The Military System of the Marathas, with a Brief Account of Their Maritime Activities c13: Chapter IX: The Third Battle of Panipat and its Lessons
The Military System of the Marathas, with a Brief Account of Their Maritime Activities c13
- Language
- English
Chapter IX: The Third Battle of Panipat and its Lessons
c13.2
The third battle of Panipat marks a turning point in the history of India. About its ultimate result there is no difference of opinion, but its immediate effects have been variously estimated. The victor, it may be safely asserted, hardly derived any permanent gain; he had to leave Delhi shortly afterwards and he failed to consolidate his authority in the Punjab where the Sikhs were founding a new power. The powerful confederacy of the Muhammadan potentates of Hindustan dissolved even before the departure of the Afghan leader, and they had to settle their accounts with the Marathas as best they could. The vanquished were temporarily stunned but were not annihilated. Their supremacy survived for another forty years, and twenty-five years after the disaster of Panipat, Delhi again found a Maratha military dictator using its impotent Emperor as an instrument and symbol of his power. Panipat did not deal the death blow to the Maratha empire, as it is commonly suggested, it only arrested its expansion and granted the future rulers of India the respite they needed for consolidating their power in Bengal. But the campaign of Panipat might have proved a blessing in disguise to the Marathas, had they been able to profit by its lessons. It revealed the glaring defects of their military and imperial organisation that ultimately led to their overthrow.
c13.3
The contest between the Marathas and the Afghans had been long impending. Ahmad Abdali made his first invasion of India in 1748. His first expedition proved a failure, but henceforth one party in the court of Delhi looked towards him for support, while the other preferred a Maratha alliance. Eventually, the Emperor, Ahmad Shah, came to an understanding with the Hindu power. The negotiation on the Maratha side was conducted by Malhar Rao Holkar and Jayappa Sindhia, and the Emperor granted the chauth of Thatta, Multan, the Punjab, Rajputana and Rohilkhand to the Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao,¹ who in his turn undertook to defend the Emperor against his enemies and disloyal subjects, among whom are specifically mentioned Abdali, the Rohillas, the Rajputs and the Amirs of Sind. The document unfortunately bears no date but probably this agreement had been concluded sometime about 1750. The Peshwa had, therefore, nearly ten years for completing his military and diplomatic arrangements before his cousin met his Afghan rival on the fatal field of Panipat.
c13.4
¹ Rajwade, Marathyanchya Itihasachin Sadhanen, Vol. I, pp. 1-10.
c13.5
According to their agreement, the Marathas made an expedition against the Rohilla chiefs, and it was at the instance of the latter that Abdali made his second expedition to India, which resulted in the conquest of the Punjab. The Rohillas were hardly a match for the Marathas. But, while common danger cemented a union among the threatened Muhammadan chiefs, the Marathas failed to pursue a common plan, for they were more anxious to secure their personal ends than to serve the common interests of the empire. Sindhia and Holkar, the two principal chiefs who were expected to look after the Maratha interests in the North, did not always agree; Hingne, the diplomatic agent stationed at Delhi, had no confidence in his military colleague Antaji Mankeshwar; and the military force employed in Hindustan was not always adequate;
c13.6
the Peshwa, above all, urged his officers to turn the channel of the golden stream from the North to the South. The result was that the Marathas made many enemies, they had given offence to the Rajputs, Jats, Rohillas and other Muhammadan chiefs by their financial demands, but their military expeditions were too short and the party strife in their council was too strong and their policy consequently was too shifting to inflict a crushing blow upon any of their enemies. Raghoba's first expedition to Hindustan in 1753 did not improve matters. Sindhia opposed Holkar's resolution of exterminating the Jats; the Raja of Jodhpur was secretly encouraged by Holkar in his war against Sindhia; and Raghoba had not the satisfaction of bringing his brother the much needed financial relief.
c13.7
But this was not all. In June 1754, Emperor Ahmad Shah was deposed and Mir Shahabuddin obtained the exalted office of the Vizier of the Empire with the help of his Maratha friends. The result was that other parties at Delhi were totally alienated from the Marathas, and the new Vizier soon gave the powerful Afghan monarch a just cause for entering India for a third time by his interference in the affairs of the Punjab.
c13.8
Among the Maratha officers employed in Hindustan none understood the complex political situation better than Govind Pant Bundele. In February 1755, he addressed a letter to the Peshwa explaining the unsatisfactory political condition then existing and suggesting the necessary measure. He told the Peshwa plainly that a force of at least 20,000 well trained and well disciplined men who were not given to plunder should be permanently stationed in Northern India for safeguarding the Maratha interests and securing the Maratha possessions there. He plainly told that the force under him was not at all adequate and, in view of the impending return of Raghoba to the Deccan, he urged the necessity of sending a strong army.¹ About four years earlier Bapuji Mahadev Hingne had requested his brother to explain the necessity of posting a strong force at Delhi, for the Maratha cause was by no means popular there.² But all these warnings from the men on the spot went unheeded, and when in the rainy season of 1755 Raghoba left for home and Holkar accompanied him, only a small force was left with Antaji Mankeshwar to look after the Maratha interests in Northern India. Sindhia was still engaged in a protracted war against the *de facto* Raja of Jodhpur.
c13.9
¹ Itihas Sangraha, Aitihasik Tipnen, Pt. II, pp. 77-8.
c13.10
² Rajwade, Marathyanchya Itihasachin Sadhanen, Vol. VI, No. 556, quoted in Sardesai, Marathi Riyasat, Vol. IV, p. 15.
c13.11
This offered Abdali and his Indian friends an excellent opportunity of which they did not fail to take an early and quick advantage. He entered India at the head of a well appointed army of veterans and literally swept everything before him. The small Maratha army was easily put to flight, Delhi was occupied by the Afghan and Rohilla troops and the recent political arrangements were entirely set aside.
c13.12
The Peshwa again sent his brother to meet the new danger, and if he had promptly proceeded to the war-zone, Raghoba might have encountered the Afghan army before it left India. But he allowed himself to be diverted with some money-raising expeditions in Rajputana and lost the opportunity of overtaking a war-worn enemy not a little fatigued by his movements in the unaccustomed heat of an Indian summer. When Abdali had left and there was no formidable opponent to fear, Raghoba and Malhar Rao Holkar entered Delhi and inflicted a severe defeat upon the Rohillas. But Raghoba committed the mistake of extending his clemency to the defeated Rohilla leader who was the staunchest supporter of Abdali in India and therefore the most irreconcilable enemy that the Marathas had. Then he went to the Punjab, drove Abdali's agent from that province and planted the ochre-coloured banner of the Maratha empire on the banks of the Indus.
c13.13
Here Raghoba lost an excellent opportunity. While on the banks of the Indus, he obtained an autograph letter from the Shah of Persia proposing an alliance against the common enemy.¹ Raghoba took it lightly. He underestimated the strength of his enemy and talked of the conquest of Kabul and Kandahar, as they had once formed an integral part of the Mughal empire. But if he had been seriously thinking of further conquest and annexation, it is difficult to understand why a strong Maratha force was not permanently posted on the natural frontiers of India. It would be far more easy to prevent Abdali’s aggression with the mighty Indus in front and a hostile Persian army at his flank, while his Indian co-religionists would be absolutely incapable of rendering the least assistance, for a comparatively small force would be sufficient for keeping the Rohillas in check. But in 1758 Raghoba again left for home. His army had long been in arrears and probably nothing would induce a southern force to stay away in a northern province for two successive rainy seasons.
c13.14
¹ *Itihas Sangraha, Aitihasik Sphuta Lekha*, Pt. IV, pp. 39-41.
c13.15
When Raghoba left Hindustan, an enormously heavy task was imposed upon Sindhia. He had to look after the extensive region from Lahore to Muttra and he was further expected to lead an expedition to Bengal, not for any political purpose but to relieve the financial difficulties of the Peshwa. It was expected that Holkar would co-operate with him, but as early as 1756 Govind Pant Bundele had informed Sadashiv Rao that the prevailing difference between the two chiefs rendered any concerted action impossible, and the situation demanded the presence of both the Peshwa and Sadashiv Rao at Delhi.¹ As before, no notice seems to have been taken of this warning.
c13.16
¹ Rajwade, *Marathyanchya Itihasachin Sadhanen*, Vol. III, No. 149, pp. 137-8.
c13.17
In 1759 Ahmad Shah Abdali came to India for the fourth time. As usual he was confronted by a hopelessly inferior force. Dattaji Sindhia had allowed himself to be duped by the friendly professions of Najib Khan, and, when he was at last undeceived, lack of boats prevented him from crossing the Yamuna and punishing the perfidious Rohilla. The appearance of Ahmad Shah at once turned the scales against him. Loath to leave his post, he wrote to Holkar for speedy reinforcements. The joint army of the two chiefs might probably have yet stemmed the tide of Afghan success, but Holkar, as usual, allowed himself to be engaged against a Rajput chief, while the fate of his race was being decided on the banks of the Yamuna. Dattaji rashly faced a superior Afghan army and paid for his daring with his life. His nephew, the legitimate head of his family, was wounded and his army was totally routed. Then Holkar tried the traditional harassing tactics of his race against the formidable Afghan cavalry, but in vain. The Afghans were hardy mountaineers and, unlike the Mughals of the Deccan, they could move swiftly when they wanted. Holkar was defeated, the Marathas were expelled from Delhi and the Afghan leader was organising a general confederacy of Muhammadan chiefs against their hated Hindu enemy, when Sadashiv Rao set out on his memorable expedition.
c13.18
The Maratha army was flushed with recent victory; their leader enjoyed a high reputation for his bravery and statesmanship; he had lately enlisted in his army a well known Musulman officer who had been trained by the celebrated Bussy. If he could attack Abdali before his diplomatic negotiations were concluded, there was yet hope for the Marathas.
c13.19
Lack of boats had prevented Dattaji Sindhia from punishing Najib Khan; lack of boats again impeded the progress of Sadashiv Rao. He had asked Govind Pant Bundele to arrange for boats, but Govind Pant did not, or could not, comply with his order, and when the Maratha army reached the banks of the Yamuna, the river was no longer fordable. The main army of Ahmad Shah Abdali was encamped at Anupshahar, while two weak detachments held Delhi and Kunjapura.
c13.20
Formidable as the Maratha army was, it was faced with one supreme difficulty. It was for all practical purposes in an enemy country. In Northern India the Marathas were known by the common name of *ganim* or enemy. They had once prided themselves on this distinction, but the general ill feeling that the policy of rapacity lately initiated by Balaji Rao had roused now proved their ruin. Sadashiv Rao had before him the difficult task of winning the alliance or, failing that, of securing the neutrality of the northern powers. His negotiations with Shuja-ud-daula proved unsuccessful, but the Jats were won over to the Maratha side. Mr. Keene has described the campaign of Panipat as a contest between the united Hindus of India and a confederacy of Muhammadans. It was nothing of the sort. The Muhammadans, indeed, had rallied to the banner of their Afghan co-religionist, all on account of the clever propaganda of Najib Khan, but the Rajputs held sternly aloof. Sadashiv Rao had no rallying cry to win them over. It was not *Hindupad Padshahi* that he was fighting for; he was, according to his own confession, fighting for the Timuride empire.
c13.21
It appears that Sadashiv Rao had at first under-rated his enemy's strength. At one time he had expected that the very rumour of his approach would frighten the Afghans away. Much of his tactical and strategical mistake was due to this over-confidence. In July the Maratha army captured Delhi, the Afghans had encamped on the opposite bank but were forced to witness the fall of the imperial city without being able to help their comrades. From Delhi Sadashiv Rao proceeded to Kunjapura and reduced that place. Hitherto he had not been guilty of any tactical blunder. He was perfectly right in reducing all the Afghan stations on his side of the river and trying to cut off the enemy's retreat, but no general can be pardoned for omitting to provide for his own safety in case of an unforeseen defeat.
c13.22
The greatest blunder that Sadashiv Rao committed at this stage was that he did not adequately guard the fords. On 17 October, the Maratha army reduced the Afghan garrison stationed at Kunjapura, and six days later Abdali crossed the Yamuna at Bagpat without any opposition.¹ Thus the Maratha army was cut off from its base of operation.
c13.23
¹ Asiatic Researches, Vol. III, p. 107.
c13.24
The exact strength of the two contending forces has been variously estimated by contemporary writers. The total strength of the Marathas amounted, according to Kasiraj Pandit, to 55,000 horse, 15,000 foot, 200 cannons, rockets and Shutarnals without number, besides 15,000 Pendharis.² The allied Muhammadan army, according to the same writer, consisted of 41,800 horse, 38,000 foot and 70 to 80 cannons.³ Muhammad Ja'far Shamlu gives a much higher figure;⁴ but on the whole, the rival forces were probably equally strong. The Marathas were superior in cavalry and artillery; their opponents had a superior infantry and the greater advantage of superior generalship.
c13.25
² Ibid, pp. 106-7.
c13.26
³ Ibid, pp. 104-5.
c13.27
⁴ Elliot and Dowson, History of India, Vol. VIII, pp. 146-9.
c13.28
The army of Sadashiv Rao differed as much from that of Shivaji as the hardy followers of Babar differed from the ease-loving officers who accompanied Aurangzib to the Deccan. Sadashiv Rao and his principal officers had, like the Mughal grandees of Aurangzib’s time, costly tents and expensive camp equipage. They were accompanied by their wives and female attendants. Nana Fadnavis, then a young man in indifferent health, had accompanied the army with the intent to visit the holy places of Northern India; and he had with him his young wife and widowed mother. A large number of traders and shopkeepers had followed the Maratha force to supply its daily needs. Sadashiv Rao was encumbered with a huge crowd of non-combatants, and worse still the presence of so many ladies of noble birth immensely added to his embarrassment. His army was hardly competent to carry on those harassing tactics, the success of which depended entirely on speed. He was, therefore, right in rejecting Holkar’s suggestion and his decision was further justified by the failure of such tactics in the late campaign. But it is difficult to understand why he did not try to fall back on Delhi even at the risk of a battle and reopen his communication with his base of operation and his far-off native province.
c13.29
Instead of that he entrenched himself strongly at Panipat. In his fortified camp defended by a deep ditch and a strong mud wall with mounted cannons he could easily beat off any attack of Abdali. And it was his plan to compel his enemies to fight the Maratha army on its own ground. Govind Pant Bundele was expected to devastate the territories of the allied princes with a flying corps of Maratha cavalry, cut off their supplies and drive Abdali to meet his destruction at Panipat. The plan looked well on paper, but its success depended mainly on the operations entrusted to Govind Pant Bundele. This officer, however, had neither the ability nor the means, as G. S. Sardesai points out, to carry out the instructions of his commander. He was by profession and training a civilian. His following consisted of the militia needed for revenue collection, and the cavalry under his command was hardly adequate for the enterprise upon which the fate of Sadashiv Rao’s grand army depended so much. But Sadashiv Rao and his companions were confident of success. Their jubilant confidence found expression in a letter written by Krishna Joshi¹ on 5 November 1760. The Muhammadan army, he informed his correspondent, was suffering from scarcity of provisions, while there was abundance of it in the Maratha camp. He expected the Afghans to fall upon their entrenched camp in a few days and meet certain destruction from their artillery. He ascribed the inactivity of the Afghan general to his fear of Maratha prowess. He jubilantly concludes his letter with the remark that ‘Abdali cannot retreat to his own country as the road is blocked, he dares not fight the Marathas as defeat is certain, he cannot sit idle as he is short of provisions’. The unfortunate writer died two days afterwards, and he hardly realised when he penned these lines how accurately he was describing the difficulties that awaited his own commander. Sadashiv Rao had attempted the combination of two fundamentally opposite methods, and the result was disastrous.
c13.30
¹ Rajwade, Marathyanchya Itihasachin Sadhanen, Vol. I, No. 265.
c13.31
We need not mention here the skirmishes that at different times took place between different companies of the two armies. From the middle of November the Marathas had begun to feel the want of food and provender, but still their commander persisted in his policy of starving his enemy, blindly ignoring the fact that his enemy had much better facilities for procuring supplies than he could have, unless and until he succeeded in reopening his communications with Delhi. With the first signs of famine in his camp Sadashiv Rao ought to have attempted to force his way back to Delhi; but, after Govind Pant Bundele’s death in the third week of December, he had no excuse for persisting in his original plan. Abdali could no longer be driven into the snare laid for him. It was no longer possible to cut off his supplies, on the other hand, it became increasingly difficult for the Marathas to send out their foraging parties. Still the Brahman general’s confidence did not forsake him and even in the face of famine he persisted in the way of certain destruction and ruin.
c13.32
He knew quite well that peace on honourable terms was no longer possible, and Kasiraj Pandit tells us that Najib Khan was now opposed to peace on any terms. He knew that the Marathas were now completely at the mercy of the allied army; he knew that he had given them repeated offence and he dared not let them escape from their self-contrived annihilation.
c13.33
At last the Marathas could no longer bear the pangs of hunger.
c13.34
Animals began to die in large numbers, the privations suffered by men were enormous and they could no longer wait in their fortified camp. At this crisis it appears that Sadashiv Rao did not possess the coolness and patience that the situation demanded. He resolved to fight, but even at the last moment it was his duty to direct the battle rather than throw himself desperately among his enemies. It was his duty to think out a fairly good plan of battle, but at the last moment he wavered. It was decided, if we are to rely on a contemporary chronicle, on the night previous that the army should form a hollow square, with the women in the centre, and with the help of the artillery try to cut its way through the hostile ranks.¹ But on the following morning this plan was suddenly abandoned and the whole army was ordered to fall upon the Muslim force. The Marathas advanced with their artillery in front. On their left marched the trained infantry of Ibrahim Khan, on their right rode the cavalry of Sindhia and Holkar, while Sadashiv Rao in person led the centre. No reserve was left, no strategy was tried, the artillery played no important part in this momentous battle, the contest was decided by a close hand to hand fight, and superior man-power ultimately triumphed.
c13.35
¹ Bhau Sahebanchi Bakhar, ed. Sane, pp. 142-3.
c13.36
Ibrahim Khan Gardi was resolved to give a good account of himself and his battalion. He took a banner in his own hands and led a resolute bayonet charge against the Rohilla divisions of Hafiz Rahamat Khan and Dundi Khan. The Rohillas were utterly routed and broken, eight thousand of them were killed and wounded and hardly one thousand were left with each chief. At the same time the Maratha centre led by Sadashiv Rao and Viswas Rao fell on the Afghan centre where the Grand Vizier commanded a compact body of ten thousand horse, seven thousand Persian musketeers and one thousand camels mounted with *Zamburaks*. Here also the resolute Marathas carried everything before them. Attai Khan, the nephew of the Grand Vizier, was killed, three thousand of his followers were slain or wounded and the demoralised Afghans began to run way. The Grand Vizier reproached them, expostulated and argued with them, but in vain. He urged Kasiraj Pandit to bring Shuja-ud-daula to his rescue. But the Chief of Oudh seems to have been an indifferent spectator; his intention, most probably, was to watch the fight and join the victors. Jankoji Sindhia, however, failed to make much impression on the division of Najib Khan. The Rohilla chief had under him eight thousand infantry and nearly six thousand horse. ‘They advanced slowly under cover of a kind of breast-works of sand, which were thrown up by a great number of Bildars who were with them, and who, having finished one, advanced the distance of half a musket shot in front of that, under cover of their own people, and threw up another; to which the troops then advanced, while a third was thrown up in the same manner.’ These defensive tactics saved them from the violent cavalry charge of the Marathas that had nearly broken the Afghan centre. Damaji Gaikwad, whose division, Kasiraj Pandit tells us, supported Ibrahim Khan, behaved very well and he himself received several wounds.
c13.37
The Marathas fought with the courage of desperation and for a moment the Afghans lost heart. But they were led by a consummate general. Ahmad Shah had been watching the battle coolly and had kept a strong reserve ready at hand to be used at the right moment. The Marathas had been able to make no impression on the Muhammadan left, and when the fresh reserve charged the Maratha centre and reinforced Abdali’s right, the tide of battle at once turned. The Muhammadan victory was complete and a whole generation of Maratha and Brahman officers was slaughtered on that fatal field.
c13.38
The defeat was due as much to bad generalship as to the inherent defects of the Maratha military system. Had there been a strong standing army to be permanently stationed in Hindustan, had Raghunath Rao held the Indus frontier, had Holkar joined Sindhia’s army in time, the battle of Panipat might not have been fought at all. But the feudal organisation of the army and the chronic financial needs of the Peshwa and his Sardars frequently compelled them to divert their energy to minor expeditions, while the real source of danger was ignored. The failure of Govind Pant Bundele was due more to the system than to any remissness on his part. His districts had for several years been disturbed by hostile Rohillas. Yet he was expected to meet not only the financial demands of the grand army but to raise a sufficiently strong cavalry force to devastate Oudh and Rohilkhand and to drive the allied army upon the artillery of Ibrahim Khan at Panipat. Another lesson of Panipat that was lost upon the Marathas was the impracticability of combining two opposite methods of warfare. The experiment proved disastrous at Panipat, and Colonel Malleson says that the fatal defeat of Assaye was mainly due to its repetition. During the Panipat campaign, Sadashiv Rao had relied almost entirely on his trained infantry for victory; his successors went further; their infatuation for this new method of fighting led them to neglect their once powerful cavalry, and during the forty years that intervened between Panipat and Assaye, Maratha generalship had also hopelessly deteriorated.
Linked texts (1)
- Bhāūsāhebāñcī bakhar — Marathi