The Army of the Indian Moghuls: Its Organization and Administration c24: Chapter XXII
The Army of the Indian Moghuls: Its Organization and Administration c24
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Chapter XXII
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Dr. Horn devotes many pages (71—105) to reproducing detailed battle pieces. These comprise Bābar's first battle at Pānīpat, 21st April 1526, Bābar's battle against Rānā Sangā, 16th March 1527, Akbar's battle at Pānīpat, 5th Nov. 1556, the battle at Korah between Shāh Shujāʿ and ʿĀlamgīr, 3rd Jan. 1659, and the taking of a mountain pass near Ajmer. Most of these serve more as specimens of style than as plain and direct reports of what happened at these actions. All of them, except Bābar's own description of the battle of the 21st April 1526, are written in that deplorably inflated, rhetorical style, of which Persian and Indian writers are so proud, where sense is drowned in sound and plain facts are buried under far-fetched metaphor. Such turgid stuff reduces the translator to despair and engenders disgust in the European reader. As will have been noticed, Dr. Horn brings his specimens no further down than the first year of ʿĀlamgīr's reign. There was much fighting in the rest of that reign and in the following reigns, and from the later historians it would be possible to put together accounts of many other battles. I may instance those of Jājau (1707), Āgrah (1712), Hasanpur (1720).
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For the first of these recourse might be had to Niʿamat Khān (afterwards Dānishmand Khān), poetically Āʿlī. This well known poet and literary man, who died 30th Rabīʿ i, 1122 H., 28th May 1710, was appointed historiographer by Bahādur Shāh, and has left two descriptions of the battle at Jājau, in which his patron defeated a brother, Aʿzam Shāh, and obtained the throne. That in the *Bahādur Shāh-nāmah* is the simpler; the other, a separate work known as the *Jang-nāmah*, is written in the florid, full-blown manner which was considered requisite for such show pieces. It is a very clever performance; an admirable specimen of a detestable *genre*. The proportion of bread to sack may be known from the fact that when, after transcribing the whole piece, I proceeded to make an excerpt of the bare facts, I found that they occupied only one-fifth of the original space.
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Following Dr. Horn’s example, I will give a description of the battle of Ḥasanpur, fought on the 13th Nov. 1720. On the 28th Sept. 1719, Muḥammad Shāh had been raised to the throne at Āgrah by the two Sayyad brothers, ʿAbdullah Khān and Ḥusain ʿAlī Khān. Shortly afterwards (8th Oct. 1720), with Muḥammad Shāh’s tacit approval, the younger brother was assassinated. ʿAbdullah Khān thereupon raised another scion of the royal house, Prince Ibrāhīm, to the throne, and marched from Dihlī against Muḥammad Shāh, who was coming from the south-east. Just before the decisive battle, the emperor’s head-quarters were at Ḥasanpur, those of ʿAbdullah Khān about six miles further north, at Bilūchpur. Both places are between Mathurā and Dihlī, on the right bank of the Jamnah, in parganah Palwal. The authorities on which the following description is founded are 1) Kāmwar Khān, 2) Shiū Dās, 3) Khāfī Khān, 4) Mḥd Qāsim, Lāhorī, 5) Mḥd Shafīʿ, Wārid, 6) Khwājah ʿAbd-ul-Karīm, Kashmīrī, and 7) Mḥd ʿUmr, son of Khiẓr Khān.
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The Battle of Ḥasanpur. Early in the morning of Wednesday the 13th Muḥarram 1133 H. (13th Nov. 1720), before the sun rose, Muḥammad Shāh mounted his elephant, Pādshāh Pasand, and took his place in the centre. Ḥaidar Qulī Khān was sent on ahead with the strong artillery force under his command¹; while Khān Daurān and Sābit Khān were ordered to follow and support him with the left wing. Muḥammad Khān, Bangash, and Sa‘ādat Khān were sent towards the river and the rear. Round his Majesty’s person were the new wazīr, Muḥammad Amīn Khān, and his son, Qamr-ud-dīn Khān, Dil Daler Khān, Sher Afkan Khān, Hizbar Khān and others. Zafar Khān, Fakhr-ud-dīn Khān, his brother, Rājah Bahādūr of Kishngarh, Nuṣrat Yār Khān, Jag Rām (Jai Singh’s dīwān) ‘Azīz Khān, Mīr Mushrif, and Rājah Gopāl Singh, Bhadauriyah, were placed in charge of the main camp, which was at a distance of one kos from the position taken up by the emperor. The prisoner, Ratn Chand, dīwān of ‘Abdullah Khān, was now sent for. He was brought before the emperor on an elephant; he was there made to dismount, and was at once executed. The severed head was thrown before the emperor’s elephant and trodden under foot.
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¹ If we are to interpret Khūshḥāl Chand literally, Berlin Ms. 495, fol. 1014b, Ḥaidar Qulī Khān used a telescope to make out the enemy’s position. He says H. Q. K. at a distance of one farsakh (3 miles) saw the enemy’s army by the eye of a dūr-bīn (telescope). Or is it only his “farseeing eye” (chashm-i-dūrbīn)? A late writer (c. 1790) Rustam ‘Alī, Bijnorī, in his “History of the Rohelahs”, fol. 52b, states that at the battle of Panīpat in January 1761, Aḥmad Shāh, Durrānī, used a telescope (dūr-bīn) to watch the movements of the Mahrattahs. As he was writing thirty years after the event, I do not know whether he is to be relied on for such a detail. Also in the Ḥusain Shāhī of Imām-ud-dīn Chistī, fol. 65b, we have mention of the field telescope as used by Taimur Shāh, son of Aḥmad Shāh, Abdālī: “The king mounted his elephant and slowly inspected the army. From time to time he raised his telescope to his eye” (qarīb-i-chasm-i-mubārik guzāsht). This telescope produced unexpected results for some of the commanders: they received a severe beating from the sticks of the nasaqchis sent to them. A learned man standing by the king, puzzled by this infliction of punishment, asked what it meant. Taimūr Shāh replied: “Through my telescope I saw that these commanders were seated under the shade of their horses, while the men of their regiments were exposed to the full heat of the sun. Tomorrow I will give them robes of honour to console them”.
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Churā Jāt, who was hovering near the army on the west, cut off many followers and penetrated into the camp. But the above-named Rājahs drove him out again. Next the Jāts attacked on the south, whence they carried off some goods and part of the imperial property. Zafar Khān, Muzaffar Khān and Muḥammad Khān, Bangash, once more repelled them. They then made a further attempt on the east side. Here Mīr Mushrif and ʿAlwī Khān, Tarīn, of Lakhnau, met and defeated them. But the uproar was very great, and the camp followers and traders were so frightened, that they jumped into the Jamnah and tried to swim across it, many losing their lives in the attempt. By three o'clock the baggage camp was moved to a safer place, and the confusion continuing, it was again moved still farther off.
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When Najm-ud-dīn ʿAlī Khān at the head of the Sayyad vanguard, appeared in the distance from the direction of the river, Ḥaidar Qulī Khān, the imperial Mīr Ātash, moved out his heavy cannon into the open, and encountered the advancing enemy with a storm of balls from them and his field-pieces. The fire was so continuous and heavy that the artillery of the other side was silenced. After every volley Ḥaidar Qulī Khān urged on his men by lavish gifts of gold and silver. As the artillery advanced, the rest of the army followed and occupied the ground. Stimulated by their commander's liberality, the gunners worked zealously, and a second set of guns were loaded by the time the first were discharged. Khān Daurān's troops moved in support of the imperial artillery, Sanjār Khān and Dost ʿAlī Khān, in command of that noble's guns, particularly distinguishing themselves. The latter was wounded in the foot. Sayyad Nuṣrat Yār Khān and Sābit Khān also took a leading part, while Saʿādat Khān and Muḥammad Khān, Bangash, created a diversion on the left. During the day a rocket fell on Sayyad ʿAbdullah Khān's powder-magazine, exploding it and causing much loss of life.
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Throughout the day of the 13th, the battle was chiefly one of artillery. The brunt of the fighting on ʿAbdullah Khān’s side was borne by his brother, Najm-ud-dīn ʿAlī Khān, who commanded his vanguard. Originally the Sayyads had intended to rely on a general onset. But Rājah Muḥkam Singh, who had deserted from the imperialists, dissuaded them, pointing out that to charge down on such a powerful artillery as the other side possessed, would be to expose themselves to destruction. Their own small supply of guns ought, he said, to be entrenched in a good position on the edge of some ravine, and there they could await the favour of events. Although Muḥkam Singh had acquired in the Dakhin the highest reputation as a soldier, his advice was not adopted. The Sayyads’ artillery was placed on a high mound, under the shelter of some trees, near a deserted village, and it tried to reply to the other side’s fire to the extent of its ability. In the field, the usual scattered fighting, charging and counter-charging, went on all day, and at one time it looked as if the imperialists would give way. But Khān Daurān, Sayyad Nuṣrat Yār Khān, Sābit Khān, Dost ʿAlī Khān, Sayyad Ḥāmid Khān and Asad ʿAlī Khān by redoubled exertions prevented a catastrophe. In the end, some of the Sayyads’ field pieces were taken, and they were ejected from their sheltered position among the trees. Najm-ud-dīn ʿAlī Khān was wounded by an arrow near the eye¹, and a ball from a swivel-gun struck him on the knee. Among the chiefs who lost their lives were Shekh Ṣibghatullah of Lakhnau, three sons, and seventy-five of his men, ʿAbd-ul-Qādir Khān, Thathawī, (nephew of Qāẓī Mīr, Bahādur Shāhī), ʿAbd-ul-Ghanī Khān (son of ʿAbd-ur-Raḥīm Khān, ʿĀlamgīrī), Ghulām Muḥi-ud-dīn Khān, and the son of Shujāʿ Khān, Palwalī. Many soldiers also were slain.
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¹ He lost his eye from this wound, and the glass ball by which he replaced it was a subject of wonder to the common people for the rest of his life, (Ma,āsir-ul-umara, ii, 508).
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‘Abdullah Khān had decided to single out for attack the force under Sayyad Nuṣrat Yār Khān, who had command of the advanced guard near the emperor. Against this man the Sayyads had a special grudge, because he, one of their own clan and a relation, had sided against them. Having swept him on one side, ‘Abdullah Khān hoped to be able to push on to Muḥammad Shāh’s centre (qalb). First of all, he tried to make his way to his objective from his own left, but found the river such an obstacle, that he changed his direction and moved across his front to the right of his own army. As soon as the movement was detected, reinforcements were sent for by Muḥammad Shāh, the centre having been left very weak. The generals who were thus summoned objected to quit their posts. The imperial artillery present with the emperor’s division, was then despatched towards the river to bar the way, and part of the vanguard was also transferred to the same point.
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Unfortunately the change in ‘Abdullah Khan’s line of advance resulted in his being drawn away from the river bank, and thus his main position was now some miles from the water side. The battle had continued till the afternoon, and so far ‘Abdullah Khān showed no signs of discouragement. But his men, more especially the new levies, became uneasy, and soon lost their heads completely. On pretence of watering their horses and camels, they rode off towards the river, only to find their opponents in possession of the banks. Group after group, on the pretext of getting water, left the standard. These desertions continued until the night fell; and all night long, from the camp to Bārah-pulah just outside Dihlī, the road was encumbered with fugitives. At night-fall there were not more than a few thousands left of the huge host that had set out from Dihli a few days before.
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At first ‘Abdullah Khān had ordered a small tent to be put up for the night where he stood, but countermanded it, when he reflected that it would be a target for the enemy's fire. The night was a moonlight one, and the imperial artillery never ceased its fire. If any man stirred in the Sayyad position or showed himself, a gun was at once pointed in that direction and discharged; and from time to time the guns were dragged forward, the oxen being harnessed to the muzzle instead of, as usual, to the breach end of the gun. Among the guns in use were those named Ghāzī Khān and Shāh Pasand. These heavy guns were fired oftener than had ever been done before in the recollection of the oldest man. Haidar Qulī Khān kept up the energy of his men by continual gifts; ʿAbdullah Khān's continued to make off in small parties. Muḥammad Shāh passed the night seated on his elephant so near the vanguard as to be under fire.
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When day dawned on the 14th Muḥarram (14th Nov. 1720), ʿAbdullah Khān found his army reduced to a few of his relations and his veteran troops. They were altogether not more than one thousand horsemen; with these he continued the fight to the best of his power. Najm-ud-dīn ʿAlī Khān and Saif-ud-dīn ʿAlī Khān, the wazīr's younger brothers, Sayyad Afẓal Khān, High Almoner (Ṣadar-uṣ-ṣadūr), Rāe Tek Chand, a Bālī Khatrī, his chief officer, Ghāzī-ud-dīn Khān (Aḥmad Beg), Nawāb Allahyār Khān, Shāhjahānī, and Rūḥullah Khān were found among these faithful few, who had passed a sleepless night on their elephants, having seen neither food nor water for many hours. Access to the river-side was blocked by the Jāṭs, who plundered impartially friend and foe. As dawn was drawing near, a ball struck the seat upon Muḥkam Singh's elephant. The Rājah got down, mounted his horse, and galloped off; for many years it was not known whether he was alive or dead.
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Early in the morning, returning to his plan of the previous day, ʿAbdullah Khān, joined by Najm-ud-dīn ʿAlī Khān and many Bārhah chiefs, again delivered an attack, in the hope of reaching the emperor's centre. The imperial left opposed a stout resistance to this onset, and at length the Sayyads dismounted to continue the fight on foot at close quarters. Shahāmat Khān and his son, Fath Muhammad Khān, Tahavvar ‘Alī Khān (better known as Bahādur ‘Alī Khān), and many others on the Sayyads’ side were slain. Darvesh ‘Alī Khān, head of Khān Daurān’s artillery, was killed; Dost ‘Alī Khān and Nusrat Yār Khān were severely wounded. Sa‘ādat Khān and Sher Afkan Khān were also prominent in this encounter. ‘Abd-un-Nabi Khān and Māyah Rām, two of Haidar Qulī Khān’s officers, and Mhd Ja‘far (grandson of Husain Khān) were the only other men of name who lost their lives on the imperial side.
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After a time the men of Khān Daurān, Haidar Qulī Khān, Sa‘ādat Khān and Muhammad Khān, Bangash, surrounded the ex-wazīr, and an arrow struck him on the forehead, inflicting a skin wound. The soldiers then tried to make him a prisoner. But, clad although he was in chain-mail, he leapt to the ground sword in hand, with the intention of fighting to the death. In spite of their knowing his practice of fighting on foot at the crisis of a battle, the ex-wazīr’s troops, when they saw his elephant without a rider, imagined that their leader must have fled, and each man began to think of his own safety. Then Tālī ‘Yār Khān charged at the head of his men, and cut down Shekh Nathū, commanding ‘Abdullah Khān’s artillery; the Rājpūts, coming up, took possession of the Shekh’s body, and carried it to the imperial camp. Najm-ud-dīn ‘Alī Khān and Ghāzī-ud-dīn Khān did their best to rally their men, but no one paid them any heed. Shujā‘at-ullah Khān, Zulfiqār ‘Alī Khān, and ‘Abdullah Khān, Tarīn, fled. Even Saif-ud-dīn ‘Alī Khān, the ex-wazīr’s brother, thought the day was lost, and left the field along with two or three hundred men, taking with him Prince Ibrāhīm, who abandoned his elephant and mounted a horse. His elephant and imperial umbrella were afterwards found, and taken by Muḥammad Shāh’s men. The feebleness of the defence would be fully proved, if we believe, as Wārid tells us, that after two days’ fighting, only forty men were left dead on the field.
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Najm-ud-dīn ʿAlī Khān, a drawn sword in his hand, rode on to enquire after and search for his brother. He found ʿAbdullah Khān standing on the ground quite alone, and although wounded in the hand, still fighting like a lion, while on every side the crowd of assailants grew greater every minute. Still not one of them had the courage to lay hands upon him; one of Khān Daurān’s men had wounded him on a finger of the right hand, but the Nawāb returned the blow by a cut, which struck the man’s leg and his horse’s shoulder. Najm-ud-dīn ʿAlī Khān dismounted from his elephant and joined his brother. ʿAbdullah Khān called out to him “Behold the inconstancy of Fortune, and the end of all earthly greatness!”, adding a verse of Saʿdī, Shīrāzī, fitting to the occasion ¹. Ḥaidar Qulī Khān, who had noticed that the howdah of ʿAbdullah Khān’s elephant was empty, made enquiries, and was informed by one of his soldiers that the Nawāb was on foot and wounded. Coming up at once with a led elephant, Ḥaidar Qulī Khān addressed the Sayyad, in the humblest manner, with words of praise and flattery. “Was he not a well-wisher, and was not his life one with his? Except to set forth for the presence of the emperor, what course was there left?” Najm-ud-dīn ʿAlī Khān made a movement to cut the speaker down, but ʿAbdullah Khān held his brother back. Then, with a haughty and dignified air, he took Najm-ud-dīn ‘Alī Khān’s hand and mounted the elephant. Ḥaidar Qulī Khān followed on his own elephant, and conducted his prisoners to the emperor, Muḥammad Shāh.
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¹ Khiẓr Khān, who took part in the battle as one of the Sayyad army, was near enough to know that ʿAbdullah Khān called out, but from the uproar could not hear his words. Some years afterwards (1138 H.) he met at Mathurā, Najm-ud-dīn ʿAlī Khān, then on his way to Aḥmadābād, and obtained from him the details in the text. Khāfī Khān, ii, 933, on the contrary, makes out that A. K. claimed aman (safety for life) by announcing himself as a Sayyad.
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His hands bound together by Ḥaidar Qulī Khān’s shawl, ‘Abdullah Khān was brought before Muḥammad Shāh. Saluting him with a “Peace be upon you”, the emperor said “Sayyad! you have yourself brought your affairs to this extremity”. Overcome with the disgrace, ‘Abdullah Khān answered only “It is God’s will”. Muḥammad Amīn Khān, unable to contain himself, leapt from the ground with joy, and exclaimed “Let this traitor to his salt be confided to this ancient servitor”. But Khān Daurān, in respectful terms, intervened. “Never! never! Make not the Sayyad over to Muḥammad Amīn Khān, for he will at once slay him in an ignominious manner, and such a deed is inadvisable. What did Farrukhsīyar gain by the murder of Zu,lfiqār Khān? Let him remain with Ḥaidar Qulī Khān, or be made over to the emperor’s own servants”. The prisoner was accordingly made over to Ḥaidar Qulī Khān, along with Najm-ud-dīn ‘Alī Khān, his brother, whose wounds were so severe that he was not expected to recover. Ḥāmid Khān, Turānī, was also taken a prisoner and brought, bare-headed and bare-footed, before his cousin, Muḥammad Amīn Khān, and Khān Daurān. The wazīr calmed his fears and assured him of being tenderly dealt with. There were many other prisoners, among them the chief being Sayyad ‘Alī Khān, (brother of Abu,l Muḥsin Khān, Bakhshī) and ‘Abd-un-nabī Khān.
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On the Sayyads’ side the entrenchments were held and the fight maintained by Ghāzī-ud-dīn Khān and others for nearly an hour after the capture of ‘Abdullah Khān. When at length they were satisfied that the day was lost, they desisted. Ghāzī-ud-dīn Khān with such baggage as could be saved, followed by Allahyār Khān and many others, moved off and marched straight for Dihlī; while the Bārhah Sayyads endeavoured to cross the Jamnah, in order to make their way to their homes. Saif-ud-dīn ʿAlī Khān had brought Prince Ibrāhīm off the field of battle, but owing to the entire absence of carriage, was obliged to leave him in the orchard of Qutb-ud-dīn Khān close to the village of Nekpur. Saif-ud-dīn ʿAlī Khān went home to Jānsath, sending Bāqir ʿAlī Khān and Khizr Khān to Dihlī to bring away the Sayyad women and dependents. These messengers reached the capital before the emperor, and carried off the ladies and children to the Sayyads' country.
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To return to the field of battle. The Moghul soldiery, as their custom was, took to plundering, and appropriated to themselves whatever horses, camels, mules, and cattle fell into their hands. Churāman Jāt followed suit, and plundering both sides with strict impartiality, made off with his booty to his own country. Among his spoils were over one thousand baggage oxen and camels, which had been left negligently on a high sandy mound close to the river, several camel-loads of goods meant for charitable distribution, and the records of the Grand Almoner's department.
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Reports of Battles. Somewhat in the same way that after a battle a modern general sends off a despatch to his superiors, a Moghul commander prepared and submitted a report (ʿarzah-dāsht) to the emperor. Often he also drew up a separate description of the fight for distribution to his friends and equals. These latter papers were styled tūmār, or roll, (a word which had another technical signification in the finance department). If the emperor was especially satisfied with any general, he gave orders that the victory should be recorded in the imperial diary of proceedings (the wāqiʿah), equivalent to our gazette. Many specimens of battle reports sent in from Bundelkhand by Muḥammad Khān, Bangash, will be found in Ṣāḥib Rāe's Khujistah Kalām; and the same work contains a tūmār circulated by Nizām-ul-mulk after his victory over Sayyad Dilāwar ʿAlī Khān, Rājah Bhīm Singh, Hāḍā, and others.
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Stratagems of War. Dr. Horn, 70, states that deceit and stratagem did not play a leading part in Moghul warfare. This may be so, still they were not unknown. Of a character similar to the pretended desertion, in order to obtain information of the enemy’s plans and strength, which was employed by Rūmī Khān at Chunār in 1538 (Horn, 71, quoting Erskine, ii, 140, note), is a plot put into execution once by Nizām-ul-mulk. In the middle of 1720, when about to fight for supremacy in the Dakhin against Sayyad ʿAlim ʿAlī Khān, governor of Aurangābād, he arranged with one of his principal officers that a fictitious dispute about pay should be raised, that the officer should behave disrespectfully, and after receiving his money, should desert to ʿAlim ʿAlī Khān’s camp. So said, so done. After an altercation, Nizām-ul-mulk paid the man and let him go. When he reached the Sayyad’s camp, this officer was received with honour and taken into the Sayyad’s service. But on the day of battle, as secretly agreed on with Nizām-ul-mulk, the deserter turned his men traitorously on ʿAlim ʿAlī Khān’s rear, and bringing him under two fires contributed materially to his defeat (Shiū Dās, fol. 42b).
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Ambush (ba kamīn-gāh nishistan) was not an uncommon stratagem. Matchlockmen were hidden in high crops, or on the edge of a ravine, at a spot where the opposite leaders would most probably pass. At the proper moment a volley would be discharged, and occasionally with deadly effect. It was in this manner that Qāim Khān, nawāb of Farrukhābād, and many of his chief officers lost their lives on the 12th Zu,l Hijjah, 1162 H. (22nd Nov. 1749), see J. A. S. B. for 1878, p. 381. An ambush was not unfrequently supplemented by pretended flight, so arranged as to draw the pursuers on and bring them under fire. We have an instance of this in Nizām-ul-mulk’s fight with Sayyad Dilāwar ʿAlī Khān in Barār on the 19th June 1720.
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Between the two forces there were deep ravines, where a large army could have been effectually concealed. Nizām-ul-mulk sent out his guns and placed them in position, so as to command from both sides the only road across this ravine. His advanced guard was concealed in the hollows on each side. Then two or three men, closely resembling the Nawāb in beard and features and age were dressed up, placed on elephants, and sent out to represent Nizām-ul-mulk at the head of his main body, which showed itself in front of the entrance to the ravine. Dilāwar ʿAlī Khān’s men came straight at their foe, and were drawn on and on by a simulated retreat. Anxious to slay or capture the opposite leader, who as they believed was in command, they pursued steadily, disposing on their way of several pretended Nizām-ul-mulks. When Sayyad Sher Khān at length brought his elephant close to that of ʿIwaẓ Khān, the Moghul by a sign caused his elephant to kneel, and by this trick, escaped with his life. When the ravine was reached, the guns did their work; and their leaders being killed, the rest of Dilāwar ʿAlī Khān’s army dispersed (Shiū Dās, 37b, M. Qāsim Lāhorī, 314, Tārīkh-i-muẓaffarī, fol. 183).
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This device of having “six Richmonds in the field” was not unusual, it having been put in practice against us in our own early fighting in the Dakhin (R. O. Cambridge, “War”, Introd. xi). It was also resorted to earlier in the century by Saʿādat Khān, Burhān-ul-mulk, founder of the Audh family. The Khīchar zamīndārs of parganah Ghāzīpur in sirkār Korah, ṣūbah Allāhābad, had long given trouble to the imperial officers, although several ineffectual attempts had been made to reduce them to order. At length, the Sirkār was made over to Burhān-ul-mulk; and on the 10th Jamādī ii, 1148 H. (27th Oct. 1735) that noble while on his way from Audh to Dihlī, undertook to eject the then zamīndār, Bhagwant Singh, son of Udārū. When the contending parties came face to face, a servant, clad in rich robes belonging to the Nawāb, was placed upon the Nawāb’s elephant. Burhān-ul-mulk took his seat upon another. Several fierce attacks on the suppositious Nawāb were repelled successfully. Finally, the Rājput chief gathered together some seven hundred men, and fully resolved on death or victory, made his way to the centre of the Mahomedan army, which he reached at the head of only forty to fifty men. Then, with not more than seven or eight men left, he arrived close to the leader’s elephant. Bhagwant Singh knew the Nawāb’s attire, and thought he was in presence of Burhān-ul-mulk himself. Before the Mahomedans could attempt a rescue, he pulled the supposed leader out of his high-sided seat (*imārī*) and slew him, with rejoicings at having successfully carried out his enter-prize. But Burhān-ul-mulk, who had stood aloof, now ordered one of his officers to advance with five hundred men, and in a few moments Bhagwant Singh was slain. The body was skinned and the skin filled with straw: then, with its head and that of the rebel’s son, it was sent to Dihli; where in Sha‘bān of the same year Rustam ‘Alī, Shāhābādī, saw them hanging in the main street, near the chief police office (*Nādir-uz-zamānī*, B.M. Or. 1844, fol. 152*a*, 152*b*, and Rustam ‘Alī, fol. 268*b*).
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When a leader took to flight on his elephant, it was not unusual for him to change places with the driver in order to escape molestation in case of pursuit and capture (Fitzclarence, 133).
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Night surprizes (*shab-khūn*, night-blood, or *shab-gīr*, night-seizing) were also a form of stratagem not unfrequently employed. It was in this way that Aḥmad Khān, Bangash, on the 1st August 1750, attacked and overcame the superior force of Naval Rāe on the bank of the Kālī-nadī river near Khudāganj (13 miles east of Farrukhābād). The Pathāns started during heavy rain at three hours after sunset, and avoiding by a long detour the front of Naval Rāe’s position, they got round to his rear near the river.
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An hour and a half before sunrise, when it was so dark that you could not tell friend from foe, the attack was delivered. Naval Rāe’s guns were fired at random and did no execution, he was killed, and his troops dispersed.
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*Statistics of Losses.* Dr. Horn devotes one section of his work (xiii, pp. 113—115) to the subject of losses in battle. Here again, as in the question of the total number present, or the strength of particular divisions, I agree with him that to obtain any idea of the numbers of killed or wounded is exceedingly difficult, historians either omitting to mention them, or if they do so, contradicting each other irreconcilably. After a battle no attempts were made to ascertain the losses or count the slain. Any statements that we may meet with are thus mere guesses, and we may be quite certain that they are much exaggerated for the defeated, and much diminished for the victorious army. From these causes such statements are quite worthless, and can form no basis for the calculation of percentages, or such-like strict arithmetical treatment. Incidentally, we learn from passing allusions the severity of the losses in a battle, or the number of the slain in some special group of those who were present. Thus, after the battle of Jājau, fought on the 18th June 1707, we are told that the defeated fugitives made off towards Gwāliyar “and so many lost their lives on the way at the hands of Jāt plunderers and the Rohelahs of Dholpur, that the ravines leading to the Chambal were encumbered with decaying bodies” (Kāmwar Khān). Another writer, Khūshḥāl Chand, fol. 373a, tells us that the loss on both sides in this battle is said to have amounted to ten thousand men. As to losses among a particular group, or of men from one town, we have an instance in the *Tabṣirat-un-nāzirīn* of Sayyad Muḥammad, Bilgrāmī, who informs us, under the year 1163 H., that thirty seven men from Bilgrām lost their lives on Naval Rāe’s side, when he was attacked by Aḥmad Khān, Bangash, near Khudāganj. Scattered notices of this sort might be collected. But of what value would they be? They might enable us to say whether the fighting had been severe or not. But as we do not know the total strength and have only vague accounts of the losses, how can any minute calculations be made? The figures, such as they are, for nine battles in the time of Bābar and Akbar will be found collected in a table on p. 115 of Dr. Horn’s essay. De la Flotte, i, 258, who knew something of the south of India between 1758 and 1760, is of opinion that battles were much less bloody than in Europe.
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*Slain and wounded.* Plundering of the slain and wounded seems to have been universal; the camp followers were those chiefly concerned, but the fighting men were not above lending a hand. In reading the memoir of Colonel Skinner’s life, a man half Indian by blood and wholly so by education, one is struck with his exultation over a piece of valuable plunder, and his obvious belief that it was a legitimate source of income. The dead bodies left on a field of battle do not seem to have been usually buried, they were left to lie as they fell; but once or twice we are told of their being collected in great pits, which were styled *ganj-i-shahīd*, or martyr store-houses. For an instance, see Rustam ʿAlī, *Tārīkh-i-Hindī*, fol. 217b. The wounded seem to have been left mostly to their fate; there was no organization for their succour, nor any attempt to heal their wounds; this was left to their relations or friends.