The Military System of the Marathas, with a Brief Account of Their Maritime Activities c14: Chapter X: The Beginning of the Maratha Navy

The Military System of the Marathas, with a Brief Account of Their Maritime Activities c14

Language: English

c14.63 — 4 parts

Chapter X: The Beginning of the Maratha Navy

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SHIVAJI'S followers had inherited from their ancestors a great military tradition; but the sea was a new element to them. The western coast of India had from time immemorial been inhabited by an intrepid race of seafarers, but no evidence can be found to support the view that any attempt had been made in the past to establish a naval power. Though the Yadava Kingdom, for example, had stretched right up to the seaboard, the ambition of the Devgiri princes seems to have been land-bound; they did not aspire to rule the waves. Shivaji may, therefore, be justly described as the father of the Maratha navy. The English factors in their wrath called him a robber and a pirate;¹ but he was in reality trying to create a new sea power; and it was not his fault that the Maratha fleet did not ride the sea with as much confidence as the Maratha horse scoured the land.

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¹ Factory Records, Surat, Vol. 89, fols. 69-70.

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His policy was, however, not one of mere adventure, nor was his object by any means impracticable. The coast-line of the Konkan, broken by many creeks, offered excellent shelter for ships, and the rocky islands near the coast presented excellent sites for naval strongholds. Shivaji had before his eyes the example of the Sidis and the merchant powers of Europe, and he could not have been ignorant of the exploits of the pirates known to European writers as ‘Malabars’. Once in secure possession of the Konkan, it did not take his keen intellect long to perceive the advantages as well as the necessity of a strong fighting fleet. The peace of his country and the prosperity of his ports equally demanded it.

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The peace of his country was threatened by the Abyssinian ruler of Danda Rajpuri. Secure in his island stronghold he could and did harass Shivaji’s land with sword and fire. The towns and villages on the coast were burnt and plundered, women and children were kidnapped to be sold as slaves, yet Shivaji’s governors were helpless, directly the invaders betook themselves to their native element.

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Shivaji’s ports offered him a brilliant chance of improving his finances. Foreign merchants, attracted to these new marts, would not only improve the general prosperity of the country by purchasing its products but would contribute directly to the coffers of the State in the shape of customs duties. He could also derive greater profit by embarking on commercial enterprises on his own account, in consonance with the practice of the Portuguese rulers of Goa and the English traders of Bombay. But free navigation of the sea was in those days denied to all who could not enforce their right. The sovereignty of the sea had been for many years effectively claimed and exercised by the Portuguese. No merchant dared to launch his bark on the Arabian Sea or the Indian Ocean without first purchasing the permission of the Government of Goa. Even sovereign powers like those of Golkonda and Bijapur had to undergo this humiliation.¹ It is true that they obtained Portuguese cartazes to a specified number merely for the asking; but these permits were accompanied in all cases by vexatious conditions. They were not to import or export certain articles mentioned in the cartaz, they were not to visit the ports of the Imam of Muscat and of other enemies of the Portuguese and they were not to carry with them any Christian slave. To ascertain whether these conditions were being loyally observed the Portuguese claimed and exercised the right of search.¹ In short they denied their weaker neighbours the freedom of the sea. But such was the dread of the Portuguese name in those days that even the mighty Emperor of Delhi deemed it prudent to provide for the safety of the pilgrim boats bound for Mecca by soliciting the *cartaz* of the Portuguese Viceroy. Although Indian traders and Indian rulers had accepted the Portuguese sovereignty of the sea as a settled fact, this assumption of authority had been from the very beginning disputed by the merchants of other European nations. And in Shivaji's time the English, the Dutch and the French successfully demonstrated the possibility of defying the Portuguese in their own element. Shivaji, possessed of a strong fleet, could secure for his subjects the same rights, the same immunities and the same advantages.

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¹ The Portuguese right to control navigation was often secured by treaties, as for instance the treaty of 1548 between Adilshah and the Portuguese, Biker, Vol. I, pp. 122-7; the treaty of 1631, between Virappa Naik, King of Canara and the Portuguese, Biker, Vol. I, pp. 270-5; and the treaty of 1645 between Jahangir and the Portuguese, Biker, Vol. I, pp. 189-92.

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¹ Sen, *A Preliminary Report on the Historical Records at Goa*, pp. 46-51; Biker, *Tratados da India*, Vol. IV, pp. 181-8.

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Moreover, a fleet in those days did not cost the State much to maintain. While protecting the mercantile fleet of the country the fighting fleet would raise a revenue by emulating the example of the European powers settled on the western coast. Like the English and the Portuguese, the Marathas could also sell their passports to alien traders if they could hold their own afloat. There was another advantage which Shivaji must have foreseen even in the earliest days of his struggle against the Muslim powers of the Deccan and Hindustan, that his enemies might try to starve him into submission by prohibiting the export of provisions from their country² as Bahadur Khan actually did. But if the sea were open to him he could get an abundant supply from the ports of the south even when the usual trade routes of the country had all been blocked against him. Prudence therefore dictated and foresight suggested that he should equip a fighting fleet of his own to protect his people, to punish his enemies, to provide for the prosperity of his ports and to secure for himself and his subjects a share of the maritime trade. It was not his aim to secure the freedom of the sea against the world; he was quite content to share the sovereignty with his neighbours.

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² Factory Records, Surat, Vol. 88, fols, 216-17. Swally Marine, 4 October 1674: ‘Bawder Ckaun hath lately sent orders that no provisions be permitted to be carried out hence or from Broach, saying that Sevagee is supplied thereby.’

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At what date he framed his naval programme and when he gave effect to it we do not precisely know. But this novel adventure did not fail to attract the early notice of his friends and foes. Khafi Khan mentions it as a new instance of his perfidy. Shivaji ‘had seized the ports of Jiwal, Pabal and others near Surat’, he informs us, ‘and attacked the vessels of pilgrims bound for Mecca. He had built several forts by the seashore, and had entirely interrupted maritime intercourse.’¹ Sabhasad sounds a note of exultation when he writes of the equipment of a mighty armada by his master as an instrument of offence as well as defence.² But as usual neither the Muhummadan nor the Maratha gives any indication of the date of so important an event. Cosme da Guarda, the Portuguese biographer and admirer of Shivaji, was definitely of opinion that his hero turned his attention to the sea when he could not expect to extend his kingdom any further on land.³ According to him, Shivaji launched his naval programme after his flight from the Mughal capital. But as usual Cosme da Guarda was inaccurate, for we read of the maritime activities of the Marathas in the letters of the English factors of Bombay and Surat as early as 1664. The Dutch spy saw at Goa a Pataxo of Dariya Sarang, one of Shivaji’s naval commanders, in January 1667,⁴ and the Dutch factors of Surat mention in their account of the first sack of Surat a rumour ‘that Sivagy had about 40 frigates in the river, also intent on plunder.’⁵ A still earlier date is supplied by a Portuguese official letter. On 16 August 1659, the Governor of Goa wrote to His Majesty the King of Portugal: ‘A son of Xagi, rebel captain of King Idalxa, has made himself master of the lands near Bassein and Chaul. He is powerful and obliges us to have great care as he has made some ships of war at Biundy, Galiana, and Panvel, ports in the district of Bassein. We have ordered the Captain not to allow them to put out in the sea and to impede their exit’.¹

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¹ Elliot and Dowson, *History of India*, Vol. VII, p. 271.

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² Sen, *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp. 93-5.

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³ Cosme da Guarda, *Vida e Accoens do famoso e felicissinio Sevagy*, Chap. XVI, p. 139.

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⁴ Transcripts of Dutch Records, English Translation, Vol. 28, DCCXXX VIII, letter from the Dutch spy at Goa, 13 January 1667.

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⁵ Dutch Records, India Office, English Translation, Vol. 27, No. DCCXI.

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¹ Pissurlencar, *Portuguese e Maratas*, p. 4.

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This is the earliest reference to Shivaji’s fleet as yet available to us. It is quite natural that his first ships should have been built at Kalyan and Panvel near Bassein, for Kalyan was in those days a shipbuilding centre of some importance. The neighbouring forests offered an abundance of excellent timber, and expert shipwrights could be lured away from the Portuguese port of Bassein and the English island of Bombay. But Shivaji must have achieved a certain importance on the sea before his ship-building activity caused so much anxiety to his Portuguese neighbours. The degree of their anxiety is hardly indicated in the few sentences quoted above, which announced a new menace to their naval supremacy. We learn from a petition, submitted to the King’s council on April 1662 by Joao de Salazar de Vasconcellos, that such was the fright caused by the construction of this fleet by Shivaji that the Captain of Bassein, Antonio de Mello e Castro, was ordered to impede its exit to the sea at any cost and the Governor promised favour and pardon to all offenders who might help him in this difficult task.² In any case 1659 is an important date in the military and naval history of the Marathas, for it witnessed both the discomfiture of Afzal Khan’s expedition and the beginnings of the Maratha navy.

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² Petitions in the Archivo Ultramarino of Lisbon, petition dated April 1, 1662.

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Of the numerical strength of Shivaji’s navy we have different estimates. Krishnaji Anant Sabhasad says that Shivaji’s fleet was divided into two squadrons of two hundred ships of varying types, and dimensions. The total numerical strength, according to him, was four hundred, a very big figure, even according to modern standards.³ Malhar Ram Rao Chitnis also says that ‘Four to five hundred ships of these different types were built and five to ten lakhs of Rupees were spent for the purpose’.¹ If these figures appear high, the one given by Cosme da Guarda is certainly low. He says that Shivaji’s fleet consisted of twenty-five ships only, all purchased from his subjects and designed for the capture of the small coasting craft called *Parangues*² belonging to the country merchants. Fryer saw on his way to ‘Serapatan (Kharepatan), to the South of Dan de Rajapore, a Strong Castle of Seva Gi’s defended a deep Bay, where rode his Navy, consisting of 30 Small Ships and Vessels, the Admiral wearing a White Flag aloft’.³ But different squadrons of Shivaji’s fleet were stationed at different ports like Rajapore, Jetapore,⁴ Malwan and Suvarnadurg, and Fryer does not pretend to speak of the entire fleet. The most reliable figures are supplied by the English factory records. Oxinden wrote on 26 June 1664: “Wee are heere allarmed to expect him by sea; for which intent report speaks him to bee fitting up some and building of others, to the number of 60 saile of frigotts, to surprize all jouncks and vessayls belonging to this port’.⁵ On 26 November of the same year, the Surat council informed their masters at home that Shivaji had fitted up four score vessels and sent them down to Batticola.⁶ The fleet that conveyed Shivaji and his army to Barcelore in 1665 consisted, according to a letter of Streynsham Master, of ‘85 frigotts and three great shipps’.⁷ We read in a letter written in 1667 that Shivaji had ‘in readiness 50 or 60 small frigotts’.⁸ In 1675 the Rajapore factors wrote to their colleagues at Bombay that Shivaji had ordered about forty small vessels to be got ready.⁹ In October 1670, Bombay was alarmed by the appearance of 60 or 70 vessles belonging to Shivaji near the mouth of the port¹⁰ and in November of the same year he fitted out a grand fleet ‘of 160 sayle of vessels small and great’.¹ From these figures it appears that Sabhasad’s estimate may not have been greatly exaggerated. We have conclusive evidence that Shivaji built new ships from time to time, and it will not be unreasonable to suppose that when he sent Dariya Sarang to an unknown destination at the head of 160 ships in November 1670, he had not completely denuded his naval bases of their protecting fleets and that the total numerical strength of his navy may be reasonably put at 200 ships, big and small. Krishnaji Anant Sabhasad and Malhar Ram Rao Chitnis were probably thinking of the mercantile fleet as well when they made their estimate, for of the different types of vessels included in their lists *Taru*,² *Tarandi*, *Pagar*, *Dubare*, *Vabhor* and *Tirkati* were not used in naval engagements; while we read not only of Shivaji’s salt boats but also of his regular ‘May fleet’ plying between his ports and those of Arabia and Persia. Whether the trading or the fighting fleet came first into existence, we cannot as yet decide.

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³ Sen, *Siva Chhatrapati*, p. 94. The total number subsequently given by Krishnaji Anant Sabhasad is 700, though he mentions only two squadrons of 200 each.

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¹ Ibid, p. 192.

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² Cosme da Guarda, *Vida e Accoens do famoso e felicissimo Sevagy*, Chap. XVI, pp. 139-40.

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³ Fryer, *A New Account of East India and Persia*, p. 145.

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⁴ Jaytapur, a small town in the Rajapore sub-division in Ratnagiri district.

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⁵ Foster, *The English Factories in India*, 1661-4, p. 345.

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⁶ Ibid, p. 358.

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⁷ Ibid, pp. 77-8.

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⁸ Ibid, pp. 268-9.

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⁹ Factory Records, Surat, Vol. 88, Pt. II, fol. 33.

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¹⁰ Ibid, Vol. 105, fol. 55.

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¹ Ibid, Vol. 105, fol. 78, and Vol. 3, fol. 111 (consultation Swally Marine, 24 November, 1670).

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² Jadunath Sarkar persists in writing *tarambes* (*Shivaji and His Times*, First edition, p. 336), not knowing that *tarven* is plural of *taru*.

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The Maratha navy contained five types of fighting ships. Of these the most important were the *Ghurab* and the *Gallivat*, but we also read of *Pals*, *Shibars* and *Manjhuas* of war. There were probably few *Ghurabs* in Shivaji’s fleet, the small frigates, mentioned in the English factory records, being rowing *Gallivats*. ‘The grabs’, says Robert Orme, ‘have rarely more than two masts, although some have three; those of three are about 300 tons burthen; but the others are not more than 150: they are built to draw very little water, being very broad in proportion to their length, narrowing however from the middle to the end, where instead of bows they have a prow, projecting like that of a Mediterranean galley, and covered with a strong deck level with the main deck of the vessel, from which, however, it is separated by a bulkhead which terminates the forecastle: as this construction subjects the grab to pitch violently when sailing against a head sea, the deck of the prow is not enclosed with sides as the rest of the vessel is, but remains bare; that the water which dashes upon it may pass off without interruption. On the main deck under the forecastle are mounted two pieces of cannon of nine or twelve pounders, which point forwards through the port holes cut in the bulkhead, and fire over the prow; the cannon of the broadside are from six to nine pounders.' A *Ghurab* never went into action unless it was accompanied by one or more *Gallivats*, which, Orme says, 'are large row-boats built like the grab, but of smaller dimensions, the largest rarely exceeding 70 tons: they have two masts of which the mizen is very slight; the main mast bears only one sail, which is triangular and very large, the peak of it when hoisted being much higher than the mast itself. In general the gallivats are covered with a spar deck, made for lightness of bamboos split, and these only carry petteraroes fixed on swivels in the gunnel of the vessel; but those of the largest size have a fixed deck on which they mount six or eight pieces of cannon, from two to four pounders: they have forty to fifty stout oars and may be rowed four miles an hour.'¹ Captain Anselm of the *Derby*, who had first hand knowledge of Sambhaji Angria's ships, says that 'his Gallivats had thirty oars or upwards' and they had remarkable speed.² Some of Shivaji's frigates, as we learn from the English factory records, did not carry more than four guns. Of the other vessels the *Pal* has been likened by an eighteenth century Portuguese writer with the frigates of Europe.³ Gemelli Careri, who travelled in a Portuguese *Manchua* in 1695, describes it as follows: "These *Manchucas* had such a Main Sail as the *Lentis* of Trapan in the Kingdom of Sicily, 12 oars and four small guns."⁴ Hamilton calls a *Shibar* a half galley.⁵ These boats were all designed for shallow water, and from the few accounts of the naval actions that have come down to us it appears that they generally waited for the calm when they had to fight against a European ship as their oars placed them at an advantage over their antagonist, and when discomfited, they readily retired to shallow waters where their heavier rival could not follow.

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¹ Orme, *Military Transactions in Indostan*, Vol. I, pp. 401-2.

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² *A Faithful Narrative of the Capture of the ship Derby*, p. 101.

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³ Jose Freire Monteroyo Mascarenhas, *Epanaphora Indica*, Pt. II, p. 8 and Pt. III, p. 27.

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⁴ Churchill's *Voyages*, Vol. IV, p. 212.

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⁵ Hamilton, *A New Account of the East Indies*, Vol. I, p. 132.

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How these ships were manned and armed in Shivaji's days is not precisely known, but probably there was not much difference in the naval practice of Shivaji and that of the Angrias. The *Ghurabs* in the days of the Angrias carried sixteen guns and a hundred and fifty armed men, while the *Gallivats* had six guns and sixty fighters. The ship's crew were divided into two classes—gunners and ordinary soldiers intended for boarding the enemy vessels.¹

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¹ *A Faithful Narrative of the Capture of the ship Derby*, p. 53.

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These seldom had any firearms but carried the ordinary weapons of offence like the sword, spear, bow and arrow. There was a scarcity of expert gunners, who were much in demand, and we may reasonably surmise that they were mere mercenaries and readily transferred their services from one master to another. Sidi Kasim seduced a number of gunners from Bombay by offering them higher pay, and when the English expostulated, he wrote to them: 'You write me concerning a gunner and I would faine know what service you want by him, but if you have need of him and will content him, by paying him what is his due you may send for him. I have taken severall gunners from our enemys (i.e. Shivaji) and have many others, therefore by that reason I shall not be revenged and besides you have one of my gunners in your service, who if he be contented to come to me, you may give him leave and send him to me.'²

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² Factory Records, Surat, Vol. 108, fols. 59-60.

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Most of the captains of Shivaji's fleet were Muslims by faith. Krishnaji Anant Sabhasad says that the chief commanders of Shivaji's fleet were Mai Naik, a Bhandari, and Dariya Sarang, a Musulman. Dariya Sarang commanded the fleet when it was sent on a mysterious and futile expedition in 1670 and Mai Naik led the Khanderi expedition in 1679. Both these officers are frequently mentioned by English and Dutch factors. A third officer, Ibrahim Khan, is mentioned by Sabhasad in his general list of infantry, cavalry and naval commanders,³ but he does not seem to have played a distinguished part like Daulat Khan, who occupied as important a position in Shivaji's navy as Mai Naik or Dariya Sarang. Sidi Sambol and his relative Sidi Misri entered Shivaji's service after the former had been replaced in the command of the Janjira fleet by Sidi Kasim by the order of the Great Mughal. The bulk of the common crew probably consisted of Kolis and Bhandaris, hardy races of fishermen of the coast who were employed for their courage and endurance by the English of Bombay and the Sidi of Danda Rajpuri. The navy was clearly not a Maratha institution as the army was.

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³ Sen, Siva Chhatrapati, p. 138.

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Did Shivaji employ European sailors in his navy? We have reason to believe that he did. Europeans had enjoyed the reputation of being good gunners and good sailors since the date of their first appearance in India, and Indian merchants were eager to secure the services of European captains and European sailors for their sea-going vessels. If they were welcomed by owners of merchantmen, it is but natural that they should have been welcomed by the leaders of the fighting fleet in an epoch when foreigners were not excluded from the military or naval services of the State. In a petition, already referred to, submitted by Joao de Salazar de Vasconcellos we read that when the security of Bassein was threatened by Shivaji’s fleet in 1659, and the Captain of that city had been ordered by the Governors of Goa to prevent the exit of that fleet at any cost, it was suggested that the danger could be evaded by causing the defection of three hundred soldiers in Shivaji’s service. This was effected by the petitioner, Joao de Salazar de Vasconcellos, because he was a friend of the Captain, Ruy L. Viegas, who was obviously a Portuguese. The men under his command are described as ‘soldados’ (soldiers) and ‘home’s de guerra’ (fighting men), and it is difficult to say whether they properly belonged to the navy. The petitioner, however, confidently asserts that their desertion effectively prevented the exit of the fleet and removed the anxiety of the Governor of Bassein.¹

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¹ Petitions in the Archivo Ultramarino of Lisbon, petition dated 1 April 1662.

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Like the army, the fleet had to spend the rainy season in enforced idleness. The little vessels could not face the fury of the Arabian Sea and had to retire to the ports when the monsoon broke. They were probably hauled ashore like the Sidi’s boats at Bombay. On the return of the fair season they repaired and refitted; and if a large expedition was contemplated, all the carpenters of the locality were impressed for this service, which made it very difficult for the ordinary merchant to secure any artificers for his private work.

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Of Shivaji’s naval expeditions or enterprises, only three deserve mention here. In the beginning of February 1665, he himself set out for Barcelore with his army in a fleet, consisting of eighty-five frigates and three great ships. He was evidently on friendly terms with the Portuguese at the time, for when he passed Goa on his way to the south, the Viceroy did not deem it necessary to dispute his progress.¹ He disembarked at Barcelore and plundered it. The major part of the fleet was sent back with the exception of twelve frigates kept for transporting his forces across the rivers.² This was probably the only occasion when Shivaji himself embarked on a sea voyage, but a force of 3,000 soldiers was transported by sea in 1670 to an unknown destination.

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¹ Cosme da Guarda mentions one naval action between Shivaji’s fleet and a Portuguese squadron in which the Marathas were defeated. It is evidently to this battle that Sebastiao Nunes Olares refers in his petition dated 13 August 1688 (Archivo Ultramarino of Lisbon). He says that he was employed in the fleet sent by the Viceroy, Antonio de Mello e Castro, against Shivaji’s armada in 1665. The naval engagement mentioned by Guarda and Olares probably took place after the Barcelore expedition in February.

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² Foster, *The English Factories in India, 1665-1667*, pp. 77-8.

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The expedition was organised on a very elaborate scale, and caused much anxiety and speculation at Surat and Bombay, but it ended in nothing. In November 1670, Shivaji assembled a vast fleet of 160 sail at Nagaon³ and mobilised a considerable army. The army and the fleet were supplied with provision for forty days and all the necessary instruments of mining, such as ‘pickaxes, shovells and crows of iron’. They were ready to depart at a moment’s notice, but their destination was absolutely unknown. Bombay had been alarmed in the previous month by the appearance of a big Maratha fleet near the harbour, so the Deputy Governor and his council were naturally suspicious of the intention of their neighbour, particularly as their relations of late had been considerably strained by the Sidi’s fleet ‘wintering’ in the English island. The Bombay authorities wrote to their friends at Surat on 17 November: ‘Where he aimes wee cannot tell or imagine, but tis good in such case to be jealous knowing who he is, for yesterday was in this place a Bramen of his (who came as wee since understand from him directly) and meeting some friends falls into discourse, and they enquiring what news he told them his master was bound upon some desperate designe nominated for 8 places which he thought his master must aime at, amongst Bombay one, but his business here as he said, was to get some pilots, he stayed not above 2 hours on the island, for had he made any longer stay, wee would assuredly have knowne more or secured his person’.¹

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³ Jadunath Sarkar is wrong in calling the place Nandgaon (*Shivaji and his Times*, First Edition, p. 343). From another Bombay letter we learn that Shivaji’s grand fleet assembled at ‘Nagaum a towne hard by Tull’. The place, therefore, must be Nagaon in Kolaba district which is only three miles from Alibag and only six miles from Thal. It is still a large and rich coastal village, and in 1790 Ahalya Bai built a temple here (*Bombay Gazetteer*, Kolaba, p. 351). Nandgaon, which lies about four miles, and not ten miles, as Prof. Sarkar thinks, north of Janjira, cannot by the widest stretch of imagination be described as a ‘towne hard by Tull’. It is, moreover, too near Janjira to be the starting place of an important expedition.

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¹ Factory Records, Surat, Vol. 105, fol. 72.

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The rest of the story may very well be told in the language of the Deputy Governor of Bombay. He wrote on 21 November 1670: ‘The General and the Admirall of the fleete which consists of 160 small vessels counted by my owne servant (who I sent as a spie) is one Ventgee Sarungee commonly called Durrea Sarungee with whom I having had a correspondence these 7 or 8 years, and always found him reall and oblidgeing, I was resolved to try if I could get out anything of his designe, soe wrote him a civill letter, wishing him good success in his voyage; and promising what assistance lay in my power; in lading three of his owne shipps, that are here to take in salt; desiring him if he could without prejudice to himselfe, advise me where he was bound to which he assured, that though his designe was carried very privately yett if I would send a trusty person, he would by word of mouth give me notice, soe I sent the Moodys son to him who arrived the next with orders from Sevagee (at the place of his rendevouzes) he tooke him aside and swore him his master was marching to Surat, with 10,000 horse and 20,000 foote and that he with 3000 souldiers and a great number of pioneers were to meet him then, the Bramanys have told him, that the 29th day of this month, Surat Castle should be delivered him; which if he carried, he would then to Broach, he likewise bid me keepe good watch and trust noebody and that I should doe well to lett noe vessel enter unsearched.’ In a postscript it is added: ‘The Sarungee likewise told him that if the Christians did not attempt to hinder his designe, his master would not meddle with them.’¹ The Bombay authorities, as they themselves write, did not trust the Admiral and were on their guard; the English President at Surat suggested that the three Christian powers should make a defensive and offensive compact to oppose Shivaji, but their fears and anxieties were soon laid at rest. The expedition came to naught. A week later another letter from Bombay informed them: ‘Sevagees fleet was to the northward a Thursday morning from Nagaum a towne hard by Tull and Friday past by here, and Saturday past by Mahim, soe wee concluded them bound according to the Generalls information (to the Deputy Governor) for Surat, but a Saturday morning at 8 o’clocke by Sevagees order, there was two frigatts well man’d with oars sent out after them, with 2 malldars,² who have order to bringe the fleete back againe; Sevagee himselfe being returned back againe after he had gone three days march.’³ On 17 December the Bombay Council wrote that they had certain intelligence of the return of the Maratha fleet to Dabhol. The expedition, whatever its destination, had failed but the fleet had not returned unscathed. The Maratha fleet had met and captured a Portuguese ship near Daman and the Portuguese soon retaliated. They encountered twelve Maratha ships, captured them all, triumphantly carried them to Bassein⁴ and then went out to seek the rest of the grand armada. It was probably of this engagement that Father Naverette heard while he was at Surat in January, 1671.⁵

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¹ Ibid, fol. 78. ² Macebearer. ³ Factory Records, Surat, Vol. 105, fols. 86-7. ⁴ Ibid, fols. 96-7. ⁵ Naverette quoted in Orme, Historical Fragments of the Mogul Empire, p. 207.

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But the enterprise on which Shivaji had set his heart most was the conquest of Janjira. The war with the Sidis had begun as early as 1648 and they had been steadily driven from their territories on the mainland. Then began a fierce struggle for the hill-girt island-stronghold of Janjira. Shivaji tried his best to reduce it by storming it from the mainland. He tried to build a mole; he ineffectually attempted the expedient of a floating battery. Once he was almost on the brink of success and the Sidi commander, driven to his last resources, had agreed to sell the island to his enemy; but his colleagues foiled him and saved the little state from being absorbed in the growing Maratha kingdom by transferring their allegiance from the weak Sultan of Bijapur to the powerful Emperor of Delhi. Neither Shivaji nor his successors ever accomplished the conquest of Janjira.

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The island of Bombay played an important and unhappy part in this struggle. Every year the Sidi’s fleet came to ‘winter’¹ at Bombay. There they were provisioned and refreshed. But the Sidi’s sailors were an unruly, lawless band. They not only committed acts of violence in the island of their unwilling hosts, but from his safe retreat the Sidi led plundering raids against the mainland opposite, which belonged to Shivaji. Shivaji protested and so did the English authorities, as they entirely depended on Shivaji’s country for their fuel and food. The Maratha king quite rightly complained that the English were guilty of a violation of neutrality when they allowed the Sidi to make use of their port. He also complained that the provisions obtained from his country were being diverted to the benefit of his enemies. The Bombay authorities complained to their superiors at Surat, but they were absolutely helpless. They dared not disoblige the Mughal Government; they had to think of their masters’ interests in the Mughal’s country and counselled patience. Every year they promised to persuade the Governor of Surat of the unreasonableness of the Sidi’s conduct and every year they heard fresh complaints from their Bombay colleagues. Their position in truth was a difficult one. They dared not break with the Mughal, for they had so many factories in his empire; they dared not break with Shivaji, for Shivaji could stop their supplies of fuel and provisions. He would have been quite satisfied if the English had rendered him secret assistance in his attempts against Janjira by selling him artillery and ammunition; but they preferred the weaker Sidi as a neighbour to the stronger Maratha. They had definitely rejected Revington’s suggestion of assisting Shivaji to conquer Janjira when it belonged to Bijapur, and in 1669 Henry Young seriously thought of purchasing the island in order to save it from falling into Shivaji’s hands.¹ They tried to induce the Sidi to refrain from hostilities against Shivaji’s lands during his stay at Bombay but the Governor of Surat laughed at their protest and the Sidi paid no heed to their expostulations. These conditions continued even after Shivaji’s death and on 28 December 1680, the Surat Council wrote to Bombay: ‘We are sorry to finde you to be soe involved in troubles betwixt Sombajee Rajah and the Siddy and which wee here seriously considered how to advise you best to direct yourselves in soe knotty an affaire, tis true the countenance, assistance and harbour given to the Siddy to the prejudice of the Rajah being both our friends will heardly pass with the Law of Nations which wee should not be the least deviate from if necessity forced not, as wee feare in our case it will, our present condition being such that wee must be forced to disoblige one or the other, the choice of which is very disputable’.²

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¹ The season meant is the Indian rainy season from June to August.

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¹ Factory Records, Surat, Vol.105, fol. 150, letter dated 16 October 1669.

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² Ibid, Vol. 90, Pt. II, fol. 5. It should be noted that the English sometimes tried to keep the balance between the two enemy powers by extending their protection to Shivaji’s fleet, as they did in 1672. We read in a Bombay letter, dated 2 December, 1672 (Ibid, Vol. 106, Pt. II, fol. 24): ‘Wee have thought good to advise you that there is laid up in this harbour, six small vessells, belonging to Sevagee with his concent, all new and lately built at Cullian Buindy, wee give out here that wee have seized on them on account of our demands made to him, and wee desire you likewise to give out at Suratt that the onely reason why they are seized on here is to prevent their attempting the Surrat armada.’

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Shivaji was greatly exasperated with the English for their failure (though for no fault of theirs) to keep their promise. The Sidi’s fleet alone stood between him and Janjira, for on the high seas his light vessels were no match for the heavier craft of the Sidi. And however friendly he might appear in his ordinary correspondence with the English, he could not forgive them for admitting the Abyssinian Admiral to their harbour. On the other hand, it would have been impolitic to drive them definitely over to his enemy’s side by any hostile action directed solely against them. In 1678 the Sidi had much provoked him by making slaves of the people and Braminys he tooke in his incurssions into his terrytorys’, and Shivaji could wait no longer. He ordered Daulat Khan and Dariya Sarang to cross over to Bombay at the head of 4,000 soldiers and burn the Sidi’s fleet at Mazagon. These two officers accordingly proceeded to Panvel, but lack of boats prevented them from crossing, and the Portuguese Government, which was fully as apprehensive of the growing Maratha power by land and sea as the English, would not permit them to make use of its territories. So the two Admirals had to return without effecting any result. The English were on their guard; and the Sidi left Mazagon and took shelter with his fleet under the bastions of the fort of Bombay.¹

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¹ Ibid, Vol. 107, fols. 112-13 (Bombay 23 July 1678); fol. 116 (Bombay 29 July 1678); and Vol. 90, Pt. I, fol. 24 (Mazagon, 24 July, 1678).

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Shivaji, however, was resolved to prevent the Sidi’s depredations; and in order to bring force to bear upon the English, he sent Mai Naik and Daulat Khan to occupy the small and hitherto uninhabited ilsand of Kenery. The twin islands of Henery and Kenery commanded, to a certain extent, the harbour of Bombay, and once established there, it would not have been difficult to surprise the Janjira fleet. The English had by some means obtained notice of Shivaji’s design. On 4 September 1679, the Surat council issued an order to the Bombay authorities ‘that they immediately erect an English flag on the highest part of the Island (and if it may be done without any danger from the Mallabars) that a file of souldiers be kept there to guard it; and the Hunter friggat be ordered to attend upon them, plying up and downe neere the said Island giving the Commander orders, in a friendly way to acquaint those that are appointed by Sevagee, for the management of that designe, when they offer to erect their fort, that the Island belongs to His Majesty of Great Brittaine, and that none can attempt anything upon the place, without an open breach of friendship’. ² But the resolution came too late; the Marathas had acted more promptly than the English anticipated, and Mai Naik with 150 men was already in possession of the island and had raised a clumsy breastwork of dirt and stone, with guns behind it, before the English were prepared to step in.

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When requested to withdraw, he firmly replied that he had occupied the island at Shivaji's command and would not retire without his order. The Surat council resolved on 15 September to ‘repell them with force as an open enemy’. This was followed by a rash assault on the island, in which Ensign (?) Thorpe lost his vessel and his life. This disaster was followed by a naval action between the English squadron and Daulat Khan's fleet (‘consisting of upwards sixty vessells small and great’). At the first onslaught of the Maratha armada most of the English ships were struck by panic and the Dove¹ surrendered without firing a shot. Captains Keigwin and Minchin in the frigate Revenge, left alone to face the enemy, coolly awaited the Marathas. Better artillery and science prevailed in the end over number, and Daulat Khan's fleet was put to flight. The defeat of the Maratha fleet, however, did not lead to the abandonment of Kenery. The Sidi shortly appeared on the scene and began to batter the hastily built ramparts of the island but after a few days the English ceased to co-operate with him. His occupation of the sister island of Henery was not calculated to conciliate the English and although Bombay advocated a vigorous policy of hostilities, Surat counselled a more moderate policy. Their man-power was limited;

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they had been enjoined by their masters to effect economy, and the military experts they had consulted were of opinion that their resources were scarcely sufficient for the defence of Bombay. They counselled a diplomatic course of shifting the burden of war to the Sidi or the Portuguese² Government and retiring from the arena. Peace proposals from Shivaji offered an easy and honourable solution of their difficulty. Kenery was but a small island and its ownership was disputed by the Portuguese. So the Deputy Governor was instructed to send a friendly and conciliatory reply. The island was held by Shivaji's men in spite of the repeated attacks of the Sidi, and early in 1680 a treaty was concluded between Shivaji and the English.³ The occupation of Kenery and the capture of the *Dove* were the last achievements of the Maratha navy before Shivaji's death. His maritime aims were not accomplished. The Sidi's fleet remained unbeaten and the island of Janjira, a mere dot in the sea, still defied the most strenuous efforts of the Marathas. Though Shivaji's captains had often captured Portuguese ships, he had failed to extort from them freedom of navigation for merchantmen belonging to his own ports.

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The only concession that he managed to obtain was included in a treaty of 1670, whereby small boats carrying provisions and foodstuffs were permitted to ply between Karanja and Goa without a Portuguese pass.¹ This concession was persistently refused to the *Gallivats* and big coasting vessels. Shivaji's fleet was numerically superior to the fleets of European nations in Indian waters; but in artillery and in the art of navigation it was vastly inferior. Shivaji himself cannot be blamed for these deficiencies. In twenty years he could hardly expect to create a navy and bring it to perfection. He had made a beginning and a good beginning; it was for his successors to build upon the foundation he had laid. In Sambhaji and Rajaram's days the Maratha fleet continued to compel alien traders to buy its permits and its power was felt at sea even after the Mughals had conquered practically the whole of Maharashtra. But nothing more was done. In its organisation, in the type of its men-of-war, in its policy of selling *cartaz* and making prizes of merchantmen that did not possess it, and in the art and science of maritime warfare the Maratha navy remained where Shivaji had left it, until in the beginning of the next century its control definitely passed from the Chhatrapati to a family of hereditary naval chiefs.

The Military System of the Marathas, with a Brief Account of Their Maritime Activities c14: Chapter X: The Beginning of the Maratha Navy

Contents

Chapter X: The Beginning of the Maratha Navy