[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Studies](https://indike.org/pramana/ins) › [Polity, law and society](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity) › [The Administration of the Sultanate of Dehli](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942) › c8 # The Administration of the Sultanate of Dehli c8: Chapter III: The Actual Sovereign The Administration of the Sultanate of Dehlī c8 - **Language:** English ### Chapter III: The Actual Sovereign ### [c8.2](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.2) THE sultanate of Dehlī, though legally a part of the Eastern Caliphate for a considerable part of its history, was always an independent state for all practical purposes. Even Khiḍr Khān’s acknowledgment of Tīmūr’s supremacy was merely apparent and formal. To understand the nature of this state, it will be useful if we examine contemporary political thought and ideology embodied in the writings of Muslim thinkers and jurists. It will also be worth while to discover how far these ideas conformed to Hindu notions, for any similarity between them would provide the psychological common ground without which the sultanate could not endure in the midst of an overwhelmingly Hindu population. ### [c8.3](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.3) Many Eastern writers on politics imagine a ‘state of nature’ before the organization of society into a state; according to the Mahābhārata, passions and greed brought about anarchy and licence, so that the gods had to intervene and appoint a ruler.¹ The dread of anarchy also appears in the writings of Manū.² In spite of the prevalent myths of a golden age, most Hindu and Muslim philosophers did not believe, as Rousseau did, in the existence of a free and happy society prior to the organization of the state. The nearest approach to Rousseau’s idea is found in a passage by Ghazzālī where he speaks of the cities of the world living in a state of heavenly bliss before they were reduced to unwilling obedience and bondage by tyrants and wicked monarchs, but here he is hardly thinking of a pre-political society.¹ Like Hobbes, Hooker and Spinoza, most Hindu thinkers consider it impossible for a man to be happy in a state of anarchy. The Muslim thinkers are in entire agreement with this view, though a hypothetical state of nature generally does not find favour with them. They have a more rational theory, and consider the tendency to anarchy an inherent defect in human nature, a destructive weakness of the human race. On the one hand they believe with Aristotle that man is a social animal, and they deduce from this that he instinctively builds institutions; on the other, they recognize that he is always ready to break the bonds of organized life whenever he finds the opportunity.² Too logical an analysis of human nature has always resulted in contradictions. One example is Rousseau's attempt to explain the problem of freedom and bondage, in doing which he not only fails but completely side-tracks the issue. Burke, and, later, the idealists quibbled with the words 'freedom' and 'restraint' and even then produced a paradox. The Muslim philosophers recognized the difficulty but overcame it by adopting the idea of 'the golden mean' and then applying this concept in rather an ingenious manner to social philosophy. ### [c8.4](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.4) ¹ Mahābhārata, Sāntī parva, section 59. ### [c8.5](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.5) ² E.g., Manū, vii, 3; also compare writings of Moh-tī (420 B.C.). ### [c8.6](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.6) ¹ \*Sulūk-u's-salṭanah\*, f. 37a. ### [c8.7](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.7) ² \*Sulūk-u'l-mulūk\*, f. 20a; \*Sulūk-u's-salṭanah\*, f. 36b; \*Dhakḥīrat-u'l-mulūk\*, f. 38a. ### [c8.8](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.8) The contradiction, says the Muslim philosopher, arises from the fact that both the tendencies in man—social as well as anarchic—are the outcome of his selfishness. His desire to build institutions is due to his dependence on his kindred for their co-operation and help, without which he cannot live a happy life. At the same time he seeks his own advantage at the cost of his neighbours. Thus, there arises a conflict between the interests of the individual and of the society; but it is possible to bring about a reconciliation between the two by applying the doctrine of 'the golden mean' and creating a sense of proportion. With the best of intentions, however, there will always be a difference of opinion regarding an equitable adjustment of hostile interests; hence, it is necessary to have an arbitrator to decide what is just and fair.¹ It is imperative to preserve society by obeying a just arbitrator, for man can attain his fuller growth only in organized society.² The best arbitrator is \*shar‘\*, the Muslim Law, which lays down the mean and brings about proportion in life. Thus the solution of the dilemma in human nature lies in the observation of the Law, which is "the author of justice"; it is the only agency which can ensure human happiness and safeguard mankind from destruction.³ ### [c8.9](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.9) ¹ \*Sulūk-u'l-mulūk\*, f. 20a. ### [c8.10](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.10) ² \*Sulūk-u's-salṭanah\*, f. 9a. ### [c8.11](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.11) ³ \*Sulūk-u'l-mulūk\*, f. 20a. ### [c8.12](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.12) This view is merely the philosophic rationalization of Muslim belief in this respect. A man can attain real felicity in following the dictates of Islam, the exoteric incorporation of which is the Law. The Muslim jurists and theologians believe in the supremacy of the \*shar‘\* and hold that it is eternal and immutable in its essence. It is based on the Qur’ān which is believed by every Muslim to be the Word of God revealed to His prophet Muḥammad. Not even the Prophet could change the revelation; he could only explain and interpret it. His interpretation, embodied in his traditions, called \*ḥadīth\*, naturally commands great respect and cannot be ignored by his followers. On these two rocks—the Qur’ān and the \*ḥadīth\*—is built the structure of Muslim Law, annotated, expanded, interpreted, and applied to the complicated and varied needs of a growing civilization by learned lawyers. This Law was the actual sovereign in Muslim lands: no one was above it, and all were ruled by it.⁴ It is not only permitted but enjoined that a Muslim should disobey the ruler if the ruler's orders violate the Law.⁵ Public opinion in Muslim lands firmly held to the supremacy of the \*shar‘\*. ### [c8.13](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.13) ⁴ Khudā Bukhsh: \*Essays, Indian and Islamic\*, p. 51. ### [c8.14](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.14) ⁵ \*Tadhkirat-u'l-khulafā fī tawṣiyat-i'l-mulūk\*, f. 12, quoting a tradition of the Prophet. ### [c8.15](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.15) Neither the Law nor its interpreters and jurists belonged exclusively to any one country; they belonged to the entire world of Islam and their influence was felt everywhere. There are no local variations of the Muslim Law. ### [c8.16](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.16) Law is powerless unless it is enforced by some agency. The ideal statesman for this purpose was the divinely-guided Prophet; but later generations have to be content with a man of lesser wisdom.¹ Such a man, some believe, is chosen by God in every age to look after the well-being of the people.² This concept is the nearest approach to the idea of divine right in Muslim philosophy, and was in favour with courtiers and ministers; but the jurists, whose outlook is more Islamic, are of opinion that it is the duty of the Faithful to elect and appoint their ruler.³ It is this injunction of the \*shar'\* which makes the state a canonical necessity. The ruler appointed and accepted by the Muslims was the caliph, who alone was the chief executive officer and supreme judge in the world of Islam. His legal representative in India was the sultan, to whom were delegated, in the area under his control, all the powers wielded by the caliph.⁴ Legally the caliph had the right to overrule the sultan in decisions which had yet not taken effect, but in actual practice the sultan in India was so powerful and at such a distance that it could never have been practical politics for the caliph to meddle with his affairs. Besides, the establishment of the sultanate in India coincided with the decay of the power of the Abbasids, who, for some time past, had preserved the shadow of legal supremacy by never failing to recognize the \*fait accompli\* and by ceasing to meddle with the internal affairs of their vassals. Thus the supreme human agency in the empire of Dehlī for enforcing and interpreting the Law was the sultan. ### [c8.17](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.17) ¹ \*Sulūk-u'l-mulūk\*, ff. 20a, b. ### [c8.18](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.18) ² \*Siyāsat-nāmah\*, p. 5; \*Inshā'-i-Māhrū\*, Letter I. ### [c8.19](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.19) ³ \*Sulūk-u'l-mulūk\*, f. 14b. ### [c8.20](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.20) ⁴ \*Proleg.\*, pp. 204-205. ### [c8.21](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.21) The jurists theoretically recognized the right of the ruler to act as the supreme interpreter of the Law, but in actual practice he could not go against the recognized interpretation, for it was not open to him to disregard ijmā‘ or a preponderant concurrence of opinion on any point.¹ Only where the jurists disagreed, was he free to take an independent line of action; but for this purpose he must be a learned jurist himself, for how could he, otherwise, understand the subtleties in which the lawyers delighted? He generally abided by the decisions of the majority.² This restriction, however, did not apply to his right of making all civil and political regulations for public welfare.³ Of course, he was not allowed to contravene the shar‘ in legislating on these occasions. This subservience of the ruler to the Law was in accordance with Hindu notions as well.⁴ The supremacy of the shar‘ has misled some into thinking that the sultanate was a theocracy.⁵ The essential feature of a theocracy—the rule of an ordained priesthood—is, however, missing in the organization of the Muslim state; the jurists are all laymen who claim no sacerdotal immunity from error. Gibb is right in calling the Islamic polity theo-centric.⁶ ### [c8.22](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.22) ¹ Sulūk-u'l-mulūk, f. 19b; also, Akhlāq-i-Jalālī, p. 55; Iḥyā-u'l-‘ulūm, i, p. 7. ### [c8.23](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.23) ² Inshā'-i-Māhrū, Letter XIX. ### [c8.24](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.24) ³ This was considered a part of executive power; Akhlāq-i-Jalālī, p. 55. ### [c8.25](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.25) ⁴ Mahābhārata, Sānti parva, section 59. ### [c8.26](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.26) ⁵ E.g., Some Aspects of Muslim Administration, p. 2. ### [c8.27](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.27) ⁶ Whither Islam, p. 26. ### [c8.28](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.28) The sovereignty of the Law was, by no means, a legal fiction. The sultans of Dehlī, on the whole showed a remarkable respect for the shar‘ in their public dealings.⁷ There are few glaring violations on record, while there are numerous instances of mighty sultans humbling themselves before the majesty of the Law. Even in cases of tyranny, the semblance of legality was generally observed. Muḥammad bin Tughluq ### [c8.29](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.29) ⁷ E.g., Tāj, ff. 147a, 181b, etc. ### [c8.30](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.30) \[The sultan's powers of legislation.\] \[Actual hold of shar‘ on Dehlī sultans.\] ### [c8.31](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.31) had his victims executed only when he had overwhelmed the jurists, who were asked to give the legal ruling, with his relentless and superior logic.¹ Even then there were instances of courageous protests, which ultimately inflamed public opinion and cost him the stability of his empire. ‘Alā-u’d-dīn Khaljī is accused of transgressing the \*shar‘\* in public affairs; but this accusation should be treated with great caution. As mentioned before, Baranī was exceedingly strict in his notions of legal propriety, and the slightest lapse on the part of the monarch condemned the ruler in the eyes of the historian. Besides, Baranī was hostile to ‘Alā-u’d-dīn Khaljī, because some of his measures had resulted in hardship to the official class to which Baranī belonged. Khusraw and Ḥasan give an entirely different impression of this sultan.² ### [c8.32](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.32) ¹ \*Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī\*, pp. 115-116. ### [c8.33](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.33) ² E.g., \*Diwalrānī Khiḍr Khān\*, p. 146; \*Khazā’in-u’l-futūḥ\*, p. 7. ‘Alā-u’d-dīn Khaljī’s progeny was extinct when Khusraw wrote: خصوصاً كنز علاء دين احمد كى بود از وے علاء دين احمد \*Tughluq-nāmah\*, p. 60. The references in Ḥasan are too numerous to be quoted, e.g., \*Kulliyāt-i-Ḥasan Sajzī\*, pp. 2, 412, 417, 460, 463, 467, etc. ‘Iṣāmī also pays a high tribute to the sultan’s love of Islam, pp. 293, 294. ### [c8.34](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.34) Great importance is attached by several scholars to ‘Alā-u’d-dīn’s conversation with Qāḍī Mughīth.³ An analysis of what the sultan has been alleged to have said will show that there was no difference of opinion between the qāḍī and his royal patron on the question of the necessity of following the \*shar‘\*. The sultan protested that in certain respects expediency had led him in the same direction as the law; in certain other matters he had enforced the \*shar‘\* as an act of devotion. The fundamental difference arose on the questions of punishments, ‘Alā-u’d-dīn’s appropriation of the booty he had won in the Deccan campaign before he came to the throne, and the extent of the sultan’s private expenditure. The sultan attributed his harshness in enforcing orders to the unnecessary contumacy of his people, nor can it be said justifiably that the \*shar'\* is at all partial to those who disobey their legitimate rulers and obstruct them in running the administration, particularly when the lands of Islam have to be defended against odds. There could be room for difference of opinion on the question of the treasures which the monarch had brought from Deogīr as a prince, for the expedition was undertaken neither at the instance of the sultan, Jalāl-u’d-dīn Fīrūz, nor with the resources of the state. ‘Alā-u’d-dīn argued that he had won this booty by his personal endeavour unaided by the state, and, therefore, was entitled to its possession. ### [c8.35](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.35) ³ Baranī, pp. 293-297. Baranī is the only contemporary authority to record this conversation. He could not have been present at the interview. It would, therefore, be wrong to assume that the sultan has been reported verbatim. ### [c8.36](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.36) Qāḍī Mughīth was a little too exacting on the question of the sultan’s personal expenditure. He laid before the sultan the ideal of the early caliphs who preferred to live a life of poverty rather than burden the public treasury with heavy expenditure. That ideal had long vanished and was found only in text-books of maxims; very few jurists have laid any great stress on the limitation of the royal expenditure, realizing well that the grandeur of the monarch’s court was a public institution of great value. Nor could ‘Alā-u’d-dīn be justly accused of extravagance, for he is reported to have been one of the most careful monarchs in the matter of economy. “Qāḍī Mughīth! Though I have no learning and have hardly read a book,” protested the sultan, “yet I am a Muslim and a descendant of generations of Muslims.” The sultan then explained that he was ignorant of the law, but his severity was mostly directed against evil-doers in the best traditions of religion. ### [c8.37](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.37) This would hardly justify the view that Sulṭān ‘Alā-u’d-dīn ignored the law; indeed even in his great need he did not exceed the legal limit of one-half of the produce in fixing the state demand, and his economic measures were but an efficient administration of the Muslim institution of \*ḥisbah\*. His grandiose scheme of founding a new religion was stillborn and was known only to his select companions. He protested, later, his adherence to Islam, though he might have transgressed minor injunctions in ignorance.¹ Indeed we are assured of his complete reformation by later chroniclers.² Baranī also tells us of his great faith in the saint Niẓām-u’d-dīn.³ Maulānā Shams-u’d-dīn Turk, a learned jurist and a foreigner, who wrote an outspoken letter to the monarch and took care to leave the sultanate before it could be delivered, found only two faults with the sultan: that he was not regular in his devotions and that he had appointed an incompetent and worthless man as his chief qāḍi.⁴ ### [c8.38](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.38) ¹ Baranī, p. 295. Baranī is the only contemporary authority to mention that it was ‘Alā-u’d-dīn’s desire to found a new religion. ### [c8.39](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.39) ² Firiṣtah, i, p. 192. ### [c8.40](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.40) ³ Baranī, pp. 331, 332. ### [c8.41](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.41) ⁴ Ibid, pp. 297-299. ### [c8.42](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.42) Yet, it should be remembered that Muḥammad bin Tughluq and ‘Alā-u’d-dīn Khaljī are the two most independent and strong-willed sultans who sat on the throne of Dehlī. ### [c8.43](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.43) Ghazzālī thinks of the state as a living organism and compares it to the human body. In working out the details of the analogy, he calls the sultan the heart of the system.⁵ His existence is the primary necessity of social life, for without a ruler to guide the affairs of mankind, all order would vanish and the very existence of the human race would be endangered.⁶ It is he whose sword cleanses the world of anarchy as well as of evil.⁷ Very great is his responsibility, for he will be questioned on the Day of Judgment regarding the condition of his people and about all acts of justice and injustice committed by him. Great, too, is the reward awaiting the just monarch, for he will find a place under the banner of the Prophet on the Day of Reckoning.⁸ Later writers, in spite of the protests of the jurists, insisted that the righteous monarch was ‘the Vicegerent of God’ and ‘His Shadow on the Earth.’¹ A monarch should make it possible for every man to attain the fullest perfection of which he is capable, otherwise his government is an engine of oppression.² Dominion can lead a man to sublime heights or abysmal depths.³ The Hindus had even more exaggerated notions about the greatness of kings. A monarch is the centre of the state, the ruler, protector and benefactor of the people.⁴ Royalty is superhuman energy embodied in a human institution.⁵ Even though the king be a child, a monarch should not be despised, for he is a powerful divinity in human form.⁶ ### [c8.44](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.44) ⁵ Kīmiyā-i-sa‘ādat, p. 8. ### [c8.45](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.45) ⁶ Sulūk-u’l-mulūk, f. 20b; Akhlāq-i-Nāṣirī, p. 359. ### [c8.46](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.46) ⁷ Sulūk-u’s-salṭanah, f. 36b. ### [c8.47](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.47) ⁸ A. M, f. 3b. ### [c8.48](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.48) ¹ \*Sulūk-u’l-mulūk\*, f. 17a.; \*Akhlāq-i-Jalālī\*, p. 134; \*Qirān-u’s-sa‘dain\*, p 25; \*Khazā’in-u’l-futūḥ\*, pp. 8, 54, 79, etc. Ḥasan (\*Kulliyāt-i-Ḥasan Sajzī\*, p 573) says about ‘Alā-u’d-dīn Khaljī: ### [c8.49](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.49) ² \*Akhlāq-i-Jalālī\*, p. 135. ### [c8.50](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.50) ³ \*Naṣā’iḥ Shāh Rukh\*, f. 12a. ### [c8.51](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.51) ⁴ \*Arthaśāstra\*, p. 378; \*Śukranīti\*, 1, 39-40. ### [c8.52](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.52) ⁵ \*Political Institutions of the Hindus\*, p. 179. ### [c8.53](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.53) ⁶ \*Manū\*, vii, 8. ### [c8.54](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.54) Thus the Muslim and Hindu traditions were unanimous in according the sultan great respect and prestige. The authority he enjoyed added to the glory of his position. The Muslim jurists assign the following functions to the sultans :— ### [c8.55](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.55) (i) to protect the Faith, as defined by \*ijmā‘\*; (ii) to settle disputes between his subjects; (iii) to defend the territories of Islam, and to keep the highways and roads safe for travellers; (iv) to maintain and enforce the criminal code; (v) to strengthen the frontiers of Muslim territory against possible aggression; (vi) to wage a holy war against those who act in hostility to Islam; (vii) to collect the rates and taxes; ### [c8.56](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.56) جهان مضبوط تيغش طول با عرض هو السلطان ظل الله في الارض ### [c8.57](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.57) Also, compare Fīrūz Shāh’s letters patent appointing Fatḥ Khān as the governor of Sind, \*Inshā-i-Māhrū\*, Letter I. ### [c8.58](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.58) (viii) to apportion the shares of those who deserve an allowance from the public treasury; ### [c8.59](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.59) (ix) to appoint officers to help him in his public and legal duties; and ### [c8.60](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.60) (x) to keep in touch with public affairs and the condition of the people by personal contact.¹ ### [c8.61](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.61) ¹ Sulūk-u’l-mulūk, f. 19a; Nuh Sipihr, ff, 726a, b; Fatāwā-i-jahāndārī, ff. 7-8. ### [c8.62](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.62) The learned jurist, Aḥmad bin Muḥammad bin ‘Abd abb, puts it very well when he says: “The sultan controls affairs, maintains rights, enforces the criminal code; he is the Pole Star round whom revolve the affairs of the world and the Faith; he is the protection of God in his realm; his shadow extends its canopy over His servants, for he forbids the forbidden, helps the oppressed, uproots the oppressor and gives security to the timid.”² ### [c8.63](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.63) ² Nihāyat-u’l-arab, p. 5. ### [c8.64](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.64) Limitations. The concentration of authority in the hands of one man has led unwary writers into painting the sultans of Dehlī as the paragons of despotism. According to these authors, their power knew no limits; but, in actual practice, absolute authority has existed only in the dream of the despot or the imagination of the fool. All political power has certain limitations and depends for its very existence on the co-operation of strong elements in the state. This elementary principle was as much at work in Dehlī as elsewhere, though the limitations might not be the same. ### [c8.65](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.65) Personal law. It has already been noticed that the sultan had very little legislative power. He could not interfere with the personal and religious law of his subjects, for both the Muslims and the Hindus had their systems of law with which they would not brook any interference even at the cost of their lives. The sultans realized their helplessness in this respect; some of them disliked certain Hindu customs but considered it impolitic to meddle with them.¹ Nor could they flout the \*shar'\* with immunity. They could rely on the support and loyalty of the Faithful only so long as they ruled in accordance with the Law; for though the Muslims are enjoined to obey their rulers and co-operate with them in lawful projects and activities, it is a mortal sin to do so if the monarch does anything unlawful or un-Islamic.² In such cases a believer's duty is to rebel, and the sultans well knew the consequences of a successful rebellion. Nāṣir-u'd-dīn Khusraw, for instance, lost his throne, because his henchmen disgusted Muslim opinion by behaving arrogantly towards Islam.³ Though not within our period, Akbar's experience illustrates this point. His heterodoxy fed the flames of a widespread rebellion in the east and resulted in an invasion by his brother from the north-west. For a moment the very foundations of the empire were shaken, and Akbar overcame the danger partly by an ostentatious display of orthodoxy for the time being, and partly with the help of his Rājpūt and Persian supporters. The rebellion would have succeeded under better leadership. Even then, Jahāngīr had to reverse his father's policy and come to terms with orthodoxy. The Hindus also believed in the right to rebel against an unjust monarch.⁴ ### [c8.66](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.66) ¹ E.g., Jalāl-u'd-dīn Fīrūz Khaljī's lament regarding his helplessness in changing the outlook of the Hindus, Baranī, pp. 216-217. ### [c8.67](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.67) ² \*Sulūk-u'l-mulūk\*, f. 16b; \*Nihāyat-u'l-arab\*, p. 5; \*Tadhkirat-u'l-khulafā fi tawṣiyat-i'l-mulūk\*, f. 6; \*Holy Qur'ān\*, v, 2; \*Ottoman Statecraft\*, p. 28. ### [c8.68](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.68) ³ Baranī, p. 411. ### [c8.69](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.69) ⁴ \*Mahābhārata\*, Sāntī parva, lxxviii, 41-43. ### [c8.70](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.70) Nor should the mentality of the sultans themselves be ignored. To-day people do not realize the hold of religion on the medieval mind. Most of these monarchs believed in the Law they were called upon to defend; some certainly approached their duties in a spirit of devotion and worship.⁵ The desire to earn the commendation of one's fellows, also, must have played its part. These psychological forces would prove more potent in curbing irresponsibility than any visible and outside restriction. ### [c8.71](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.71) ⁵ E.g., Jalāl-u'd-dīn Fīrūz Khaljī; Fīrūz Shāh. Also, vide, Ḥamīd Khān's remark to Buhlūl Lodī, Dā'ūdī, f. 6b. Also, vide Tāj, ff. 10a, 181b, 195a, 196a, etc., for Quṭb-u'd-dīn Aibak, and f. 235 for Īltutmish. ### [c8.72](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.72) Co-operation. The sovereignty of a single man is a legal myth. No man can impose his will upon a large population without considerable support, which assumes two forms. A small group of influential men give him active support by putting their energies, capabilities and even lives at his disposal. The greater portion of the populace give their passive support by obeying orders and paying taxes. The Dehli sultan had to rely on the active support of the nobles who, for one reason or another, were willing to make common cause with him.¹ The monarch had also to ensure the co-operation of a fairly large number of ‘ulamā; the learned theologians and lawyers, on account of their influence with the Muslim populace.² Then there were the many public servants in various branches of the administration who put their experience and technical knowledge at the service of the state. Nor could the ruler forget the cultivators of the soil, the Hindu peasants and their representatives—the village headmen, the local chiefs and tribal heads.³ The ultimate force of the state consisted of the Muslim fighters who shed their blood for the glory of the sultan. No monarch has alienated any of these elements with impunity or succeeded in his projects without their support. The hostility of the people seldom proved fruitless.⁴ The limitations of royal power were recognized by contemporary writers. In discussing the reasons for Muḥammad bin Tughluq’s difficulties and failures, Baranī¹ twice says that his executions had created widespread disaffection.¹ ‘Alā-u’d-dīn Khaljī’s measures succeeded because he had a very good technical staff at his disposal who efficiently co-operated with him.² Muḥammad bin Tughluq’s excesssive demands drove the peasantry of the Doāb into rebellion and the result was almost complete loss of revenue.³ Actually there is no sanction for unbridled tyranny except the timidity of the people, and the Indian populace during the Middle Ages was by no means timid or forbearing; on the other hand, the people were mostly warlike, refractory and rebellious. Besides, those were the days of dense forests and limited means of communication; and the difference between an army and armed rabble was proverbially very little. ### [c8.73](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.73) ¹ \*Vide\* Fakhr-u’d-dīn Kotwāl’s advice to Niẓām-u’d-dīn who aspired to usurping the throne, \*Baranī\*, pp. 136-138; also, Bughrā Khān’s advice to Kaiqubād, \*Baranī\*, p. 151. ### [c8.74](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.74) ² So great was this influence that monarchs were often jealous. For Shaikh Niẓām-u’d-dīn’s influence \*vide Baranī\*, pp. 341-346. \*Inshā’-i-Māhrū\* has an interesting letter (XXIII) addressed to a leading theologian to exercise his influence with a tribe to pay the state demand. Ghazzālī says in \*Iḥyā-u’l-‘ulūm\*: الملوك حكام على الناس والعلماء حكام على الملوك ### [c8.75](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.75) ³ A.M., f. 33b. ### [c8.76](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.76) ⁴ E.g., Nāṣir-u’d-dīn Khusraw, who recognized the importance of the hostility of the people (\*Tughluq-nāmah\*, p. 47); Aḥmad Ayāz, who was ### [c8.77](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.77) ¹ Baranī, pp. 500, 522. ### [c8.78](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.78) ² Idem, pp. 288-289. ### [c8.79](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.79) ³ Baranī, p. 473. ### [c8.80](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.80) No feudal lord in Europe exercised a greater check on royal power than the nobles in India.⁴ The Muslim state had to exist in the midst of an alien population which was only gradually reconciled to its sway. Its doors were battered by Mongol hordes who reached the very walls of the capital. In the midst of these difficulties the sultan could not offend the powerful nobles without grave consequences, specially when some of them were heads of clans and thus had a permanent following. It was not easy to impose the royal will on them, for they considered themselves the peers of the monarch and quite capable of founding royal dynasties themselves.⁵ Their relationship to the throne varied according to the character and capabilities of the monarch. If the wise Buhlūl could at need humble ### [c8.81](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.81) ⁴ The importance of the nobles was widely recognized, e.g., Tughluq-nāmah, p. 46. ### [c8.82](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.82) ⁵ A. M., f. 34b. ### [c8.83](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.83) virtually a monarch; Muḥammad bin Tughluq. The populace of Dehlī rebelled against Rukn-u’d-dīn and put Raḍiyah on the throne, Minhāj, p. 184. ### [c8.84](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.84) himself before the nobles by putting his turban at their feet; the inexperienced Ibrāhīm lost his throne by alienating them. The only ideal that held the nobles together was the service of Islam.¹ They knew that the sultanate was the last stronghold of Islam during the domination of the heathen Mongols over the lands of the Eastern Caliphate. It was realized that ‘a faith without a state is futile and a state without a faith is without any guidance’. ² They also felt that a nation which is ruled by others is like a dead body.³ These feelings knit the lords into a body which obeyed the king so long as they felt that he was performing his duty; but they did not hesitate to revolt against him if he proved incapable of defending these ends. It must be admitted, however, that the nobles were only too often swayed by motives of self-interest. ### [c8.85](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.85) ¹ Dā’ūdī, f., 6b; also, vide sentiments of nobles fighting against Nāṣir u’d-dīn Khusrau, ‘Iṣāmī, pp. 367, 368. ### [c8.86](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.86) ² Akhlāq-i-Nāṣirī, p. 408. ### [c8.87](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.87) ³ Vide ‘Īsā Khān’s remark to Sher Shāh, Sarwānī, f. 47b. ### [c8.88](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.88) This brings us to the legal aspect of the question of the dethronement of a monarch; but its discussion requires an understanding of the principles on which a Muslim ruler was raised to the throne. The election of Abū Bakr as caliph after the death of the Prophet provided the jurists with a precedent on which they could base their theories of succession to sovereignty. Two main points emerge from it. The elders did not even discuss the question of relationship to the Prophet, thus proving that considerations of legitimacy did not claim their attention. They also established “the principle of free election by the assembled community and its confirmation by general homage.”⁴ This idea became firmly grounded in the minds of Muslim lawyers. The other method was that the reigning caliph nominated his successor, but this nomination was to be confirmed by general election and homage.⁵ The nomination was but a recommendation to the electors which might or might not be respected. A number of caliphs adopted this. ### [c8.89](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.89) ⁴ V.K., p. 9. ### [c8.90](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.90) ⁵ Idem, pp. 266-267. ### [c8.91](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.91) device of obtaining general homage for their nominee in their lifetime.¹ But throughout the history of the Caliphate, political thinkers and jurists maintained that the office was elective. The same ideas underlie the rules regarding the election of a sultan.² The legal aspects of the election have been worked out by the doctors of law with their wonted thoroughness and logic. The majority are of opinion that a monarch elected by the most influential men in the capital is entitled to the allegiance of the people, but they are not unanimous regarding the qualifications of these electors.³ The failure to work out a satisfactory method of general election resulted in mere logical quibbles about the minimum number of electors, thus reducing the election to a mere formality. ### [c8.92](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.92) ¹ V K. pp. 266-267. ### [c8.93](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.93) ² Sulūk-u'l mulūk, f. 14b. ### [c8.94](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.94) ³ V.K., p. 264. ### [c8.95](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.95) Generally the form of an election was maintained by the sultans of Dehlī. The nobles and the learned and most influential theologians at the capital agreed upon a candidate and proclaimed him the sultan. Then a formal oath of allegiance was sworn by them and, later, by the populace.⁴ Of course this was often an election only in name because the candidate had already decided the issue by conquest in battle or by overwhelming force; but it had the advantage of being legal and conforming to the wishes of the jurists and the people. It should not be forgotten that another force was at work; most of the sultans were Turks and, in spite of their zeal for Islam, Turkish and tribal ideas still influenced their minds. The nobles did not always take hereditary rights into consideration, for not many sultans were succeeded by their sons; but they did try to limit their choice to the ruling house. The changes in the dynasties seem to have been fortunate, which proves that they were not made without reasons of state. Even when a successful warrior like Jalāl-u’d-dīn Fīrūz Khaljī raised himself to the throne, the outward form of election was maintained.¹ The Turks did not like the coming of the Khaljīs to power, and the sultan was not popular with the populace. It seems, therefore, that a large number of people did not take the oath of allegiance for some time; but the more important elements soon began to co-operate. Actually there was a legal loophole which the sultan could have utilized. The later jurists had recognized ‘election by force or usurpation’ which created a sanction for seizing power by force; that it was not employed shows the strong sense of political decency among the ruling class. ### [c8.96](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.96) ⁴ Minhāj mentions the elections of Mu'izz-u'd-dīn Bahrām Shāh (p. 191), 'Alā-u'd-dīn Mas'ūd Shāh (p. 198), and Nāṣir-u'd-dīn Maḥmūd (p. 208); 'Iṣāmī mentions those of Kiumarth (p. 199), Shihāb-u'd-dīn 'Umar (p. 341) and Quṭb-u'd-dīn Mubārak Shāh (p. 345). The Tughluq-nāmah mentions Ghiyāth-u'd-dīn Tughluq's election (pp. 135-143). I.B. (ii, p. 21) describes the election of Iltutmish. ### [c8.97](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.97) ¹ Barani, p. 173. ### [c8.98](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.98) The right to dethrone a sovereign is the logical corollary of an elective monarchy. Though some jurists hold that an election is so holy and binding that the electors could be released from their vows only by the sovereign himself, the majority of lawyers believe that the monarch could be deposed if he failed to carry out his trust. Injustice is considered to be a sufficient cause for dethronement. All writers agree that a man suffering from mental or physical infirmity cannot continue to be a sovereign. Great importance is attached to loss of power of judgment and eyesight.² The fact that a number of Dehlī sultans, mostly incompetent, were removed from the throne shows that the monarch was not considered too sacrosanct to be touched if he proved himself useless to the state. Of course there were intrigues and rebellions against some capable rulers as well, but they generally did not gain much support. ### [c8.99](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.99) ² V.K., \[illegible\]: 248, 264, 267, 268. The custom of blinding a claimant to the throne to make his accession impossible is of Byzantine origin and crept into the Muslim world as late as the 4th century A.H., Mez., p. 372. ### [c8.100](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.100) The jurists have carefully laid down the qualifications of an aspirant to monarchy. He should be capable of dealing with the problems of the state and in full possession of his physical and mental faculties. If he had lost his eyesight, hearing or power of speech, he could not ascend the throne.¹ Some writers also add that he should belong to the male sex and be of adult age.² These two qualifications were not always demanded at Dehli. It is true that Raḍiyah's election caused a controversy; she was not able to command the obedience of all the nobles, yet she was elected and ruled for four years with the co-operation of a large number of generals and statesmen. There were not many instances of young boys coming to the throne; the few who were raised were mere puppets in the hands of some successful intriguer, but generally the usual formalities of accession were observed. ### [c8.101](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.101) ¹ Aḥkām-u's-sulṭāniyah, pp. 4, 5. ### [c8.102](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.102) ² V.K., p. 264. ### [c8.103](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8.103) The absence of a hereditary principle of succession had its usual drawbacks, but it was responsible for the fact that quite a number of brilliant men can be counted among the sultans of Dehli. It was by no means easy to occupy the throne of a state placed in such difficult circumstances. Fools and mere pleasure-seekers could not be tolerated for long, because the sultanate required all the care and work that a man could give it. The rough and ready methods of selecting the sultan worked well and proved successful in finding the right man at the right time. ## Linked texts (6) - [Mānava Dharmaśāstra](https://indike.org/pramana/in.niti.dharma.manu.7.3) — Manu & Bhṛgu, Sanskrit - [Mahābhārata](https://indike.org/pramana/in.lit.mahabharata.vyasa.12.78) — Vyāsa, Sanskrit - [Tārīkh-i Firishta](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darkages.general.tarikh-i-firishta) — Muḥammad Qāsim Hindū Shāh Firishta 1606, Persian - [Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra](https://indike.org/pramana/in.niti.artha.kautilya) — Kauṭilya, Sanskrit - [Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darkages.sultanate.tarikh-i-firuzshahi-afif) — Shams-i Sirāj ʿAfīf - [Tārīkh-i Mubārakshāhī](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darkages.sultanate.tarikh-i-mubarakshahi) — Yaḥyā b. Aḥmad Sirhindī --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.qureshi-1942.c8) · Pramāṇa