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The Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus: A Study in Comparative Politics c9.s4.t3: 3. The Politics of Economic Associations

The Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus: A Study in Comparative Politics c9.s4.t3

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English

3. The Politics of Economic Associations

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We shall now analyze the constitutional, political or civic immunities and liberties enjoyed by the gilds of ancient and mediæval India. This will throw light on the amount of decentralization achieved in Hindu polity. No governmental documents are available however. The only authorities are literary.

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In the first place, *śreṇîs* were monopolistic organizations anxious to maintain in tact their economic autonomy. We learn from Nârada that the gilds were indeed open to more than one socio-religious group or caste.¹ But generally speaking, their regulations were as exclusive in spirit as the ordinances, say, of the English hatters’ craft in the fourteenth century.² They sought to regulate the number of apprentices and also the hours of labor.³ On festive occasions, in street processions, and at social gatherings each *śreṇî* was represented by its own banners and buntings bearing on them the implements and emblems of the respective crafts.

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¹ Hopkins’ *India*, p. 174; Mookerji's *Local*, pp. 58, 61, 62.

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² Unwin, p. 89; Palgrave’s *Dictionary* (“Craft gilds”).

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³ Birdwood’s *Industrial Arts of India*, pp. 137—140; Hopkins’ *India*, pp. 171—174, 193—196. See Nârada’s rules of apprenticeship in Mookerji’s *Local*, 51, 52.

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In the second place, the *jetthaka* (alderman) and *setthi*, i. e., the heads of corporations were treated by kings as representatives of the people functionally divided as artisans, merchants and peasants. In pre-Maurya times, i. e. previous to the third quarter of the fourth century B. C., it was through their gilds that the people were summoned by the king on important occasions.⁴ *Śreṇîs* appear thus to have played an important part in the public finance. The taxes to be paid by traders and other inhabitants of the town were agreed upon by the ruler “in consultation with the heads of the gilds”.⁵

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⁴ Rhys Davids’ *Buddhist India*, p. 97.

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⁵ Hopkins’ *India*, p. 176.

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Necessarily, therefore, in the third place, *mukhyas* i. e. heads, presidents or representatives of the corporations constituted, like councillors of the king, an important “estate” of the realm. At the coronation of kings, e. g. in the *Râmâyaṇa*, gilds had the right to the sprinkling or anointing ritual. Sometimes gild members occupied high state offices, as we know from the *Jâtakas*.⁶ Socially, on the whole, they were “peers” of the king. As poets of the *Mahâbhârata*⁷ have declared the royal ideal of manliness, kings were ashamed to return to their homeland if they were defeated in battles. For, “what would the elders of the gilds say to me”, argued the kings, “and what should I speak to them in reply?” The moral control exercised by gilds on state policies may be presumed to have been of a high order. Undisputed, therefore, was their influence on public opinion.

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⁶ Fick, p. 177.

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⁷ *Vana-parva*, Ch. 248, 16.

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In the fourth place, leaving aside the fact that men following the soldier’s profession were often organized on the gild principle (*śreṇî-vala* or gild corps¹ e. g. the Kṣatriya gilds of Gujarat described by Kautilya) the ordinary industrial and commercial *śreṇîs* had great military importance as well. The chief reason of course was their power over the purse or the sinews of war.

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¹ *Artha*, pp. 415, 455.

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Political theorists, therefore, considered it a part of the statecraft to pacify the gilds of one’s own state and try to win over the elders of the enemy’s gilds. The methods suggested in the *Mahâbhârata*² are the well known ways and means of *Realpolitik*, such as were appreciated by Philip of Macedon, Machiavelli the Italian, Walpole the Englishman, and Guizot the Frenchman. These are the corrupt practices of bribery and the sowing of dissensions among the members of corporations. Or perhaps in the language of Bolshevik economics these should partially be described as the traditional tactics of capitalism which is said to be “international” enough to seek allies even among enemy bankers.

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² *Śânti-parva*, Ch. CXLI, 64.

Cites (6)