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The Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus: A Study in Comparative Politics c15.s2: Section 6. Right to Revolt

The Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus: A Study in Comparative Politics c15.s2

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Section 6. Right to Revolt

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The limitations of the king as ruler are fully admitted in the theory of the *nîti-śâstras*. Kâmandaka,¹ Manu,² and Śukra³ are never tired of moralizing, like Elyot in his *Gouvernour*, as to the failings to which the monarch as much as all other human beings is naturally liable, especially because of his high position. Moreover, the restraints on his authority implied in the conception of kingship as a public service and in that of the ministry as a body of overseers and controllers are the two checks that the philosophers offer to the doctrine of the *saptâmga*.

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¹ I, 23, 37, 56—57; IV, 46, 48; XIII, 19; XIV, 1.

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² VII, 39—41; 45—53.

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³ I, lines 181, 183—185, 197—198, 243—244.

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It has to be observed that both these restrictions are distinct from and in addition to the moral and spiritual checks that are binding upon all men as men according to normal Hindu pedagogics. The king therefore is not sacred. As a consequence Hindu thought does not seem to have ever recognized any "divine right" of kings, just as Hindu history does not know of any theocratic state, except in the Khalsa of the latter-day Sikhs.

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This secular idea of monarchy is not however inconsistent with the conception of the ruler as a "god in human form".⁴ The divine character of royalty is described in the *Manu Samhitâ* and the *Mahâbhârata* and is stated also in the *Śukra-nîti*. Royalty is indeed superhuman energy embodied in a human institution, exactly as every activity and *élan* or *śakti* of life is godly or divine in the mythological imagery of Hindu heinotheism.

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⁴ Manu VII, 4—8; *Mahâ*, Vana, CLXXXV, 27—31; Śukra, I, lines 141—143.

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But the king is not "vicar of God" as understood by mediaeval western philosophers, imperial as well as anti-imperial.⁵ The divinity that hedges the monarch is the glory and importance of the functions that he has to perform as *svâmin*. By analogizing the marks of *aiśvarya*, i. e. sovereignty with the attributes and *śakti* of the gods (or powers of nature) Śukra wants the people to understand nothing more than the fact that kingship consists in protection of person and property,⁶ administration of justice,⁶ diffusion of culture and *dharma*,⁶ philanthropy and charity,⁶ and last but not least, realization of revenues.⁶

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⁵ Carlyle, I, 147—160; III, 115, 117—123; Figgis' *Divine Right of Kings*, pp. 219—226.

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⁶ I, lines 144, 151; 147; 145, 146; 149; 148.

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Not even the thinkers of Manu's school by any means contemplate the "patristic" dogma of the state or the monarch as divine in a theological sense. Their metaphor is meant only to bring to the forefront the supreme character of Bodin's *majestas* as an abstract attribute in civil society. In order to appreciate Hindu political theory it is essential to remember this materialistic view of sovereignty (*aiśvarya*) which, so far as Eur-America is concerned, is absolutely un-Christian or pre-Christian, i. e. "modern" and Greek.

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In any event, the metaphorical sacredness of sovereignty does not carry with it, according to *nîti* philosophers, the infallibility and inviolability of the holder of the sceptre, the *danda-dhara*. Not any prince and every prince is "made out of the permanent elements" of the gods of fire, air, water, light, wealth and so forth. It is "only the king who is virtuous that is a part of the gods". How to know such a ruler? The marks of the "god in human form" are fully described in the *Kâmandakî-nîti*, *Śukra-nîti*, and the *Manu-Samhitâ*.¹ He must practise self-restraint and be valorous and skilled in the use of arms and weapons. He must be well up in statecraft and diplomacy and must be able to crush the foes. He must be learned in the arts and sciences. And he must have long-period statesmanlike views. But "otherwise, i. e. if he happens to be the enemy of *dharma* (*Kultur* or Platonic "virtue") and oppressor of the people the king is a part of the demons". Such notions are diametrically opposite to the creed of Augustine² that even Nero was ruler by divine right.

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¹ Kâmandaka, IV, 3—8; Śukra I, lines 139—140, 167—170; *cf.* Manu VII, 25, 26, 27—29, 30—32, 33—34.

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² Augustine's *City of God*, Book V, 19, 21 (Dods' transl., Vol. I, pp. 216, 219).

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One must not consequently look for a Gregory the Great in India to preach on the exemplary conduct of a "good subject" like David who would not criticize the tyranny even of a Saul. The radical tendencies of the *nîti-śâstras* are developed on postulates which are as the poles asunder to the axioms of the church fathers. In *nîti* thought the King can do wrong as any other mortal. The person, property and family of the ruler are therefore not exempt from punishment (*danda*) by the people, e. g. the fine of the *Manu Samhitâ*. The bed-rock of Hindu political philosophy in the analysis of Kingship is accordingly furnished by the differentiation of the king as "a part of the gods" from the king as "a part of the demons". This is the basis of the distinction between "legitimate Kingship" and its contrary, i. e. tyranny. In the treatises on *smriti* and *nîti* Kingship automatically ceases to be legitimate as it ceases to promote justice (*dharma*), and the drastic remedy suggested is revolution and tyrannicide.

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Kautilya observes that *prakriti-kopo hi sarva kopebhyo garîyân*, the wrath of the people is the supremest or most dangerous of all wraths. This is the Hindu counterpart of the Confucian proverb, “Of all who are to be feared, are not the people the chief?” In other words, the “fear of the people is the wisdom of the lord”. Like Mencius,¹ the Rousseau of ancient China, and Manegold of Lautenbach, the most radical anti-imperialist of mediaeval Europe, Manu has described in no uncertain terms as to the form generally taken by this “wrath of the people”. “The King who through foolishness arbitrarily tyrannizes over his own state is very soon deprived of his kingdom and life together with his kith and kin. As the lives of living beings perish through torture of the body, so the lives of kings also are lost through torturing the Kingdom.”² Such a “torturer” or persecutor is known as “ruiner” or “destroyer” in the *Mahâbhârata*. And according to its teachings he is to be executed (*nihantavyah*) by the people.³

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¹ *The Book of Mencius* (Legge’s transl.), Bk. I, pt. II, Ch. VIII, 2, 3. *Vide* the author’s “*Democratic Background of Chinese Culture*” in the *Scientific Monthly*, January, 1919. cf. Dawson’s *Ethics of Confucius*, 241—247.

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² Manu VII, 111, 112.

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³ Anuśâsana, Ch. LXI, 32—34.

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It is thus not the Gregorian doctrine of non-resistance championed by Hobbes in the *Leviathan* or by his junior French contemporary Bossuet in the *Politique* that could have found an echo in Hindu political thought. The Stuarts of England and *le grand monarque* would have been thoroughly disappointed with the *nîti* theory in regard to the status of the king. The right of resistance to the King’s “demonical”, i. e. autocratic and arbitrary (or “Satanic”, to employ Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi’s expression in 1921) rule is taken for granted, and the doctrine of expulsion of the tyrant one of the A. B. C.’s in Hindu political *Weltanschauung*. The student of the *nîti-śâstras* is thus constantly reminded of Languet’s (1518—1581) queries in the *Vindicae contra Tyrannos*⁴ as to whether it is “lawful to resist a prince who violates the laws of God and lays waste his church” and “whether one might resist a prince who oppresses and ruins the state and how far”.⁵ And the conclusion that is advanced by the European advocate of tyrannicide is identical with that of the protagonists of *dharma*.

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⁴ Dunning Vol. II, 46—55.

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⁵ Chs. II, III.

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The *tyrannos* of the Western political theory is the “mere fellow”

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(and not a "sovereign") of the Chinese Micians and "the monarch who follows his own will",¹ "a thief in the form of a ruler",¹ "the enemy of virtue, morality and strength",¹ etc. of the Hindu radicals. The *Śukranîti* is quite at one with the *Politics* of Aristotle in its investigation of the "abuses" to which monarchy degenerates under "abnormal" conditions. And neither Isidore of Seville under the influence probably of Stoic teachings nor John of Salisbury² in the *Policraticus* makes out a more pronounced antithesis between the king and the tyrant than does Manu or Śukra.

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¹ *Śukra-nîti*, II, lines 7—8, 515—516, 549—550.

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² Poole (*John of Salisbury*), 201—225, 238; Carlyle III, 111, 113, 137—140, 145; for a general account of Isidore see Brehaut's *Encyclopedist of the Dark Age, Isidore of Seville*.

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The unequivocal enunciation of the doctrine of resistance, i. e. of the rights of the *prakriti* as against the "demon" in human form is as manifest in Śukra as in Manu. Quite in keeping with the spirit of the *Mahâbhârata* Śukra gives the verdict that the people should "desert the tyrant as the ruiner of the state".³ The "alienation from the subjects"⁴ because of "repression" leads ultimately to his ruin.⁴ The "discontent" may assume larger proportions and "destroy the monarch with his whole family".⁵ The overthrow and execution of Vena and Nahûṣa, the tyrants of Hindu legends, are therefore justified as a matter of course.⁶ Only, the *Śukra-nîti* and the *Manu Samhitâ* are not explicit as to the methods of doing away with tyrants, if, for instance, as approved in England by the author of the *Policraticus*, the "poisoning" of a Tiberius could be resorted to by the people.⁷

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³ II, 550.

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⁴ II, 8, I, 319—320; *cf.* the effects of the mal-administration of justice in Kâmandaka, XIV, 13—14.

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⁵ IV, ii, 49.

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⁶ 135—138.

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⁷ Gerson, p. 170; Carlyle, III, 145.

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As a natural corollary, however, the right to "cashier kings for misconduct" is in Śukra's theory backed by the right to "elect" a ruler. In the place of the deposed tyrant the priest with the consent of the ministry should install one who belongs to his family and is qualified.⁸ This advice of the Hindu philosopher is of a piece with Menicus' commendation of the conduct of the rebel minister I Yin,⁹ and is organically related to the general theory of popular sovereignty in Asian political philosophy.

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⁹ I, XXXI. Vide "the doctrine of resistance in Hindu thought" (*Pos. Back*,

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