The Military System of the Marathas, with a Brief Account of Their Maritime Activities c5: Chapter I: Shivaji and his Followers

The Military System of the Marathas, with a Brief Account of Their Maritime Activities c5

Language: English

Chapter I: Shivaji and his Followers

c5.1

SPLENDID soldiers alone cannot make a splendid army and a nation of fighters does not necessarily rank as a military power. Military efficiency demands discipline in the men and imagination tempered with common sense in their leaders. A military power needs above all an ideal to defend, an ideal to fight for. The Marathas had earned the reputation of good soldiers as early as the first half of the seventh century A.D., but it was not before the second half of the seventeenth that they emerged from comparative insignificance and obtained a place among the great powers of India. Till then they were disunited, disorganised and a prey to petty dissension.

c5.2

Of the military organisation of the Marathas in the early times we know next to nothing. They must have followed the Chalukya banner and later fought under the valiant Rashtrakuta kings; that they were good fighters is beyond doubt, for Hiuen Tsang was highly impressed with their warlike qualities. He sang the praises of the Maratha warriors but how they were armed and accoutred, how they were paid in peace time and mobilised in times of war, whether they had any regular cadre of officers and any military tactics of their own the Chinese pilgrim either did not know or did not think fit to record.¹ After the Chalukyas and the Rashtrakutas came the Yadava and the Silahara dynasties, both of undoubted Maratha origin.² The latter ruled over small principalities in the Konkan and Karhad but the kingdom of the former was of considerable extent. In the few inscriptions that have come down to us the Yadava kings boast of their huge elephants and mention also their Dandanayakas. But these were common features of all Indian armies of those days, and the fact that the kingdom collapsed at the first attack delivered by an external foe does not argue well for its military capacity. Nor do we find any trace in the chronicles of the Turkish conquest of the Deccan of those harassing tactics that the Marathas of the seventeenth century used with such remarkable success against the imperial army of Delhi. Ramchandra Deva, the last independent Yadava king, became a feudatory of the Turkish ruler of Delhi after his numerous forces had been beaten by a small Muhammadan army. His son-in-law made an unsuccessful attempt to throw off the Muhammadan yoke and after his defeat we lose sight of the Marathas for centuries. They do not reappear on the scene till the fall of the Bahmani kingdom. But in the meantime they had not been idle. They had lost their political independence but their country had not been completely conquered. The physical features of their land formed a natural bulwark, while their villages, though few and scattered, were each provided with a defending wall. The Deshmukhs¹ or petty feudal lords could defy an invading army for months in their impregnable strongholds perched on the summit of inaccessible hills. They had no exaggerated regard for national honour for the idea of nationality was yet unborn, and as practical people they were not reluctant to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Muhammadan Prince, provided that the latter guaranteed to them peaceful possession of their hereditary lands and hereditary rights. The Muhammadan conqueror on his side recognised the limits of his own supremacy and did not seek to extend them. Thus the Maratha chiefs continued to exercise their petty sovereignty over their hill-girt principalities, long after the Yadava and the Silahara princes had made way for a stronger military power from the North.

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¹ The Chinese pilgrim says of the people of Maharashtra: ‘The inhabitants were proud-spirited and warlike, grateful for favours and revengeful for wrongs; self-sacrificing towards supplicants in distress and sanguinary to death with any who treated them insultingly. Their martial heroes who led the rear of the army in battle went into conflict intoxicated, and their war elephants were also made drunk before an engagement’. Thomas Watters, *On Yuan Chwang*, Vol. II, p. 239.

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² The Silaharas were feudatories to the Rashtrakutas and the Yadavas and did not ever possess the same power and enjoy the same influence as the two latter. The Rashtrakutas also according to some authorities belonged to the great Ratta tribe from whom the modern Marathas are said to have been descended.

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¹ The term Deshmukh has been derived from Sanskrit Desha, country or province and Mukhya chief. The Deshmukh enjoyed almost sovereign authority over his small principality or district. For the rights and perquisites of a Deshmukh in the Peshwa days. See Sen, *Administrative System of the Marathas*, pp. 243-51.

c5.6

Yet peace was not the keynote of this primitive society. The climate and the physical features of the land, which engendered courage and endurance in the Maratha, made him also self-centred and crafty. The isolation of his daily life led also to a certain parochialism in political affairs. The ambition of the average Maratha villager was confined to his own village and the ambition of the average Maratha chief seldom extended beyond the narrow confines of his paternal principality. But to every Maratha high or low one thing was of paramount importance. He lived and died for his watan.¹ What his bapoti² was to the Rajput, the watan was to the Maratha. There was no sacrifice he could not make for it; even apostasy from his religion was not too high a price to pay for its retention. As each watan had more than one claimant, it caused continual strife between rival chiefs and rival families. And as the Maratha of those days did not readily forget a loss or forgive an injury, these quarrels inevitably led to blood feuds, which could only be ended by the complete extermination of one of the rival families.³ Such hostilities kept the Maratha so busily engaged that he had hardly time or inclination to notice the movements and progress of the external world. The habit narrowed his vision but made a good soldier of him; and thus when the time came, he was ready to take advantage of the new situation and improve his fortunes.

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¹ Watan is an Arabic word and originally meant home, but in Marathi it has acquired a special significance, and stands for any hereditary right or property.

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² Bapoti is patrimony and has the same significance as Watan.

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³ Many instances of such blood feuds will be found in the papers published by Mr. V. K. Rajwade in Vol. XV of his Marathyanchya Itihasanchin Sadhanen and only two instances have been quoted in Sen, Administrative System of the Marathas, pp. 30-4.

c5.10

After the dissolution of the Bahmani kingdom the Maratha chiefs began to extend their view and sought civil and military situations in the new courts. They were welcomed by all the new houses who had partitioned the old kingdom. The policy of rival houses was uncertain and shifting and their alliances were not of long duration; and they had no hesitation in joining their Hindu neighbour of Vijayanagar against a brother Muhammadan Prince. After the battle of Talikota they employed their energy and resources in the conquest of the weakest members of the confederacy, Berar and Bidar. Yet when this was accomplished the survivors found themselves unable to compose their differences, and while in this position, were suddenly confronted by a new menace from the North. These continual wars offered excellent opportunities to Maratha soldiers and Maratha diplomats, who were as eager to earn new as to retain their old *watans*.

c5.11

The beginning of the seventeenth century saw many Marathas in high positions in the military and the civil services of the Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Golkonda Governments. In 1615 Malik Ambar employed a Brahman diplomat, Kasi Pandit, to negotiate peace between Ahmadnagar and the Portuguese state in India.¹ Four copies of the treaty resulting from this negotiation were made — two in Portuguese and two in the ‘Hindu language,’ or, more accurately, ‘Hindu alphabet.’ (Dous de letra endu e dous em portuguez). This clearly testifies to the growing influence of the Hindus in the court of their Muslim rulers. A fresh treaty was concluded two years later and as before two copies of the treaty, apparently for the use of the Indian signatory, were prepared in the Hindu language instead of Persian.² In this interesting document the date of the Hindu calendar (o premeiro do mes asar dos gentios) is given side by side with those of the Persian and Portuguese reckoning.

c5.12

¹ Biker, *Tratados da India*, Vol. I, p. 192. But there is earlier evidence of the employment of Hindus of Maharashtra in the diplomatic service of Muslim rulers. In 1547 Nizamshah sent two envoys to Goa. One of these was a Muhammadan Xeraffiecao (Sharif Khan?) by name and the other was, as his name Catymagy or Timagy Aldeu shows, a Hindu. Biker, Vol. I, pp. 120-2.

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² Ibid, p. 193.

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It was, however, in the army that the Marathas particularly distinguished themselves. The art of war was still in its infancy, primitive weapons like sword and spear, bow and arrows, lance and dagger, which demanded little or no technical knowledge were still in general use, so that every able bodied man was a potential soldier. He could enlist as a *Bargir*³ or, if he had means enough to buy a horse and the slender outfit that a soldier needed in those days, he could join as a *Silhedar*¹ with much better prospects of advancement. A well-to-do *Silhedar* was really a *condottiere* leader with his own followers whose services he could utilise as he chose. Naturally he tried to secure the best market for his commodity. This was the time-honoured system in India and it is at least as old as the *Sukranitisara*.² Neither time nor foreign conquest had affected it in the least. Success added to the *Silhedar*'s reputation and following and of course improved his worldly prospects, for his reward generally came in the shape of a *jahgir* or military fief. It was in this way that some Maratha families rose to prominence. The most important of them in rank as well as in power were the Mores of Jawli with the twin titles of Raja and Chandra Rao. Next came the Savantas of Wari, the Ghorpades of Mudhol, the Nimbalkars of Phaltan, the Jadhavs of Sindkhed, the Shirkes, only lately dislodged from their paternal principality, the Surves with whom the Shirkes had found an asylum, the Mahadiks, the Mohites and the Ghatges. Of less note were chiefs like the Jedhes, the Manes and the Dafles.

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³ Persian *Bargir* literally means a burden taker but in the Mughal as well as in the Maratha army the term signified a soldier who rode a horse furnished by his employer.

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¹ *Silhedar*, more properly *Silahdar*, literally means equipment holder, i.e., a soldier who finds his own horse and arms.

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² *Sukranitisara* is the digest of a work on polity attributed to the legendary sage Sukracharya. The school of Sukracharya is mentioned by Kautilya in his *Arthasastra*, but I am of opinion that the digest in its present form cannot be older than the 15th century A.D.

c5.18

These families formed the military aristocracy of the land, but it should not be forgotten that in Maharashtra the profession of arms was not limited to the noble few. The social barrier was neither strong nor insuperable. The Shelars and the Jadhavas,³ descendants of ruling kings, had declined in the scale, the Pawars, another princely family, had reconciled themselves to their humble lot and no longer hesitated to marry Kunbi girls of lowly origin.⁴ They still affected the title of ‘Raje’ after their first name, but that was the only trace of royalty now left to them. This society was naturally democratic, and the common dangers, common risks, and common adventures of a soldier's life levelled what difference might have survived. A promising young man who had only recently rejected the plebeian plough for the more aristocratic sword, could aspire to the hand of a daughter of the proud Nimbalkars, and could demand a matrimonial alliance with the princely family of the Jadhavas. Social intercourse was more intimate and less formal than what is possible in a modern barrack, and an able leader of magnetic personality commanded not only the admiration but also the affection of his following. The common soldiers, except the few who formed the King's bodyguard, had nothing to do with the state but looked for pay, promotion and preference to the *Jahgirdar* under whom they immediately served. A loyal *Jahgirdar* contributed to the strength of the Government; but in those days it was no discredit to set up as a 'pund palegar' or lawless chief, as once did a Nimbalkar and a Jedhe.¹ Yet the state continued its policy of multiplying the military fiefs and conferring fresh *jahgirs* on each enterprising *Silhedar*. Even a wise prince like Muhammad Adilshah laid down that while a disloyal Zemindar should be deprived of his fief, the loyal lord should on no account be discouraged or disturbed.² The inevitable result of this policy was that the civil Government of the country was subordinated to military needs and the major portion of Maharashtra was held by a number of military leaders serving under three different masters. When Shivaji rose to power, the principality of Ahmadnagar had already been annexed by the Emperor of Delhi and the kingdoms of Bijapur and Golkonda were awaiting a similar fate.

c5.19

³ The Shelars claim to be the descendants of the Silaharas and Lukhji Jadhav was a direct descendant of Ramchandra Deva the last independent Yadava ruler of Devgiri. Similarly, the Mores are supposed to be connected with the ancient imperial Mauryas.

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⁴ In the family history submitted to the Inam Commission the Pawars confess that after they had settled in the South they behaved like Sudras and married Sudra girls. *Kaifiyats yadis*, etc., ed. Mawjee and Pararsnis, p. 71.

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¹ Mudhoji Rao Nimbalkar set up as a rebel chief. See *Itihas Sangraha*, *Prachin Marathe Sardar*, p. 28. Kanhoji Jedhe also defied the authority of the Bijapur Government; Sen, *Administrative System of the Marathas*, p. 33.

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² *Itihas Sangraha*, *Aitihasik Sphuta Lekha*, p. 25.

c5.23

The question may very well be asked why did the Maratha *Jahgirdars* not make common cause against their Muslim masters and assert their independence. The answer is that everybody acted for himself and would not co-operate with his brother chiefs (in another kingdom) except for personal reasons. The Mughal power was deemed invincible; the weakness of the two surviving offshoots of the Bahmani kingdom was not yet apparent; they were still planning and making fresh conquests in the Karnatak. And people who have anything to lose do not generally favour a change. While the Marathas claimed a common origin, spoke a common language, and professed a common faith in normal circumstances, religious persecution alone could unite them under a common banner. The Muslim rulers of the South normally pursued a policy of religious toleration, and on occasions when a chief of note was compelled to forsake his father’s faith, the pangs of conscience were forgotten in the arms of a royal princess.¹ The Mughal annexation of Ahmadnagar, however, introduced a new element in southern politics, the more orthodox, the more uncompromising and the more bigoted belief of Shahjahan and Aurangzib; and the repeated invasions from which the subjects of Bijapur and Golkonda suffered and the scant consideration with which solemn treaties were treated by ambitious Viceroys like Aurangzib created an atmosphere of distrust and disquiet. Simultaneously a new spirit had been infused into Hinduism in the Deccan by what is popularly known as the Pandharpur movement. This, in short, was the situation when Shivaji appeared in the political arena.

c5.24

¹ It is said that Bajaji Rao Nimbalkar married a Princess of Bijapur after his conversion to Muhammadanism. *Itihas Sangraha, Prachin Marathe Sardar*, p. 30.

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With the advent of Shivaji a new era opened in the military history of the Marathas. He had a clear conception of military organisation, definite plans of military reform and specific views and opinions based upon past experience. He believed in personal selection but had no faith in hereditary genius. He approved of unity of command, but would not tolerate military interference in the civil administration of the country. He wanted a strong monarchy as the only antidote to the prevailing discord, dissension and anarchy, and could not therefore reconcile himself to feudalism and all that it stood for. He had some advantage over his antagonists. His hands were not tied by precedents; but at the same time, as the founder of a new kingdom and a new house, he could not ignore the tradition of the land, nor could he afford wholly to alienate the vested interests.

c5.26

His first steps were naturally cautious and circumspect. He started operations with a small force attached to his father’s *jahgir*, which probably needed few officers. But as soon as this force was augmented by the addition of Sambhaji Mohite’s cavalry¹ a Sarnobat or commander-in-chief was appointed. During the Sarnobatship of Mankoji Dahatonde the strength of the army was 3,000 and by 1659, if we can believe Krishnaji Anant Sabhasad, Shivaji was in a position to bring ten thousand cavalry and ten thousand Mawle infantry into the field. In this army the Silhedars did not preponderate although at first Shivaji had to depend mainly on these free-lances. Of the three thousand horsemen under Mankoji Dahatonde, fully two thousand were Silhedars; but by 1659 the strength of the paga or regular cavalry had risen to seven thousand, while the Silhedars numbered only three thousand.² In other words the numerical proportion of the Silhedar had fallen from 66 % to 33 % of the whole cavalry force available for service. This feature of the Maratha army did not escape the notice of the Muslim historians. Khafi Khan writes: ‘It is said that Sivaji got together some ten or twelve thousand of Kachh and Arab horses, so that when he sent out an army most of the horsemen were bargirs, i.e., they rode horses belonging to him’. ³ Bhimsen, who served under Dalpat Rai, a Bundela chief, informs us that Shivaji employed Silhedars, ‘but the Mahrattas, who had most pay, were bargirs.’⁴ Krishnaji Anant Sabhasad is more positive in his statement: ‘The strength of the paga (regular cavalry) was rendered superior (to that of the Silhedar). The Silhedars were placed under the jurisdiction of the paga.’⁵ It is needless to point out that the numerical superiority of the regular cavalry over the irregular Silhedar horse contributed to better discipline in Shivaji’s army. But he did not stop here. A born military leader, he recognised early the supreme need of unity of command in the battle-field and this he attained by establishing a regular cadre of officers both for the infantry and for the cavalry.

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¹ Sabhasad, p. 8. Sen, Sivachhatrapati, p. 4.

c5.28

² Sabhasad, p. 11. Sen, Sivachhatrapati, p. 8.

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³ Elliot and Dowson, History of India, Vol. VII, p. 287.

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⁴ J. Scott, History of the Dekkan, Vol. II, p. 55.

c5.31

⁵ Sabhasad, p. 28. Sen, Sivachhatrapati, p. 30.

c5.32

Of the cavalry officers, the lowest in rank was the Havaldar. He commanded a unit of twenty-five horsemen, and to each of these units was attached a water carrier and a farrier. Over five such units was placed a Jumledar, while a Hazari had under him ten jumlas.

c5.33

The *Panchhazari* commanded five *hazari* units, and the chief command of the cavalry rested with the *Sarnobat*, who was subordinate to none but the King, the supreme military and civil head of the state.

c5.34

A number of civil officers were attached to the army. A *Jumledar* was assisted by a *Majumdar* or accountant with 100 to 125 *Hons* a year. A *Hazari's* civil establishment consisted of a *Majumdar*, a *Karbhari* and a *Jamenis*; and a similar staff, probably with more pay, was attached to the *Panchhazari's* office. Besides these there were the regular news writers of the camp, who held their office independently of the military commanders and reported to the King or his *Vaknavis*.¹

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¹ The Vaknavis or Mantri, as he came to be styled, after Shivaji's coronation was in charge of the intelligence department. See Sen, *Administrative System of the Marathas*, p. 52.

c5.36

In the infantry the smallest unit consisted of ten men, commanded by a *Naik*. Five such units were placed under a *Jumledar*, and two or three *jumlas* formed a *Hazari's* division. When this cadre was introduced there were apparently only seven divisions of Mawle infantry and these were placed under the *Sarnobat* Yesaji Kank who held the chief command. The *Sarnobat* of infantry was inferior in rank and status to the *Sarnobat* of cavalry, for, while the letter was admitted to the *Ashta Pradhan* Council the former had no place in that body. For their civil assistants the *Jumledar* and the *Hazari* of the infantry had each a *Sabnis*, who kept the account and the muster roll. The *Sabnis* of the *Jumledar* drew a salary of 40 *Hons*,² while the officer of that name on the *Hazari's* staff was given 100 to 125 *Hons*.

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² The value of a *Hon* varied from four to five rupees.

c5.38

As was natural the military officers were much better paid than their civil assistants. The *Jumledar* of the cavalry had 500 *Hons* a year besides the proud privilege of riding in a palanquin. The *Hazari*, his official superior, drew a salary of 1,000 *Hons* while the *Panchhazari* received double that amount. Krishnaji Anant Sabhasad, to whom we are indebted for these figures, does not tell us the precise salary of the *Sarnobat* or the commander-in-chief; but from a memorandum drawn in the first year of the coronation era¹ it appears that the clothes of honour awarded to the *Senapati* were in every respect similar to those of the crown prince and the Peshwa or prime minister. The document throws no light on the emoluments of the office.

c5.39

¹ A new era was started from the year of Shivaji's coronation. This was known as *Rajyabhisheka* or coronation era. For the memorandum see Sane, *Patre Yadi Bagaire*, pp. 57-361.

c5.40

The infantry officers were not so well paid as their colleagues in the cavalry. The *Jumledar* received only 100 *Hons* or about thirty rupees per month, and a *Hazari's* pay was 500 *Hons* or about 1,800 rupees per annum. It should, however, be remembered that the purchasing power of money was much higher in those days, while the general scale of pay was nowhere very high. The Portuguese Captain of Chaul was paid 400,000 Reis or 1,000 rupees per year,² while the salary of Captain Keigwin, who commanded the English forces on the island of Bombay during the rebellion against the East India Company, and Sir John Child must appear, according to modern ideas, absurdly exiguous.³

c5.41

² J. Garson da Cunha, *Notes on the History and Antiquities of Chaul and Bassein*, p. 69. The pay of the Portuguese soldiers continued to be poor when Hamilton visited the west coast of India in the second decade of the 18th century. He wrote: ‘Their soldiers’ pay is very small and ill paid. They have but six Xerapheens per month and two suits of calico, stript or chequered in a year. Their two suits may amount to forty Xerapheens; and a Xerapheen is worth about sixteen pence half peny ster. Out of their six Xerapheens in money that they are to receive, their Captain who is Barrack-Master and Victualler to his Company detains five, and the other one is paid in small money to discharge the Accounts of the Shoemaker, Tailor, Barber, Washerman and Tobacconist.’ *A New Account of the East Indies*, Vol. I, pp. 249-50.

c5.42

³ Keigwin's salary was six shillings a day with an allowance for diet. See Ray and Oliver Strachey, *Keigwin's Rebellion*, p. 67. The salary in Indian money amounted to 72 Rupees per month according to the exchange then current.

c5.43

The Bijapur officers obtained hereditary *jahgirs* in lieu of pay. In the Mughal army the *mansab* was not hereditary but the *Mansabdar*⁴ held a *jahgir*. Even civil officers were granted *mansabs* and their pay or more accurately their *jahgir* depended on their military rank. The private was as a rule very poorly and irregularly paid. Even in the lifetime of Aurangzib the commanders frequently found themselves, specially on occasions of sudden and unforeseen transfer, unable to pay the arrears due to their soldiers as we learn from the interesting memoir of Eradut Khan.¹ This irregularity caused indiscipline in the army and the *jahgir* system was incompatible with the ideas of a strong monarchy. Shivaji did not favour the *jahgir* system nor did he approve of hereditary appointments. Most of his principal ministers were expected to take a military command when necessary. The *Peshwa*, Moro Trimbak Pingle, and the *Sachiv*, Annaji Datto, were often employed on active service. On such occasions they held independent commands but the *Sarnobat* was on no account permitted to interfere in the civil administration of the land. Shivaji laid down that soldiers and officers should be punctually paid, partly in kind and partly in cash. In an age when barter was in vogue payment in kind could not, if fairly made, cause any hardship.² Shivaji’s men and officers were paid either in cash from the central treasury or by *varat* or assignments on the provincial revenue. In the latter case payment was made by the district officers but the assignee was not on any account to interfere with the collection. In case he held any land of the Government, the rent payable by him was deducted from his salary and the balance was paid in cash or by *varat*. Shivaji had tried his utmost to undo the evils of feudalism by depriving the old Deshmukhs and Deshpandes of some of their obnoxious rights and prerogatives. He had, like Henry II, pulled down the fortified castles of the petty local tyrants³ and he was determined not to create new fiefs and renew the evils of military tyranny and feudal anarchy. No office in his army was hereditary, and all officers, high or low, were liable to dismissal, transfer or censure as the case deserved.

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⁴ The *Mansabdar* literally means the holder of a *Mansab* or command; the lowest *Mansab* was that of ten horsemen.

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¹ See John Scott, *Memoirs of Eradut Khan*, p. 1. He says, ‘I had entertained numerous followers, a tenth of a tenth of whom, the suddenness of my recall rendered incapable of paying; but as my life was yet to remain, I made my escape from among them in the best manner I could with my family.’

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² Payment in kind was fairly common in those days. The East India Company’s officers used to pay the wages of their Indian labourers partly in kind and partly in cash. See Anderson, *The English in Western India*, Second edition, pp. 221-2.

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³ Sabhasad bakhar, p. 33. Sen, *Siva Chhatrapati*, p. 38.

c5.48

Shivaji had no less than five *Sarnobats* of cavalry. Of the first, Tukoji, we know practically nothing, neither do we know why he was removed in favour of Mankoji Dahatonde. After Mankoji’s death, Netaji Palkar, a commander of exceptional ability, was raised to the chief command. He was dismissed for his failure to succour Panhala and replaced by a dashing cavalry leader, Kadtoji Gujar. Death caused a vacancy for the fourth time, and Hasaji Mohite,¹ who had served with distinction under the late *Sarnobat*, was promoted. It should be noted that in no case did a relative or heir of the last incumbent obtain the office. When Tanaji Malsure, the brave leader of the Mawles, fell in the assault on Sinhgad, his office passed to Suryaji, not because he was brother of the fallen hero, but because he had retrieved the fortunes of the day by rallying the demoralised assailants after their general’s death. According to the old feudal traditions the command ought to have passed to young Rayaba, who, according to the writer of an old ballad, was taken into Shivaji’s favour.²

c5.49

¹ Prof. Jadunath Sarkar is of opinion that Pratap Rao was succeeded by Anand Rao. He writes (*Shivaji and His Times*, first edition, p. 260), ‘I here follow the account of Narayan Shenvi, written at Raigarh, only a month later, on information supplied by Shiva’s ministers.’ I have carefully gone through Naran Sinay’s letter (Factory Records, Surat, Vol. 88, fols., 78-83). He does not say that he got his information about Shivaji’s army from any of his officers or ministers. He prefaces his report on military affairs as follows: ‘By other Conveighances Your Honour will have received newse of the proceedings of Sevagees army nevertheless I cannot be excused without giving some account.’ As for the sources of his information he is absolutely silent. This is all the more remarkable as he specifically mentions that the account of the naval action between the Sidi and the Maratha fleet he had heard from Shivaji, (‘this news Sevajee told me himself’). Moreover the appointment of the Sarnobat was not made at Rairi, as Naran Sinay himself tells us. And as all the Maratha accounts contradict his statement on this point, I do not feel inclined to reject them. Naran Sinay, it is evident, had been wrongly informed.

c5.50

² Acworth and Shaligram, *Aitihasik Povade*, p. 60.

c5.51

But while he rejected the time honoured *jahgir* system for the remuneration and reward of his adherents, Shivaji did not neglect to confer on them other marks of appreciation as occasions demanded. Both Kadtoji Gujar and Hasaji Mohite obtained high sounding titles. The right of carrying *aftabgir*,³ an ornamental circular sun shade, and of riding in a palki or a nalki was granted to deserving officers. Presents of gold and silver ornaments and money were made to officers and men for acts of conspicuous bravery. Wounded men received allowances according to the nature of their injuries, and widows of soldiers killed in action were suitably pensioned. A similar pension was granted to the minor children of fallen soldiers, and these were taken into service as soon as they came of age.¹

c5.52

³ Sen, *Siva Chhatrapati*, pp. 35-6.

c5.53

¹ Sabhasad bakhar, p. 25. Sen, Siva Chhatrapati, p. 25.

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The abolition of the jahgir system was not the only reform at which Shivaji aimed. He wanted to introduce strict discipline in his army. His success in this direction was far from complete for he had to fight against tradition and environment. None the less he deserves credit for his attempt. His army was employed in mulukgiri or foreign expedition for eight months in the year. They returned to cantonment when the monsoon broke and the four months of the rainy season they had to spend in barracks in enforced idleness. Shivaji laid down that provision and medecine for men and fodder for their horses should be carefully stored in the cantonments. During the active season, if we may call it so, the Maratha army subsisted on the spoils of war but here again it was clearly laid down that the prize belonged to the state and not to the army. Women, Brahmans and cows were not to be molested on any account. It was a capital offence to bring a female slave or a dancing girl into the camp. It was probably military discipline and not moral reform that he strove to achieve.² Krishnaji Anant Sabhasad tells us that Shivaji inflicted exemplary punishment on some of his soldiers for breach of discipline during the Karnatak expedition. But it was impossible to effect such a moral revolution all at once. From the preamble of a Portuguese treaty it appears that Shivaji’s men had carried away men, women, children and cattle from Portuguese territories.³ In 1672 some soldiers had been guilty of disorderly conduct at Chaphal.⁴ In 1676 Shivaji had to address a letter of admonition to the regiment encamped at Chiplun;¹ from the text of the letter it appears that they had taken away from the civil population by force what could be and should have been obtained by peaceful purchase. But when we remember how the Mughal soldiery destroyed the standing crops on their marches, drew out the straw from the thatch to feed their horses, and compelled the unoffending villagers to carry their baggage, we feel inclined to judge Maratha delinquencies more leniently.² War does not bring out the best side of human nature. But in some of his disciplinary reforms Shivaji was notably successful, and his camp was entirely free from the undesirable presence of women of easy virtue, as we are informed by two European travellers. John Fryer, the East India Company’s physician, tells us that ‘whores and dancing wenches’ were not allowed in Shivaji’s camp.³ Bishop Navarette went to Surat and spent a few days there in 1671. ‘I was told at Surat,’ he writes, ‘that Sabagi Mogal was extraordinarily careful that no woman should be in his army; and, if he happened to find one, he immediately turned her out, first cutting her hair and ears. This to prevent the effect of sensuality on the alertness and activity of his troops, for the same reason as the Tartars.¹ The good Bishop did not know that Shivaji was not a Mughal but his evidence shows what reputation the Maratha leader enjoyed as a strict disciplinarian.² There is good reason to believe that women were very seldom molested by Shivaji’s soldiers; for a brave Mughal governor once deemed it safest to leave in a woman’s garb when the Marathas appeared at the gates of his city.³ This was accomplished in an age when a Mughal general had in his camp 400 dancing girls from Kabul and Lahore to enliven his leisure.⁴

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² Chitnis bakhar, ed K. N. Sane, p. 180.

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² Biker, Tratados da India, Vol. IV, pp. 131-2. Sen, Historical Records at Goa, p. 10.

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⁴ Bhate, Sajjangad Wa Samartha Ramdas, p. 122.

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¹ V. K. Rajwade, *Marathyanchya Itihasachin Sadhanen*, Vol. VIII, pp. 23-5.

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² Manucci, *Storia do Mogor*, ed. Irvine, Vol. II, p. 452. ‘When the soldiery passes through they plunder everything they can lay hands on,—cattle, food supplies, grass, straw, they destroy houses to get firewood, and on the villagers’ heads they load their luggage, and by dint of blows force them to carry it.’ Military discipline was very slack even at Bombay as we can infer from the following passage in a letter dated 5th October, 1669, ‘as to the strictness of discipline we shall goe as farre as wee dare’. Factory Records, Surat, Vol. 88, fol. 147. In a consultation held at Swally on the 17th October, 1670, occurs the following statement: ‘Mr. Streinsham Master having formerly advised us of some irregular actions committed by the seamen that were sent up for the defence of the Company’s house at Suratt they being very prompt to offer violence to the estate of the natives; Wee then to remedy and stopp their proceedings in such an unlawful manner and keep up our wonted credit and reputation thoughtt good to enorder Mr. Master to promise the seamen a gratuity for their encouragement in case they behave themselves decently and soberly, which Mr. Master accordingly did.’ Factory Records, Surat, Vol. III, fol. 96. Things were much worse in Bijapur where the “Naikwadis” did not permit a Governor to enter the fort until he had granted all their unreasonable demands. *See* letter from Carwar dated 20 September 1671. Factory Records, Surat, Vol. 106, fol. 14.

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³ Fryer, *A New Account of East India and Persia*, Original edition, p. 174.

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¹ Navarette quoted in Orme’s *Historical Fragments of the Moghul Empire*, p. 91.

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² Cosme da Guarda, *Vida e accoens do famoso e felicissimo Sevagy da India Oriental*, p. 69.

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³ Factory Records, Surat, Vol. 105, fol. 93.

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⁴ Scott, *History of the Dekkan*, Vol. II, p. 28. But Mahabut Khan was not the only delinquent in this respect. William Minchin wrote about the Sidi Admiral who had no money to pay his men: ‘The Siddy minds nothing but his dancing women whom he hath continually dancing before him.” Factory Records, Surat, Vol. 90, Part I, fol. 29, (the date of the letter is 25 July 1678).

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On their march the Maratha army of Shivaji’s day was not encumbered with much baggage or equipment. Their arms were of the simplest and most primitive kind. Field-artillery they had none; and the elaborate and comfortable camp equipage of their Mughal adversaries they did not require. The men wore a turban, a simple jacket and tight fitting trousers; their officers were better protected with a helmet and an armour of chain or more frequently with thick padded coats of quilted cotton. In their saddle bag they carried with ease the scanty provision on which they and their mounts could subsist for days. In his second expedition to Surat Shivaji had no tent with him and the Dutch spy found him sitting on the ground.⁵ In his longer and more elaborately organised Karnatak expedition he had only two small tents, one for himself and the other for his minister, as we learn from Martin, the French Governor of Pondichery,⁶ and it is no wonder that, thus lightly equipped, the Maratha army was able to cover forty-five to fifty miles in a single march.¹ In fact this constituted their greatest advantage over their heavily armed and heavily armoured Muhammadan adversaries. Man for man the Maratha horseman was no match for the Mughal or the Bijapuri, but where they were not absolutely sure of victory they would not risk a pitched battle. Superior discipline, greater hardihood, and greater speed more than compensated for the slighter build and the lighter weight of the Maratha soldiers.

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⁵ Dutch Records, India Office transcripts, English translation, Vol. 27, D.C.C. XIX, 18 Jan. 1664.

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⁶ Monsieur Germain, who was sent by Francis Martin to Shivaji’s camp, found it ‘sans faste, sans femme, ni bagage; deux tentes seulement, mais de simple toile grosse et forte limitées, l’une pour lui, l’autre pour son premier ministre’ (Martin, *Memoire sur l’etablissement des colonies francaises dans l’Inde*

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¹ Sir William Foster, *The English Factories in India, 1661 - 1664*, p. 236.

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Let us now see how the contrast impressed two European contemporaries, an English Doctor of Medicine and an Italian Doctor of Law. John Fryer gives the following estimate of the merits and demerits of the rival armies, ‘Seva Gi’s Men thereby being fitter for any Martial Exploit, having been accustomed to Fare Hard, Journey Fast, and take little Pleasure. But the other will miss of a Booty rather than a Dinner; must mount in State and have their arms carried before them, and their women not far behind them, with the Master of mirth and jollity; will rather expect than pursue a Foe; but then they stand it out better; For Seva Gi’s men care not much for a pitched Field, though they are good at Surprizing and Ransacking; yet agree in this, that they are both of stirring Spirits’.² Francis Gemelli Careri visited India in 1695 and the Shivaji he speaks of was Ram Raja or Ram Rao as he calls him. ‘This Shivaji,’ he writes, ‘whom his Subjects call Raja, which signifies petty King, is so Powerful, that he maintains war at once and the same time with the Great Mogul, and the Portuguese. He brings into the Field 50,000 Horse, and as many or more Foot, much better Soldiers than the Moguls, for they Live a Day upon a piece of dry Bread, and the Moguls will March at their Ease carrying their Women, abundance of Provisions, and Tents so that their Army looks like a moving City.’³

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² J. Fryer, *A New Account of East India and Persia*, p. 175.

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³ Dr. John Francis Gemelli Careri, *A Voyage Round the World in Churchill’s Voyages*, First edition, 1704, Vol. IV, p. 212.

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Orientale, fol. 286 R°). This remark was repeated by Martin in fol. 287 R° of his Memoirs, where he says, ‘J’ay deia remarqué que son camp nestoit point enibrassé de bagages ny de femmes’.

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The achievements of Shivaji's army need not detain us long. They are well known. The Maratha chroniclers assert with evident pride that he fought with success against four great powers. The numerical strength of his army has been variously stated. Krishnaji Anant Sabhasad puts it well above 100,000. But the causes of his military success are not far to seek. Superior discipline, superior leadership and the unquestioning confidence of his men account for the brilliant victories which the great Maratha obtained over the Mughals, the Portuguese, the Bijapuris and the Haidrabadis, not to mention the petty poligars who acknowledged his suzerainty. But the main question yet remains to be answered. Why did the self-seeking, watan-loving Marathas submit to Shivaji's leadership? Their devotion no doubt was due to the personal magnetism of the leader, but what first caught their imagination and made them forget their agelong policy of blood-feud and personal aggrandisement? In that age the idea of nationality was yet unborn; but race and religion still stirred the deepest chord in the sentiment of the rude Maratha peasant soldiery. It was to these feelings that Shivaji appealed. The ideal he set forward before his people was a Hindvi Swarajya (Hindu empire), a Maharashtra Padshahi (Maratha kingdom),¹ but above all a Dharma Rajya, a kingdom of righteousness. He assumed the title of Go Brahman pratipalak, and the protection of the cow and the priestly caste was considered the paramount duty of every Hindu.² For this cause the Brahman could fight shoulder to shoulder with the meanest of the untouchables, the Mahar, who is not allowed to live within the village walls. And Shivaji excluded none from his army, not even the Mahar. In India religious intolerance has been very rare and Shivaji's conception of a Hindu empire was in no way identified with religious persecution. He enlisted in his army seven hundred Pathan deserters from Bijapur, at least three of his naval commanders were Muslims by faith, and he venerated the Muhammadan saint Sheikh Muhmmad as he venerated the Hindu Saints Tukaram and Ramdas. He granted *inam* lands for ‘the illumination of, and food offerings to, the shrines of Muhammadan saints, and Muslim mosques were maintained by state allowance’.¹ Only once in his eventful career did he fail to respect the asylum given by a Muhammadan saint to some fugitives,² but he never failed to show due respect to the holy scriptures of the Muslims. And Khafi Khan who delights in showering the most opprobrious epithets (e.g. the reprobate, the sharp son of the devil, the father of fraud, that dog, hell dog, evil malicious fellow)³ on him is yet constrained to admit that, ‘he made it a rule that whenever his followers went plundering, they should do no harm to the mosques, the Book of God, or the women of any one. Whenever a copy of the sacred Kurán came into his hands, he treated it with respect, and gave it to some of his Musalmán followers. When the women of any Hindu or Muhammadan were taken prisoners by his men, and they had no friend to protect them, he watched over them until their relations came with a suitable ransom to buy their liberty’.⁴ The ideal of a Maratha kingdom when preached by such a man made an irresistible appeal to the Marathas and they saw in him the long expected and long prophesied deliverer of the land that had once belonged to their ancestors. A grandson of Lukhji Jadhav, Shivaji could claim to be a descendant of the hero of the *Mahabharata*, while his father claimed the hero of the *Ramayana* for his ancestor.⁵ Shivaji was himself popularly regarded as an incarnation of the god Shiva.¹

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¹ The term Hindvi Swarajya is used by Shivaji in a letter to Dadaji Naras Prabhu. See Rajwade, Marathyanchya Itihasachin Sadhanen, Vol. 15, p. 272. The term Marhasta Rajya occurs in Jedhe Yancha Karina published in Shiva Charitra Pradip, p. 43.

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² When Chhatrasal the Bundela chief waited on Shivaji, the Maratha King urged him, in an inspiring speech, to return to his own principality and fight the Mughals there. Lal Kavi, who must have heard an account of this meeting from Chhatrasal himself, says that Shivaji addressed the Bundela prince thus: 'Does not the Chuttree faith consist in protecting the cow and the Brahmuns, in guarding the Veda, in showing skill and valor in battle? and if you lose your ltife, will you not hrough the solar orb enter the mansion of bliss, enjoying plentitude of happiness and repose?' W. R. Pogson, A History of the Boondelas, pp. 52-3.

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¹ Sabhasad bakhar, p. 33, Sen, Siva Chhatrapati pp. 38-9. ² This saint was Jan Muhammad. *See* Scott, History of the Dekkan, Vol. II, p. 54. ³ Elliot and Dowson, History of India, Vol. VII, pp. 254, 256, 262, and 269. ⁴ Ibid, p. 260. ⁵ The Bhonslas claim to be a younger branch of the Udaipur family who in their turn asserted that they were descendants of Rama, the hero of the Ramayana.

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¹ Sabhasad bakhar, p. 6.

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The old aristocracy did not respond to his call. Though the Mores of Jawli were broken, they would not bend their knee before the man of yesterday. The Ghorpades of Mudhol positively identified themselves with the Bijapur Government, and so did the Manes of Mhasvad. The Savants of Wari yielded to superior force but did so with reluctance and were never reconciled to their new lot. Even the Nimbalkars, near relations of Shivaji, could not be accounted steadfast friends. Thus Shivaji could not win to his side the land-owning interests, but the masses flocked to him, they hailed him as their King and leader, and it was the tillers of the soil, the hewers of wood and drawers of water, who formed the mainstay of the new movement.²

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² Even in the closing years of the 18th century a Muhammadan writer, the author of Tarikh-i-Ibrahim Khan, remarked that most of the men in the Maratha army were husbandmen, carpenters and shopkeepers, men of mean birth. See Elliot and Dowson, History of India, Vol. VIII, p. 262.

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Religion has now lost the influence it once exercised over politics and it is not easy to realise today how Shivaji’s message stirred his co-religionists outside Maharashtra. That it touched a few responsive hearts, there is no doubt at all. Did not Bhushan³ travel all the way from Etawa to Raigad to sing the glories of the new champion of Hinduism? Was not the same note echoed by Lalkavi?⁴ Did not Chhatrasal, the renowned Bundela chief, look to Shivaji as his ideal?¹ To a Frenchman² he was a second Julius Caesar, a second Gustavus Adolphus. Is it any wonder that the Hindus burning with the shame of their degradation should admire and worship him?

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³ Bhushan wrote Shiva Raja Bhushan, a series of laudatory verses in which he compared Shivaji with the legendary heroes of India and observed that but for him Hinduism would have vanished from Hindustan.

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⁴ Lal Kavi wrote of Shivaji in the following terms: ‘From the time that Ourungzeb ascended the throne, a great persecution of the Hindoos commenced; their temples were pulled down; their places of religious resort destroyed; their images mutilated; and a tax was levied on every house. The Rajpoots of the adjacent country were conquered, made obedient to the Emperor, and powerful armies were sent against those who resisted his commands. All were reduced to submission except one Raja, named Sheo Raj, who set a noble example of heroism and independence, overran eleven provinces, levied contributions, seized the Soo-bahdars, and destroyed the imperial troops, whose efforts he successfully continued to repel.’ Chhatra Prakash, Canto XI. Pogson, A History of the Boondelas, pp. 51-2.

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¹ Pogson, *A History of the Boondelas*, p. 52.

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² Carré. See Orme, *Historical Fragment*, p. 174. Carré's *Histoire de Seva-gy* has been translated into English by the present writer and published in the *Calcutta Review*, February 1928, pp. 222-44.

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But the new ideal died with Shivaji. His successors were impelled by other motives and guided by other principles. There was a sure but not a slow reversion to the ancestral type, and feudal institutions were revived on a larger scale and with renewed vigour. The effect was disastrous; the common ideal was lost sight of and with it disappeared for ever unity of purpose. As its former ideal grew dim, the once notable discipline of the army degenerated, and in the end the only feature common to the military excursions of Shivaji and Balaji Baji Rao was the collection of *Chauth*.

Linked texts (5)

Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra — Kauṭilya, Sanskrit
Mahābhārata — Vyāsa, Sanskrit
Vālmīkirāmāyaṇa — Vālmīki, Sanskrit
Itihāsa-saṅgraha — Marathi
Chatraprakāś — Lāl Kavi, Hindi