Administrative System of the Marathas c11.s4: 6. Mints and Coins
Administrative System of the Marathas c11.s4
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6. Mints and Coins
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Besides land revenue and customs duties, a small income was derived from mints. The Peshwas did not permit free coining, but the goldsmiths usually obtained license for mints under certain restrictions. That must have been the practice in the pre-Peshwa period also. Shivaji never tried to control the currency and plainly told the English Ambassador, that "he forbids not the passing of any manner of Coins, nor on the other side, can he force his Subjects to take those Monies whereby they shall be Losers; but if their Coin be as fine an Allay, and as weighty as the *Mogul's*, and other Princes, he will not prohibit it."⁴⁰ The result was that all sorts of foreign coins were current in Shivaji's kingdom and even in his own treasury could be found few or no coins of the Rairi mint. Sabhasad says⁴¹ that Shivaji had no less than 400,000 of Shivarai Hons at the time of his death, but these Shivarai Hons were in all probability of Vijayanagar origin, for only 2 or 3 Shivaji Hons have yet been discovered. Sabhasad enumerates no less than 32 different kinds of gold coins and 6 different kinds of silver coins while giving an account of Shivaji's treasures. They were:
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⁴⁰ Fryer, p. 80.
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⁴¹ Sabhasad, p. 96. Sen, Siva Chhatrapati, pp. 134-135
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*Gold Coins.*
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1. Gambar.
2. Mohar.
3. Putli.
4. Padshahi Hon.
5. Satlamis or Satramis.
6. Ibhrami.
7. Shivarai Hon.
8. Kaveripak.
9. Sangari Hon.
10. Achyutrai Hon.
11. Devarai Hon.
12. Ramchandrarai Hon.
13. Guti Hon.
14. Dharwari Hon.
15. Falam (Fanam).
16. Pralkhati Hon.
17. Pav Naiki Hon.
18. Advani Hon.
19. Jadmal Hon.
20. Tadpatri Hon.
21. Afraji Hon.
22. Tribaluri Hon.
23. Trisuli Hon.
24. Chandavari (Tanjori) Hon.
25. Bildhari Hon.
26. Ulphakari Hon.
27. Muhammad Shahi Hon.
28. Veluri Hon.
29. Katerai Hon.
30. Devajvali Hon.
31. Ramnathpuri Hon.
32. Kungoti Hon.
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*Silver Coins.*
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1. Rupees.
2. Asrafis.
3. Abashis.
4. Dabholi Kabri.
5. Chauli Kabri.
6. Basri Kabri.
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Some of these coins were current in foreign countries; Ibhrami, for instance, was common in the market places of Bussorah.¹²
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¹² Fryer, p. 210.
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Shivaji had his mint at Raigad. His first coins were not probably issued before 1674. A large number of copper coins were issued, and no less than 25,000 of these were collected and examined by the Rev. Mr. Abbott.⁴³ But very few gold coins of Shivaji are known to-day, probably because only a few were struck.
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⁴³ J. B. Br. R.A.S. Vol. XX, p. 109.
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Shivaji had no good mechanic to work his mint. The irregular shape of the coins and the misshapen alphabets of the legends show the crude method of their manufacture. The writer of the Bombay Gazetteer⁴⁴ gives the following account of the working of the Chandor mint, closed in 1830. "A certain quantity of silver of the required test was handed over to each man who divided it into small pieces, rounded and weighed them, greater care being taken that the weights should be accurate than that size should be uniform. For this purpose scales and weights were given to each of the 400 workmen, and the manager examined them every week. When the workmen were satisfied with the weight of the piece, they were forwarded to the manager who sent them to be stamped. In stamping the rupee an instrument like an anvil was used. It had a hole in the middle with letters inscribed on it. Piece after piece was thrown into the hole, the seal was held by a workman called *batekari*; and a third man gave a blow with a six pound hammer. Three men were able to strike 2,000 pieces an hour, or 20,000 in a working day of ten hours. As the seal was a little larger than the piece, all the letters were seldom inscribed." The Chandor mint was opened long after Shivaji's demise. But that the description holds good with respect to Shivaji's mint also, can be proved by a simple inspection of Shivarai coins. The small Shivarai Hon in the museum of the Bharat Itihas Sanshodhak Mandal, for example, lacks the compound letter "tra" in the word Chhatrapati, evidently because the little circular piece had originally been hammered on a seal of much larger size.
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⁴⁴ Bombay Gazetteer, Vol. XVI, p. 429.
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The goldsmiths in charge of the mint could evidently boast of very little learning. In the copper coins alone, we find no less than eight different spellings of the word Shri Raja Shiva Chhatrapati. The Rev. Mr. Abbott gives the following eight variations in the spelling of this word on Shivarai pice:
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1. Ob श्रोराजाशिव ... छत्रपति R.
2. ,, श्रोराजाशिव ... छत्रपती ,,
3. ,, श्रोराजाशोष ... छत्रपति ,,
4. ,, श्रोराजाशौष ... छत्रपती ,,
5. ,, श्रोराजासिव ... छत्रपति ,,
6. ,, श्रोराजासिवा ... छत्रपती ,,
7. ,, श्रोराजासौव ... छत्रपति ,,
8. ,, श्रोराजासौव .. छत्रपती ,, The small Shivarai Hon in the Bharat Itihas Sanshodhak Mandal's 45 museum has on the obverse the figures of Shiva and Bhavani seated side by side, and on the reverse the name of Shivaji inscribed in the following manner:
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श्री रा (modi) जछ (व) पती
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7. Chauth and Sardeshmukhi:
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But neither the land revenue, nor the customs duties and the income from mints, added so much to the treasury of Shivaji as the Chauth and the Sardeshmukhi. Even in normal times he depended more on his army than on his civil officers for the necessary finances. It is on this account that he has been branded as a robber chief both by his contemporaries and by posterity as well. But the great Maratha king had no other alternative. He had to brave the enmity of the Mughals and the Sultan of Bijapore, not to count the pinpricks that he had often to bear from such minor powers as the Habshis of Janjira, the Portuguese of Goa, and petty semi-independent chiefs like the Koli Rajas. He had to organise an army to defend his newly conquered territories, he had to build innumerable forts to fortify difficult passes, he had to fit out a fleet to prevent the piracy and the depredations of the Siddi's navy, he had to buy arms and ammunitions and needed money for these works. Nature was by no means munificent to the Maratha. The valleys yielded but a scanty return to the strenuous labour of the Mawali peasants. It would have been impossible for Shivaji to finance his army and navy from the limited resources of his native land alone, even if he had taxed all his ingenuity to enhance them. Consequently he had to make war furnish the means of war.
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⁴⁵ Through the kindness of Prof. D. V. Potdar, the Joint Secretary of the B.I.S. Mandal, I obtained an opportunity of examining this really rare coin, but it has already been described by Mr. Bhave in the fifth Sammelan Vritta of the Mandal, p. 121.
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But Chauth and Sardeshmukhi were quite different from spoils of war. They were more or less permanent demands. Shivaji's claim to Sardeshmukhi was based on a legal fiction. He claimed to be the hereditary Sardeshmukh of his country and had put forth his claim early in his career. If his claim had been acknowledged, or if he had succeeded in obtaining a farman in its support, there would have been no legal flaw whatever in his demand. This imperial sanction, however, could not be obtained before Shahu's accession to his grandfather's throne, and in Shivaji's time at least, Sardeshmukhi was not recognised as his watan. Chauth was nothing but a tribute exacted from the weak by the strong. The Raja of Bednore and the Chief of Soonda agreed to pay Chauth in 1676, because they had no option in the matter. Shivaji had invaded their principalities with a strong army and any refusal would have been sternly punished. The Marathas obtained a legal right to levy Chauth, when the diplomacy of Balaji Vishwanath secured for Shahu an imperial recognition of that oft-repeated claim. This legal sanction would have been of little avail, if it had not been backed by the lance of the Maratha horseman. Nothing short of an expedition would make any chief or king, either Hindu or Muhammadan, admit Shivaji's claim to a quarter of his revenue and nothing but a strong army could enforce punctual payment. It was, therefore, a military contribution levied by a power without being in formal occupation of the country, and without observing the formalities specified by modern International Law. But the late Mr. Ranade does not admit that Chauth was a mere military contribution without any moral or legal obligation on the part of the Marathas to protect the Chauth-paying chiefs from the invasion of a third power or to restore peace and order in their country. He was of opinion that the policy underlying the exaction of Chauth was the same as that which impelled Lord Wellesley to enforce a subsidiary alliance on his weaker neighbours. "The demand for *chouth* was subsequently added with the consent of the powers whose protection was undertaken against foreign aggression, on payment of fixed sums for the support of the troops maintained for such service. This was the original idea as worked out by Shivaji, and it was this same idea which in the Marquis of Wellesley's hand bore such fruit a hundred and twenty five years later." Such is Ranade's interpretation of the Chauth policy.¹
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¹ Ranade, R. M. P., pp. 224-225.
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The Chauth was originally nothing but a black mail. The subjects of the Koli Raja of Ramnagar used to give considerable trouble to the Portuguese subjects of Daman by their robbery, depredation and plundering raids. At last the peaceful inhabitants of some villages in the District of Daman came to an amicable arrangement with the Raja of Ramnagar and agreed to pay him an annual tribute called the Chauth (Chouto) provided his people no longer caused them any loss or trouble. The Raja of Ramnagar was styled in the Portuguese records as the king Choutia as he used to receive Chauth. When this arrangement was made we do not exactly know, but it has been mentioned by Fr. Antonio de Gouveia as early as 1603. (Jornada, Fl. 125 quoted in Dalgado's *Glossario Luso Asiatico*, Vol. I, p. 280.) The King Choutia and his claim to Chauth has been referred to in a royal letter in 1605. After the annexation of the Koli principalities of Jawhar and Ramnagar Shivaji asserted his claim to the Chauth of Daman. He demanded Chauth from his Muhammadan enemies for the first time in 1665 and it is noteworthy that he had passed through the principality of Ramnagar on his way to Surat in the previous year. It is therefore clear that Shivaji was not the originator of Chauth but he was certainly responsible for its wider application. For a more detailed discussion of this interesting question, the reader is referred to my *Historical Records at Goa*, pp. 12-24. The unpublished Portuguese It is true that Shahu had, in return for the grant of Chauth, bound himself to maintain a body of 15,000 horse in the Emperor's service, to be placed at the disposal of the Subhedars, Faujdars and officers in the different districts "and to maintain peace and order." But neither Shahu nor the Peshwas ever cared to assist the Subhedars of the Deccan unless it served their own interest. Shivaji also had often offered his services to the Emperor of Delhi, but he had exacted Chauth at the point of his sword; the Emperor did not expect that Shivaji would ever look after the Mughal interests and Shivaji also knew that no treaty would serve him better than his own strong arms. It cannot, therefore, be denied that the Maratha kings exacted Chauth without undertaking the least responsibility for the country's welfare, and it should also be remembered that they never expected the Chauth-paying states to give up their diplomatic independence. Here lies the fundamental difference between the subsidiary system and the exaction of Chauth. The East India Company always held themselves responsible for the defence of the allied state, while they expected it to renounce
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records have been for the first time quoted there in extenso. The Raja of Ramnagar did not, it should be noted, offer to protect the people of Daman from foreign aggression but it was only the aggression of his own people that he undertook to prevent and Shivaji does not appear to have gone further than that all diplomatic relations with other powers. Moreover, the Marathas never cared to maintain an extra Regiment when they received Chauth from a prince, nor had the amount of tribute any relation to the possible expense that might be incurred in the defence of the Chauth-paying territories. I do not, however, hold that the Maratha statesmen had no idea of a subsidiary arrangement; such an arrangement was made with the Raja of Bundi by the Peshwas, but that was long after the demise of Shivaji.
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The Chauth was therefore nothing but a contribution exacted by a military leader. But are such exactions sanctioned by International Law? The ancient Romans, while extending their empire, had set no limit to their rapacity. "*Bellum alit bellum*" war must pay for war, was their favourite maxim. But pillage has not ceased to be an inevitable characteristic of war with the dissolution of the Roman Empire. Even in the 19th century, so late as 1865, General Sherman's campaign had been accompanied by the systematic pillage of the territories he marched through.⁴⁷ Requisition, which is only a variation of contribution, is also sanctioned by the most modern laws of war and was practised, though unwillingly, by no less a man than George Washington.⁴⁸ Shivaji also could plead as urgent a necessity as Washington. Both of them had been fighting for their country's liberation and both of them were sorely in need of money. Washington requisitioned the property of his unwilling fellow-citizens and Shivaji levied contribution on the enemy subjects. It served two ends at once. It not only weakened the enemy he was fighting, but at the same time added to his own resources.
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⁴⁷ Bentwitch, p. 28.
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⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 10.
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Shivaji's kingdom was a military state if we are allowed to style it so. It was in a state of chronic warfare. Even for its finances, Shivaji depended more on war than on the processes of peace. The wealth amassed in the ports of his enemies by their commercial enterprise flowed into Shivaji's treasury, as a reward of his military prowess. The result of this policy was the inevitable ruin of trade and commerce. Surat, the premier port of Western India, lost its trade for ever. But while plundering his enemies' lands Shivaji took good care to protect his own country from a similar calamity. It was absolutely impossible that his attempts in this direction should be crowned with complete success. But he did all that was practicable. His statesmanship converted the hardy soldiers of Maharashtra into excellent civil administrators. Shivaji did not aspire to be an original legislator, indeed, he had no leisure for such work. But he revived some of the best regulations of his predecessors and made slight improvements upon them. It does not seem possible that he had been able to achieve much reform. We also do not know how far the spirit of these regulations was observed by Shivaji's officers. The public opinion of that time did not condemn bribery and corruption and we are afraid, Shivaji's officers were not much better, if not actually worse, than their successors of the Peshwa period. His country saw no peace till the overthrow of the Mughal power. Shivaji never had more than a couple of peaceful years at a time and even that not more than once in his life. It is futile to expect that commerce and agriculture should prosper under these circumstances. But Shivaji's regulations were well suited to the needs of the country. The assessment was flexible and varied from year to year. Whatever might have been the annual yield, a considerable share was left to the peasants. In the years of scarcity they could expect relief from the state. Consequently, they had good reasons to devote their attention to agricultural pursuits, but it is quite probable that the prospects and honour of a military career had stronger charms for the hardy peasant of the Ghat ranges.