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Mughal Administration c9: Chapter V. Taxation

Mughal Administration c9

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Chapter V. Taxation

§ 1. Chronic antagonism of the Indian peasant to the revenue collector.

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A careful student of Indian history is very much struck by the chronic antagonism between the rent-payer and the rent-receiver from very ancient times. European travellers in India have noticed how the ryot was averse to paying even his legitimate rent and that force had to be employed to get from him the dues of the State [*Storia do Mogor*, ii. 450.] On the other hand, in Sanskrit literature as well as Persian Court-annals we read how the "king's men"—*i.e.* revenue officials and underlings,—preyed on the peasantry, and in both ages the sovereign was called upon to save the ryots from such blood-suckers.

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The Indian peasant's habitual reluctance to pay revenue was partly due to the fact that he derived little benefit from the Government in return for the revenue paid; but it was mainly because of the uncertainty of that Government. I have explained already how the State in Mughal India performed no socialistic duties, but simply undertook to defend the country from invaders and rebels. Even this work of national defence was badly done at times, while the policing of the villages against thieves and robbers was done by a village agency which was not remunerated out of the State revenue, but from the villagers' own contribution. Thus, the ryot received nothing visible in return for which Government might fairly demand from him a share of the fruits of his labour.

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Secondly, changes of dynasty were so frequent, wars of succession within the same dynasty so much the rule rather than the exception, and the invasion of neighbouring countries (in Sanskrit *digvijay*, in Persian *mulk-giri*,) was so universally regarded as a duty by Hindu Rajahs and Muslim Sultans alike, that the peasant in India seldom knew for certain to whom to pay the revenue, even when he was willing to pay it. He naturally wanted to avoid having to pay the same money twice over. It was (he felt) wiser to wait for some months or years, even at the risk of some beating in the meantime, and see which side became firmly planted on the throne and then pay the revenue to it. But the arrears of revenue which thus accumulated could never be paid in full after such long delays, because much of the peasant's stock was eaten up by him and much of it plundered during the unsettled state of the country.

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Many centuries of political insecurity and revolution have left in the mind of the Indian peasant even of the 20th century, a subconscious but ingrained belief that wars of succession are quite in the nature of things and that whenever the Government is engaged in a war anywhere, a wise peasant ought to think twice before paying the revenue due.

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During the late war with Germany, several khas-mahal ryots in Chittagong hesitated to pay their land-tax and told the Deputy Collector, "If the *Kohisur* (i.e., Kaiser) comes will he not ask for our revenue over again? Save us, Sir, from the double payment."

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I was in a North Bengal village at the time of the death of King Edward VII. The first question which the local ryots asked me on hearing of His present Majesty's succession was, "Are not his kinsmen disputing his accession to the throne?" We can easily imagine the long ages of disorder and oppression that lie behind this traditional belief among our villagers.

§ 2. The peasant ever in arrears of payment.

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Hence, the collection of the revenue was always the result of a struggle between the ryot and the sarkār, and the arrears were seldom, if ever, cleared. The next logical step in this vicious circle was for the Government collectors to exact from the ryot, under the name of the never-to-be-extinguished arrears, everything except his bare subsistence. In most parts of Mughal India the ryot was, therefore, in the same condition as the French peasantry in the reign of Louis XV, trying to escape the unjust taille, or the cottier tenants of Ireland perpetually in debt to their landlords.

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There was this difference, however, that in pre-British times there was no eviction for default, no starvation of the peasantry (except when there was a local famine, with no communication with the more fruitful parts of the country). In the early and mediæval times, the peasant was left in his holding and left with enough to feed him (except when the entire harvest failed). The old custom of payment by the division of the crop* (the batāi system) was an advantage to him, as the payment depended on the actual harvest of the year, unlike the modern money rent which is an amount fixed irrespective of the yield in different years. In those days of constant war and disorder, the peasant was also cherished and valued because his landlord had need of him as an armed retainer. Indeed, competition for tenants among the zamindars was the rule and the poorer peasants sometimes escaped from one zamindari to another in the hope of getting rid of their arrears with the former and of faring better under a new landlord. Cases of such fugitive ryots were very frequent in North Bengal only sixty years ago.

§ 3. Illegal imposts on peasants condemned by the Government Head.

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The natural tendency of the ryot to withhold or refuse the payment of revenue and the failure of the State to give him a clean slate every three or five years by writing off his arrears, were the chief causes of trouble in the Mughal revenue department. The evil was aggravated by the greed of the revenue underlings and of some of the Emperors even. When I discuss the list of ābwābs or unauthorized exactions from the people in Mughal times, the reader will perceive the wonderful fertility of the human brain in devising means for squeezing money out of the people,—at birth, throughout life, and even after death. Several of these ābwābs were not directly paid by the peasant ; several of them affected the smaller dealers and townspeople too. But as our population is predominantly agricultural and most of the articles for sale came from the land, the weight of the ābwābs pressed most heavily on the ryots.

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∗ Cf. Abu Yusuf, 76:—"I have not found anything more fruitful for the Treasury and less inconvenient for the people subject to the land-revenue, [more] effective in protecting them from the abuses to which they render themselves liable by passing the burden from one to another among themselves, and more suitable for saving them from ill-treatment by the administrators and collectors,—than a just and light payment in kind (muqāsama, division of crops) : the prince finds in it his satisfaction, the tax-payers a benefit and a guarantee against mutual injustice consisting in shoving off the tax from one to another."

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It is only fair to add that in respect of the ābwābs, there was a clear conflict of policy between the Emperors on the one hand and the revenue collectors on the other. The Emperors are for ever issuing orders to their officers to show leniency and consideration to the peasants in collecting the revenue, to give up all ābwābs, and to relieve local distress ; and the revenue officers are as often squeezing everything out of the peasants except the barest subsistence. A solemn proclamation is issued by one Emperor abolishing all ābwābs and urging all his officials, "at present and in future" to obey these instructions. But these very ābwābs crop up again and have to be abolished by his successor with another proclamation, which has exactly the same efficacy as the first. This was the experience of other Islamic countries, such as Egypt, also. (See *Encyclo. Islam*, iii. 176-177, under *Maks.*)

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The policy of the supreme head of the Mughal Government not to practise any exaction on the ryot is manifest from the contemporary histories and letters, and can be proved to have been a reality and not merely a pious wish. Several instances are recorded in the reigns of Shah Jahan and Aurangzib in which harsh and exacting revenue collectors and even provincial viceroys were dismissed when the complaints of their subjects reached the Emperor's ears. A characteristic anecdote to the same effect is told in India Office Library Persian Manuscript No. 370, interleaf facing folio 68. It clearly illustrates Shah Jahan's eagerness to do justice and even liberality to the peasantry, and I shall narrate it here.

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"One day," so runs the story, "Shah Jahan was looking through the revenue returns of his empire and discovered that in a certain village the revenue for the current year was entered as higher by a few thousands [*dām*?] than that of past years. Immediately he ordered the High Diwan Sadullah Khan to be brought to the Presence for explaining the difference. Sadullah Khan was then sitting down in his treasury with an open bundle of revenue papers before him and his eyes dozing in consequence of his daily and nightly attention to the business of his department. The royal messengers brought him to the Emperor in exactly the same condition [and dress] that he was in. Shah Jahan asked him for the cause of the increase in the assessment. After a local inquiry it was found out that the river had receded a little and a new tract of land had risen above water-level, causing an addition to the area of the village and the income of the State. On the Emperor asking whether the land in question was *khālsa* or *āima*, a further inquiry was made and it was found to adjoin a piece of rent-free grant of land (*aima.*) Then Shah Jahan cried out in wrath, ‘The water over that tract of land has dried in response to the lamentations of the orphans, widows and poor [of the place] ; it is a divine gift to them, and you have dared to appropriate it to the State ! If a desire to spare God’s creation had not restrained me, I should have ordered the execution of that second Satan, the oppressive faujdar [who has collected revenue from this new land.] It will be enough punishment to dismiss him as a warning to others to refrain from such wicked acts of injustice. Order the excess collection to be immediately refunded to the peasants entitled to it.’ ”

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This anecdote may not have been true, but it is *ben trovato*, it shows the atmosphere and the public belief in Shah Jahan’s kindness to his subjects.

§ 4. Lower revenue officials were harsh and extortionate.

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The lower officials of Mughal India were incurably corrupt, while the highest were, on the whole, just and statesmanlike except an occasional diwan who inflated the revenue demand *on paper* and farmed the collection to the highest bidder with ruinous consequences, as can be illustrated from the revenue history of Orissa in the 17th century.

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The subahdar of Orissa wrote in 1662: "The mahals of Crownland have been reduced to desolation and their affairs have fallen into confusion in consequence of the harsh assessment of an unreasonable amount of revenue and the neglect of details by the [new] diwan, Muhammad Hāshim. He transacts business in this way: when a candidate for kroriship accepts the post, Hāshim imposes on him the paper assessment of the parganah and sends him there, before he can learn about the [actual] yield of the place. After a short time, another man is secured for the post, and Hāshim Khan taking money for himself from this man, dismisses the former krori, appoints the second man and makes him promise a larger revenue than the first collector had engaged for. After a little time, a third man appears, offering a still higher sum to the State, and he is sent as collector to the parganah! ...The Khan has thus increased the revenue [on paper] twofold in some places and threefold in others, while the ryots, unable to pay, have fled away and the villages have turned into a wilderness." [Studies in Aur. Reign, xiv. § 15.]

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The man was shortly afterwards removed from his office.

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The Emperor, the High Diwan, and even the subahdar may have been just and kind in their treatment of the peasantry. But the lower official or revenue underling was the man on the spot, the person in direct relation with the ryots and therefore his harshness and greed affected the ryots far more effectively than the far-off Emperor’s or Chancellor’s kind intentions and benevolent proclamations. This fact was well-known in the 17th century.

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The great and good High Diwan, Sadullah Khan, used to remark that a diwan who did not do justice to the ryots was a demon sitting with a pen and inkpot before him. The propriety of this epigram will become clear when it is remembered that in the Persian alphabet *a* is a long vertical line with a sharp downward point like an Indian reed-pen, while the letter *n* is formed by a circle open at the top, just like an indigenous inkpot. The word *diw* means ‘an evil spirit’; and hence *diwan* can be analysed into *diw* followed by *a* or a pen and *n* or an inkpot! (*Ruqaāt-i-Alamgiri*, letter No. 154.)

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In fact, the cunning of the local officials and the subordinates of the revenue department was too much even for the lord of the Peacock Throne, and we find more than 50 *abwabs* flourishing immediately after the death of this very Shah Jahan.

§ 5. Why revenue officials exacted perquisites.

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The exaction of perquisites and presents by the officials from the subahdar downwards was one of the greatest evils of mediæval administrations, in the East and the West alike. In the Mughal empire the evil was aggravated by three other causes, *viz.*, (1) the custom of offering presents to the Emperor and the princes by the higher officers and to the higher officers by the lower, (2) the nominal salaries paid to the lower officers, and (3) the submissive, indifferent spirit of the people.

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Immemorial custom and the prevalent notions of social etiquette, as well as the more worldly motive of keeping one’s superiors in good humour, made it imperative for the subahdars to offer rare or valuable presents to the Emperor on his birthday, and also at their visits to the Court. The High Chancellor also had to be propitiated by similar means.

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This pressure passed from the top to the bottom, though it was unintentional and its real effects were not fully realized by the head of the State. The Emperors, without meaning it, squeezed the subahdars and the subahdars did so to the zamindars ; the provincial diwan had to gratify the High Diwan and therefore he had to squeeze the subordinate collectors of the revenue ; and these men at the bottom of the official ladder squeezed the ryots.

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This was quite distinct from giving bribes to cause a failure of justice or to win a favour that was undeserved by the man or injurious to the real interests of the State. Taking bribes was recognized as a wicked and disgraceful thing even in Mughal times, though it was extensively practised under the veil of secrecy.

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The low salaries paid by the Government had necessarily to be supplemented by the clerks and other subordinates exacting unauthorized fees from the men who had to do business with them. It was called “the writer’s fee” *haqq-ul-taharir* (or *tahariri* as used in the law courts and some other offices here even now). In the Manual (page 74) the auditor (mushrif) is advised, "Take the writer's fee that the people pay you willingly, for how else can a man deserving Rs. 50 but paid a salary of Rs. 20 a month contrive to live?"

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§ 6. The krori or collector of revenue of a district.

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The actual revenue collector was the krori, so styled because he was placed in charge of a tract theoretically expected to yield a revenue of one kror of dām, i.e., 2½ lakhs of Rupees. The arrangement was Akbar's (Ain, i. 13.) But the title of krori was continued in later times irrespective of the amount of revenue to be collected by this officer. It latterly meant simply 'a collector of State dues', and we have a class of kroris of ganj, i.e., collectors of markets.

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"The krori ought to entertain a body of militia (sehbandi) proportionate to his jurisdiction and collect the revenue without negligence and at the right time. He should not demand mahsul (the State due in cash or kind) from places not yet capable of paying, lest their ryots should run away. He should urge his subordinates not to realize anything in excess of the regulations, lest he should, in the end, be subjected to wāsilāt (examination of accounts with a view to detecting peculation.) He should be honest." (Manual, p. 66.)

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The duties and necessary virtues of an ideal "collector of the revenue" under Akbar are described in the Ain, ii. 43—47; but he seems to have been a higher officer than a krori of the 17th century.

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The sanad appointing a new krori runs thus: "Collect the revenue season by season as assessed by the *āmin*, and pay it to the *fotahdār*. With the advice of the faujdar and amin, carefully deposit the [accumulated] money in the imperial treasury, giving a receipt for it to the fotahdar. Send to the Government Record Office your abstract accounts and statements of income and disbursement and other papers, as laid down in the regulations. Do not collect any *ābwāb*, such as *nahib* (? fee for expediting business), the collector's perquisite (*tahsildāri*), etc., lest the money should be taken back from the offender and he be dismissed''.

§ 7. The amin and the qanungo.

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*Āmin* literally means an umpire or arbitrator, a trustee for others. The essence of his office was to be an impartial umpire between the State demanding revenue and the individual ryots paying it.

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The *Manual of the Duties of Officers* (63—65) gives us the following information about the *āmin* and his work :—

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''The *āmin* should know the regulations (*zābita*) well, and be an honest and expert man, well-versed in the quality (good or bad) of every affair. He should make the assessment (*mushakhkhas*) according to the rules and let none steal Government money.

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''The *āmin*'s work is to cause the kingdom to be cultivated. Before the commencement of the season of cultivation, he should take from the *qānungo*es the preceding ten years' papers of the revenue assessment and area of the villages, ride to the villages in company with the kroris, chaudhuris, *qānungo*es and zamindars, inquire into the condition of the villages, as regards their [culturable] area and the actual number of ploughs, compare the area given in the papers of the qanungo with the real area, and if the two do not agree call upon the qanungo to explain the excess (in the case of excess), and censure the headmen (in the case of shortage), saying ‘Why did the qanungo give a false return and why did the headmen tell lies?

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“Then inquire whether the existing ploughs are sufficient for the cultivators of the village. If not, then grant taqāvi (agricultural loans), proportioned to the area of the culturable soil of the village, for the purchase of oxen and seeds, taking bonds* from the headmen for the recovery of the loan with the first instalment of the [next] year’s revenue, and indemnity-bonds (muchilka) from the kroris that they would realize the loan with the first instalment of the [next] year.”

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The sanad appointing an āmin runs thus: “Do your work with honesty and truthfulness. Exert yourself to perpetuate the cultivation and increase the habitation. You will be held responsible for the portion of the collected revenue deposited with the fotahdar which he keeps in his hands in arrear (i.e., without paying it into the treasury). Urge the krori to collect the revenue according to his own assessment and deposit it with the fotahdar. Give temporary receipts (chithā) for the money that the ryots pay to the fotahdar, under your seal and the fotahdar's signature, and at the time of payment of revenue in full (bebāqi) make up the account according to this chithā. Do not collect any ābwāb like bālā dasti and tahsildāri, as all these have been forbidden by the Emperor. Warn the chaudhuris and qānungoes not to exact any such cess."

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∗ These bonds (tamassuk) were to be endorsed by the chaudhuri as security, sealed by the qazi, and attested by the qanungo and zamindar.

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The papers which the āmin and the krori had to submit to the Diwan's office are enumerated in Z. 34a and D. 89a, those that they had to keep, in 4 6a and b.

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The QĀNUNGO, as the name implies, was a walking dictionary of the prevailing rules and practices (qānun), and a store-house of information as to procedure, precedents, land history of the past, etc. The Ain (ii. 66) styles him "the refuge of the husbandman." [See also Ain, ii. 47n.]

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They were 'village revenue-officers who recorded all circumstances within their sphere which concerned landed property and the realisation of the revenue, keeping registers of the value, tenure, extent, and transfers of lands, assisting in the measurement and survey of the lands, reporting deaths and successions of revenue-payers, and explaining, when required, local practices and public regulations ; they were paid by rent-free lands and various allowances and perquisites." (Wilson, 260.)

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The Manual (148-149) instructs a new qānungo thus: "The Emperor's business goes on in reliance on your papers. To your office belong the papers of division (taqsim) comparison (muāzana) etc......... Keep two copies of the records,—one in your house and the other in your office (in charge of your gumashtah) so that one at least may be saved in case of fire or flood."

§ 8. Abwabs or illegal cesses.

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I shall now discuss in detail the ābwābs or exactions made on various pretexts in addition to the regular land-revenue or custom duty. These imposts were again and again declared by the Muhammadan sovereigns to be illegal and forbidden within their realms, but they soon reappeared with some changes in their items. Thomas in his Revenue Resources of the Mughal Empire has given from Persian sources lists of the ābwābs abolished by Firuz Shah Tughlaq (1375 A.D.) and Akbar (about 1590). Those prohibited by Aurangzib in a farmān dated 29th April 1673, are enumerated in Mirāt-i-Ahmadi, i. 286—288 (with explanations on pp. 260-264), Z. f. 135, and D. f. 102. But these three sources do not agree in all points; Mirāt names forty-one, Z. seventyfour, and D. seventy-eight ābwābs as abolished at this time. In Bengal nineteen such imposts continued to be levied, but from the tenants only, till the 19th century, when the British law-courts finally put an end to them as illegal. (Rampini’s Bengal Tenancy Act, 4th ed., pages 255-256.) We are thus in a position to make a comparative study of the growth of ābwābs through several centuries of our history.

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The ābwābs may be divided into six broad classes :—

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(a) Duties on the local sale of produce, like the municipal octroi duty of certain towns in modern India, but taken by the State.

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(b) Fee on the sale of immovable property.

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(c) Perquisites exacted by the officials for their own benefit, and fees or commissions levied on behalf of the State, on almost every conceivable occasion.

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(d) License-tax for plying certain trades.

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(e) Forced subscriptions.

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(f) Special imposts on the Hindus.

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The imposts abolished by Akbar are named in the *Ain-i-Akbari*, ii. 66-67, of which a somewhat different version is given by Thomas in his *Revenue Resources*, 17-19. Both these lists require correction in the light of the explanations of several of the items given in this chapter.

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Jahangir abolished the duties named *tamghā* and *mir-bahari*, "together with the taxes of all descriptions which the *jagirdars* of every *subah* and every *sarkar* had been in the habit of exacting on their own account." [Elliot, vi. 493.]

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In addition to *abwabs* or illegal direct taxes on sellers and buyers of goods and practitioners of every trade and profession, there was another source of exaction, namely the private trade* of the local officials in defiance of the Emperors' repeated prohibitions, which imposed an oppressive burden of indirect taxation on producers and consumers.

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As late as 1665, we learn from Aurangzib’s *farman* dated the 20th November of that year, that the magistrates and other officers in Gujrat used to buy and sell on their own account by force, paying less than the market price to the vendors and exacting an unfairly higher price from the traders on whom they forced their goods. "Mutasaddis (collectors), seths (leading merchants) and desais (headmen) in many parganahs when the new harvest is marketed do not allow the public to buy it, but take up the whole of it themselves, and out of it they force on the traders whatever is rotten or spoilt, taking the price of good grain....... Governors and rich men cultivate every kind of kitchen vegetable and fruit in their own gardens and in those of the State, and force them on the vegetable-sellers at double the fair price... In Ahmadabad and the parganahs of that subah certain men have taken in farm (ijāra) the monopoly of buying and selling rice, and nobody can deal in that grain except with their consent; hence, rice has become dear in Gujrat." [Mirat, i. 260.]

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∗ Called *tarak* in Persian [*Ghiyās-ul-lughat.*]

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The evil custom of local governors and even faujdars opening the packages of traders on the road and taking out whatever they liked at prices fixed at their own caprice, was known as early as Jahangir’s reign and was definitely forbidden by that Emperor in one of his twelve rules. [Elliot, vi. 496.] But the practice continued, as we know from the European travellers in India. As late as the beginning of the 18th century we find Aurangzib writing a stinging letter of censure to his grandson Azim-ush-shan, the governor of Bengal, for conducting such unfair private trade (sauda-i-khās.) [Rivaz-us-salatin. Eng. tr. 246, and I.O.I.MS. 3021, In fact, in mediæval India, the corrupt greed of the ill-paid officials found unchecked indulgence from the system of public taxation, which was crude, not clearly defined nor sufficiently made known to the public, but often varied from reign to reign. The timidity of the common people and the weakness of the central Government and its lack of a sufficient number of trusty agents left the population helpless under official extortion. The same commodity was subjected to taxation twice or thrice over, in spite of the Emperors' prohibition.

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A farman of Aurangzib, dated 20th November 1665, gives illustrations of the illegal exactions on the people of Gujrat; the same practices must have prevailed in the other provinces of the empire also. These forms of extortion are described below.

§ 9. Abwabs abolished by Aurangzib.

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Aurangzib abolished the following *abwabs* :—

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A. *Duties on the sale of produce* :—

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[The lawful tax, confined to certain articles only and not leviable when the price of the commodity was below the *nisab* or Quranic minimum (Rs. 52-8), was 5. p. c. of the sale price in the case of Hindu dealers, and 2½ p. c. for Muslims. *Mirat*, i. 258.]

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1. Fish &c. caught and brought by fishermen for sale.

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2. Kitchen vegetables, brought by peasants from their fields for sale.

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3. Cow-dung cakes (used as fuel.).

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4. Milk and curd.
5. Leaves of the *Dhāk* (*Butea frondosa*,—Bengali *Palāsh*) and *Pālā* (*Jharberi* or *Zizyphus*) trees and the bark of the Babul (gum plant, *acacia*) &c., brought from the jungles for sale.
6. Grass, brambles, and fuel-wood brought from the jungles.
7. Oil. [We learn that in Saraspur in Gujrat the officials exacted Rs. 30 annually from each carrier of drums (*kupahs*) of oil. *Mirat*, i. 261.]
8. Earthen pots and dishes, made in the villages and towns for sale.
9. Tobacco. [This excise duty was abolished in 1666 in consequence of a soldier killing his wife when her cart was searched by the tax-collector for concealed tobacco. *Storia do Mogor*, ii. 175 and *History of Aurangzib*, iii. Ch. 28 § 1. Aurangzib’s farman of 1673 definitely instructs his officers, “Do not trouble the people by searching their dolis, bullock-carts, and other things.” *Mirat* i. 287 adds the explanation, “The dolis, bullock-carts, and camel-litters ridden by women and children used to be searched, and bags, boxes and bundles opened, for taking the tax on tobacco and other things.”]
10. A State monopoly of purchase was now ordered to be discontinued: “Formerly the officials used to buy up for the State factory of perfumery all the roses available, and their sale to the public was prohibited. But at the suggestion of Qutbuddin Khan a farman was issued allowing gardeners to sell their flowers wherever they liked." [Mirat, i. 262.]

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B. *Fee on the sale of property.*

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11. On the sale or mortgage of land.

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12. On the sale of houses (*haveli*), qanungoes and piadas used to take 2½ p. c. from the vendor. [M. i. 260.]

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13. "In the village of Dholqa when a poor man wishes to pull his house down and sell the materials, the kotwal takes three tankas for every thousand bricks that are sold for one Rupee." [M. i. 262.]

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14. In addition to No. 12 above, when a house was sold, Government exacted a valuation fee (*muqimi*) from the vendor. [Mirat, i. 287, Z. and D.]

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15. On the sale of slaves.

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C. *Fees or commissions of the State and perquisites of officials :—*

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As Shihabuddin Talish complained in 1666, "From the first occupation of India and its ports by the Muslims to the end of Shah Jahan's reign, it was a rule and practice to exact *hāsil* (duty) from every trader—from the rose-vendor to the clay-seller, from the weaver of fine linen to that of coarse cloth."

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16. *Rāhdāri* or remuneration of road patrols.

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[Abolished by Aurangzib in 1659. The hardships and abuses connected with this tax are fully described in my *History of Aurangzib*, iii. Ch. 28 § 1 and *Studies in Aur. Reign*, Ch. xi. In the Crown-lands alone this tax used to yield 25 lakhs of Rupees a year, at the time of its abolition.]

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17. Ground-rent for stalls in bazars (*tah-i-bāzāri.*) Vegetable-sellers and dealers in similar articles squated down in the bazar, and had to pay a rent for the space at the bottom (*tah*) of the market-place which they occupied. A very ancient tax, abolished also by Firuz Shah (1375.)

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18 & 19. In decreeing suits for the repayment of loans and in returning to the owners stolen property which had been recovered, the magistrates used to take one-fourth of the value of the loan or property, for the State. Aurangzib abolished this fee, as well as the payment of the fines and thanks-offerings (*sharāi jurmāna wa shukrāna*) [by litigants] which had the sanction of ancient usage and Muslim judicial practice.

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20. *Shash dāmi* (a fee of three-twentieth of a Rupee.) ?

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21. A tax on every iron cauldron in which molasses are boiled. [Mirāt adds, "But the duty on sugar boiling is to be levied as laid down by law."]

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22. Ferry tax collected on rivers that have dried up [and can be crossed on foot.]

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23. A tax called boatmen’s wages (*mallāhi*), taken on behalf of Government, from traders and travellers in crossing ferries, must not exceed the actual wages of the boatmen or the estimate [of it] made by Government.

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24. Tax on stone or iron weights, levied at the time of officially stamping these weights.

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25. Fee for the census of arms (*dast-yār*), houses and their inhabitants, which was taken from the Hindus, but from which the Muhammadans were exempt. We know that it was the *kotwāl’s* duty to prepare such lists for the cities, but it was clearly illegal to tax the people for this operation. [The text looks like *dastār-shumāri*, or tax per turban, which suggests the tax on every *pāgri* abolished by Akbar. *Ain*, ii. 67.]

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26. The customary perquisite on confirmation of grant (*muqarrari*) taken from men in the enjoyment of rent-free land (*madad-i-mā‘sh.*)

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27. The exaction of presents in kind from such men at the time of marking out their plots of land (*chak bandi.*)

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28. Tax for grazing bullocks taken from the *banjāras* (wandering grain-sellers) and other people. *Mirāt*, i. 260, explains it thus, "The collectors take one *tanka* under the name of *gāu-charāi* every time that bullocks of carts and pack-oxen are brought into the city and fed on purchased grass and stalks of millets (*karbi*)." The same authority refers (p. 263) to another practice,—"In the city of Patan, the officials by violence exact four *Murādi tankas* every year per head of sheep, eight annas per cow and one Rupee per buffalo, even though they may not be grazing at large (*sāima*) and their price is below the *nisāb* (the canonical minimum value for taxation)."

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29. Tax for hiring out carts, camels, and messengers.

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30. When the class of men called *Dhawāia*, who live by hiring out their carts, buy oxen in Burhanpur or any other place, paying the tax on purchase there, and bring them to Ahmadabad, they have to pay that tax again here, and if they do not pay it of their own motion, they are declared offenders (for attempted evasion of the tax) and fined.

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31. Perquisite levied on the weighing balances (*dandi*) from *chungi* (octroi collection stations) and other places; called the *dārogha’s* fee for *tarāzu-kashi*, and in some places *dhāran* and *dandi-dāri*. [*Mirāt*. But Z. and D. have simply *dāroghagāna wa rasum-i-kotwāli*.]

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32. Perquisites on special occasions—e.g., once a year (*sāliānah*), once a season (*fasalānāh*), once a month (*māhānāh*), on Fridays (*jumagi*), daily (*roziānah*), in winter (*zamstāni*), on the two Ids (idi.) [The text is obscure ; the Muslims seem to have been exempt from these from the very beginning.]

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33. Price of paper [used in official accounts and in the receipts granted to the peasants.]

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34. Presents (*peshkash*) taken by newly arrived officials from the grain-dealers and other [trades-] people, in some places from the banjaras. Mirat, i. 261, adds, "Faujdars and kroris take from the men of the parganahs on the banks of the Sabarmati and Watrak rivers, by force what they call *kachari*, amounting to Rs. 10 to 15." And again, "If a resident of Ahmadabad wants to cut a tree in his ancestral house that is doing harm to his building the officials of the place will not allow him to cut it down or even any branch of it, unless he pays them something." (*Ibid* 260.)

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35. Leave-taking fee (*rukhsatanah*),—exacted by royal messengers from the persons addressed, after carrying letters to them from the imperial camp.

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36. The sentries at the gates of forts must not take anything from the people passing through them. Mirat, 262, explains it thus,—"The guards at the gates of the city of Ahmadabad and its suburbs (*puras*) prevent carts, pack-oxen, and men carrying loads on their heads from entering or leaving till they have paid some gratification."

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37. "When a poor man or peasant brings any kind of animal to Ahmadabad or its *puras* for sale, exactions are made from them twice,—first as the import duty (*āmdani*) and secondly as the royal commission on the sale-price. If they cannot sell it but wish to return with it, the officials exact an export duty (*raftani*)"! [*M. i.* 262.]

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38. "When carts loaded with grain or other things leave [the city], the officials take Rs. 2 per cart at the police office (*chabutra*) under the name of *chhati*." [*M.* 263.]

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39. In Patan, on every cart of banana or sugarcane they charge four or five Rupees, and also take 4 per cent of the mangoes bananas or sugar-cane. [*Mirat*, 263. Text reads *chahār sad*, which I have emended as *sad chahār*.]

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40. From every waggon of grass or millet-stalk in several places they take one bundle, and in the case of fire-wood five seers. And when loads of these are carried on men's heads, they take four *badams* from each. [*Mirat*, 260. *Karbi*—the stalk of millets, &c., used in feeding cattle. *Badam* or almond was used in Gujrat as a sort of counter, like *cowries* in North India; 100 *badams* make one anna. (K. M. Jhaveri.)]

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41. *Chungi-gosht* (or *chauki-gosht*?) A share of meat taken by the police, [*Mirāt* 287 adds “at the kotwāl’s chabutra.”]

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42. Governors must not billet themselves on private houses, mosques, or shops, without the consent of their owners. [Also forbidden by Akbar and Jahangir; Elliot, vi. 503.]

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43 and 44. Fee on a low-caste Hindu marrying a Hindu widow (*dharicha*) and having a child by her. [I am inclined to think that there was no taxation of the birth of children in general, though some extortionate zamindars are even now known to practise it.]

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45. Making good the losses in transit of fruits and things ordered by the Emperor from the provinces. The people were taxed for it! [*M.* 287.]

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D. *License-tax on trades and professions* :—

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A poll-tax called *muhtarfa* (Wilson, 350) was levied by the officials everywhere upon every class of artificers. It was repeatedly condemned by Aurangzib. [*M.* 260.]

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46. Slaughter-fee, at the time of slaughtering cows, goats, &c. *Mirat* 261 adds,—“The officials first of all collect the duty on the purchase of oxen, buffaloes &c.; then at the time of slaughtering them they take an additional Rs. 1½ per head of cow or buffalo... Hence, meat is very dear in the province of Gujrat." Aurangzib (in 1665) strictly ordered,—"When a cow or buffalo is sold for the maulud ceremony or a feast &c., the duty on the purchase is, according to a former order, collected at the kotwal's chabutra at the rate of 5 p. c. from the Hindu and 2½ p. c. from the Muslim vendors; but do not give them any other trouble." [Mirat, i. 262.]

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47. From footmen (piadas), for the rods [danda, which they carry as badges? Or, for dhanda=profession?]

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48 and 49. From cotton-dressers and sugar-cane-pressers, when they came to a new place to start business there, the officials used to exact Rs. 1½ before allowing them to set up their trade. [Mirat, 260.]

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50. Fee for learning a craft. "If a man wishes to learn any branch of the weaver's or embroiderer's art, he has to pay the local officers something under the name of 'craft learning fee' on the completion of his training." [Mirat, 260.]

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51. From thatchers (of roofs) and watchmen.

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52. Tax levied at the time of printing cloth. [Mirat, 287, adds "and the hands of Kallāls or brewers of wine."]

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53. Headman's fee (muqaddami) on the hire of camels.

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54. Commission of the headman (*dastur-i-mehtarāi*) in the vegetable market &c. [Wilson, 338.]

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55. From mummers, who use to put on disguises and go to houses where marriages are being celebrated, to entertain the people,—take away everything received by them. [Aurangzib forbade this kind of entertainment in Kashmir in his latter years.]

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56. From brokers, escheat to the State the brokerage of the Government brokers. [? Obscure text ; doubtful translation.]

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57. Tax on matchlocks [? or from gunsmiths. D. only source.]

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E.—Forced subscriptions, gifts, and service:—

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58. Forced labour (*begār.*) “In the city and villages of the province of Gujrat, on account of forced labour [exacted by the officials] the artisans are put to great distress.” [Mirat, 260, farmān of 1665.]

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59. Forced labour and [compulsory contribution for] lamps on the *Id* festival.

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60. Contribution exacted for lighting lamps in the nights of *shab-i-barāt*, *diwāli*, and *āshura* (the first ten days of the month of Shawwāl), &c.

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61. *Bhet baqra.* Presents, including a goat, offered by the people to the governor or zamindar on his visit to a place, the price of which is raised by compulsory subscription from the peasantry collected by the local officials or the landlord’s agents.

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This *abwab* lingered in Bengal till late in the 19th century. [D. Z. and *Mirat* 287 read *bhet banjāra*.]

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In 1682 Aurangzib had to issue another *farmān* [*Mirat*, 304] forbidding the following *abwābs*,—*malba*, *bhet*, *bālādasti*, *tahsildāri*, *sādir* and *wārid*,—which are explained below.

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*Malba*—Village expenses met by public assessment. Its principal items in the N. W. Provinces are—feeding the members of the community when absent on public duty, or those of other villages on a visit, feeding religious mendicants, payments to subordinate police and revenue officers, remuneration to individuals for losses incurred in supplying cattle and carts for public service, fines imposed for plundered property when traced within the boundary of a village, presents to dancers singers jugglers and the like for amusing the inhabitants, expenses of religious worship and occasional festivals, expenses of Panchayets assembled on the business of the village, funeral expenses of a headman or any respectable member, &c. The total often reached 12 p. c. of the land revenue. [Wilson, 324.]

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*Bālādasti*—Unauthorised or oppressive exactions in general. [*Ibid*, 51.]

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*Tahsildāri*—A tax levied under the Mughal Government to pay the allowances of the revenue collector. [*Ibid*, 500. See *Ain*, ii. 66.]

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*Sādir wa wārid*.—Exactions made by the royal messengers from the villages along the roads and from wayfarers. [See *Mirat*, 287.]

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F.—*Imposts on the Hindus* :—

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62. Tax on bathing in the Ganges and other sacred waters. The Mughal Government used to take Rs. 6-4 from every pilgrim at Allahabad. [*Storia*, ii. 82.]

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63. Tax on carrying the bones of dead Hindus for being thrown into the Ganges. [The *jizya* or poll-tax was reimposed later, in 1679.]

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In Egypt, the sources of revenue illegal according to the Canon Law were the *mukus*,—a vast number of small taxes and all sorts of monopolies. [*Encyclo. Islam*, ii. 15, iii. 176. Lane-Poole’s *Hist. of Egypt*, 43.]