Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

The Positive Background of Hindu Sociology c11.s1.t35: Keith, 1928

The Positive Background of Hindu Sociology c11.s1.t35

Language
English

Keith, 1928

c11.s1.t35.1

A great transformation took place in Keith's ideas. By 1928 in his judgment the name Kauṭalya "has no value being obviously a correction." The *Arthaśāstra* is considered by him to convey "absolutely general and very pedantic utterances" and is therefore not to be compared with Bismarck's *Gedanken and Erinnerungen*, or "Thoughts and Memories" (Stuttgart 1898) which is full of practical details. The maxims of the *Arthaśāstra* are suited to the requirements of a moderate-sized state and "ignore entirely the issue of the government of an empire." Smith's claim that the *Arthaśāstra* had been composed before Chandragupta established the Empire is regarded as "absurd". The effort to establish resemblances between the *Arthaśāstra* and Megasthenes's *Indika* has according to Keith been a "complete failure". Yājnavalkya was known to the *Arthaśāstra* which may have used some of the other Smritis like Manu and Nārada. By the fifth century A.C. the *Kauṭalya* and Chāṇakya were known to the Jaina canons like *Nandisūtra* and *Anuyogadvārasūtra*. The work was prior to the *Kāmasūtra* and *Panchatantra* of the fourth century. It may have been written about 300 A.C. by a court official somewhere in South India. Keith has in the main reproduced Jolly's last words as given in the Introduction to the Lahore edition (Vol. I. 1923).

c11.s1.t35.2

Keith asks "why the author knows nothing of an empire or Pāṭaliputra" (p. 461). The answer is to be found in a statement to the effect, say, that a Briton writing on political science may have no occasion to refer to London or to the British Empire.

c11.s1.t35.3

Depending on Stein's general conclusion Keith¹ asserts that the "*Arthaśāstra* knows nothing of the wooden fortification of Pāṭaliputra but provides for stone work." This statement should appear to be out of the mark because the *Arthaśāstra* says nothing about Pāṭaliputra. And as for stone work recent excavations have discovered remnants of walls built with this material. Should the *Arthaśāstra* be alleged to know of nothing but stone as building material, even then it can be well accepted as a document describing the Maurya conditions.² One should not inadvertently rest assured that wood work is the only stuff that has been discovered in the course of excavations and explorations.

c11.s1.t35.4

¹ *History of Sanskrit Literature* (Oxford 1928), pp. 458-461.

c11.s1.t35.5

² Stein: *Megasthenes und Kauṭilya* (Vienna 1922), pp. 28, 33-34 40. See the discussion about Stein, *supra*, pp. 260-272.

c11.s1.t35.6

Another paper of Keith's was published in 1928.³ It is like Jolly's *Introduction* (1923) and Winternitz's paper in the *Calcutta Review* (1924) a substantial contribution against the Indian tradition. For all practical purposes the three arguments are more or less identical. They are based fundamentally on Jolly's German papers (1911-16) and fortified by Stein's *Megasthenes und Kauṭalya* (1922).

c11.s1.t35.7

³ "The Authenticity of Kauṭilya" in the *Sir Asutosh Memorial Volume* (Patna).

c11.s1.t35.8

In this paper Keith has adumbrated certain questionable views of a general character. His statement that the intellectual power of Machiavelli is wholly lacking in the author of the *Arthaśāstra* is unsupported by facts of comparative politics.

c11.s1.t35.9

It is strange that Keith is prepared to discover in Machiavelli the "ideal of a national king ruling over a centralized realm in lieu of a chaos of contending states" but fails to find the same ideal or anything like it in Kauṭalya. Machiavelli has been presented as standing for the "ideal of the Renaissance", an ideal of "universal peace", which of course remains yet to be realized, as it should appear to Keith as to others. Should it be possible, however, for twentieth century scholarship to credit Machiavelli with such extraordinary political futurism, one wonders why it should not be equally reasonable to trace some of the latest ideas or ideals of today in the *sūtras* and *bhāṣyas* of Kauṭalya. In this context we must remember all the time, as one can believe with Keith, that the "search for such a state organization as shall secure universal peace" has not led to any tangible results. He has not cited any relevant passages from Machiavelli nor tried to discover phrases from Kauṭalya such as might correspond to what he means by Machiavelli's Renaissance political ideals or philosophy. But when he makes the categorical statement that the conception of "unversal peace" is "wholly alien to the *Arthaśāstra*" one wonders whether justice has been done to the conception of the *chāturanta* or *sārvabhauma* state which furnishes the fundamental basis of Kauṭalyan as of other Hindu politics. Furnished as Keith is with such postulates, it is easy for him to declare that "of political philosophy the *Arthaśāstra* has little conception" and that "it expresses no new theory of the purpose of the state and has no ideals." He has, however, not made it clear as to what he understands by "political philosophy," "theory of the state," and ideals.

c11.s1.t35.10

In my analysis the most important fact against the Indian tradition is to be found in the quotations from Kauṭalya himself by name in the third person. The standpoint of Hillebrandt, Jolly, and Winternitz has been presented by Keith with great force in this paper. “The citation of views under the form *iti Kauṭilyah* is *prima facie* wholly against this view (Kauṭalya's authorship),” says he. One ought to agree with him in the remark that “no effective reply has been adduced to meet this obvious objection.” My views on this question have been expressed on different occasions in the course of this investigation.

c11.s1.t35.11

S. K. Aiyangar, 1929

c11.s1.t35.12

According to S. K. Aiyangar “nobody could ordinarily be a minister who was not a Paṇḍit”¹ Govinda Dikshita of the seventeenth century was such a ministerpaṇḍit. In Aiyangar's judgment the fact that Kauṭalya lays down the rules “by which a state placed in the middle of a number of states round about it of equal strength can make conquests of its neighbours and become an imperial state is just what gives the indication that Chāṇakya helped to evolve from out of a powerful single state an empire, far flung and reaching to the frontiers which British statesmen even of the twentieth century have sighed for in vain at least on one side of India.”

c11.s1.t35.13

¹ Introduction to V. R. R. Dikshitar's *Hindu Administrative Institutions* (Madras 1929) pp. xiii-xiv.

c11.s1.t35.14

Aiyangar says that we may take with Meyer that Kauṭalya was the minister of that name who assisted Chandragupta in the establishment of, and in laying down the lines of the administration for, the Maurya Empire. His position is thus indeed that of Smith and Monahan who consider the *Arthaśāstra* to be a pre-Imperial Maurya work.

c11.s1.t35.15

D. R. Bhandarkar, 1929

c11.s1.t35.16

In regard to Megasthenes's statements that Indians never took to wine except at sacrifices and that theft was of rare occurrence Jolly is sceptical and has used Kauṭalya as the touchstone. This methodology is open to question, as has ben pointed out by D. R. Bhandarkar.

c11.s1.t35.17

"If this work is much posterior in date to Megasthenes, as Prof. Jolly contends, where is the necessity, asks D. R. Bhandarkar, "of bringing in its contents to disprove the statement of the Greek ambassador?"¹

c11.s1.t35.18

¹ *Some Aspects of Ancient Hindu Polity* (Benares 1929) p. 45.

c11.s1.t35.19

D. R. Bhandarkar agrees with Shamsastry that some of the manners and customs depicted in the *Arthaśāstra* are pre-Maurya (p. 46). This may indeed be almost taken for granted because many of the mores even of to-day can be traced back to the Vedas.²

c11.s1.t35.20

² See D. Bhattacharya: *Guṇaviṣṇu's Chhāndogya Mantra Bhāṣya* (Calcutta 1930); also Hillebrandt: *Ritual-literatur* (Grundriss der indoarischen Philologie).

c11.s1.t35.21

Arguing against Winternitz in connection with Kauṭalya's love of endless and pedantic classification and definition, D. R. Bhandarkar observes (p. 43) that "this list of excellences is a *sine qua non* in the treatment of *maṇḍala* ("geopolitical" sphere), whose main object is to gauge the strength of one state against the neighbouring ones as every ruler is expected to do." But one will have to retort that although the object is quite understandable the fact remains that Kauṭalya had to have recourse to this sort of fatiguing categories. One can establish a thesis even without creating such an atmosphere of roundabout and hair-splitting definitions of definitions. It is not possible to get out of these super-logicalisms of Kauṭalya as of Śākya the Buddha and Mahāvīra. But even then one is not forced to hold, as does Winternitz, that Kauṭalya cannot be a practical, hard-headed and shrewd statesman.

c11.s1.t35.22

D. R. Bhandarkar's position that the *Arthaśāstra* "combines the minimum of speculation with the maximum of practical wisdom" (pp. 50-51) is entirely misleading. He makes an antithesis between speculation and practical wisdom which is unwarrantable. Besides, it is to be observed that the *Arthaśāstra* is from top to bottom nothing but speculation. It is *Kauṭalya-darśana*, it is a *śāstra*, albeit "very often combined with practical wisdom," and what is more, always supported by command over the psychology of superiors and subordinates, friends and foes, in one word, ever backed by the knowledge of the realities of flesh and blood. In order to demonstrate that Kauṭalya has practical wisdom one does not have to argue like D. R. Bhandarkar in such a way as to rob Kauṭalya of his intrinsic merit as speculator *par excellence*, as philosopher, aye, one of the greatest philosophers of all ages.

c11.s1.t35.23

At one point (pp. 51-52) D. R. Bhandarkar seems to concede to Jolly the point that the *Arthaśāstra* "cannot be much anterior to the *Kāmasūtra*." And his arguments are threefold:

c11.s1.t35.24

(1) the chapter of each ends with the verses of the other,
(2) the quotations in each are invariably indicated by a prefatory remark to the effect, and
(3) each commences with a detailed table of contents.

c11.s1.t35.25

One cannot understand how this correspondence between two authors in the purely formal side of book-making can compel anybody to believe that they "could not have been separated from each other by any long interval." Quite another explanation might appear to be more reasonable. Let us admit for the present (1) that the *Arthaśāstra* and the *Kāmasūtra* were not written or compiled by one and the same individual or school, and (2) that the *Arthaśāstra* was the original upon which the *Kāmasūtra* drew for certain items. We may then believe that in the art of book-making Kauṭalya initiated a new style. This new style appeared to be attractive to those scholars who took interest in topics which were nearest to those of the *Arthaśāstra*. It is quite reasonable to surmise that the Kauṭalyan style remained unimitated for quite a long time until some genius got inspired to make a name for himself as the pioneer of a new science by at last utilizing the Kauṭalyan method. No arbitrary period can be set up for this interval between the originator and a great imitator.

c11.s1.t35.26

In D. R. Bhandarkar's final argument (pp. 56, 61) the *Arthaśāstra* in the main (excluding the first and the last chapters) is composed in *Dharmasūtra* style and may therefore belong to the period from the seventh to the second century B.C. He furnishes instances of Vaśiṣṭha's *Dharmaśāstra* as well as a Jātaka quoting from the *Arthaśāstra*. And these instances point to the pre-Asokan origin of the treatise. The first and last chapters may have been added "shortly before the time" of *Kāmandakī*, says he, and there may have been a few interpolations in that process of "imparting a finishing touch to the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭalya."

c11.s1.t35.27

It may not be difficult to believe that the first and last chapters did not come from the same hands as the main corpus of the text. But there is no earthly reason for the assumption that the Kauṭalyan school came into existence “shortly before the time” of Kāmandaka, when it was alleged to be felt necessary to add the first and the last chapters by way of finishing touch.

c11.s1.t35.28

According to D. R. Bhandarkar the “use of one’s name in the third person is more modest and is common to both the Sanskrit and vernacular literatures” (pp. 50-51).

c11.s1.t35.29

This is unacceptable. By no means can a self-quotation or rather a reference to one’s name in the third person be described as a case of modesty on the part of the author in the East or the West, in ancient or in modern times. This is normally speaking anything but modesty. It may be conceded that perhaps once in a while an author is likely to use the third person about himself when he happens to be in an exceptionally devout and humble attitude. Medieval poets, preachers and singers of the religious turn or *Bhakti* school in India, for instance, are used to this kind of modesty. But as a rule to mention oneself by name is not a mark of modesty. In modern Eur-American scholarship it is the practice of authors while writing the report on or even history of researches in certain sciences say, from anthropology to zoology, to name themselves along with other contributors to the fields in question. This is excusable on grounds of objectivity. In any case it does not bespeak modesty, however.

c11.s1.t35.30

But on occasions of controversy when the views of several authors are being discussed and criticised almost as in an assembly it cannot by any means be taken as modesty in the East or the West to name oneself in the third person as the exponent or opponent of certain views. Not even the question of objectivity can furnish a justification here. In controversies conducted through journals or carried on in learned societies nobody would dare mention oneself in the third person in any country.

c11.s1.t35.31

As for ancient and medieval Indian practice D. R. Bhandarkar's two references (Medhātithi's commentary on *Manu I*, 4 and Viśvarūpāchārya's commentary on *Yājñavalkya I*, 2) point simply to general rules of etiquette in the literary profession. The authors are said not to use the first person in order that *svapraśaṃsā* or *ātmastūti*, i.e. self-praise may be avoided. It is on considerations of objectivity that the avoidance of the first person is practised by literary men, say the Hindu commentators. These are "general" rules. But the commentaries do not say anything about the special situations covered by problems of controversy. Neither Viśvarūpāchārya nor Medhātithi says that the third person is used by authors about themselves when they are combating the views of others.

c11.s1.t35.32

In the *Arthaśāstra* we have instances of Kauṭalya being quoted no less than seventytwo times not under the ordinary circumstances but under conditions of controversy. Humanly speaking, this is unpardonable. That is why men of ordinary common sense cannot be blamed if they are not prepared to take those passages in which Kauṭalya is quoted as written by Kauṭalya himself. The hand of somebody other than Kauṭalya in the composition of the work can be very reasonably suspected. And this is bound to tell very effectively against the authenticity of the Indian tradition as generally understood.

c11.s1.t35.33

Johnston, 1929

c11.s1.t35.34

So far as literary evidences are concerned, it is *vis-à-vis* (1) *Pāṇini*, (2) *Patanjali*, (3) the *Kāmasūtra*, (4) the *Tantrākhyāyikā*, (5) the *Panchatantra*, (6) the *Yājnavalkya Smriti*, (7) the *Manu Samhitā*, (8) the *Raghuvaṁśa*, (9) the *Śakuntalā*, (10) the *Daśakumāracharita*, (11) the *Purāṇas*, (12) the *Kāmandakīnīti*, (13) the *Brihat Samhitā*, (14) the *Charaka Samhitā*, (15) the *Mudrārākṣasa*, etc., that the orientations of the *Arthaśāstra* were investigated up till now. Enumerated without reference to chronological order, as they are, these are all Sanskritic and “Hindu” sources. A few Jaina sources were also studied, namely, (1) the *Nītivākyāmrita*, (2) the *Nandīsutta* and (3) the *Anuyogadvāra*.¹

c11.s1.t35.35

¹ Jolly's Introduction to the Lahore edition (1923), pp. 10-12.

c11.s1.t35.36

The Buddhist and Pali sources had been neglected. Hopkins's reference to the *Jātakas* was very slight. New lights, therefore, have been thrown on the Kauṭalya question by the publication of H. E. Johnston's paper on “Two Studies in the Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya” in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (London) for January 1929 because here the perspectives are derived from Buddhist sources, namely, (1) the works of Aśvaghoṣa (second century A.C.?) (2) Āryaśūra's *Jātakamālā* (fourth century A.C.?) and (3) the *Lankāvatārasūtra* (fourth century A.C.?).

c11.s1.t35.37

It is to be understood however, that the dates of these Buddhist texts are in any case as questionable as those of the "Hindu" and Jaina texts mentioned above. Altogether, we encounter once more the eternal problem of Indian chronology,—namely, the ascertainment of an unknown with reference to another unknown or questionable.

c11.s1.t35.38

Let us begin with Johnston's general orientations.

c11.s1.t35.39

On the one hand, he would not care to read into the *Arthaśāstra* the "ideas of a great statesman or a deep political thinker." On the other hand, he believes that "half its value is missed by treating it as the pedantic theories of a Paṇḍit." In his judgment it is "in essence the work of a practical administrator" whose interest in political theories does not go beyond the considerations of the "king's advantage." The *Arthaśāstra* is besides alleged to be "unfettered by moral or religious prejudices except in so far as their existence in others affects the execution of policy."

c11.s1.t35.40

In his *Saundarananda* Aśvaghoṣa uses the concept of the "conquest of the earth", says Johnston. But the doctrine of *vijigīṣu* or world-conqueror in the chauvinistic sense was not used with the alleged "relentless logic" in Aśvaghoṣa's days as in the days of Kauṭalya. In Johnston's logic Aśvaghoṣa must therefore be earlier than Kauṭalya.

c11.s1.t35.41

But this interpretation is questionable. One might perhaps argue, on the contrary, that although the Kauṭalyan category was already there Asvaghoṣa's personal message happened to be different from, nay, the opposite of Kauṭalya's. Hence to the one it was very subsidiary while to the other it was a prominent item in thought. May be, even the same category of world-conquest was used in a humane manner by Aśvaghoṣa while in Kauṭalya's mentality it was perhaps nothing but a creed of alleged self-aggrandisement of the most materialistic dye.

c11.s1.t35.42

From the analysis of philosophical doctrines it is never safe to argue about their chronological relations. Let us take an historical fact. It was during the epoch of "pacifistic" propaganda by Sākya the Buddha's followers that Chandragupta Maurya knew how to organize his legions and consummate his *digvijaya*. Sākya's teachings may have been unknown or unnoteworthy to the officials of the Maurya "general staff." This does not prove that the Buddha or his followers were later in time than Chandragupta Maurya or mere non-entities on any count.

c11.s1.t35.43

Johnston does not likewise seem to be taking a commonsense view when he believes that in his *Buddhacharita* Aśvaghoṣa might have seized the opportunity to condemn the *Realpolitik*, so to say, of the Kauṭalyan *Arthaśāstra*, had the latter treatise been known to be a "standard work" by this time.

c11.s1.t35.44

As suggested above, the situation might be entirely otherwise. In other words, the alleged Kauṭalyan chauvinism and cult of self-aggrandisement may have been quite dominant in the philosophical *milieu* of Hindustan for a number of centuries. But not everybody cared to take interest in or to have the inspiration to condemn it,—not, at any rate, the professors of the Sākyan cult of humanitarianism, Asokan *Dhamma* and so forth. The world was pluralistic enough for both the Aśvaghoṣan and the Kauṭalyan strands of life and thought. From the indifference of Aśvaghoṣa in regard to Kauṭalya we can infer nothing as to the chronological relations between the two. We understand simply that neither in *Saundarananda* nor in *Buddhacharita* are we to find the characteristic messages of the *Arthaśāstra*. Today, for instance, every power in Eur-America and Asia is keeping its gun powder dry although a dominant political and moral philosophy of the hour is to be seen in the cult of world-peace, disarmament and what not. The philosophers of militaristic energism are plying their trade merrily although anti-militaristic preachings over the radio are frequent.

c11.s1.t35.45

In Āryaśūra’s *Jātakamālā* Johnston detects certain tenets which seem to be like those of Kauṭalya. The phrase *nītikauṭilyaprasaṃgeṣu* used by Āryaśūra has been supposed to contain Kauṭalya’s name. According to Johnston, therefore, “it is quite certain that Āryaśūra knew the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭalya and that in his day it was regarded as the standard work.”

c11.s1.t35.46

Unfortunately the passages cited indicate nothing more than a moralist’s “shortest way” with politics. And as it is the object of the writer to condemn just those aspects of *Khattavijja* or *Kṣatriyavidyā*, the Kṣatriya science or politics which deal with diplomatic manœuvres, double dealings, intrigues etc. the common noun *Nīti-kauṭilya* has been used. No person need be understood here as a matter of course and there is no question of the *Arthaśāstra* being a standard book or even a book in the time of Āryaśūra.

c11.s1.t35.47

*Nītikauṭilya* = crookedness of policy. It is not identical with *Kauṭilyanīti* (politics or political science or statecraft). There is no presumption to think that either a book or an author is meant here. Even if *Kauṭilyanīti* had been used by Āryaśūra one might suspect perhaps that we had here a sly hit at the book or the author or both. But in *nīti-* *Kauṭilya* no suggestion along those lines can be automatically entertained.

c11.s1.t35.48

However, Johnston's interpretations bring the *Arthaśāstra* between Aśvaghoṣa of the second century A.C. and Āryaśūra of the fourth century A.C. The lower limit of its composition can hardly be later than 250 A.C., says he.

c11.s1.t35.49

The *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* has an appendix of 884 *ślokas* which belongs to the fifth century A.C. In the prophecy about future *riṣis* that are to arise the appendix mentions them in the following order: (1) Pāṇini, (2) Kātyāyana (3) Yājnavalkya, (4) Vālmīki, (5) Masurākṣa, (6) Kauṭilya, (7) Aśvalāyana and (8) the scion of the Śākiyas.

c11.s1.t35.50

The mention of Kauṭilya in this fifth century list of *riṣis* without reference to the Mauryas leads Johnston to the following conclusion: Viṣṇugupta Kauṭilya, the author of *Arthaśāstra*, was a different person from the minister of Chandragupta Maurya, whose name perhaps was Chāṇakya.

c11.s1.t35.51

This line of reasoning is not long followed by Johnston. One finds that it is arbitrary. In any case he hastens to conclude that the lower limit of the composition of the *Arthaśāstra* is certainly not later than about 250 A.C., and that the upper limit is perhaps the beginning of the Christian era.

c11.s1.t35.52

Incidentally, it is to be observed that Masurākṣa is known as the author of *Nītiśāstra* in the Tibetan *Tanjur*.² This work, be it noted further, is placed in that list "just after a slightly longer work called both *Chāṇakya-nītiśāstra* and *Chāṇakya-rājanītiśāstra*."

c11.s1.t35.53

² *J.R.A.S.*, (London) January 1929, p. 87.

c11.s1.t35.54

Johnston has approached the *Arthaśāstra* not only from the perspective of Buddhist ideology but also from that of administrative experience. He believes that "Kauṭalya's attitude comes naturally in fact to all who have been engaged in administrative work." And on the strength of such experience he has attempted explanations of certain passages on land tenure and agriculture which need not be discussed in this context. But it is worth while to observe that he finds himself unable to accept the theories set out in Breloer's *Kauṭalīya-Studien I. Das Grundeigentum in Indien* (Bonn 1927). His disagreement with Breloer on certain issues is radical.

Cites (33)