History of Dharmashastra (Ancient and Mediaeval Religious and Civil Law in India) v4.c63.t2.127
History of Dharmaśāstra (Ancient and Mediaeval Religious and Civil Law in India) v4.c63.t2.127
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*Daughters.*—Daughters do not inherit as long as any widow of the deceased owner is alive. The daughter also had to struggle hard for recognition as heir just as the widow had. Gaut., Baud. and Vas. omit the daughter as an heir. Ap. Dh. S. II. 6. 143 recognizes the daughter as an optional heir (probably with sapiṇḍas). When Manu IX. 130 declares, 'one's son is like one's self and one's daughter is equal to one's son; how can another person take the wealth (of the deceased) when she who is the very self (of the deceased) lives', it appears from the context (IX. 128-129) that it is the *putrikā* (the daughter appointed as a son) that is intended to be referred to therein. Medhātithi, Nārāyaṇa and Kullūka interpret the word 'duhitā' in Manu IX. 130 as applicable to the putrikā only. In the Nirukta,¹³⁶⁵ Yāska cites Ṛg. III. 31. 1 as relied upon by those who support the claims of the daughter to inheritance and also derives the word 'duhitā' in various ways, but from his explanation of Ṛg. III. 31. 1 it appears that he is referring to the putrikā's right of inheritance. As the usage of appointing a daughter as a son became gradually obsolete, the ordinary daughter came to be recognized by analogy as the heir of a sonless man after the widow. Yāj. and Viṣṇu both recognize the daughter as an heir after the widow. Nār. (dāyabhāga, 50)¹³⁶⁶ recognizes the daughter as an heir after the son on the ground that she continues the lineage (of the deceased father) just like a son. When Nār.
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(dāyabhāga, 27) speaks of the daughter being entitled to maintenance till marriage, the context shows (as remarked by the Sm. C. II. p. 296) that he is referring to the daughter of a person who was re-united at the time of his death. Bṛ. declares¹³⁶⁷ (S. B. E. 33 p. 378 verses 55-56), 'the wife is declared to be the inheritor of the husband's wealth and, in default of her, the daughter; the daughter, like a son, springs from the limbs of a man: how can another man inherit her father's property while she lives?'. Though the words of Yāj., Viṣṇu and Bṛ. were clear enough ancient commentators were not prepared to accept them in their literal sense. Viśvarūpa holds that Yāj. means only the putrikā and employs the plural in order to convey that several daughters may be appointed as sons. The Sm. C. II. p. 295 informs us that the same opinion was held by Dhāreśvara, Devasvāmin and Devarāta.¹³⁶⁸ The Mit. rightly refutes these views by saying that the word 'duhitarah' in Yāj. cannot refer to 'putrikā', since Yāj., has himself stated the putrikā as equal to the aurasa son (in II. 128), as the putrikā is included among the sons by Vas. and as the widow and the daughters are declared by him as heirs in the absence of all the sons, principal and secondary. Yāj., Viṣṇu, Bṛ. are silent as to whether any discrimination was made between daughters as heirs. Kāt. (926) gives¹³⁶⁹ a preference to the unmarried daughter and the Mit. and the subsequent digests follow Kāt. The Dāyabhāga¹³⁷⁰ (XI. 2.
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4 p. 175) quotes a prose passage of Parāśara preferring an unmarried daughter as an heir to a married daughter. Among married daughters the Mit., pressing into service a text of Gaut. on succession to strīdhana, holds by analogy that among married daughters the indigent (or unprovided for) one is to be preferred to one who is well-placed.¹³⁷¹ Herein the Mit. follows common sense and the natural inclination of a father to feel more concern for a poor daughter. The Dāyabhāga prefers the unmarried daughter to the married daughter as is done by the Mit., but among married daughters Jīmūtavāhana, following an author called Dīkṣita, prefers one who has had a son or who is likely to have a son to a widowed or barren daughter or to one who has given birth only to daughters. This preference is due to the principle of the Dāyabhāga¹³⁷² that spiritual benefit is the governing factor in succession. The barren daughter or widowed daughter is unable to confer spiritual benefit on her father since she will have no son that will offer piṇḍas to the deceased owner (who will be the maternal grand-father). The Mit. on the other hand relies on nearness of blood (prattyāsatti) as the guiding principle. But, as pointed out by the V. P. p. 519, the Dāyabhāga is inconsistent. There is no reason on its own principle why the unmarried daughter should be preferred to a married daughter who has a son.
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The latter is then and there capable of conferring spiritual benefit while it is problematical whether the unmarried daughter will confer spiritual benefit (since she may after all be blessed with no son after marriage). Aparārka (p. 721) and V. R. (p. 517) give three meanings of the word 'apratiṣṭhitā' viz. 'childless, poor, widowed'. In deciding whether a particular married daughter is indigent as compared with another, the Courts refuse¹³⁷³ to go into nice or minute questions of the respective monetary positions of their husbands and prefer one to the other only if there is great disparity or marked difference between their positions.