State and Government in Ancient India c24: Chapter XVII: A General Estimate
State and Government in Ancient India c24
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Chapter XVII: A General Estimate
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We have now finished our survey of the Ancient Indian Polity. We have studied its different features and surveyed the administrative systems under the different dynasties. We shall now proceed to form a general estimate about the merits and limitations of the Ancient Indian Polity. While doing so, we shall take an impartial standpoint. We should not however forget that ancient thought and institutions cannot be judged by standards then not known anywhere. We shall have to make due allowance for the circumstances and surroundings in which the ancient Indian polity and thought were developed and then form our estimate about them. We shall also discuss the lessons taught by our general survey and estimate; the study of the past becomes more useful and interesting, if it can be made to bear on some of the problems of the present as well.
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Several types of states like republics, oligarchies, diarchies and monarchies were prevailing in India in ancient times, but eventually monarchy became the order of the day. This phenomenon was not peculiar to ancient India; it repeated itself in ancient Europe also where we find the republics in Greece and Italy being gradually supplanted by monarchies and empires. Representative government was not known both to the ancient East and West, and so republics could function only when the state was small and frequent meetings of its Assembly consisting practically of all the senior members of its privileged order were possible. As in the ancient republics of Greece and Italy, political power was vested not in the whole population, but in the members of a small privileged order, mostly consisting of Kshatriyas and perhaps of the Brāhmaṇas also in a few cases. The Hindu polity worked in a society that had accepted the principle of the caste system, which laid down that government was primarily the function and duty of the Kshatriyas, assisted to some extent by the Brāhmanas. Franchise in the ancient Indian republics could, therefore not be extended to the whole population. In the modern age, which does not believe in the predetermination of one’s functions by birth, it will naturally have to be extended to all. The constitution of republican India has already done so.
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Democracy is the order of the day at present and we have already established a full fledged republic in India in 1951. It will be, therefore, necessary to understand the causes that led to the disappearance of the republics in ancient India. Generally speaking republics could function successfully in ancient India in small states. They also presupposed a kind of tribal unity in the governing class; republics failed to develop into a purely territorial state of large dimensions. Distances are annihilated now; the principle of representative government has been discovered and is in universal practice. Tribal stage has passed away long ago and we have now developed a national consciousness. There is therefore no reason why India should not function and flourish as a large republic in the modern age.
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Growing veneration for a hereditary ruler fostered by the principle of the divinity of king was also partly responsible for the disappearance of the ancient republics. When presidents, generals and members of the executive council became hereditary in republics, their polity could not be much differentiated from monarchy. Divinity of king is now a dead doctrine and we need not apprehend that it will prejudice the development of the republican spirit or institutions in the modern times. It is interesting to note that some members of the old feudal order are taking part in the working of the new democracy as members of the Parliament, ministers or deputy ministers.
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A study of ancient Indian history and polity shows that our republics flourished as long as there was harmony and concord among the members of their Assemblies. There was, however, a tendency among them to quarrel. In some republics every member of the Assembly was given the title of *rājā*; often he was not inclined to accept the leadership of a fellow member because it presupposed his own inferiority. Neighbouring kings used to send spies to foment quarrels and dissentions among the members of the republican bodies. Groups and parties were often formed in the republican Assemblies and they spent their time and energy in bringing each other's downfall and incidentally paving the way of an outside conqueror. Many of the ancient Indian republics were destroyed by the neighbouring kings and emperors by encouraging feuds and dissensions among the members of their Assemblies. The party defeated in the Assembly would often seek outside help and thus seal the ruin of the state. Modern India, which seeks to develop republican traditions and institutions, may well carve on the gate of its Parliament House the prophesy of the Buddha about the Lichchhavi republic. The republic of the Lichchhavis, said the Buddha, would prosper as long as the members of their Assembly met frequently, showed reverence to age, experience and ability, transacted the state business in concord and harmony and did not develop selfish parties engaged in unending wrangling for their narrow and selfish ends.
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In the course of time, monarchy became the order of the day owing to the causes already explained. It cannot be denied that our political writers placed the highest possible ideals before the kingly order; they can be hardly improved even in modern times. The king was to be *dhritavrata*, pledged to maintain and defend law, order, justice and morality; he was not above the law, but subject to its jurisdiction. He was to be something even more than a trustee for his subjects; a trustee has merely to abstain from taking any undue advantage of his position, while promoting the interest of the trust; the king, according to the ancient Indian ideals, has to sacrifice his own personal comforts and interests in order to secure the prosperity of the kingdom. Divinity was conceded not to the *person* but to the *office* of the king. The theory that a king can do no wrong and is accountable to none but God was almost unknown to ancient India. Attention of the king was pointedly drawn to the great necessity of a proper training, the absence of which was sure to land him into numerous pitfalls, that do not come across the path of an ordinary individual. The doctrine of the divinity of the king's office was intended merely to inspire respect for authority and not to encourage autocracy or irresponsibility in the kingly order.
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It must be however admitted that in actual practice many kings failed to live up to the ideal. The percentage of vicious or tyrannical kings in ancient India was however by no means higher than in medieval Europe. It would be however useful to understand the causes that were responsible for the non-realisation of the ideal of kingship in a large number of cases.
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Failure to develop proper secular and constitutional checks on the power of the king was the main reason for the kingly ideal not being frequently realised in practice. Like some medieval political thinkers of Europe, most of our ancient Indian thinkers did no doubt not say that a bad king was accountable to God alone. Nevertheless, in actual practice the fear of hell was the only effective deterrent in the case of a tyrant. Our writers no doubt permit subjects to migrate *en masse* from the country, if the king became oppressive; ancient inscriptions supply some instances of kings being brought to their senses by this method. This remedy, however, is a very impracticable one and could not be easily resorted to. They also sanction regicide in extreme cases. Regicide, however, presupposes an open and successful rebellion; as a remedy against day to day petty cases of tyranny, it is altogether impracticable and inapplicable. Ancient Indian polity failed to develop secular and practicable remedies which could control the actions of a king who was inclined to disregard the ideal and become tyrannical.
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This failure was largely due to the disappearance of the *samitis* or Popular Assemblies in the post-Vedic period. As long as these Assemblies functioned, they could effectively control the actions of the king in the day to day administration. The Vedic literature makes it quite clear that a king could succeed in maintaining himself on the throne only so long as his *samiti* or Popular Assembly was in agreement with him. If there was a disagreement, the views of the Assembly generally prevailed, and kings had to submit or abdicate and go into exile.
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Central Assemblies, however, gradually disappeared in the post-Vedic period, not because democracy became more and more unsuitable to the Indian temperament, but because the state became bigger and bigger in size, rendering the meetings of a Central Assembly more and more impracticable. Had Aśoka, Chandragupta or Harsha revived the Central Assembly, its members would have had to spend several weeks in reaching the capital in order to attend the Assembly meetings, and an equally long time in returning to their homes. The principle of representation was also unknown in those days both in the East and in the West.
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At the attainment of Independence in India in 1947 there were a number of ruling princes in the country, and it was possible to try the experiment of the limited monarchy in their states on the Vedic lines. Things however moved with a lightning rapidity and most of the ruling princes agreed to merge their states in the Indian Republic. For a few years about half a dozen members of the princely order functioned as hereditary Rājapramukhas, but all of them disappeared in that capacity when the recommendations of the States Reorganisation Committee were given effect to in 1956. The days of even limited monarchy are thus over in India.
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Effective popular central Assemblies not being found practicable in the case of larger kingdoms, ancient Indian political thinkers tried to protect the interests of the people by recommending and bringing about a great decentralisation of the functions of the government. Large powers were vested in the district, town and village administrations, which could be effectively supervised and controlled by local non-official councils. In the Gupta period, the sale of even the waste lands owned by the state required the sanction of the popular district council. The powers of town and village councils in ancient India were probably more extensive than those of similar bodies in any other polity, eastern or western, ancient or modern. They collected the revenues on behalf of the Central Government, refused to collect oppressive taxes, settled village disputes, organised works of public utility, and often maintained and financed hospitals, poor houses and educational institutions. It would be worth while to entrust larger and larger powers to the district boards and local and village councils. A word of warning, however, must be given. The village councils worked successfully in the past because the people had a high regard for truth and character and were instinctively inclined to respect age, experience and ability. Members of the village councils were not elected; they were raised to that position by the consensus of public opinion. Democracy of the modern type involving voting and party alignments did not exist, and is new to India. It presupposes wide spread of education, which must be immediately brought about. Fear of God and hell, which has now disappeared, must be replaced by the sense of civic duty, which alone can now induce our elected representatives to place the good of the people they represent above everything else.
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Village Panchāyats of ancient India exercised wide judicial powers. They decided practically all cases excepting those of serious crimes. Life in ancient times was simple; judicial disputes were usually confined to local parties and transactions and the law to be administered was known to and understood by all. Modern law is complex and complicate and presupposes technical knowledge and assistance; parties to a dispute may often belong to distant places. Village Panchāyats in modern times cannot, therefore, successfully exercise that wide civil jurisdiction which they did in the past. A beginning has been made by investing them with a limited civil jurisdiction. It will be difficult for witnesses to tell brand lies in the presence of their fellow residents in the Panchāyat courts, with reference to events and transactions well known to the locality. The revival of the village Panchāyat courts will also secure speedier justice. There will be, however, some uphill wrok. The faith in God and the dread of hell that helped the cause of justice in ancient times are rapidly dying out. Party factions are cropping up in villages due to illiteracy and selfishness So until a proper sense of civic duty and responsibility is developed to replace the faith in God and fear of hell, there will be some difficulty in the successful working of the village Panchāyats.
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Ancient India sought to solve the problem of the finance of the local bodies by localising a part of the land revenue. Most of the villages could get back about 15 to 20% of the proceeds of the land-tax from the government of the day. If the state governments, which are benefiting by the abolition of the Zemindari, set apart a part of the additional income from this or other sources to meet the needs of the village Panchāyats, the financial hurdle in their successful working may be removed.
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There can be no doubt that ancient Indian political thinkers had evolved excellent principles for taxation. The grounds on which remissions were sanctioned and exemptions granted were also as a rule sound. All will agree that the state should gather the taxes like the bee, which sucks the honey without damaging the flower, that the trade and industry should be taxed not on gross earnings, but on net profits, that an article should not be taxed twice, that the rise in taxation, when inevitable, should be gradual, and so on. The principles of exemption were also sound. The dumb, the deaf, the blind and the widows were exempted from taxation, as they were usually poor. Students studying at the Gurukulas (educational institutions) were also given the same concession, as also teachers, if they were poor and imparting education free. These principles are well worth considering by a modern welfare state of the socialistic pattern.
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The taxation was usually determined by the local customs and traditions. In the later times, however, when the *samiti* disappeared from the scene, governments would often impose high and arbitrary taxes. We often find tugs of war between the central governments, which wanted to levy new and oppressive taxes and the village Panchāyats, which would refuse to collect them. Very often, however, power prevailed and justce went to the wall; we find villagers migrating *en masse* to escape unbearable taxation. There can be no doubt that in later times, the interest of the average man in the sphere of taxation was not adequately protected when a greedy tyrant was on the throne. This however happened primarily because there was no *samiti* or popular assembly in later times. The importance of a strong and vigilant popular Assembly as a champion of popular rights and interests cannot be overemphasised.
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The ancient Indian state was not merely a tax-gathering corporation, interested only in preserving law and order. It is pleasing and surprising to find that the state in ancient India should have interested itself in a number of ministrant activities of the nation-building type, which are being undertaken by the modern governments only in relatively recent times. Private agencies, trade guilds and state departments worked side by side to promote national welfare without mutual jealousies. Mines were worked both by the state and private enterprise; guild banks and organisations often inspired greater confidence than the state treasuries. Private and guild concerns received subsidies, if they promoted national welfare. The state regarded itself as a trustee for the population as a whole, and usually contented itself by harmonising the conflicting interests of the different classes. It tried to keep the scale even between the capital and the labour, the employer and the employee, the producer and the consumer and the merchant and the purchaser by laying down suitable and stringent regulations for curbing the greed of the former and protecting the interests of the latter. Free India has embarked on the pattern of the mixed economy, as was the case with ancient India. We have however to see to it that the growing sphere of state socialism does not eliminate or cripple private and corporate enterprise. If the state runs the key industries and controls the rest, if it encourages the local bodies and city corporations also to enter the field of production and constructive nation-building activities, we shall have an economic structure, more or less similar to that in ancient India and likely to meet the needs of the time.
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The ideals of the ancient Indian state were undoubtedly very high and all comprehensive. It sought to promote the moral, material, aesthetic and spiritual progress of the whole community. Human ideas about the progress in these different spheres go on changing from age to age, and it is no wonder that we may not be able to agree with all that the state in ancient India did or countenanced in order to achieve progress in this fourfold field. For instance, it gave a general support to the *varṇāśramadharma*, which was undoubtedly iniquitous, especially to the Śūdras and untouchables. We must not, however, forget that a state is but the spokesman of the society it represents ; if certain iniquitous practices were tolerated by the state in ancient India, the society is as much to blame as the state. We should not judge ancient customs and institutions by modern standards and ideals. People in those days had a burning and living faith in the doctrine of Karma. Even the Śūdras and untouchables believed that they were born in their particular caste as a natural result of certain sins committed by them in past lives. As a further consequence of the same, some classes have certain religious and social disabilities imposed upon them in this life as well, under the sanction of the divine *śāstra*. It was impossible for the ancient Indian state even to think of disallowing these disabilities, much less of removing them. Equality of all citizens before the law, therefore, did not exist in ancient India to a great extent. It is no doubt a sad spectacle. We would all have felt prouder of our civilisation if the Smṛiti writers had imposed a higher punishment on the Brāhmaṇa culprit than on the Śūdra one, since they recognised the sin of the former to be greater than that of the latter We should, however, not forget that such iniquities and inequalities existed in all civilisations, eastern and western, and have not completely disappeared even in modern times. If the fine for murdering a Śūdra is lighter than that for murdering a Brāhmaṇa, we should not forget that the wergeld for the head of a slave or a serf was much smaller in Europe than that for the head of a knight or a landlord. Limited exemption from taxation sometimes sanctioned by the ancient Indian state to the Brāhmaṇas had its counter part in the European polity, where the church and nobility enjoyed many unjust exemptions down to the 18th century. Ancient Indian state did no doubt not belive in affording opportunities to the son of a cobbler to become a premier ; but such a phenomenon rarely occurred in ancient times, both in the West and the East. It will have to be admitted, however, by every impartial critic that the ancient Indian state was not solicitous only for the interests of the Brāhmaṇas ; it tried to promote the material and moral interests of all the castes; only it did not encourage one profession to trespass on the field of another ; for society honestly believed that these fields were predetermined by birth.
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The ideal of an all-India state under an emperor ruling over the territories from the Himalayas to the sea was recognised, as early as *c.* 1000 B. C., if not earlier. There were, however, only few occasions in ancient Indian history when it was actually realised. The recognition of this ideal was probably a natural consequence of the realisation of the fundamental unity of India,—geographical, religious and cultural. The ancient Indian polity, however, laid down that the empire should not be at the cost of local autonomy, culture and institutions ; it therefore laid down that the *chakravartin* or the emperor should remain content, if his imeprial status is recognised by the offer of a suitable tribute. He was not to annex the local, provincial or district kingdoms ; even if the heads of the latter had been defeated or had died fighting, some relations of theirs were to be put on the throne on condition that they were willing to recognise the conqueror's suzerainty. Local laws, customs and tradition were never to be interfered with by the conqueror.
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An all-India state powerful enough to bring about the unity of the country and to defend it from foreign aggression through a cooperative effort under the aegis of the Central Government, but generous and considerate enough to permit the existence of local governments following their own customs and traditions and fostering their own culture and customs was thus the ideal of the ancient Indian polity. Curiously enough it is very much similar to our present ideal of a strong and united India with full autonomy to states. Let us therefore analyse a little more closely this ideal and find out its strong and weak points as disclosed by our ancient history.
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The insistence of the political thinkers that conqueror should allow the conquered king or state to retain his or its individuality in the feudatory capacity, undoubtedly produced many good results. It permitted local culture, traditions and political institutions to develop more or less unhampered. It toned down provincial and dynastic jealousies and animosities; for an ambitious province or kingdom could at most aim at imposing its more or less nominal suzerainty over its neighbour; it could never aim at crushing its culture or wiping out its separate existence. Warfare also tended to remain humane; neither side had the danger of being completely wiped out, if it was defeated; it therefore did not generally stoop to unchivalrous and unapproved methods to avert a defeat or win a victory.
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While recognising that this ideal of an empire with a number of composite units governed by feudatory kings or republics had many good points about it, we cannot remain oblivious to certain injurious results that sprang from it. The recommendation to recognise local autonomy by permitting the conquered king or state to continue in the feudatory capacity eventually stood in the way of effective unification of India. Most of the ancient Indian empires were merely loose federations of a number of feudatory kingdoms held together by masterful personalities for a few decades. Many of his feudatories were usually entertaining imperial ambitions; for the political thinkers recognised that it was but a natural thing that each feudatory should aspire to the imperial status for himself. As a consequence big kingdoms and empires in ancient India were never in a state of equilibrium for a long time. There was a constant tussle going on for the coveted position of a Chakravartin. It was the duty of each king to secure the expansion of his kingdom by attacking his neighbours when they were weak. Feudatories were therefore usually on the look out for an opportunity to rebel against the imperial power. Ninety percent of the wars in Indian history would have been avoided if the ideal of the Chakravartin had not been recommended to every feudatory, and if its successful realiser had not been prevented from annexing the conquered state and compelled to permit it to continue to rule in the feudatory capacity.
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Ancient Indian political thinkers probably thought that there was nothing wrong in this ideal. Probably they felt that each king, state or province should have a sporting chance to be the leading state in the country at one time or another. Frequent wars no doubt thus became inevitable; they were perhaps felt to be necessary to keep up the martial spirit and traditions of the Kshatriyas. It did not matter very much whether Pāṭaliputra, Kanauj or Avanti was to be the imperial capital of India. Whatever province may be at the head of the empire, the culture, religion and language of the subordinate provinces did not suffer; for the conqueror was expressly required to respect and preserve local traditions, cultures and institutions.
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Ancient Indians began to become growingly indifferent in the course of time to the necessity and desirability of a strong and stable central state. As monarchies became the order of the day from *c.* 400 A. D., the interstate struggles became dynastic wars for hegemony; people were not much interested in them because they knew that their local culture, laws and institutions would not be much affected, whatever might be the outcome of the struggle. Contending armies also fought not so much for their states as for their kings. There was hardly any patriotism in the real sense of the word. This ideal of federal-feudal empire, with full liberty to each constituent state to strike for the imperial status but without permission to forge a unitary empire after the conquest, thus produced a state of continuous instability in ancient India. There were frequent wars, but they did not lead to the emergence of a strong and unitary state. The energy of the nation was unnecessarily wasted in interminable feuds, which only weakened the combatants. The country as a whole became weak and fell an easy prey to the Greek, Scythian and Muslim invaders.
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A glance at our history shows that India has prospered only when it had succeeded in evolving a strong central government. In the age of Aśoka, Chandragupta II and Akbar India was able to make good progress, because it had a strong Central Government. The same fact is at the root of the progress made during the last 100 years.
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It is a matter of satisfaction that the new Indian constitution recognises this fact and provides for a strong central government. Ancient India was keen that there should be full freedom for the cultural development of each state, even if it was conquered by its neighbour. Luckily now there is no longer any possibility of one state in India being defeated or conquered by another and the principle of state autonomy guarantees a fair amount of freedom for the development of local culture, language, literature and industry.
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State jealousies, however, can creep up owing to linguistic differences and conflicting economic interests. There were several languages in ancient India, but Sanskrit was cultivated as the official *lingua franca* even by the states of the south, whose regional languages were of Dravidian stock. Vijayanagara issued its official charters not in Canarese, but in Sanskrit. There is therefore nothing wrong in the effort to have a national language. We should however not forget that Sanskrit did not stand in the way of free development of the different vernaculars like Bengali, Marathi, Gujarati, Telugu, Tamil, etc. The development of Hindi as a national language should not in the same way be an impediment to the full and free development of the regional languages.
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Economic conflicts and jealousies between the states would be another impediment in the emergence of a strong Indian nation. But these can be solved without much difficulty in our national forum, the Central Parliament. We cannot and should not forget that union is strength; the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R. have become great world powers because the different states which constitute them have agreed to merge themselves into a Federal State to watch the common welfare of the federating units. Had this happened in Western Europe, the once powerful and flourishing states of that region would not have been thrown into the background by Russia and America.
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If the states in India effectively check separatist or fissiparous tendencies in order to develop a strong Union Government at the centre, and if the latter shows a genuine concern for fostering the cultures, languages and economic development of the former, our Union Government will be powerful enough to defend the motherland against external aggression, to promote an all-round economic development and capable enough to make India once more a mighty and flourishing country, whose voice and views will count in the comity of nations.
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*Oṁ tatsadbrahmārpaṇamastu.*