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The Positive Background of Hindu Sociology c11.s1.t37: Kane, 1930

The Positive Background of Hindu Sociology c11.s1.t37

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English

Kane, 1930

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Kauṭalya mentions neither the four stages of a lawsuit,—namely, plaint, reply, proof and judgment,—nor the three kinds of evidence,—documents, witnesses and prescription.¹ These two groups of items are fully developed by Yājnavalkya. The widow or the mother is not the heir to a sonless son according to Kauṭalya who thus differs entirely from Yājnavalkya. The *strīdhana* (the woman's special property) of a woman dying during her husband's life time is divided in the *Arthaśāstra* among her sons and daughters. But in Yājnavalkya's system the daughters get a preference. Yājnavalkya is considered by Kane to represent a much more advanced stage and therefore to be "later by several centuries" than Kauṭalya.

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¹ P. V. Kane: *Histoty of Dharmasutras* (Poona, 1930) pp. 95-97, 101, 104.

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In comparison with Manu also Kauṭalya is considered to be "primitive." The *Arthaśāstra* permits the Brāhmaṇa to marry even a Śūdra woman. But the *Manu Samhitā* allows such unions although on second thought it condemns them. In the *Manu Samhitā* widow remarriage is forbidden while it is permitted in the *Arthaśāstra*. A wife is permitted by Kauṭalya even to desert her husband if he is of bad character, endangers her life and so forth. From the standpoint of juridical development Manu represents a much developed strand and hence a relatively recent age compared to Kauṭalya.

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The existence of correct *triṣṭubh* metres in the *Arthaśāstra* argues for a late date corresponding to that of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and much later than that of the *Brihaddevatā*.

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According to Kane the *Rāmāyaṇa* may be a work even of the fifth century B.C. and the date of the *Brihaddevatā* is still debatable. He is convinced therefore that all circumstances agree with the traditional date of 300 B.C.

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De La Vallée Poussin, 1930

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In *L'Inde aux temps des Mauryas* etc. De la Vallée Poussin considers Jacobi's interpretation of the *Arthaśāstra* to be "extravagant" and Meyer's introduction to his German translation to be "deceptive". Evidently he accepts the arguments of Stein regarding the alleged discrepancies between Megasthenes and Kauṭalya. In his judgment the best study is that of Keith who "has destroyed the thesis of Jacobi".

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The only French contribution¹ has bearing on the name Chīna as used in the *Arthaśāstra*. Pelliot's paper entitled "Origine du nom de China" in *Toung-Pao*, called attention to the well known fact that not before Tsin Shi-hwangti became Emperor of a United China, could China as the name of the whole country be known abroad as such.

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¹ French Indology has hardly anything to offer in regard to the Kauṭalya question. But in Kalidas Nag's *Les Theories Diplomatiques de l'Inde Ancienne* (Paris 1923 pp. 116-118) we are presented with a summary of Jolly's views as against those of Jacobi and a reference to Stein.

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Pelliot's remark is, however, irrelevant because Chīna, as mentioned in the *Arthaśāstra*, refers to a Himalayan region and not to any extra-Indian territory.²

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² Jayaswal; *Hindu Polity* (Calcutta 1924) Part 1, p. 212.

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De la Vallée Poussin's own position is described below.

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"The attitude of F. W. Thomas as one belonging to the adverse camp is perhaps a little too favourable for the authenticity or the quasi-authenticity of the *Arthaśāstra*”, says he (pp. 71-72). “The comparison between Magasthenes and the *Arthaśāstra* forbids the placing of the latter under the first Maurya. Besides, the *Arthaśāstra* envisages a regime of small states, very small states, and should appear to have reference to an India fragmented and not to the Imperial India of the Mauryas.”

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We shall do well to consider, says he, that this book like many Indian things does not have a date and that it contains interpolations and idealistic interpretations. But still he believes that it is based on ancient data (*il repose sur des données anciennes*). Altogether, he would give the historian the right to make use of it in order to design the picture of Hindu states of all times (*le tableau des états hindous de tous les temps*). He is cautious, however, to say that this right ought to be used by the historian with moderation.

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According to *De la Vallée Poussin*, one should take literally neither every thing that is reported by Magasthenes nor all that is said in the *Arthaśāstra*. “Just as the art of love presented in the *Kāmaśāstra*, thank God, is not followed by all the lovers in India,” says he, “so also the rulers of India did not practise the childish international Machiavellism prescribed by the *Arthaśāstra*, the permanent intervention of the state officials in the village feasts etc.”

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Dikshitar*, 1932

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*The Mauryan Polity* (Madras 1932) by V. R. R. Dikshitar examines the ideas of Winternitz and Keith in one Appendix and those of Stein in another.

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Dikshitar points, as does N. N. Law, to Vidyāraṇya, the minister of Bukkā, the Emperor of Vijayanagara in mediæval Southern India who was both a Paṇḍit and a statesman. Paṇḍit-statesmen or statesmen-Paṇḍits have gloriously adorned many an enviable station in every state, says he. Kauṭalya belonged but to the same category.

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Incidentally Dikshitar adduces arguments in favour of the tradition which establishes Kauṭalya's identity with Vātsyāyana, the author of *Kāmaśāstra*.¹

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¹ P. 317. See also K. V. R. Aiyangar: *Ancient Indian Polity* (Madras 1916) pp. 90, 152 (Vatsyāyana=Kauṭalya).

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Concerning the controversy over the Maurya metallurgy he observes as follows (p. 339): "To say that Megasthenes's account betrays an infant stage of India's technical sciences is a contradiction in terms. His mention of "other metals" as well as their different uses show as much an advanced stage as that portrayed in the *Arthaśāstra*. We are not able to find any difference between the two versions except the fact that Magasthenes does not mention much by way of workmanship in metals."

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Like all other Indian Indologists Dikshitar finds the references (pp. 307-310) in the form of *iti Kauṭalya* as but belonging to the common professional etiquette of Hindu literary men. The problem should not appear to be very simple. The item has been discussed above.

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Attention may be further called to the fact that an author who has to oppose certain views does not have to mention himself even in the first person. He has only to state his position. Readers understand that as long as the entire book is written by the author all the views presented against the exponents in question are automatically his. Anything else would be unnatural. It is because of six dozen self-quotations or rather references to Kauṭalya himself that the Kauṭalyan authorship of the book was suspected and the question of plural authorship raised by Hillebrandt in the very first paper (1908) which established the authenticity of the *Arthaśāstra*. That question cannot be ignored or belittled.

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Attention may be drawn to a paper of Dikshitar's, namely, the one entitled “Is the *Arthaśāstra* secular?” in the *Proceedings of the Third Oriental Conference Madras* (1924). He answered the question in the negative, because among other things, as it appears, Kauṭalya has respect for the *Purohita* (the king's family priest) and has cared to recommend Vedic ceremonials to the attention of the ruler. It is perhaps only necessary to observe that the writer of a textbook of mineralogy can have respect for his family priest and also take part in the religious ceremonies of his village. But all this does not render the textbook of mineralogy unsecular. *Artha* is *artha* i.e., something secular according to the very logic of *trivarga*.

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In “Kauṭalya and Machiavelli” (*I.H.Q.* March 1927) Dikshitar agrees with me in my remarks that “Kauṭalyaism first, Kauṭalyaism second, Kauṭlyaism always has remained the motto of the Hindus as of the other pillars of the state.” He concedes also that “undoubtedly Kauṭalya is ‘an inveterate trait of the Hindu genius.'” But in his analysis Kauṭalya or his work “has nothing to do with Machiavelli or Machiavellism.” The subject has been discussed by me at length in other contexts and need not detain us here.

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In these two papers Dikshitar had much to say on what he considered to be the "Hindu viewpoint." But this consideration has not been prominent in his later writings, *Hindu Administrative Institutions* (1929) and *The Mauryan Polity* (1932). Here we have perhaps another evidence of the growing secularization in indology.

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Breloer, 1934

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A work of substantial importance by Bernhard Breloer in several volumes has been attacking the Kauṭalya question from the standpoint of comparative jurisprudence. Some of his methods and conclusions ought to be valuable not only as contributions to the study of the *Arthaśāstra* itself but also in regard to the larger problems of Hindu polity, economy and law.

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"Kauṭalya was no man of the crowd but a powerful statesman, a mind, from whose name the children of India even today feel a light palpitation of the heart, an Āryan endowed with intelligence and inflexibility, a figure like the Hagen of the *Nibelungenlied*. Hermann Jacobi who infused into my mind his respect for this extraordinary figure calls Kauṭalya the Bismarck of India because in his person and work he corresponds to what we Germans understand about the unifier of Germany.

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"Not only did Kauṭalya raise that person to India's imperial throne who expelled the Macedonian army of occupation but he also extirpated the reigning royal family.

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"This work did not appear to Kauṭalya, to follow his own words, more important than the collection of the laws which constitute the stuff of the present treatise. He considered this to be a political achievement which he himself placed by the side of his external activity, which indeed he frankly regarded as a necessary counterpart."

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These are the words with which Breloer opens the Part i. *Finanzverwaltung und Wirtschaftsführung* or "Financial Administration and Economic Planning" (Leipzig 1934, 606 pages) of the Vol. III of his *Staatsverwaltung im alten Indien* or "Administration of the State in Ancient India." The two previous volumes are:

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1. *Das Grundeigentum in Indien* or "Landed Property in India" (Bonn 1927, 145 pages) which deals with the modern land laws of India as well as with their history as embodied in Kauṭalya, Megasthenes, Akbar etc. and
2. *Altindisches Privatrecht bei Megasthenes und Kauṭalya* or "Hindu Private Law as described by Megasthenes and Kauṭalya" (Bonn 1928, 200 pages).

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*Indian Tradition as Starting Point*

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According to Breloer scepticism about authenticity can be overriden by those who have "some amount of confidence" in the indigenous tradition.

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A bad touchstone is selected, says he, if one tries to test the authenticity of Kauṭalya by reference to the *Smriti* literature. The Megasthenes question also like the Kauṭalya question cannot be solved with one stroke. He is not interested in the solution of the authenticity question for the present but is trying to build up a critical standpoint which may prepare the way for that solution. This is what he calls the "higher critical method" and evidently consists in the analysis of the principal contents (*beherrschende Materie*).¹ This explains why his Kauṭalya researches have carried him to the ancient, medieval and modern, as well as to the East and West (*wie breit eine Untersuchung anzulegen ist*).

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*Megasthenes in Agreement with Kauṭalya*

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In regard to Stein's *Megasthenes und Kauṭilya* (1922),² Breloer observes that the comparison between Megasthenes and Kauṭalya as regards legal institutions cannot be undertaken on the strength of a dictionary in the hand but of intensive juridical researches. But both in regard to landed property and to debts Megasthenes's reports were rejected flatly as exaggerated and idealized. The only witness that was available until now, namely, Megasthenes did not enjoy much confidence (*sich keines allzu grossen Vertrauens erfreute*) because people felt disappointed or cheated (*getäuscht*) with his reports. It is because of this want of confidence in both Megasthenes and Kauṭalya that comparative jurisprudence has been requisitioned by Breloer. He is interested, therefore, neither in the *Smriti* literature nor in Magasthenes for comparison with Kauṭalya but in the history of other allied laws such as are likely to throw light especially on Megasthenes.³

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² Vol. I, pp. 4-6. On the Megasthenes question see B. K. Sarkar: "Hindu Politics in Italian" in the *I.H.Q.*, for September 1925—April 1926.

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³ Vol. II. pp. 6, 7.

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'And here the attention may be called to the paper on the "German Translation of the Kauṭilyan *Arthaśāstra*" in the *I.H.Q.* for June 1928 in which the present author made the following remarks: "We need a third and more reliable source on the strength of which both Kauṭilya and Megasthenes can be appraised as to the Maurya or non-Maurya elements reflected in each." Breloer's methodology may turn out to be fruitful in the long run.

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From the standpoint of private law Stein's ideas, according to Breloer, have been proven to be baseless (*grundlos*). The alleged discrepancy between Megasthenes and Kauṭalya in regard to slavery does not exist. The absence of slavery in India as reported by Megasthenes is true in the sense that slavery as understood in Hellenistic Europe was unknown in India and that what was supposed to be slavery in India was really nothing but a relation of service which could be dissolved (*lösbares Dienstverhältnis*).⁴ All the 15 kinds of *dāsas* described in the *Nārada Smriti* are interpreted as staying outside the category of slaves, strictly so called.

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⁴ Vol. II. pp. 6, 8, 10, 31-37, 48, 69, 70, 158. See Stein's *Megasthenes und Kauṭilya* (Vienna 1922) pp. 109-115.

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As for the alleged absence of litigiousness among the Indians also Megasthenes's report is not as rosy as Stein and others believe.⁵ Law suits were not unknown in India. Only the methods of civil process as prevalent in Greece were different from those in India. Witnesses likewise were known in Indian law courts according to Megasthenes. He was aware also of the use of seals. In the law of debts in Macedonia six witnesses were required for the validity of contract. India did not know this law. In Greece, again, the suits regarding debts constituted a special branch of the law of contract. But in India the general law of contract covered debts as other items. Altogether, according to Breloer, Megasthenes was not idealizing the Indian conditions and his reports in so far as these legal data are concerned agreed with the data of the Indian texts.

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⁵ Vol. II. pp. 70, 72, 75, 88, 126, 158.

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Megasthenes really pointed to the special characteristics of Indian legal institutions. One should not therefore make much capital out of the alleged discrepancies between Kauṭalya and Megasthenes (*die Grundgedanken des Griechen auch aus den überlieferten indischen Rechtsquellen klarer hervortreten*). Apart from other topics of Hindu law and polity, the fact of Megasthenes being in substantial agreement with Kauṭalya is well calculated to open up new vistas in comparative sociology.

Cites (9)