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War in Ancient India c9.s2: Section IV: Site for the Battle-Field

War in Ancient India c9.s2

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Section IV: Site for the Battle-Field

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Another strategical consideration which engaged the general’s mind was the choice of a proper site for the operations of war. It is thus laid down in the Śivavyāsadhanurveda:²⁴ “That battle-field which is damp, hard, full of gravel and water and contains granite and shrubs ought not to be chosen. But one without inundations, but expansive, covered with a little dust or an uninhabited plain, is the best theatre of war.” In the battle of the Hydaspes, it is said that Porus fixed that “site where there was no clay but that the ground from its nature was all flat and firm, and suited for the movements of cavalry whether charging or falling back”, and that he drew up his army in order of battle, the elephants being posted in the front lines at intervals of not less than 100 feet and before the whole body of his infantry, so as to strike terror into Alexander’s soldiers. The infantry was arranged in two lines, one behind the other, and also on the wings beyond the elephants. On both sides of the infantry the cavalry were posted, with chariots in front. According to the *Agnipurāṇa*,²⁵ again, strategic warfare must be conducted in forests, on rivers and on rainy days, for attacks on open grounds are always difficult. In the battle-field the commander should aim at the strategical position of the army in its various divisions. It was then the time for him to show his mettle. Śukrācārya says²⁶ that both small and big guns are to be stationed in front, and behind them the foot-soldiers. The wings are to be occupied by elephants and chargers. With regard to the general arrangement of the army in the field, the *Agnipurāṇa*,²⁷ says that the various divisions should stand neither too close nor too far apart, so that the soldiers can exercise their weapons freely and without obstruction of any sort. In the forefront, the flower of the army are to be stationed, of course after keeping some as a reserve for an emergency. The most important portion that should not be neglected on any account, is the rear. Bold warriors armed with swords must occupy the front. Behind should stand the archers with bows and darts, then the horsemen, the charioteers and the elephant-men in order. Before the vanguard the leader of the army should stand holding firmly the flag-staff. The front is to be an extensive field so as to allow flanking movements without the least difficulty. This is evident from the fact that the war-wise leaders of Hindu India were accustomed to all kinds of strategical movements. As for the king himself, he was not to take an active part in the actual operations of the field. For if he should happen to fall, that would decide the battle instantaneously. Therefore he should continue to encourage the army only from the rear.

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²⁴ Śārangadhara, 1681-82.

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²⁵ Ch. 236, 59-60.

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²⁶ IV. 7. 343-5.

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²⁷ Ch. 236, 28-37.

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In this connexion we may invite attention to an important prescription of the *Agnipurāṇa*.²⁸ It says that a competent general should attack the rear of the enemy if he should find the ground in front and on the sides undulating. In such a situation it was not possible for the enemy to escape.²⁹ Kauṭalya recommends entangling the enemy in an ambuscade by fording the river elsewhere if they guarded a particular ford.³⁰ This can be illustrated from the battle of the Ten Kings explained in the *Ṛg Veda Saṃhita*.³¹ Here the contending parties were the Tritsus and the Bharatas. Both planned to the Roman world, and the most important events of the reign of Constantine are thus represented as the immediate consequences of his conversion. But the historian, who must be content with the evidence of the times, will not be easily persuaded that the zeal of Constantine was not stimulated by the hope of political advantage, or that the conversion of the empire was not the result of a long and gradual process of change.

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²⁸ *Ibid.*

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²⁹ Compare Oman's remarks on the Byzantine general of the 10th Century A.D. (*op. cit.* pp. 208 ff.).

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³⁰ *Ar. Śās.* p. 365.

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³¹ III, 53.

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The conversion of Constantine is a subject which has been discussed with great warmth by the historians of the church, and it is not surprising that their opinions should be divided. The panegyrists of the emperor, who were eager to celebrate his piety and his zeal, have represented his conversion as a miraculous event, which was confirmed by the appearance of a cross in the sky, and by the victory which he obtained over his rival Maxentius. The critics, on the other hand, who are less disposed to believe in the supernatural, have sought to explain the conversion of Constantine by the influence of his mother Helena, or by the political necessity of securing the support of the Christians, who were already a powerful and influential body in the empire.

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It is probable that the truth lies between these two extremes, and that the conversion of Constantine was the result of a combination of motives, in which the influence of his mother, the political advantages of the Christian religion, and the genuine conviction of his own mind, all played a part. The character of Constantine was complex and contradictory, and it is not easy to determine the precise nature of his religious beliefs. He was a man of great ambition and of great ability, and he was always ready to adapt his conduct to the circumstances of the time.

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The conversion of Constantine was a turning point in the history of the Roman empire, and it had a profound influence on the development of the Christian church. The emperor, who had once been the persecutor of the Christians, became their protector and their patron, and he used his power to promote the interests of the church and to suppress the pagan religion. The conversion of Constantine was the beginning of a new era in the history of the world, and it is a subject which will continue to be discussed by historians for many years to come.

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to recognise friend from foe.³⁰ Two things are clear. One is that there was no national flag as we have to-day, and secondly that these standards and flags were the rallying points of the belligerents in the battle. Strategy, then, is the science, as distinguished from the art, of war.

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