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A History of Hindu Political Theories from the Earliest Times to the End of the First Quarter of the Seventeenth Century A.D. c12.s2: I

A History of Hindu Political Theories from the Earliest Times to the End of the First Quarter of the Seventeenth Century A.D. c12.s2

Language
English

I

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In the course of our survey of Hindu political thought in the preceding chapter, we have brought down its history to the period of the great catastrophe which overtook the land in the eleventh and twelfth centuries A. D.,—we mean, of course, the conquest of Northern India by the arms of Islam.∗ The works that we have to consider in the present place,—the Śukranīti no less than the commentary of Mādhavāchārya and the two great mediaeval Digests incorporating separate sections on the rules of polity (Nīti),—belong to a time when the foreign conquerors had established their unquestioned sway over some of the fairest and largest provinces of India. Yet it is noticeable that the chain of continuity in this case was not broken at all, that the authors of this period, in other words, follow however modestly the track laid down by their great predecessors. Indeed if we have to look for any direct trace of the influence of foreign rule in the field which we are now treating, we shall find it perhaps merely in the scantiness and the pronounced dogmatic tendency of the latest phase of the indigenous thought.

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∗ Hemachandra lived from 1086 to 1173 A. D. The Indian invasions of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni began *c.* 1000 A. D.

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The Śukranīti which in spite of its complex and miscellaneous nature represents the literature of Nīti during this period, is the last notable monument of the Hindu genius of political speculation. It freely incorporates whole passages and even extracts from the old literature on polity.† But it is distinguished, as we hope to show presently, from other mediæval compilations of a similar nature by the freshness, not to say, originality of its outlook upon certain standard branches of political theory.∗

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† Thus to confine ourselves to the first chapter of the Śukranīti, we find that Śukra I 22^b=Śāntiparvan CXXXIX 57^b; Śukra I 64-65=Kāmandaka I 9-10; Śukra I 71=Manu VII 4; Śukra I 97-104=Kāmandaka I 26-27; 29; 39-40; 42-44.

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∗ The Śukranīti is attributed to Śukrāchārya, the preceptor of the demons, but it was doubtless produced by an unknown author of the late mediæval period who aspired to cast the halo of venerable antiquity around his production by tracing its creation back to an indefinite past. Its exact date is still uncertain. Gustav Oppert who published the standard edition of this work held (Preface, p. viii) that it "belonged to the same period which produced the Smriti and the early epic literature." His view which necessitated the belief in the existence of guns and gunpowder in Ancient India is at the present time completely discredited. One of the latest contributors to the controversy regarding Śukra's date is *Prof. Benoy Kumar Sarkar (Positive Background of Hindu Sociology.* Vol. II Part I, pp. 65-67).

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Śukra applies to his own work the title (Nītisāra) that was used by Kāmandaka as the designation of his treatise. His conception of the science, however, is somewhat different from that of the older writer. To him Nītiśāstra is much more than the Art of Government in the stereotyped monarchic State. Thus it is significant that while Kāmandaka addresses himself specifically to the kings,† Śukra introduces his work by stating in a general fashion that it has been written for the benefit of kings and others whose span of life is too short to permit the study of the archetype of Nītiśāstra prepared by the god Brahmā.‡

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† Vide Kāmandaka I 8: upārjane pālane cha bhūmerbhūmiśvaram prati etc. Here the words 'bhūmiśvaraṁ prati' 'to the rulers of the earth' are used, as the commentator remarks, on the ground that any other person is not eligible to the science of polity (anyasya tu rājavidyāyāmanadhikārāt).

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‡ Vide Śukra I 2-3: "The divine Self-existent One revealed the Nītiśāstra consisting of one hundred lakhs of verses for the good of the world. The summary of that work, concise and filled with argument, (has been prepared) by ourselves, Vasiṣṭha and the rest, for the sake of ensuring prosperity and for the good of kings and others who enjoy a limited tenure of existence."

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In the same context we are told that Nītiśāstra is the source of livelihood of all persons (sarvopajīvakam) and maintains the established usage of the people (lokasthitikrit). In accordance with this conception of the science we find the author devoting a separate chapter of his work¹ to the subject of general (sādhāraṇa) Nītiśāstra which is conceived by him to be applicable to all persons. In this chapter he gives a list of moral maxims and rules of good conduct which he declares at its end² to pertain to the king as well as the subjects.

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¹ * Ch. III.

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² † III 324.

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Thus politics or the art of government in Śukra's system is not an independent branch of study, but is merged in a science of general morals.³ What, then, is the use of this comprehensive science, especially in comparison with the sister sciences. As the rules of kingly policy are conceived to be the core of the Nītiśāstra, it follows that its primary use must be for the king. On this point Śukra expresses himself quite clearly. Since the Nītiśāstra, he says at the beginning of his book, is the root of virtue, wealth and desire, and bestows salvation, it should be constantly studied with care by the king; through its knowledge kings and others conquer their foes, and gratify their subjects. Further on the author observes that the primary duty of the king (*viz.* the protection of the subjects and the chastisement of the wicked) is impossible without Nīti: indeed, the neglect to follow Nīti is the king's principal loophole for attack, and increases his enemies and diminishes his strength. The king who gives up Nīti and becomes self-willed (svatantra) suffers pain.∗ The author continues in the same strain through the following lines, but these do not add anything to the argument.

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³ ‡ For a similar conception cf. Garuḍa Purāṇa CVIII 1 quoted, p. 223 supra.

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∗ I 5-6; 14-16.

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Nītiśāstra, then, is the *sine qua non* of the king's successful administration. But since it is much more than an Art of Government, it necessarily fulfils a higher purpose than the interests of the king alone. The author's view in this matter is presented in connexion with a remarkable estimate of the relative values of Nītiśāstra and the parallel sciences. The contrast first turns on the scope of the two sets of studies. Other branches of knowledge, Śukra states, enlighten the people only on one aspect of human activities (kriyaikadeśabodhīni), but Nītiśāstra is the source of livelihood of all creatures and maintains the established usage of men. Turning to the next point the author states the case against the other studies in the following manner. May not, he asks, there exist the knowledge of words and their meaning without Grammar, or that of ordinary categories without reasonings discussed in Logic, or that of the regulation of rules and actions without Mīmāmsā, or that of transitoriness of the body and such other things without Vedānta? These branches of knowledge, Śukra grants, teach their respective doctrines and are constantly upheld by those persons who severally follow their teaching. But, he asks, what does this skill in intelligence which is derived from these sciences avail to persons engaged in their ordinary occupations? While such are the limitations of the above sciences, Nītiśāstra, the author conceives, stands on a quite different footing. Without Nīti, he says, the maintenance of the established usage of men is impossible just as that of the body is impossible without food.∗ In the above extract, it will be observed, primacy is claimed for Nītiśāstra on two grounds which, yet, are closely connected with each other. Firstly, it is urged that this science unlike the rest fulfils the interests of all people. In the second place, and here we touch on the intense realism of Śukra's thought,—while Grammar, Logic, Mīmāṁsā and even the holy Vedānta are conceived by the author to be merely theoretical studies having no importance even within their own province and no bearing on the ordinary affairs of men, Nītiśāstra is held to be the most practical science: it is, in the author's expressive words, as indispensable to the social order as food is to the human body.

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∗ I 4-5; 7-11. [^\dagger]: I 61-62.

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We may begin our analysis of political ideas in the Śukranīti by considering the author's treatment of the concept of seven factors of sovereignty. After giving the standard list of those factors he writes, "Among these the king is declared to be the head, the minister (is) the eye, the ally the ear, the treasury the mouth, the army the mind, while the fort and the territory are the two arms and legs."[^\dagger] In this striking passage is presented for the first time, so far as we are aware, in the history of Hindu political theory, a complete analogy between the factors of sovereignty and the organs of living beings. This, we think, is not sufficient to warrant the conception of organic unity of sovereignty, although it implies, without directly expressing the same, the notion of co-ordination of the factors thereof to a common end.

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The theories of kingship in the Śukranīti, we think, are largely based upon those of the earlier writers, but they present some points of remarkable, if not original, interest. Śukra admits in one place that the king and the people are helpful to each other, for he writes, "The people do not follow their respective duties without the king's protection; on the other hand, the king does not prosper on earth without the people."[^asterisk] This passage, however, is preceded by two other verses which occur likewise in Kāmandaka.dagger According to these the king when he is approved by the aged causes prosperity and rejoicing, but if he were not to be a perfect guide, the people would suffer utter destruction like a boat at sea without the helmsman. According to this view, then, the happiness as well as the misery of the subjects depends upon the varying quality of the king. With this is connected an idea that we have found to occur in the Mahābhārata,[^ddagger] namely that the king is the maker of the epoch. Time, Śukra says in one place, is divided according to the seasons (namely, the rainy, the cold and the hot), the courses of the stars, as well as the observance of good and bad along with greater and less conduct. As the king, the author continues, directs the observance of conduct, he is the cause of time; for if time were to be the authority, the fruit of good works

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dagger † I 64-65 = Kam. I 9-10. [^ddagger]: ‡ Supra p. 187.

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[^asterisk]: * I 66.

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would not belong to the performer thereof.∗ The conception of the king's office that is embodied in the above passage is not, as we have said, an original one, but a greater definiteness may, we think, be observed in the present case in as much as the varying degree and quality of the conduct that is enforced by the king is brought by Śukra into relation with the astronomical and the seasonal measurements of time.†

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∗ I 21-22.

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† It may be further observed in this connection that Śukra bases his conclusion in the above extract upon what may be called the doctrine of Free Will. Śukra, indeed, while believing in the joint operation of self-exertion and destiny in the affairs of men, inculcates reliance upon the former rather than upon the latter. Cf. Ibid I 48-49.

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Besides exhibiting the importance of the king's office from the point of view of the subjects, the author mentions in justification of monarchical authority a doctrine which is shared by him with at least one other writer,‡ namely that the king rules his subjects by virtue of his merit. Śukra is a great believer in the doctrine of karma, and expresses himself on this point with characteristic emphasis. "Karma alone," he writes in one place, "gives rise to good and bad conditions on this earth; the deeds done in a previous birth (prāktana) are themselves nothing but karma; who can even for an instant exist without karma?"§ In the following lines he explains that the division of society into five classes, namely the Brāhmaṇa, the Kṣatriya the Vaiśya, the Śūdra and the barbarian arises not from birth but from quality and merit (guṇakarmabhiḥ). In another place he declares that men are directed towards virtue and vice by desires assuming such forms as would help the fulfilment of the deeds done in the previous birth, and he concludes that it is most certainly in accordance with such deeds that everything happens.∗ Applying this basic concept of Hindu thought to the specific case of the king, Śukra writes, "The king acquires supernatural lustre (tejas) by means of his austerities (tapas), and he becomes the director, the protector as well as the source of delight; the king sustains the earth by means of his work done in his previous birth (prāktana) as well as by his austerities (tapas)"† According to this view, then, the king rules his subjects by his own merit—merit conceived as consisting mainly in the sum total of deeds done in the previous birth. The doctrine is repeated in another passage where the author, we think, boldly alters a text of the Manusaṁhitā to suit his own theory. He writes, "The king becomes the lord of (both) the movable and the immovable beings through his own austerities (tapas), taking (for that purpose) the eternal particles of Indra, of the Wind, of Yama, of the Sun, of Fire, of Varuṇa, of the Moon, and of the Lord of wealth (Kubera)."‡

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‡ The reference is to Nārada whose view is quoted pp. 228-229 supra.

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§ I 37.

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∗ I 45-47. Śukra, indeed, is such a staunch believer in karma that he explains (I 49) destiny itself to be the work performed in the previous birth.

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† I 20. For a similar idea compare I 122 where sovereignty (svāmitvam) is said to be the fruit of austerities.

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‡ I 71-72. Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara, in his edition of the Śukranīti (p. 17), prefixes to these verses another verse which is identical with Manusaṁhitā VII 3. This would make Śukra reproduce *verbatim* Manu's theory of the creation of kingship. The last-named verse, however, does not occur in Gustav Oppert's standard edition which has been uniformly followed in this work.

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The last passage obviously brings Śukra into line with the exponents of the doctrine relating to the divine nature of the king. Of the two forms in which this doctrine occurs in the earlier writings, Śukra adopts the one that involves the equivalence of the king's functions to those of the deities. This is embodied in the lines immediately following the extract quoted above. As Indra, we are told, is capable of collecting his own dues and of protection, so is the king : as the Wind propagates smell, so the king directs the good and the bad actions : as the Sun removes darkness, so the king directs men to virtue and destroys unrighteousness : the king, while punishing the evil deeds, is Yama since the latter inflicts punishment : like Fire the king is pure and appropriates his own dues from all persons for their protection : as the god Varuṇa sustains the whole earth, so does the king with his wealth : as the Moon gladdens the people with its rays, so does the king with his own merits and deeds : the king who is able to preserve his treasure is as the god Kubera with respect to his jewels.∗

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∗ I 73-76.
* I 93-94.

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We have thus found in Śukra a twofold principle justifying the king's authority over his subjects. The king, it is held, is the maker of his age and rules by personal merit. With this is combined the notion that the king is a multiple deity by virtue of the resemblance of his functions to those of the deities. Let us next consider what privileges are claimed by the author on behalf of the king in the light of the above principles. We may begin by mentioning the remarkable passage which makes monarchy, as it were, the natural and necessary condition of the subjects. "The king, although endowed with good qualities, may sometimes lack sovereignty over his subjects, but the latter, be they never so wicked, must not live without a king." The author makes his meaning clear in the immediately following passage by employing a bold mythological simile. "As Indrāṇī (*i.e.* the queen of Indra) is never without a husband, so are the subjects never (without a master,'"* Śukra, moreover, inculcates in the earlier fashion the duties which the subjects owe to their ruler. The people, he says in one place, should salute the king as if he were an incarnation of Viṣṇu, and they should not divulge the king's secrets or even think of harming or slaying him.†

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† II 212; 231. Elsewhere (III 50) the author enjoins honouring of the king along with that of the gods, the preceptor, Fire, ascetics and the like.

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The above represents only one aspect of Śukra's thought with regard to kingship. The other aspect is concerned as in the earlier works with the formulation of principles tending to check the abuses of the king's power. Thus in the first place the author insists that protection is the high duty of the king. "The gods kill and cast down the king who does not afford protection, the Brāhmaṇa who does not practise austerities and the rich man who does not give alms."‡ In another place where he mentions the eightfold occupation of the king, Śukra includes protection of the subjects in the category.§

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‡ I 121.

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§ I 124-125.

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While on this subject we may mention a remarkable dictum of Śukra which involves, we think, an extreme development of the old Hindu maxim of the co-ordination of taxation and protection. The king, says the author in one place, having the aspect of a master was appointed by Brahmā to the service (dāsyatva) of the people, with his own share of the produce as his fee (svabhāgabhrityā) for the purpose of constantly protecting them.∗ According to this view, then, the king is the servant of the people by divine creation, and he receives his share of the produce as his fee for the service of protection.†

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∗ I 188.

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† It is instructive to compare the doctrine of Śukra with its counterpart in the work of Āryadeva (p. 209 supra). Both these writers categorically state the doctrine that the king is the servant of the people, receiving his share of the produce as his fee. But while the Buddhist author apparently derived it as a corollary from the theory of Contract, his Brāhmaṇa successor explicitly based it upon the king's divine creation. This divergence may tend to show how completely the Brahminical view of the origin of kingship had swept its Buddhist rival out of the field.

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Besides insisting with the earlier writers upon the king's primary duty of protection, Śukra follows them in making righteousness the rule of the king's conduct.‡ It is in this connection that the author distinguishes, for the first time, so far as we are aware, in the history of Hindu political theory, between the good king and the tyrant from the point of view of the king's divine nature— a distinction which, we think, was not needed by the older writers because of their uniform inculcation of the primary duty of protection. The righteous king, Śukra says in one place, is a part of the gods, while the reverse who destroys righteousness and oppresses his subjects is a part of the demons.∗ In another place we are told that the good king is derived from particles of the gods, while his opposite is a part of the demons.† Elsewhere Śukra divides kings into three classes, namely those endowed with the quality of goodness (satva), of darkness (tamas) and of passion (rajas), and he declares that while the first class of kings assimilates the particles of the gods, the second assimilates those of the demons, and the third those of men.‡

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‡ I 67-69. Cf. Kām. I 15-17.

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∗ I 70.

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† I 86-87.

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‡ I 29-35.

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Finally, it must be observed that Śukra, however much he may insist upon the duty of obeying the king, is no believer in the doctrine of unlimited obedience. He counsels the subjects in one place to abandon the land ruled by a bad king.§ In another place, without going so far as to sanction the right of tyrannicide, he concedes to the people the right of deposing bad rulers. If the king, we are told, although high-born, becomes averse to good qualities, policy and strength (guṇanītivaladveṣī.) and is unrighteous, he should be repudiated as the enemy of the kingdom (rāṣṭravināśaka). In his place the purohita should instal a virtuous prince of his family for the protection of the kingdom after obtaining the approval of the subjects." ||

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§ III 43 ; 45.

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|| II 274-275. The above view may be connected with Śukra's insistence upon merit instead of birth as constituting the king's title to respect. The king, he says in one place (I 182), is honoured not so much for his high birth as for his possession of the qualities of strength, prowess and valour.

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When we proceed to examine the next class of works that falls within the limits of this chapter, we cannot fail to be struck with a sense of disappointment. The commentary of the distinguished scholar Mādhava on the Smriti work of Parāśara represents during this period the tradition of the canonical scholiasts, just as the Nītimayūkha of Nīlakaṇṭha and the Rājanītiprakāśa of Mitramiśra may be held to be the representatives of the literature on polity (Nīti). These authors, however, present few theories of politics properly so called, and none marked by original thinking. Beginning with Mādhava we find that he conceives the king to be an incarnation of God, and connects this belief with the king’s fulfilment of his elementary duty of protection. He writes, “As the divine incarnation in the form of Rāma and others came into existence for punishing the mighty Rāvaṇa and others like him, so the divine incarnation in the form of the king (rājāvatāra) is born for the purpose of punishing lowly beings like thieves and the rest.”¹ In another place Mādhava mentions in justification of the king’s right of jurisdiction the old Brahminical doctrine of the king’s divine creation out of the essences of the gods. He says, “In as much as the king by virtue of his being created from the essences of the Moon, Indra and other gods, is competent to decide suits like the non-payment of debts, he should try the same.”²

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¹ * Commentary on Parāśara, Vyavahārakhaṇḍam, pp. 5-6.

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² † Ibid pp. 10-13.

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We may next consider the author’s treatment of the question relating to the incidence of the rights and duties pertaining to the Kṣatriya ruler. The great scholiasts of the preceding epoch, as we have observed in another place, held these duties to be applicable to all rulers of kingdoms and even in one case to the subordinate executive officers as well.∗ Mādhava characteristically adopts the contrary view, and upholds it by the method of dogmatic interpretation alone. He develops his argument in the style of the mediæval Hindu schoolmen by putting forward a preliminary objection (pūrvapakṣa) and ending with the demonstrated conclusion (siddhānta). Commenting on a verse of Parāśara, he says, “It may be contended that in the words ‘the king (rājan) should punish’ [Parāśara I 60] the right even of the ruler of the kingdom (bhūpāla) to punish is indicated. How then can this (punishment) be said to be the special duty of the Kṣatriya?” To this the author replies, “Not so, since in the section on the expiation of sins by the performance of sacrifices (aveṣṭi) the term ‘rājan’ has been explained by means of the office of a Kṣatriya.”[^\dagger] This argument is expanded by Mādhava in the following lines, but it is unnecessary to quote them here.

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∗ Vide pp. 234-236 supra. [^\dagger]: p. 393, Bibliotheca Indica edition.

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The above idea of kingship as an office applicable to the Kṣatriya order alone is repeated by Nīlakaṇṭha, who adopts the identical method of dogmatic interpretation. He writes in the opening passage of his work, “Now the word ‘rājan’ applies to the Kṣatriya alone, not to one who is qualified for kingship. For it has been explained in the section on the expiation of sin by performing sacrifices (aveṣṭi) that kingship comes into existence after consecration, while the canonical directions given beforehand in the words ‘the king should be consecrated’ can appertain to the Kṣatriya alone.”

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Mitramiśra differs from both the above writers in his treatment of the concept of kingship. Indeed he follows the example of the great scholiasts of the former period in extending the duties of kingship to all rulers of kingdoms and even to the subordinate officials. His argument like that of the earlier writers depends upon verbal interpretation combined with the idea of the necessary relation between protection and the collection of taxes. He observes, after quoting the first verse of Manu’s seventh chapter, “In these cases too (namely, those of the texts cited by the author in the above context from the Smṛitis and Purāṇas), in the following words explaining kingly duties ‘I shall explain the kingly duties’ etc., the term king (rājan) implies by derivative interpretation a king possessing the lordship of a kingdom. This is the correct interpretation, for by the above-quoted reasoning (*viz.* that of Vijñāneśvara) the word king (rājan) would signify the Kṣatriya in general.” Further on he writes, “Though this body of kingly duties is explained with reference to kings, it must be understood to apply in some sense to one engaged in protecting a part of a kingdom etc., who may be of a different caste. For in the extracts (from the Manusamhitā), ‘I shall speak of kingly duties’ and ‘what conduct the king (nṛipa) should follow,’ the word ‘nripa’ is separately used, and the collection of taxes has protection for its object, while protection (itself) depends upon the exercise of the sceptre.’”cont∗

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cont∗ * Ibid p. 14.

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