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A History of Hindu Political Theories from the Earliest Times to the End of the First Quarter of the Seventeenth Century A.D. c11: Chapter V. The Beginnings of Decline—The Essence of Polity (Nītisāra) of Kāmandaka, and the Purāṇas and Minor Law-Books (Smritis). Circa, 200-500 A.D.

A History of Hindu Political Theories from the Earliest Times to the End of the First Quarter of the Seventeenth Century A.D. c11

Language
English

Contents

Chapter V. The Beginnings of Decline—The Essence of Polity (Nītisāra) of Kāmandaka, and the Purāṇas and Minor Law-Books (Smritis). Circa, 200-500 A.D.

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THE BEGINNINGS OF DECLINE—THE ESSENCE OF POLITY (NĪTISĀRA) OF KĀMANDAKA, AND THE PURĀṆAS AND MINOR LAW-BOOKS (SMRITIS). CIRCA, 200-500 A.D.

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Kāmandaka’s Nītisāra is not an original work, but a scholar’s compilation based principally upon Kauṭilya’s Arthaśāstra—The theory of integration of the constituent factors of sovereignty—The theory of kingship—The rule of the king’s discipline and of punishment (daṇḍa)—Relation of Kāmandaka’s statecraft to morality.

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II

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General character of political ideas in the Purāṇas and the minor Smritis—The doctrine of the king’s divine nature—The theory of the king’s immunity from harm and of obedience of the subjects—The principles limiting the abuses of the king’s power.

I

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In the preceding chapter we have endeavoured to describe in connection with the two great works of the Brahminical canon and especially the Mahābhārata the synthesis, under the influence of the dominant conception of the religious basis of human existence, of political ideas derived as well from the secular Arthaśāstra as the older canon. It is indeed in the last-named work that Hindu political theory reached its high water-mark. In the present period the writers, as we hope to show presently, tried at some points to amplify or at any rate treat the ideas of the older masters, but their speculations can not certainly compare either in depth or in thoroughness with those of their predecessors.

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Of the works with which we are concerned in this chapter we shall first select for examination the one which divides with the Śukranītisāra the credit of being the most popular text-book on the science of polity in the whole range of Hindu literature.∗ The Nītisāra of Kāmandaka, as this treatise is called, may well claim to be reckoned as the representative of the literature of Arthaśāstra during this period, for its author professes in the genuine style of the latter class of works to deal with the acquisition and the protection of territory.† Nevertheless there can, we think, be no comparison between Kāmandaka and his predecessors in the same field, for he can not, unlike the latter, lay claim to the merit of originality or even of first-hand study of the phenomena of the State. Out of love for the science of polity, he says in the context in which the passage just quoted occurs, we shall teach something that is approved by those versed in the royal policy. This is evidently the language not of one in touch with practical politics, but of a man of books. Kāmandaka moreover leaves us in no doubt as to the source of his inspiration. For in the same context he deliberately announces his work to be based upon the teaching (darśana) of Viṣṇugupta (Kauṭilya) whose ancestry and achievements he extols in the highest terms.∗ The Essence of Polity, then, according to the explicit testimony of its own author, is a scholar's compilation based principally upon the Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya. In accordance with this description we find that the author, while excluding from his purview the whole of Kauṭilya's material relating to civil law and the departments of the administration, furnishes what amounts to a metrical paraphrase of the rest. It must, however, he remembered to Kāmandaka's credit that he arranges his borrowed material under more convenient headings, while he multiplies, it may be with pedantic thoroughness, the categories into which his master's rules of public policy are resolvable.† While Kauṭilya's work is the chief source of Kāmandaka's inspiration, he is indebted, as we hope to show presently, to the Brāhmanical canon for some phases of his thought.

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∗ Kāmandaka's Nītisāra is repeatedly quoted in the Rājādharma and Nīti sections of the Mediaeval Digests of the sacred law. Even the Matsya Purāṇa, as we shall see later on in this chapter, borrows one of its longest discourses on Nīti from the same source. A Nīti work, lastly, purporting to be the composition of Kāmandaka is extant in the ancient literature of the island of Bali near Java. Vide *Essays Relating to Indo-China*, Vol. II, p. 93. (Trübner's Oriental Series).

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† Vide Kāmandaka I 8: upārjane pālane cha bhūmer bhūmīśvaraṁ prati yat kiñchidupadekṣyāmo rājavidyāvidāṁ matam.|| Throughout this work the references to Kāmandaka in the Roman character stand for prakaraṇas, not sargas, in the edition of T. Gaṇapati Śāstri (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series).

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∗ I 2-7. Elsewhere (III 6) Kāmandaka, citing an opinion of Kauṭilya, characterises it as the teaching of his master.

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† Cf. *e.g.* Kāmandaka's division of his work into separate chapters dealing with the circle of States (maṇḍala) (XII-XIII), the six forms of foreign policy (XIV-XVI), deliberation in the State Council (XVII), and the conduct of the Ambassador (XVIII-XIX). Also cf. Kāmandaka's lists of the different kinds of alliance (XIV), war (XV), neutrality and marching (Ch. XVI), as well as the lists of kings with whom alliance should be made and of those with whom it should not be made (XIV). [^*] XXII 93. Cf. *Kauṭ.* pp. 322-324. [^†] VII 1-2.

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Beginning our survey of Kāmandaka's political ideas with his treatment of the concept of seven limbs of sovereignty, we have to observe that the author takes over from his master the specific order in which the 'calamities' of the limbs are described. Along with this Kāmandaka combines, however incongruously, a notion that was at best dimly perceived by Kauṭilya, the notion, namely, of the organic relation of the factors of sovereignty. Thus he applies in one place the epithet 'helpful to one another' (*parasparopakārī*) to the seven limbs, and he explains his meaning by saying that sovereignty does not flourish even if it is deficient in one single limb. In this passage is evidently embodied an idea which, if we might express it in the technical language of political theory, would be called that of the integration of the governmental units.

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When we turn to consider the general theory of kingship in Kāmandaka, we find him virtually reproducing in a somewhat perfunctory fashion some of the basic ideas of the older masters. He has, to begin with, a lively sense of the importance of the king's office from the point of view of the subjects. Protection, he says in one place, depends upon the king; the science of agriculture, cattle-breeding and trade (*vārttā*), in its turn, depends upon protection, if this science were to be suspended, the people would not live even though they might breathe. Like the clouds, Kāmandaka goes on, the king is the refuge of all creatures: if the clouds were to go wrong, the creatures could still live, but they could not do so if the king were to go wrong.∗ According to this view, then, the king's office is the primary as well as the essential condition of existence.† In an earlier passage the author shows how the happiness as well as the misery of the people depends upon the personality of the king. There he says that the king who is approved by the aged persons causes prosperity and rejoicing, while he who is an imperfect guide plunges the people in utter destruction.‡

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∗ I 12-13.

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† Similarly in IV 34, after describing the duties of the castes and the orders, the author states that should the king not exist, righteousness would perish, and if righteousness were to disappear, the world itself would be destroyed.

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‡ I 9-10.

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While thus inculcating the old notion of the paramount importance of the king's office, Kāmandaka, it should be particularly remarked, fails to mention, as he might very well have done, the theories of divine creation of the king. Indeed it appears that the author's references to the divine nature of the king, much as this doctrine was familar by this time, are few in number and indirect in their nature.§ The result of this half-hearted acceptance of the older teaching may be seen, we think, in the remarkably colourless fashion in which the author handles the old doctrine relating to the submission of the subjects. The people, he says, honour even as they honour Prajāpati (Brahmā) the king who is virtuous, who protects his subjects well and who conquers the towns of his enemies.*

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§ One such reference may be quoted. In the introductory verse where it is customary to offer salutation to a deity for the purpose of removing obstacles, the author pronounces benediction upon the king, the lord, the auspicious one, wielding the sceptre, through whose might the world follows the eternal path.' This is justified, as the commentator remarks, by the plea that the king is created out of the essences of the guardian deities and is animated by the god Viṣṇu. (Vide Śaṅkarārya's commentary on Kāmandaka I 1.)

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When we look out in Kāmandaka's work for the principles counteracting those of monarchical authority, we find it to be an almost complete blank. There is, however, one extract which, while occurring in the context of passages justifying the king's authority, incidentally embodies, we think, the idea of the king's duty of protection. There it is said, "The king protects the people; the latter cause him to thrive (by payment of the sixth part of the produce and the like). Protection, however, is better than causing prosperity, since if the former were to disappear, the latter would be an evil even if it could exist."† In this extract the last phrase is particularly noticeable. Its meaning, as the commentator points out, is that in the absence of protection whatever is paid by the subjects for making the king thrive is impure in the sense of being mixed up with the sins of the subjects.‡

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n * I 11.

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n † I 14.

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n ‡ Kāmandaka's silence with regard to the theory of the king's divine creation and his colourless reference to the doctrine of submission of the subjects, are matched by a Tamil author belonging to the early centuries of the Christian era, the illustrious Tiruvalluvar who treats the subject of kingship in one of the sections of his famous work called the Kural. May this coincidence be taken to be a measure of the qualified success as yet attained by the Brahminical theories of the king's origin such as those that are exhibited in the Manusamhitā and the Mahābhārata? It will probably help us to answer this question if we remember that the attitude of Kāmandaka and the Tamil poet presents a marked contrast to that of the canonical authors of this period, whose theories of kingship are saturated, as we hope to show presently, with the doctrines of the king's divine nature and of the obedience of the subjects.

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Kāmandaka’s rules relating to the art of government properly so called, which form as might be expected the core of his thought, have little, if any, independent interest. It will be enough to illustrate their nature by means of two examples. Kāmandaka urges upon the king in the early part of his work¹ the necessity of self-discipline and intellectual training, his rules to this effect being merely an amplification of those laid down by Kauṭilya. He conceives this discipline to be the essential requisite of successful government, for he says, “How can the person who is unable to control his own mind conquer the earth extending up to the sea ?”² In some later verses he drives his lesson home in the fashion of his master by quoting the instances of those who achieved success through sense-control and of those who failed through its neglect.³

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¹ * I 21-60 ; II 61-71.

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² † I 39.

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³ ‡ I 56, 58-60.

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Next to his inculcation of discipline on the king’s part may be mentioned as an illustration of the author’s statecraft his rule of punishment (daṇḍa). Paraphrasing a text of Kauṭilya Kāmandaka shows the evils of excessive severity as well as leniency, and he recommends the infliction of just punishment.⁴ With equal fidelity to his master he points out in a later passage, the function of punishment as the grand safeguard against anarchy, and he connects this with the old Brahminical idea of the universal wickedness of men⁵. Since creatures with their proper duties violated, he says, have a tendency to prey upon one another, there arises in the absence of punishment the destructive condition indicated by the maxim of the fishes (mātsyanyāya). Amplifying this idea in the following verse, the author states that this world, shelterless and being perforce caused to sink into hell under the influence of desire, greed and the like, is sustained by the king by means of punishment.∗ This is followed by two other verses of the same nature, but it is unnecessary to quote them here.

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⁴ § V 37.

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⁵ || Cf. pp. 107, 154 supra.

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∗ V 40-41.

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When we turn from the above to consider the author's attitude towards morality in so far as his rules of policy are concerned, we find him occupying a position which, in its attempt to condone a partially Machiavellian statecraft from the point of view of authoritative example, betrays the influence of the Mahābhārata.† In the beginning of his work he broadly inculcates the king's observance of the rule of virtuous conduct. The king who is devoted to righteous conduct, he says, unites himself and afterwards his people with the threefold end of life, while he who is of an opposite nature destroys both without doubt. In the following lines he drives his lesson home by quoting the example of the good king Vaijavana and the wicked king Nahuṣa, and he admonishes the king to seek his welfare with righteousness as his guide.‡ This, however, does not prevent the author from reproducing in the actual details of his statecraft some of the typical rules of the Arthaśāstra. Thus in his chapter relating to the suppression of disturbers of the public peace he writes that the king should slay without delay the wicked ones (dūṣyāḥ)—that is, as the author explains, those sinful favourites of the king who singly or collectively harm the kingdom—either secretly, or else publicly after causing them to incur the enmity of the people.∗ In another place Kāmandaka, while analysing the seven traditional forms of policy (upāya) divides punishment into three classes, of which the first-named (viz. slaying) is subdivided into two kinds, namely the open and the secret. While the former should be applied, Kāmandaka thinks, against the enemy who is hated by the people, the latter should be inflicted upon those who irritate the subjects, who are the king's favourites, and who are powerful and oppressive to the others. This last form of punishment, the author explains, consists in the application of poison, secret appliances, weapons, and ointments causing sores.† In the third and last extract bearing on this point Kāmandaka divides fighting into two classes, namely fair and treacherous. The former, we are told, should be resorted to when the king has the advantage of time and place, has seduced the enemy's elements of sovereignty (or subjects) and is powerful, but the latter should be followed in the contrary circumstances. This last form of fighting comprises, as we learn from the numerous examples given by the author, various methods of slaying the enemy by attacking him on unfavourable ground or when he is off his guard.∗

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† Cf. p. 202 supra.

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‡ I 15-16.

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∗ IX 9-10. Cf. p. 149, *supra*. It may be mentioned in this connection that Kāmandaka's example of contrivances for secret punishment (Ibid 11-12) is copied from Kauṭilya p. 239.

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† XXVII 9-12.

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∗ XXXI 54-68. Cf. pp. 149-150, supra.

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Rules like the above might have been justified by Kāmandaka, as they were by his master, merely from the point of view of the interests of the society or of the State. It is, however, characteristic of the author that he seeks in the course of the chapters just cited to justify his statecraft on the higher ground of morality. Thus while advising the king to suppress the disturbers of the public peace, he writes, "Kings that were almost like sages had recourse to righteous slaughter; hence the king is not afflicted with sin by slaying the wicked in the interests of righteousness."† Again, in his chapter relating to unrighteous fighting the author winds up by saying that the slaying of the foe by treachery does not involve the obstruction of righteousness, and he quotes the example of the Kuru hero Aśvatthāmā who slew the Pāṇḍava host during night-time when it was absorbed in deep slumber.‡

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† IX 5. In connection with this point it should be noticed that Kāmandaka introduces (Ibid 7) an elastic definition of morality (dharma), making it synonymous with the approved opinion of the Aryas learned in the canon.

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‡ XXXI 71.

II

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Let us now turn to the second class of writings that may be said more or less properly to fall within the limits of this chapter. This is the collection of the Purāṇas and the minor Law-books (Smṛitis), which represents during this period the literature of the Brahminical canon, just as Kāmandaka's Nītisāra represents the literature of Arthaśāstra.∗ Here again, as in the former case, the signs of decline as compared with the vigorous speculation of the earlier epoch are writ large on the surface. For in the first place much as the authors of the Purāṇas worked out in their sections on rājadharma and Nīti the ideas of the older canon, especially in relation to the king’s office, their contributions are essentially of the nature of compilations based upon the earlier material.† Nothing, moreover, is more characteristic of these authors, in so far as our point of view is concerned, than their endless and monotonous repetition of the rules of kingly conduct in the place of speculations of an abstract nature.‡ As regards the minor Law-books we find that however interesting may be the development of the theory of kingship in these works, they make after all but a slight contribution to political theory.∗

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∗ Strictly speaking it is the Mahāpurāṇas alone that should be included along with the minor Smṛitis in the present section, but for the sake of convenience it has been thought advisable to draw upon the minor Purāṇas as well.

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† A remarkable instance of what we think to be pious plagiarism occurs in the Agni Purāṇa (CCXXXVII-CCXLI) which contains a long discourse on Nīti that purports to have been addressed by king Rāma to his brother Lakṣmaṇa. It consists in reality of a string of unacknowledged quotations culled from the successive chapters of Kāmandaka’s Nītisāra.

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‡ A further sign of decline in our view is the description in the Garuḍa Purāṇa (CVIII 1) of Nītiśāstra as a science of general morals, of which the art of government Arthaśāstra is a branch.

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∗ The paucity of political ideas in the Purāṇas and the minor Smritis is explained partly at any rate by their nature and scope. The Purāṇas, as Prof. Bühler pointed out long ago (S. B. E. Vol. XXV, Preface, p. xci), are "popular sectarian compilations of mythology, philosophy, history and the sacred law, intended, as they are now used, for the instruction of the unlettered classes, including the upper divisions of the Śūdravarṇa, the so-called Sachchhudras." The minor Smritis, again, apart from the fact that they have come down to us mostly in a fragmentary form, are concerned in the main with the branches of civil and criminal law alone.

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To illustrate the political ideas of the works that we are now considering, it will be enough to describe their theories of kingship. The Purāṇas repeat in some passages the older view of the primary importance of the king's office from the standpoint of the subjects. The author of the Brihaddharma Purāṇa, for instance, declares in one place that the four orders (āśramas) are capable of enjoying their existence only under the king's protection, while the prosperity that exists in the absence of the king depends upon another person and is therefore insecure.† It is, however, mainly upon the doctrine of the king's divine nature—a doctrine which, as we have seen elsewhere, is as old as the Vedic Saṁhitās—that the authors whom we are now considering depend for the purpose of stressing the principle of monarchical authority. Thus the author last cited declares in one place that the king has a divine body in the form of a mortal, and again, that the king who has the same physical attributes and limbs as other men lives on earth as a god.∗ The idea of the king's divinity is presented by these authors in the two distinct forms that we have found to occur in the Manusamhitā and the Śāntiparvan, namely, that involving the equivalence of the king's functions to those of the deities and that signifying the king's creation by the Supreme God out of the divine elements. Both these notions, it will be presently seen, are connected with the king's fulfilment of the essential duties of his office. The first may be illustrated by means of the following examples. The king, we are told by Nārada as well as Brihatparāśara, assumes the forms of five deities, namely Fire, Indra, the Moon, Yama and Kubera, according as he fulfils an equivalent number of functions.† Slightly altered versions of the above may be traced in the Mārkaṇḍeya and the Brihaddharma Purāṇas.‡ The account in the Agni Purāṇa is somewhat different in as much as it conceives the king as assuming the forms of nine deities according to the nature of his functions. The king, we are told, is like the sun because he can be gazed at with difficulty on account of his lustre; he is like the moon because he is the object of gratification to the people through his sight; he is the god of wind since he sweeps the world with his spies; he is Manu Vaivasvata because of his punishing crimes; he is the god of fire when he burns the evil-minded; he is Kubera when he gives away wealth to the twice-born; he is Varuṇa since he showers wealth; he is the Earth as he sustains the world by his forbearance, and he is the god Hari because he protects the people by exercising the powers of enthusiasm, counsel, and the like.∗

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† Quoted in Hemādri, Chaturvargachintāmaṇi, Vratakhaṇḍam, Vol. II, p. 1060. The same idea is conveyed in another passage of the Brihaddharma Purāṇa (Pūrva-khaṇḍam IV 33) in the form of a striking metaphor. There it is declared that a land without a king is like a woman without a husband.

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∗ Quoted, Hemādri (loc. cit.). Nārada (XVIII 52) compares the king to a deity.

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† Quoted in Mitramiśra's Rājanītiprakāśa, pp. 20-21. The text of Nārada here cited corresponds to chapter XVIII 26-31 of the published work. (Vide S. B. E. Vol. XXXIII pp. 217-218). In another passage quoted by Mitramiśra (op. cit. pp. 21-22) Nārada adds, "The king by virtue of his brightness and purity is like the Being without beginning and without end, provided he does not stray from the path (of duty)."

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‡ The list in the Mārkaṇḍeya (XVII 21) has the Sun and Wind in place of Fire and Kubera, while that of the Brihaddharma (Uttarakhandam III 6-7) has Īśa (Śiva) and Varuṇa in the place of Indra and Kubera,

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∗ CCXXV 17-20.

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Let us next mention the passages illustrating the doctrine of the king's divine creation. Bṛihatparāśara states in one place that the Creator formed the king out of the essences of eight separate deities whose names are specified by the author.† This idea occurs in an amplified form in the Bṛihaddharma Purāṇa which states that the Lord of creatures (Prajāpati) formed the king's person by taking lordship from Indra, power from Agni, cruelty from Yama, prosperity from the Moon, riches from the god of wealth, and steadiness from Viṣṇu.‡

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† Vide Mitramiśra, op. cit., p. 16.

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‡ Uttarakhaṇḍam III 8-9. The Matsya Purāṇa (CCXXVI 1-12) combines the idea of the king's divine creation with that of the equivalence of his functions to those of the deities.

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The theory of the king's divine nature naturally leads to that of the submission and obedience of the subjects, which the canonical authors whom we are now treating appear likewise to have derived from the Manusaṁhitā and the Mahābhārata. This obligation on the part of the subjects is justified, as before, partly on the ground of the primary importance of the king's office and partly on that of his divine nature.∗ The Brihaddharma Purāṇa states in one place that the king assumes the forms of five distinct deities and therefore none should harm or vilify him.† According to Devala the mother is Hari (Viṣṇu), the father is a deity, the elder brother is the god Kriṣṇa, the preceptor is the god Viṣṇu, and the king is a god in visible form; therefore none should harm them.‡ The king's command, so runs a couple of verses in Nārada, makes impure men pure and *vice versa*: hence he should not be slighted or abused.§ Elsewhere Nārada declares in language recalling a celebrated text of Gautama's Dharmaśāstra, "Two persons, a Brāhmaṇa and a king, are declared to be exempt from censure and corporal punishment in this world; for these two sustain the visible world."||

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∗ Nārada, it will be presently seen, adds a third ground involving the king's personal merit, which we are doubtless to understand was acquired by the latter in his previous birth.

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† Uttarakhaṇḍam III 6-7.

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‡ Vide Hemādri, Chaturvargachintāmaṇi, Prāyaśchittakhaṇḍam pp. 76-77.

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§ Vide Mitramiśra, *op. cit.* p. 22.

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|| XV and XVI 20, Jolly's translation. Cf. Gaut. VIII 1-3; XI 31-32, quoted pp. 62-63, supra. We may mention in this connection that Nārada (XVIII 12) forbids advising or rebuking a king as well as a Brāhmaṇa on account of their dignity and sanctity, and elsewhere (Ibid 54) he includes both the king and the Brāhmaṇa in the list of eight sacred objects.

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While in the above extracts the canonical authors would seem to teach the king's right of immunity from harm, they inculcate in other passages more or less on the same twofold basis of the king's divinity and the nature of his office the duty of obedience on the part of the subjects. The king's command, says Brihatparāśara in one place, is his great majesty ; he who disregards this should be slain by means of weapons. Whatever the king hears, does and speaks, should be done by all his subjects. He who disregards the king's power at once perishes. Finally the author clinches his arguments by putting a question. "Who will not," he asks, "obey the command of the person that quickly does, sees, hears, knows, causes to shine and protects, everything, since he is born out of the essences of all deities?"[^asterisk] We may notice in this passage a tendency to develop the older teaching relating to the obedience of the subjects. This tendency, we think, is most prominent in the next passage that we shall consider. The king's command, says Nārada in one place, should be obeyed, otherwise death would follow. What the king says, be it right or wrong, is the law (dharma) of the suitors. The king lives on this earth like a visible Indra ; the people cannot prosper by violating his orders. Whatever a king does is right, that is the settled rule, because the protection of the world is entrusted to him and on account of his majesty and benignity towards all creatures. As a husband though worthless must be always worshipped by his wives, in the same way the king though feeble should be worshipped by his subjects. Through fear of the king's command the people do not swerve from their duties. The subjects are purchased by the king's austerity, he is their master, therefore they should submit to his command ; their pursuits of

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[^asterisk]: \* Vide Mitramiśra, op. cit. p. 23.

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agriculture, pasturage and the like (vārtā), depend upon the king.∗ In this extract it is categorically stated that the king should be honoured irrespectively of his personal qualifications, and his orders obeyed without reference to their moral justification. Whether the further implication of this theory as involving absolute non-resistance on the part of the subjects was realized by the author, it is impossible to say. But there can be no doubt that the above passage marks the culmination of the Hindu doctrines of submission and obedience and makes the closest approach to the Western theory of Divine Right.

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∗ Quoted, Mitramiśra, *op. cit.* p. 22.

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And yet while sufficiently emphasizing as above the principle of monarchical authority, the authors whom we are now considering are careful to re-iterate, however partially, the principles tending to check the abuse of the king's power. These writers, to begin with, repeatedly express the idea that the king is the universal protector.† The duty of protection moreover, is enjoined by means of the usual sanctions. It should further be observed that as in the Manusamhitā, the conception of the king's divine creation is here held to involve his divinely ordained duty of protection rather than his divine right to rule.†

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† The Garuḍapurāṇa (vide Mitramiśra, *op. cit.* p. 30) declares that the king is the strength of the weak. A passage of the Kālikāpurāṇa (Ibid p. 30) states that the king is the son of the sonless, the riches of the poor, the mother of the motherless, the father of the fatherless, the protector of those who have no supporter, the husband of the widow, the servant of those who have none such and the friend of men. Brihaspati (Ibid p. 24) declares that the king (rājan) is so called because he gladdens (rañjayati) his subjects with the fourfold division of his troops and because he shines in his own person. A text of Kātyāyana (Ibid p. 30) mentions that the king is called the preceptor of those who have none, the home of the homeless, the son of the sonless, and the father of the fatherless.

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^∗ The Brihaddharmapurāṇa (Uttarakhaṇḍam III 10-11) states that the king who protects his subjects acquires the sixth part of their spiritual merit and performs, as it were, a thousand Aśvamedha sacrifices. According to the Mārkaṇḍeya-purāṇa (XXVII 31) the king gains a portion of righteousness by protecting his subjects. The king, we are told in the Agni-purāṇa (CCXXII 7; 9-11), who oppresses his subjects shall live for ever in hell. The person who protects his subjects, the author continues, lives as it were in heaven, while hell is the abode of the man whose subjects are not protected. The king earns a sixth part of the merits as well as the demerits of his subjects. He acquires virtue by means of protection and incurs sin by its default.

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† Cf. Matsya Purāṇa (CCXXVI 1) where the king is said to have been created by the Self—existent One (*i.e.* Brahmā) for the purpose of inflicting punishment and of protecting all creatures. For the view in the Manusamhitā, vide p. 185, supra.

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