave his way to the throne. But another motive, that of punishing King Rāmachandra for his raid into the Uttar Pradesh a few years earlier, may also have influenced his action.
v2.c14.s1.t7.23
'Alā-ud-Dīn had planned his audacious enterprise with great care. He decided to march only after he had been definitely assured by his spies that the main Yādvaa army was far away in the south on a raiding expedition. He first gave out that he was only leading a punitive force against Chanderi, and thereafter professed to be marching to Rājamahendri to seek service under the king of that territory, since he was dissatisfied with his treatment by his own uncle. Moreover during his march he pitched his camps on the borders of desolate places, in order to avoid attracting attention. When, however, he reached Lachur, the governor of the place reported the advent of the hostile army to the capital and endeavoured to prevent its further advance. 'Alā-ud-Dīn, however, easily overcame the opposition and rapidly reached Devagiri by forced marches at amazing speed.
v2.c14.s1.t7.24
Rāmachandra was completely taken by surprise. 'Alā-ud-Dīn had with him a force variously estimated as between 6,000 and 8,000 horsemen. Against it Rāmachandra could raise a militia of only about 4,000; he was, therefore, easily defeated in an engagement fought near the capital and had to take shelter in the fort. This, however, had then no ditch around it nor were its walls yet complete. The king's plan was to hold out until his son, who had been summoned to his assistance with the utmost urgency, should reach the capital to rescue him. But the fort was not provisioned for a siege and Rāmachandra was therefore compelled to sue for peace. 'Alā-ud-Dīn agreed to retire on receiving an indemnity consisting of about 1,500 pounds of gold, a large quantity of pearls and jewels, 40 elephants, and several thousand horses. He also obtained the hand of one of the daughters of Rāmachandra, who further agreed to pay an annual tribute equal to the revenues of the Elichpur District. The raider had succeeded in exacting all this booty and was about to retire within a fortnight of his arrival, when Saṅkaradeva, the crown prince, reached the capital with a force more than twice as large as that of 'Alā-ud-Dīn.
v2.c14.s1.t7.25
Muslim historians are not agreed as to what happened after the arrival of the crown prince. The later ones among them, such as Firishta, tell us that in spite of his father's advice he reopened hostilities but was defeated by 'Alā-ud-Dīn who then naturally imposed a much heavier indemnity. 'Isamī, however, records that the crown prince accepted his father's advice and desisted from attack, though he had a much larger force under his command than that of the enemy.
v2.c14.s1.t7.26
'Alā-ud-Dīn's raid was no doubt a daring exploit, 'whether we regard the resolution in forming the plan, the boldness of its execution or the great good fortune which attended its accomplishment'. It reflects little credit on the efficiency of the Yādava administration that it should not have anticipated the danger of a Muslim attack from the north and strongly garrisoned the Vindhyan passes; the capital lay open without any adequate defence. That 'Alā-ud-Dīn's retreat should not have been cut off, and that no effort should have been made to retrieve the disaster at Devagiri by surrounding and destroying the army on its return through little known passes and forests would seem to prove that the Yādava leadership was completely demoralized, and its forces confused and discouraged.
v2.c14.s1.t7.27
During the next eight or nine years 'Alā-ud-Dīn was occupied with various affairs and incidents in northern India. It is surprising to notice that the four Hindu states of the south—the kingdoms of Devagiri, Warangal, Dvārāsamudra, and Madura—should have learnt no lesson from the raid of 'Alā-ud-Dīn and the possibilities it foreboded. The Khaljis had become masters of practically the whole of northern India and their resources in men, money, and materials were much larger than those of any single Hindu kingdom in the south. The only chance of survival of these lay in forming a pan-Hindu league, pooling the resources of the whole of the Deccan. But not a single statesman in any of the Deccan states seems to have conceived this idea or tried to realize it. We have seen already how the Yādavas had stabbed the Chaulukyas and the Paramāras in the back while these were being weakened by invasions from Delhi (pp. 534, 539); the discomfiture of the Yādavas at the hands of 'Alā-ud-Dīn was now fully exploited both by the Kākatīya ruler Pratāparudra and the Hoysaḷa king Ballāḷa II. As soon as the news of Rāmachandra's defeat reached Warangal, Pratāparudra invaded and annexed the Yādava districts of Anantpur and Raichur. A little later, in A.D. 1296, the Hoysaḷa ruler Ballāḷa annexed the Santaḷige one thousand and invaded the Banavāsi twelve thousand in A.D. 1300. Neither of these rulers had the foresight to realize the common danger and to form a common alliance. They had their ancient hereditary feuds with the Yādavas and were only rejoiced that the Muslim victory over the latter enabled them to pay off their old scores.
v2.c14.s1.t7.28
Rāmachandra continued to send the agreed tribute to Delhi till A.D. 1303 or 1304. In that year the armies of 'Alā-ud-Dīn, marching against the Kākatīyas from Bengal, were defeated by Pratāparudra. This event induced a section of the Yādava court to imagine that the imperial power was declining and could be flouted with impunity. The crown prince Śaṅkara was the leader of this party and prevailed upon his father to stop the payment of the annual tribute. He also excited the imperial wrath by deciding to marry Devaladevī, a daughter of King Karṇa of Gujarāt, whom Sultan 'Alā-ud-Dīn had wished to have handed over to him, since her mother Kamalādevī, whom he had married after she had been made prisoner, desired to have the company of her daughter.
v2.c14.s1.t7.29
After the conquest and annexation of Mālwā, the Sultan sent two forces in 1307, one under Malik Ahmad to capture Devaladevī and another under Malik Kafūr to reimpose his authority over the Yādavas. 'Isamīs information that King Rāmachandra had sent a secret message to the Sultan informing him that he was a mere prisoner in the hands of his crown prince and had no sympathy with his rebellion seems to be correct. For when the Yādava forces under Śaṅkaradeva were defeated by Kafūr in the vicinity of Devagiri, in March 1307, and King Rāmachandra was taken prisoner and sent to Delhii he received remarkably courteous treatment from the Sultan. 'Alā-ud-Dīn restored his kingdom to him, giving him in addition the district of Naosari as a personal *jagir*. He was also given the title *Raja-i-Rājān* and permitted to go back to Devagiri to rule his kingdom as an imperial feudatory.
v2.c14.s1.t7.30
Rāmachandra was deeply affected by this kind treatment and remained completely loyal to the Sultan throughout his life. When the imperial army halted at Devagiri in 1309 on its way to Warangal, he offered it all possible facilities. When two years later a second army arrived at Devagiri on its way to Dvārāsamudra, he placed all the resources of his kingdom at the disposal of his sovereign, and not only supplied cotton, wool, and brass objects 'beyond computation', but also directed his general Purushottama to guide the force to the borders of the Hoysaḷa kingdom. Personal loyalty, however, was not the only impulse behind this conduct; the Yādavas were the hereditary enemies of the Hoysaḷas and their king Ballāladeva had recently exploited the discomfiture of Rāmachandra at the hands of 'Alā-ud-Dīn by snatching from him the districts of Santaḷige and Banavāsī. The prospect of the defeat of King Ballāla at the hands of the Sultan was not, therefore, unpleasing to the old Yādava king.
v2.c14.s1.t7.31
The exact date of the death of King Rāmachandra is not known, but it seems to have taken place sometime in A.D. 1311.¹
v2.c14.s1.t7.32
¹ He was still living in September 1310, when the Purushottampuri plates were issued by him.
v2.c14.s1.t7.33
The reign of Rāmachandra lasted for forty years (1271-1311). It was thus long but not glorious. In his earlier years it is true that he inflicted smashing defeats on the Hoysaḷas and even succeeded in penetrating as far as Banaras in the course of a raid. But he had no real political foresight. It seems that he did not appreciate the significance of the expansion of the Muslim power in northern India or learn any lessons from it. He should have realized that he would be the first Deccan king to succumb to the imperial ambitions of the Sultans of Delhi, whose resources were very much greater than his own. Another ruler with more statesmanlike acumen would have tried to form a south Indian Hindu federation to oppose the onslaught of the north Indian Islamic imperialism. Rāmachandra failed to conceive any such project. Probably he was not more to blame in this connexion than his contemporaries ruling at Warangal, Dvārāsamudra, and Madura, who were all too much actuated by personal jealousies to think of any action in common. Rāmachandra's defeat in 1294 was no doubt due to his being unprepared, but in succeeding years he did not make any effort to retrieve the situation. Probably he realized that his resources were too small as compared to those of 'Alā-ud-Dīn to offer any possibility of successful revolt, and therefore decided to remain loyal to him, in spite of his son's opposition to this policy. He thereby no doubt succeeded in keeping his kingdom intact down to the end of his reign.