The Military System of the Marathas, with a Brief Account of Their Maritime Activities c16: Chapter XII: The Maratha Fleet under the Peshwas
The Military System of the Marathas, with a Brief Account of Their Maritime Activities c16
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Chapter XII: The Maratha Fleet under the Peshwas
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It is uncertain at what date the Peshwas first cast their eyes towards the sea and decided to extend their authority in that direction. The treaty of 1713 left the best ports and harbours in the possession of Kanhoji Angria, and no mention is made of the Peshwa’s fleet either in the treaty concluded in January 1722 between Baji Rao and Francisco Jose de Sampaio e Castro or in the treaty of 1732 (1731-32 30 January 10 February) between Krishna Rao Mahadev, Governor of Kalyan, and Martinho de Silveira de Menezes, Captain-General of the fortresses and lands of the North. But Baji Rao must have organised a navy sometime between this date and 1739, for reference is made to the Peshwa’s fleet in Baji Rao’s treaty with the English in 1739¹, as well as in the treaty of 1740-41 concluded between the Governments of Poona and Goa.² By 1750 the Peshwa’s fleet had also begun to exercise authority by sea like the older navy of the Angrias; for on 14 January 1751, Padre Angelo dos Serafins wrote from Goa to a friend in Portugal that in spite of the amity established between the two States by the treaty of Poona the Marathas did not desist from harassing Portuguese trading vessels at sea.³ In 1755 Edward Ives saw the Peshwa’s fleet near the harbour of Bombay.⁴ He writes: ‘During my stay at Bombay two fleets of country vessels came into the bay: One of them belongs to the Nanna or prince of the Maharattas, the other to Monagee Angria, the brother of Angria the pirate. These vessels were not unlike the Tartans of the Mediterranean, only a great deal lower; they carried two guns in the bow, and a vast number of men. . . Each fleet consisted of about 30 sail.’ But this was not the total strength of the Peshwa’s fleet in the middle of the eighteenth century. It consisted of more than fifty vessels when it was sent to co-operate in the same year with Commodore James. As Commodore James complained of the cowardice of the Peshwa’s fleet, stating that it rendered him no assistance but only caused loss of time, we may assume that the Peshwa had not yet been able to enlist experienced seamen. His Admiral was Naro Pant who, according to Captain Low, had earned some distinction as a soldier on land, but had had no experience of the sea.¹
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¹ Forrest, *Selection from State Papers*, Appendix A, pp. 699-704.
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² Biker, *Tratados da India*, Vol. VI, p. 207.
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³ Fr. Angelo dos Serafins, *Relacao da viagem que o illustrissimo Marquez de Tavora Vice-Rey do Estado da India fez do porto desta cidade de Lisboa ate o da cidade de Goa*, p. 8.
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⁴ Ives, *A Voyage from England to India*, p. 43.
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¹ Low, History of the Indian Navy, Vol. I, p. 131.
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Naro Pant still held the chief command of the Peshwa’s fleet when Balaji Baji Rao attempted to conquer Janjira after the reduction of Gheria. Gheria, however, had been reduced by the prowess of Watson and the machinations of Ramaji Mahadev and not by the valour of Naro Pant who preferred to lie behind whenever a bombardment was imminent. The Peshwa solicited English assistance in his attempts against Janjira, but here his interests were not identical with those of his late allies and they refused to fight against the Sidi. Henery was reduced by the joint efforts of the Kolaba fleet and the Peshwa’s navy, though the exact share of the latter in this achievement is not specifically recorded. It soon became evident that the Peshwa’s naval strength was very inadequate for the reduction of the Sidi’s island and he applied for help to the Portuguese.² The Portuguese welcomed the suggestion and were sanguine about their success. But when they appeared near the island, they found the English flag flying there. The Portuguese were annoyed, but were not prepared for a war with the English. Henery was, therefore, occupied by the Peshwa’s troops and a small squadron was stationed there, while the other island remained in possession of Raghuji Angria. The proximity of the two islands led, as McCluer informs us, to constant bickerings between the two chiefs about the division of the spoils.
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² Biker, Tratados da India, Vol. VII, pp. 175-9.
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Foiled in their attempt against Janjira, the Peshwa’s fleet employed itself for the next fifteen years in their routine work of issuing passports and seizing ships that did not possess them. These duties could not always be effected without fighting. In 1763, for example, the Peshwa’s captains seized a Dutch ship off Anjidiv;³ they also took a Danish vessel, which was rescued later by a Portuguese squadron.¹ The Portuguese themselves lost several boats, as Conde de Ega informed the home authorities in 1764.² The Maratha fleet, he wrote, infested the sea and respected no nation except the English. They had in the previous year captured a Portuguese ship of Macao, a *Pal* belonging to Mozambique and some small vessels belonging to the traders of Portuguese India. Their losses might have been much heavier had the Maratha Admiral been better versed in the art of navigation, for both the north and the south-going Portuguese merchant fleets had been attacked by numerically superior Maratha squadrons.³ In 1767, a Maratha fleet of six *Pals* and fifty-four *Gallivats* attacked a Portuguese squadron of one *Pal* and four *Manchuas* convoying a big merchant flotilla near Gheria but after two hours’ obstinate fighting the Peshwa’s fleet had to retire.⁴ Gheria still continued to be a point of danger for merchant fleets, though its prestige had evidently much declined since the days of Sambhaji and Tulaji Angria.
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³ Officios dos Governadores, (Archivo Ultramarino, of Lisbon) Maco 2, Letter No. 4, 20 January 1764.
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¹ Officios dos Governadores (Archivo Ultramarino of Lisbon) Maco 2, Letter No. 4, 20 January, 1764.
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² Officios dos Governadores (Archivo Ultramarino of Lisbon) Maco 2, Letter No. 15, dated 20 January, 1764.
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³ Ibid.
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⁴ Officios dos Governadores, Maco 12, No. 21.
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During the first Maratha war, the Peshwa’s fleet caused some anxiety to the Bombay Government, who wrote thus to the Governor-General and Council: ‘As a considerable part of our marine force is employed at Bassora and in the Persian Gulf, we have at present not a sufficient marine force for the protection of our trade on the Coast of Malabar from the Maratha fleet, which, it is most probable, will attempt making some depredations on it.’⁵ But actually little damage was done, and the Maratha fleet proved vastly inferior to that of its English opponents. Only two naval actions were fought during this war. The first took place in 1755 near Gheria. The frigate *Revenge* and the *ghurah* *Bombay* encountered the Maratha fleet near that port. The latter tried to flee, but one of their largest ships, the *Shamsher Jang*, was overtaken. After three hours’ fighting the Maratha man-of-war blew up and the Captain perished with most of his crew.¹ The second action, which was fought after the conclusion of peace, was lost by the English. The *Ranger*, a small brig of twelve guns, was conveying a number of high military officials from Bombay to Calicut, when it encountered the Maratha fleet under Anand Rao Dhulap, the best known, if not the ablest, of the Peshwa’s naval officers. The Maratha Admiral was ignorant of the termination of war, and the English Captain chose not to enlighten him. After a most stubborn fight the *Ranger* was captured and carried to Gheria, but not before the great majority of the men on board had been either killed or wounded. The *Ranger* was restored to the English Government as soon as Anand Rao Dhulap learnt of the conclusion of peace.²
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⁵ Forrest, *Selections from State Papers*, Maratha Series, p. 208.
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¹ Low, History of the Indian Navy, Vol. I, pp. 156-7.
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² Ibid, pp. 157-159.
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In 1787 the Maratha Government proposed an alliance with the Portuguese, soliciting their co-operation in naval engagements against Tipu’s fleet. This clearly shows that the fleet³ had not yet earned the full confidence of the Poona Government, and six years later when they planned for the last time the conquest of Janjira, they again deemed it necessary to purchase the co-operation of their Portuguese neighbours.⁴
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³ Officios dos Governadores, Maco 20, Letter No. 95, 12 March, 1787; Biker, Tratados da India, Vol. VII, pp. 221-2.
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⁴ Officios dos Governadores, Maco 29, Letter No. 37, 12 March, 1793.
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The last achievement of the Peshwa’s fleet was the capture of Ximpi⁵ in 1791. The Portuguese Government had planned to forestall the Marathas and occupy the stronghold of Piro on their own account, but in the name of their protege the Raja of Sunda, Babu Rao Saloc,⁶ the Maratha Admiral, took possession of the neighbouring island of Ximpi with two big *Pals* of three masts, two *Ghurabs* and 4 *Gallivats*. As Ximpi was fortified both by nature and by art and was deemed almost impregnable, the Portuguese were greatly surprised at its speedy reduction by the Maratha fleet. After this the Maratha fleet proceeded to Onore, where it divided into two squadrons. One of these started for the north, while the other waited at the port with the intention of capturing a ship belonging to their enemy, Tipu Sultan.¹ On the whole, it may be safely asserted that the record of the Peshwa's fleet was neither great nor glorious, and, while the Maratha horseman had left a reputation behind him, the existence of the Maratha sailor will hardly be suspected by the average student of Indian History today.
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⁵ Ibid, Maco 26, Letter No. 33, 18 April, 1791.
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⁶ This is the Portuguese spelling of Babu Rao’s surname, the more accurate transliteration would be Salokhe.
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¹ Officios dos Governadores, Maco 27, Letter No. 30, 19 April, 1791.
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We have more precise knowledge about the internal administration of the navy under the Peshwas than in the previous periods. The military head of the navy was the Subhedar or Admiral. The first Admiral of the fleet, of whom we know nothing but the name, was Baji Rao Bekse. He was succeeded in office by his son Trimbak Rao in 1749-50. The Admiral then enjoyed a salary of 1,000 Rupees a year besides allowances in cash and kind which amounted to 186 Rupees in cash and 16 maunds of grain.² Thirteen years later, however, we find that the revenue of some Mahals was granted to Anand Rao Dhulap for meeting the expenses of the fleet in which his own salary and allowances were undoubtedly included.³
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² Peshwas' Diaries, Vol. III, p. 185.
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³ Peshwas' Diaries, Vol. IX, p. 339.
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The civil administration of the fleet was at first vested in certain hereditary officers commonly styled Darakhdars. They were clerks by profession, and although the muster-rolls and the accounts of the navy demanded little technical knowledge, the purchase of provisions for the navy and the repair of old and damaged ships in particular could not be satisfactorily performed by civil servants, who had no knowledge of the needs of the fleet. In 1765-66, therefore, a Karbhari and an Amin were appointed to supervise the civil administration of the fleet and the Admiral was also associated with them in this work.⁴ The Amin was generally responsible for the accounts, muster-rolls, purchase of provision, etc. Even this arrangement did not prove entirely satisfactory, and in 1781-82 the Darakhdars were recalled and Anand Rao Dhulap became the undisputed civil and military head of the Peshwa's fleet. He was directed to fit out a fleet of three Pals, three Ghurabs and thirteen Gallivats, and to meet the expenses of the fleet from the revenue of the Mahals granted for the purpose as well as from the income derived from prizes taken at sea. The Admiral was further empowered to impress the services of carpenters, blacksmiths and cobblers living in the districts granted to him.¹
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⁴ Ibid, pp. 340-3.
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¹ Peshwas’ Diaries, Vol. VI, pp. 195-6.
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The salaries of the ordinary sailors and petty officers of the navy were as follows during the regime of Balaji Baji Rao:²
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² Ibid, Vol. III, pp. 186-7.
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| *Sar Tandel* | .. | Rs. 10-0 per month. |
| *Tandel* | .. | ,, 7-8 ,, ,, |
| *Sailor* | .. | ,, 4-8 to 5 per month. |
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Besides this they received a food allowance in kind which varied with the rank of the men. In 1782-83 the salary of a soldier serving in the navy, including all allowances, was 65 Rupees per year; that of a sailor 61 Rupees and 8 annas, while a gunner drew a slightly higher salary of 67 Rupees and 8 annas.³
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³ Ibid, Vol. VI, pp. 196-8.
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The officers and sailors of the navy were suitably rewarded by the Peshwas for good service in war. Madhav Rao I distributed Rs. 4,250 among officers and sailors of the navy for their services against Hyder Ali. Three officers, Damaji Saik Kuveskar, Shivaji Rao Surve and Vithoji Naik Bamkar were given Rs. 300, Rs. 250 and Rs. 200 respectively. Balaji Hari Fadnis received Rs. 500 and serangs and sailors were allotted Rs. 3,000 in all.⁴
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⁴ Ibid, Vol. IX, p. 344.
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From our brief survey of the naval history of the Marathas it will be apparent that during the one hundred and five years of its existence the Maratha navy made no progress either in the art of navigation or in the method of warfare. McCluer visited the principal ports of the coast in 1787 and 1788 and has left a brief account of the Maratha ships and their method of attack: ‘They send’, he tells us, ‘2 large ketches, with a number of gallivats to cruize; each gallivat carrying 80 or 90 men armed with lances, musquets, and stones. One large carriage-gun is lashed down in their prows to the beams with strong ropes, so I suppose when the gun fires the vessel recoils with it.’⁵ Compare with this the accounts of Angria’s ships and the method of attack left by Captain Anselm and Benjamin Hall fifty-three years previously, and they will be seen to tally in every detail. The ships were similarly manned, similarly armed and similarly manoeuvred for a century and half while immense improvement was being effected in naval engineering and naval strategy in the west. The Marathas knew and acknowledged the superiority of the Europeans at sea; they considered the naval superiority of the western nations as a possible source of danger; but they made no effort to learn, to improve, or to invent. In 1679 Daulat Khan’s fleet of sixty sail fled before a single English man-of-war; in 1739 a single Portuguese frigate defeated Sambhaji Angria’s squadron of seventeen veessls; in 1752, again, a single Portuguese ship beat back an Angrian fleet of twenty-one, while in 1767 an unequal combat between sixty Maratha men-of-war and five Portuguese vessels ended in the discomfiture of the numerically superior fleet. While European sailors traversed the oceans and the seas of the world the Marathas preferred to hug the coast; while the European captain was armed with the best artillery of the age, the Maratha still retained his lance and spear, bow and arrow, and even that pre-historic weapon, an unhewn stone. In war as well as in civilization there must be progress or decline; as the Maratha sailor did not, or could not, go forward, he was gradually relegated to the background. This fate was inevitable; for nature planned the survival of the fittest, and in war the strongest is the fittest, and the strongest must survive. In primitive times mere physical strength sufficed for battle; but in the eighteenth century war had already become scientific and a constant intellectual effort was required to maintain military and naval efficiency. The Maratha soldier and the Maratha sailor were both temperamentally conservative. They clung steadfastly to the ways of their forefathers, and in consequence sank into hopeless decrepitude.
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⁵ McCluer, Description of the Coast of India, p. 25.