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War in Ancient India c9.s3.t1: Siege Operations

War in Ancient India c9.s3.t1

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Siege Operations

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How the siege operations were conducted and what devices and tactics were adopted to get possession of the enemy’s fortresses may next engage our attention. Five methods seem to have been employed in capturing a fort.⁶² They were intrigue, *apasarpan* or pretending to retreat, *vamanam* or winning over the people, *paryu-vasanam* or actual siege, and *avamartha* or taking by assault. In Kauṭalya’s opinion, an invading king should not, all at once, commence the siege of the enemy’s fortress, for such a procedure would ultimately land him in trouble. So a regular siege must be preceded by a considerable reduction of the enemy’s forces. This alone would easily lead him to victory in the struggle.

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⁶² *Ar. Śās.* pp. 407-08.

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Employing means, whether fair or foul, the would-be conqueror should prepare the way for a well-laid siege.

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A messenger should speak highly of his omniscient and supernatural powers and of his close association with several deities, and thus evoke a sort of awe and reverence in the enemy towards him. Again, heretics and jugglers may be specially employed to seduce the enemy's subjects from their loyalty to their lord by playing upon their humour through the display of various kinds of magical tricks. Or again, officials in the employ of the invader should pretend to have been dismissed by their master and seek employment with the defending sovereign. And after they gained his confidence they were to aim at his life. Further, the would-be conqueror, to ensure eventual success, should win over guilds of merchants and other public corporations, and thus weaken the enemy. These and other methods prescribed by Kauṭalya may appear to laymen as unscrupulous, but they could be justified on the ground that his work is a treatise of expediency, and therefore these various means recommended for winning over the enemy's subjects or reducing his strength have indeed an ethical character, for it is the svadharma of a kṣatriya king to conquer the enemy though it might cost his life.

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With such preliminaries the invader might begin the siege if he found that everything else was in his favour and not in the enemy's.⁶³ The opportune moment to commence siege operations might be when the enemy was in distress or suffered from disease, when his officers were disloyal and given to bribery, or when he possessed inadequate or ill-equipped defences, or had no ally to support him. The invader should wait for some such opportunity, and when it presented itself should not let it go, for there is only one tide in the affairs of men. Again, if the invader could not effect his purpose satisfactorily and found the enemy's people and officers above corruption or bribery, then he must have recourse to other and more effective means. Particularly when the enemy's subjects assumed the offensive, the invader might destroy their crops, water sources and stores, cut off their communications and place all kinds of obstruction in their path. This is only the pratikriya of Indian political literature. It is not, therefore, considered a sin. For instance, Hanumān burnt down the whole city as his tail was set fire to. Thus by destroying their crops and depriving them of their cattle, an invading king prepared the ground for laying a siege to the enemy's fort.

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⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 404-05.

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During the actual operations of a siege, the ditch surrounding the ramparts of a fort if empty, should first be filled by the besiegers with water and with mud and sand if it contained water. Then reaching the outer walls of the parapet, and finding them strongly guarded with well-equipped warriors, machines, explosives, and other materials might be used to bring down the walls by assault. In the meantime, the cavalry troops would be employed in forcing a passage through the various gateways of the fortifications. If these endeavours should not bear fruit, then recourse might be had to the use of fire. This was the last alternative, for Kauṭalya himself says that it is immoral and should be used only in an extreme crisis. Arrows vomiting fire could be shot both at the defenders of the fortress and into its interior. But this would not be sufficient to set fire to the whole of the fortress inside. So it is suggested that the tails of birds could be tied with ‘agniyoga’ which, when deposited on the roofs of the houses, would ignite and reduce the whole building to ashes.⁶⁴ In a fragment of Megasthenes, mention is made also of a kind of boiling oil used in warfare and especially in sieges. It was extracted for the king, according to Ktesias, from a worm found in the Indus. The oil had the power to ignite everything. What exactly the worm referred to is, has not been finally settled, though Professor Wilson identified it with the alligator.

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⁶⁴ Even in modern wars, birds are not without use, (e.g. carrier pigeons are particularly useful in carrying messages).

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If, despite such methods,⁶⁵ the enemy would still not submit, and offer a defensive attack and there was no chance of bringing down the fortress, other methods were recommended as a last resort. One such method is to befriend the enemy, observe carefully his weak points, and suddenly strike him, thus depriving him of his citadel. If this should fail, the invader may feign defeat and exhaustion, and setting fire to his own camp, pretend to retreat, and thus induce the enemy to open his gates and come out. He should then turn back and take the fortress by storm without losing a single moment.

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⁶⁵ *Ar. Śās.* XIII, ch. 4.

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Another factor to be reckoned with was the use of elephants in siege warfare.⁶⁶ That these animals were used for demolishing the fort-walls is seen, beside other evidences, from the first fragment of the *Indika* of Ktesias. These animals were particularly trained for this purpose. At a given signal from their leader these animals rushed impetuously towards the walls and pressed themselves against them.

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⁶⁶ *Indika* of Ktesias (Fragments, *IV).

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We have a good description of the siege of the Lanka fortress in the *Rāmāyaṇa*. Hearing that Rāma was approaching with vast monkey hosts, Rāvaṇa stationed very brave men to defend the four gates of his citadel, himself defending the northern gate.⁶⁷ The monkey warriors with trees and rocks destroyed the upper portions of the great walls and filled the moat with trees, rocks and straw.⁶⁸ Several thousands of monkeys under their leaders made an onslaught against the gateways. But the Rākṣasas hurled incessantly innumerable darts and Bhindipālas from the walls. Gradually all the Rākṣasas were killed. Finding that the city had not fallen, Sugrīva ordered what we may call a mass attack.⁶⁹ Thereupon the monkey-warriors with fire-brands in their hands advanced towards the gates and set fire to them. Some of them entered the city and set fire to the highways and byways as well as the great storied buildings and even the palace. Enraged at this, Indrajit thought of vanquishing the enemy by the use of stratagem.⁷⁰ He brought in his car an illusory figure of Sītā and had her slain in the presence of these monkey-warriors. Then he performed some *homas* and sacrifices at Nikumbhala secretly in order to overwhelm the enemy’s forces and rout them thoroughly. But it was discovered, and he was soon killed by Lakṣmaṇa. It may be noted also that fire was resorted to only towards the end of the siege and that Rāma very dexterously allied himself with Vibhīṣaṇa who offered to help him. This alliance with an important member of the enemy’s party was, indeed, a clever move which ultimately paid very well. For but for his timely warning Indrajit might have finished his ceremonies at Nikumbhala and proved more than a match for the allies through his prowess and capacity for producing illusions. Lastly, the city was entered and Rāvaṇa was killed in a fierce battle. Thus did Rāma come into possession of the city.

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⁶⁷ *Rāmāyaṇa*, Yuddha kāṇḍa, ch. 36.

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⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, ch. 46.

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⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, ch. 75.

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⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, chh. 81-82.

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According to the *Agnipurāṇa* the invading monarch should carefully note that part of the citadel over which the crows came in and went out, and concentrate his attack on that quarter.⁷¹ If this were done, it was believed that the fort would be captured in the end. Before starting on a military expedition, Kālidāsa says that the king should see that the capital fortress as well as the frontier fortifications were well-fortified and defended.⁷² For the value of a fortress to the king is incalculable. Only after such precautions had been taken did Rāghu set out on his famous Digvijaya.

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⁷¹ *Agnipurāṇa*, ch. 232.

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⁷² *Raghuvamśā*, Canto IV, 26, 17, 52.

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Fear of foreign invasion is not the sole motive that necessitates the construction of these huge forts. Does not the lion, the king of animals, and a fierce destroyer of the gigantic elephant, have its abode in the mountain caves? So also there are advantages in a fortified palace.

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Having thus captured the enemy’s fortress, the invader should show mercy to the weak and the wounded. He must remove all his enemy’s soldiers and warriors and replace them with his own men, lest the former should do any mischief. Then he should make a triumphal entry into the palace with all the paraphernalia of a victor. After the fall of the citadel Laṅkā, Rāma with his hosts spent the night in the city adorned with his garland of victory. He generously granted the kingdom to Vibhīṣaṇa, the brother of the slain king.

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Let me conclude this section by referring to the attitude of modern military experts towards the use of fortifications. Most of them take the view that as conditions exist at present fortresses are unnecessary and dangerous. The men garrisoning them might be better employed in other places. Both the country and the army are either ruined by them or draw from them no tangible benefit. They entail enormous and wasteful expenditure for their building, maintenance, and garrisoning with troops. In fine, fortresses are seldom anything but an incubus. These remarks of a weighty authority must be respected, though we see a tinge of exaggeration in them. There is a wrong notion that is still current, namely, that these forts have lost their military value and are an anachronism since the invention of gun-powder.⁷³ But Dr. Oppert and some other scholars have demonstrated that gunpowder was in use in ancient India even in very early times, and still those strongholds were recommended as safe ones.

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⁷³ Clarke's *Mediaeval and Military Architecture*, Vol. I. *Operations of War*.

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No doubt they were costly defences and some of the soldiers mobilised in the forts could have played a useful part in the open field. But there is the other side of the shield. It was during the last Great War, as we all know, that the fortresses in Belgium offered a stubborn resistance to the Germans, but for which the latter might in all probability have overwhelmed the whole of France. In fact they were decisive in arresting the progress of Germany. Therefore to decry the value of a fort is to misjudge its merit. It was perhaps rightly said that the “fortifications of Paris assure more powerfully the independence of France against the attacks of all Europe than the acquisition of many provinces which would only so much the more extend the frontier.” It may be that the extensive use of gunpowder in recent times has facilitated their destruction much more quickly than before. But this is not a sufficient argument for condemning such a useful institution which has rendered glorious service through the ages. Even the use of heavy guns and shells has not thrown the dug-out trench out of its usefulness. Trench warfare is but one kind of defensive operation from the security of the fortified and protected underground trench.73a

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73a The trenches during the Great War of 1914-18 and the underground fortifications of the Maginot and Siegfried Lines may be noted in this connection. It may be recalled that the Barrier Fortress effectively checked Louis XIV's ambitious schemes of conquest of the Netherlands in his wars.

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