[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Studies](https://indike.org/pramana/ins) › [Polity, law and society](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity) › [The Army of the Indian Moghuls: Its Organization and Administration](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.irvine-1903) › c26.2 # The Army of the Indian Moghuls: Its Organization and Administration c26.2 The Army of the Indian Moghuls: Its Organization and Administration c26.2 - **Language:** English ### [c26.2](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.irvine-1903.c26.2) Strong places were most commonly reduced by strict investment and starving out (Fitzclarence, 245). There were few captures by a \*coup de main\* (\*sar-i-suwārī\*), the walls were not often breached, and rarely escaladed. Treachery within the walls was as frequent a cause of surrender as any other thing. In sitting down before a fortress, a Moghul army tried to surround it completely so as to prevent any ingress or egress. As Grant Duff, 165, expresses himself, “they never considered an army capable of undertaking a regular siege unless sufficiently large to surround the place invested and completely obstruct communications”. Earth works (\*mūrchal\*) were thrown up, in which the siege guns were placed. The system of digging approaches and laying mines (\*naqb\*) was known and practised, at any rate in Northern India. No doubt, Lake, 14, holds the contrary view; he says “the natives appear to be utterly ignorant of the art of conducting approaches by sap: and generally they are also unacquainted with Mining”. But this opinion must be understood as applicable to the Dakhin only. - [Previous: c26.1](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.irvine-1903.c26.1) - [Next: c26.3](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.irvine-1903.c26.3) - [Up: c26](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.irvine-1903.c26) --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.irvine-1903.c26.2](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.irvine-1903.c26.2) · Pramāṇa