The Administration of the Sultanate of Dehli c12.276
The Administration of the Sultanate of Dehlī c12.276
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the *dīwān-i-riyāsat*, also *‘adl*.¹ Under the Caliphate, the *mu‘dil’s* duty was to register deeds, and to inform the courts of a man’s antecedents when he appeared as a witness.² This function was transferred to the *dād-bek* under the sultans, so the term *‘adl* came to be applied to the functions of the *dīwān-i-riyāsat*. The importance of trade was recognized from the very beginning in the sultanate; Quṭb-u’d-dīn Aibak instructed his governors to encourage commerce.³ The office of *ra’īs* existed from the start, so some kind of price control was always maintained; but probably these officers actively intervened only when guilds of traders or craftsmen exploited their virtual monopoly to the detriment of the people. In view of this knowledge, it is easier to understand ‘Alā-u’d-dīn Khaljī’s success in bringing prices down to a certain level and maintaining them there. The *dīwān-i-riyāsat* was an efficient instrument of economic control. ‘Alā-u’d-dīn’s greatness lies not in forging the instrument but in developing it and increasing its efficiency. He raised the value of the bullion in his treasury by reducing the prices of commodities and stabilizing them at a low level. His choice of a *ra’īs* was fortunate, because he was fully acquainted with the market, was efficient and exceedingly strict. The sultan, however, did not leave the working of the scheme entirely in the hands of Ya‘qūb, the new *ra’īs*, but took pains to keep himself in touch with the work.
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A large number of inspectors were employed to enforce the new level of prices. Both the sultan and the *ra’īs* employed spies to discover any breach of the rules. Innocent children, slaves and professional spies were all used as agents to expose offenders; and once an offender was discovered, the punishment was highly deterrent.⁴ But no amount of espionage or inspection could have succeeded if steps of a more scientific nature had not been taken. First, measures were taken to maintain the supplies of essential foodstuffs at the new prices. The state raised its demand to a half of the produce and realized it in kind. This grain was stored in granaries, and thus the state became the greatest dealer. Then, just as much grain was left with the cultivator as he was likely to require in the course of the year; he had to sell the rest to authorized dealers at the rates fixed by the state. Thirdly, it was made a penal offence for any trader to store grain beyond the quantity he was likely to sell within a specified time; nor was the consumer allowed to buy in excess of his recognized need. All carriers and dealers were registered; their families were kept as hostages at Dehlī or its vicinity. They were held collectively responsible for the offences of any member of their fraternity. The cultivator was encouraged to bring his own produce to market; the fact that he did so shows that the dealer was left a fair margin of profit.
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No trade in grain was allowed except in the recognized and supervised markets. Thus, by the control of supply, transport and demand, the state succeeded in fixing and establishing a lower price for grain. Similar steps were taken to fix the prices of other commodities. Just as there was the mandwī for the trade in corn, the sultan erected a big market called sarāi 'adl where cloth and various other commodities were sold. Here the main difficulty was that the state was not in the same privileged position as in the corn trade; it neither could hold the main supply in its hands, nor could it fix the prices at the source, for some of these commodities were imported. These factors must certainly have been taken into consideration in fixing prices. The supply was ensured by registering the merchants and giving them money to keep the market well stocked. The next step was to cut down the demand by rationing the goods, so that no one could buy without a licence from the rai's which was granted in accordance with a fixed scale. This drastic reduction in demand must have affected the limited medieval market considerably and brought down prices.¹ Indeed economy was the watchword in ‘Alā-u’d-dīn’s reign; the sultan is accused of niggardliness in dealing with men of learning and talent. The same measures of economy were forced on his people, not just for caprice, but in the highest interest of the people.² The sultan took similar steps to ensure a cheap supply of horses for his troops;
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here the broad classification into grades could not be worked in practice without an expert and impartial adjudicator. The monarch often inspected the horses himself and punished the dealers who were found guilty of charging prices which disagreed with the fixed schedule. The general result of all these steps was that the sultan succeeded in reducing prices to the desired level; his treasury sufficed not only to finance defensive measures against the Mongols but also to fit out conquering expeditions to the Deccan which brought more wealth.³ ‘Alā-u’d-dīn’s system ceased under Quṭb-u’d-dīn Mubārak Shāh, not only because the latter was incapable of sustained effort but also because he was not faced with the same problems; yet the *dīwān-i-riyāsat* continued to function.⁴ After the anarchy, when Sikandar Lodī put the government on a sound basis, we find him interested in the question of prices; he read daily market reports submitted from the various parts of his dominions.⁵ His interest in commerce is shown by the fact that he established a new standard of weights and measures which endured long after him. The Sūrs also maintained the *dīwān-i-riyāsat*; Hīmū, who rose to the supreme command of the troops under ‘Adlī, was at one time the superintendent of markets.⁶ The fact that prices were very low and commodities plentiful under the Lodīs and yet the department of ‘adl continued to function shows how deeply rooted the institution was in the sultanate of Dehlī.¹