A History of Pali Literature v1.c2: Foreword
A History of Pāli Literature v1.c2
- Language
- English
Foreword
v1.c2.1
There can be no doubt that a new and ample treatment of the Pāli literature is a great scientific want felt by all the scholars who are working in that field. Many problems connected with the subject are still unsolved. Not even the question of the origin and home of what we call Pāli language and of its linguistic character is definitively settled, and the chronological order of a single book is very often uncertain. Professor Winternitz in his great work on Indian literature has described also the Pāli literature in an admirable manner. But the scope of his work did not allow him, of course, to enter into all the details and to discuss the many divergences of opinion. Malalasekera in his recent publication has confined himself to the Pāli books composed in Ceylon. Hence the whole canonical literature was to be left aside. I was very much pleased, therefore, when I heard that Dr. Bimala Churn Law had intended to publish a comprehensive work on Pāli literature. We all know his former publications on Buddhist topics and their intrinsic value, and I repeatedly congratulated him on the happy choice of his themes and on the clever manner in which he had accomplished his task. I was even more pleased when I had the opportunity to peruse a good deal of the manuscript of the present work. It will prove to be extremely useful to all the Pāli scholars by the sober and impartial judgment of the author and by the clear and exhaustive exposition of the various problems. Above all I wish to point at the important discussion of the relative chronology of the canonical texts, which means a considerable progress beyond what Rhys Davids has said on the subject, and at the ample and very clear summaries of the Tipiṭaka books which will be welcome to those who are unable to read them in the original language but wish to become acquainted with their general plan and contents. I frankly say that I found all I could read extremely suggestive and I am convinced that I shall learn much from the book even where my opinion may perhaps differ from that of the author.
v1.c2.2
WILH. GEIGER.
v1.c2.3
The problem of the "state of nature" is the central problem of the political philosophy of the Enlightenment. It is not a historical problem, but a logical one. It is not a question of what man *was* in the beginning, but of what he *is* in his essence. The state of nature is the state of man stripped of all the artificial additions of society, of all the conventions of law and custom. It is the state of man as he is in himself, in his original purity or his original corruption.
v1.c2.4
The thinkers of the Enlightenment were not in agreement as to the nature of this state. For some, like Rousseau, it was a state of innocence and happiness, a state from which man had fallen through the development of reason and the arts. For others, like Hobbes, it was a state of war, a state of "nasty, brutish, and short" life, from which man had to be rescued by the creation of a sovereign power. But for all of them, the state of nature was the starting point of their inquiry. It was the laboratory in which they tested their theories of human nature and of the origin of society.
v1.c2.5
The state of nature is not a place, but a condition. It is the condition of man before the establishment of civil society. It is the condition of man as a natural being, governed by natural laws, and not by the laws of men. The state of nature is the state of freedom and equality, but it is also a state of insecurity and conflict. It is the state in which every man is his own judge and executioner, and in which there is no common power to settle disputes.
v1.c2.6
The transition from the state of nature to civil society is the central event of political history. It is the event that marks the birth of the state, the birth of law, and the birth of justice. It is the event that transforms man from a natural being into a social being, from a subject of nature into a citizen of the state. The social contract is the instrument of this transformation. It is the agreement by which men renounce their natural freedom and submit themselves to the authority of a sovereign power, in exchange for the protection of their rights and the security of their lives.
v1.c2.7
The social contract is not a historical fact, but a theoretical construct. It is a device for explaining the legitimacy of political authority. It is a way of saying that the state is not a natural growth, but a human creation, and that its authority is derived from the consent of the governed. The social contract is the foundation of modern political theory. It is the principle that justifies the state and limits its power. It is the principle that makes the state the servant of the people, and not their master.
v1.c2.8
¹ See, for example, the discussion in Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, pp. 250 ff.
Cites (1)
- Tipiṭaka (Theravāda) — Pāli