[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Studies](https://indike.org/pramana/ins) › [Polity, law and society](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity) › [The Military System of the Marathas, with a Brief Account of Their Maritime Activities](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928) › c7 # The Military System of the Marathas, with a Brief Account of Their Maritime Activities c7: Chapter III: Revival of Feudalism The Military System of the Marathas, with a Brief Account of Their Maritime Activities c7 - **Language:** English ### Chapter III: Revival of Feudalism ### [c7.2](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.2) TRADITION dies hard. Reformers in every country and in every age have an uphill task. They are often far in advance of their contemporaries and the final success and ultimate acceptance of their ideals do not depend wholly on themselves. The gospel of Christ, the inspired utterances of Muhammad needed the Apostles and the Khalifas respectively for their dissemination and acceptance by the world. The ardent loyalty to the king which Shivaji had inspired in his people, the iron discipline which he had enforced in his army, the subordination of the military to the civil authority which he had striven to secure, were not in any way the result of orderly evolution from historic precedent, but were essentially new revolutionary ideas conceived by the mind of a born leader of men. Novel though his ideas were, they failed to shake the implicit trust of the people in him or to arouse their doubts as to the soundness of his policy. His successors, unfortunately, had neither the foresight nor the ability to carry on his unfinished work, and when the moral impetus which he had given to it was spent, old ideas regained their ascendancy and feudalism entered upon a new and vigorous life. ### [c7.3](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.3) Sambhaji has been blamed for undoing his father’s work, but for the revival of feudalism he was not responsible. He was a good soldier but he did not possess his father’s statesmanship, vision and idealism. With his troops he was immensely popular and although his personal example was hardly calculated to improve discipline, he did nothing to encourage hereditary appointments in the army. His financial difficulties were great and punctual payment was impossible. This led him to relax the military code of his father; and spoils of war which in Shivaji’s time had formed the property of the State were now left entirely to the army. This no doubt impaired discipline, but Sambhaji went no further. He did not try to solve his financial difficulties by creating fiefs in favour of his military officers, and the inspiration which he failed to give during his lifetime he supplied by his death. For though he lived a rake, he died a martyr and for a time at least his demoralised followers were fired with a religious enthusiasm that Sambhaji’s death had kindled. ### [c7.4](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.4) The period succeeding Sambhaji’s death, though decidedly critical, was not wholly destitute of hope for the Marathas. It is true they were losing fort after fort, and that Rajaram, their new king, had to seek safety in distant Jinji, leaving the defence of Maharashtra in other hands. It is true that Maratha officers, like Suryaji Pisar, did not hesitate, as in the days of old, to sacrifice the interests of the State to their own. Yet, thanks to Aurangzib, a new spirit was engendered among the Marathas and the triple barrier, which divided them politically so long, was demolished by the Mughal conquest of Bijapur and Golkonda. Moreover, the imposition of \*jiziya\* was not calculated to conciliate a warlike people who had long been unfamiliar with religious intolerance. Unfortunately Rajaram, who did not possess the magnetic personality of his father, permitted himself to delegate his authority to two Brahman officers, and thereby lowered the prestige of the kingly office in an epoch when the ruler had perforce to be either the supreme war-lord of the State, or, failing that, a nonentity. The task which he had thus delegated to Pralhad Niraji and Ramchandra Pant Hukmatpanha was unusually arduous, for with an empty war-chest, they were expected to repel an attack backed by the whole weight of the Mughal empire. Aurangzib’s errors of policy had disposed the majority of the Marathas to support their cause; but despite this fact, their inability to command the same devotion that was shown to Shivaji or that would have been shown to Rajaram, if he had inherited his father’s qualities, obliged them to purchase the loyalty of their adherents by concessions of the type most appreciated by the Marathas. Hereditary fiefs were created in favour of successful warriors and fresh services were rewarded with fresh \*jahgirs\*. In fact the \*jahgir\* was often granted in districts still in Mughal possession and the favoured \*jahgirdar\* had frequently to kill the bear before he could own the skin. The old discipline fell rapidly out of date, and Shantaji Ghorpade, the only officer who adhered to it,¹ was weakly sacrificed by the impotent King to the fury of his discontented soldiers. Within twenty years of his death Shivaji’s military reforms were relegated to the scrap-heap, though the kingdom he had founded still survived. ### [c7.5](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.5) ¹ Khafi Khan says that Shantaji used to inflict very severe punishment for the slightest offence. See Elliot and Dowson, \*History of India\*, Vol. VII, p. 359. Rajaram did nothing to compose the differences between Shantaji and Dhanaji. The unpopular general was deserted by his followers and when the death hunt was being vigorously made the weak Raja remained an indifferent and impotent spectator. ### [c7.6](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.6) The decline of the monarchy continued steadily after Rajaram’s death, for the long minority of his two sons offered excellent opportunities to the fief-holders of consolidating their power and extending their prerogatives. The advent of Shahu improved their chances still further. Shahu’s claim to the throne of Satara was hotly contested by Tara Bai and her partisans, and this led to a long civil war by which the Mughals alone profited. The feudal chiefs made the best use of the monarchy’s need and weakness, and Damaji Thorat, Udaji Chauhan and Kanhoji Angria began to ravage Shahu’s territories and to exact \*chauth\* from his partisans. These powerful chiefs have been described as robbers and miscreants by Grant Duff, for he derived his information from the Satara records. But in theory they regarded themselves as vassals of the rival house of Kolhapur and considered the persons and property of Shahu’s followers as their rightful prize, Ultimately Shahu’s party emerged victorious and the power of his Kolhapur cousin was limited to a small principality, with option to extend towards the south and with free communication with the sea through the old naval port at Malwan. Shahu’s success, however, far from restoring the power of the royal house of Satara, was merely symptomatic of the complete revival of feudalism. ### [c7.7](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.7) Balaji Vishwanath, who contributed more than anybody else to Shahu’s success, found it beyond his power to reduce Kanhoji Angria, but managed to achieve by diplomacy what he could not obtain by war. Kanhoji offered allegiance to Shahu, but retained his fief and naval command. Probably this suggested to Balaji a new method of conciliating other military chiefs and restoring internal peace and order by directing their attention abroad. When he obtained the imperial \*farmans\* for \*chauth\* and \*sardeshmukhi\* for his master, he had something tempting and something definite to offer to those who would loyally serve Shahu and acknowledge his authority. The \*sardeshmukhi\* was the Raja’s \*watan\* and could not be alienated; but only a quarter of the \*chauth\* was retained for the Raja and was henceforth styled \*Rajbabti\* or royal perquisite. The remaining three-fourths of the \*chauth\* was available for distribution among Shahu’s followers, six per cent. of the total \*chauth\*, called in Marathi \*sahotra\*, was set apart for the Sachiv; another three per cent, was denominated \*nadgaundi\*, while the balance called \*mokasa\* was granted to different military leaders, in return for their maintenance of a fixed military contingent and an undertaking to perform military service on behalf of the State, whenever occasion so demanded. ### [c7.8](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.8) Balaji Vishwanath’s settlement however, did not stop here. Lest the interests of the different chiefs should in any way clash and lead to hostilities, he clearly defined their ‘spheres of activity’. Thus Khandesh and some part of Balaghat were reserved for the Peshwa; the Senapati received Baglan and Gujarat; to the Sena Saheb Subha was assigned Berar and Gondwana and all the territories to the east; the Sarlaskar was in charge of Gangthadi and the province of Aurangabad; while the districts between the Nira and the Warna were left to the Pratinidhi’s care.¹ These chiefs were to collect \*chauth\* from the territories assigned to them; they could if they liked extend their activities further in their immediate neighbourhood. They were to make a stipulated contribution to the royal treasury and to meet the expenses of some of the \*karkhanas\* or royal establishments; within their fiefs they were to exercise sovereign authority without any interference from the Raja. Thus peace at home and expansion abroad were at once provided for. As some checks on these feudal chiefs, who for all practical purposes became independent princes, their civil establishments were appointed from headquarters. The Raja’s Chitnis sent his agent for similar work with a \*jahgirdar\*, as also did the Fadnis and the Potnis. The King was henceforth not to trouble himself about financing military expeditions or the payment of the army. The \*sardeshmukhi\* and \*babti\* were expected to meet all his personal needs. Thus the feudalisation of the army and the State was complete. ### [c7.9](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.9) ¹ Malhar Ram Rao Chitnis, \*Thorle Shahu Maharaj Yanche Charitra\*, ed. Sane, 3rd edition, p. 47. ### [c7.10](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.10) Spain had recourse to a somewhat analogous arrangement when adventurers like Cortés and Pizzaro were authorised to equip military expeditions on their own account. The King was occupied with matters nearer home and had neither the time nor the means to undertake distant conquests and private enterprise was encouraged where the State was unwilling to risk men and money on expeditions of doubtful character. The leaders of such expeditions naturally demanded dictatorial powers and were rewarded with rich grants in the newly conquered lands. The State profited without running any risk. But here the Spanish analogy ends; for the extraordinary authority and special powers conceded to the first ‘conquistadores’ ### [c7.11](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.11) were not hereditary, and the Spanish Government took good care to curb their power by sending special commissions to the newly conquered kingdoms. It may also be added here that the Portuguese followed a similar policy in India, most of the lands in Bassein and Bombay having been granted in the first instance to deserving military officials and others, who in return were bound to furnish military service to the King of Portugal. Subsequently, the obligation to perform military service was exchanged for a ‘quit-rent’. The defects of the Maratha system were obvious. It made unity of command impossible and created hereditary commands by postulating hereditary genius. It transferred civil administration to military officers who were not necessarily qualified for such work, and as a result even military efficiency suffered. ### [c7.12](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.12) In theory the Senapati still continued to be the Commander-in-Chief, but in practice he was supplanted by the Peshwa. Under Shivaji’s scheme the Peshwa had to lead expeditions and to render military service like the Dalwai¹ of the old Vijayanagar kingdom; but during the reign of Rajaram the chief command was conferred on able generals, such as Shantaji Ghorpade and Dhanaji Jadhav, whose military reputation was so high that no Peshwa could think of disputing their authority. Shahu appointed Chandrasen Jadhav to the office of Senapati on his father’s death; but when Chandrasen joined the Nizam, the office was conferred on Khande Rao Dabhade.² His son Trimbak Rao, a military officer of high reputation, was defeated and killed by Baji Rao at Dubhoi, and thereafter the Senapati hardly played any part in Maratha history, although the Dabhades still continued to enjoy their \*jahgir\*. When the family was at last deprived of its hereditary office and \*jahgir\*, the Peshwa simply legitimised an accomplished fact by granting Gujarat to the Gaikwads with the office of Sena Khaskhel. The office of Senapati was on different occasions offered to Ramchandra Jadhav and Murar Rao Ghorpade, both of whom had hereditary connection with the office; but by that date it had become an empty honour. ### [c7.13](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.13) ¹ It is worth noting that Dalwai and Peshwa are synonymous terms, and both the officers exercised almost the same functions. I am inclined to think that the Peshwa’s office was created after the model of that of the Dalwai rather than that of the Vizier. ### [c7.14](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.14) ² Khande Rao’s immediate predecessors were Chandrasen’s stepbrother Santaji Jadhav, and Man Sing More. See \*Itihas Sangraha\*, \*Peshave Daftarantil Sanadpatranil Mahiti\*, p. 349. ### [c7.15](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.15) In rank the Sarlaskar, the Sena Saheb Subha and the Sena Khaskhel were below the Senapati, but it is difficult to say which of these officers had precedence over the others. The office of Sarlaskar was older than the other two andthe office of Sena Khaskhel was originally conferred on a junior member of the Senapati’s family, just as the posts of Sena Dhurandhar and Sena Bahadur¹ afterwards served to console the junior members of the Bhonsla family, the eldest branch alone being entitled to the higher office of Sena Saheb Subha. To each of these offices was attached a \*jahgir\* in return for which the holder was expected to maintain a stipulated force. These honours, it appears, were confined only to the older families who had risen to prominence under Rajaram or Shahu. ### [c7.16](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.16) ¹ The Sena Dhurandhar’s office was certainly older than that of the Sena Saheb Subha, for it is mentioned in the memorandum drawn in the first year of the coronation era. \*See\* Sane, \*Patre Yadi Bagarie\*, p. 358. ### [c7.17](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.17) This system did not work well, and led to conflict which it was expected to obviate. The Peshwa fought with the Senapati, the Dabhades could render no service to the State as genius was not hereditary, the Gaikwad and the Bhonsla were not very favourably disposed towards the Peshwa and the Peshwa found it necessary to trespass on their special reserves. But the lesson of this failure was absolutely lost on the Peshwas, who, as their empire expanded, continued to create new fiefs more or less on the old lines. ### [c7.18](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.18) In the new scheme the King’s perquisites, \*sardeshmukhi\* and \*babti\*, naturally found no place. The revenue, whether collected in the annexed territories or exacted in the shape of contributions in the neighbouring dominions, was divided between the Peshwa and his Sardars. The Sardar obtained a \*saranjam\* or fief in lieu of his stipulated service; and although the Peshwas did not look upon the old chiefs, who held their fiefs directly from the King, with a kindly eye, the number of \*saranjams\* they created was enormous. These varied in size and character as well as in importance, as the stipulated quota, ### [c7.19](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.19) The duties assigned to this office were similar to those of the Biniwala or Quartermaster-General in the Peshwa period. For a \*sanad\* granted to Khandoji Bhonsle, Sena Bahadur, see \*Itihas Sangraha, Peshave Daftarantil Sanadapatrantil Mahiti\*, pp. 183-4. ### [c7.20](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.20) for which they were granted, ranged from one to 'twenty-two thousand sawars or horsemen. A list, drawn up in the year 1811-12, enumerates no less than sixty saranjamdars, exclusive of the powerful Sardars of Central India like the Sindhia, the Holkar, the Pawars and the Bundele.¹ They did not all get equally favourable terms. In the paper, mentioned above, we find that Nilkantha Mahadev Purandare enjoyed a saranjam of 2,00,000 Rupees for a body of 500 horse, while Sadashiv Mankeshwar obtained, for an equal force, a saranjam of 2,50,000 Rupees. Chhatra Sing Toke's saranjam amounted to 20,000 Rupees for a quota of 30 horses; for a similar quota Ananda Rao Thorat got no more than 14,000 Rupees. The saranjam figures of Raghuji Angria (60,000 Rupees for one horseman) and the Panshes (40,000 Rupees for two horsemen) are rather misleading; for Angria was the hereditary Lord High Admiral ('wajarat mav') and the Panshes were in charge of the artillery and were not expected to serve the State at the head of a body of cavalry. The difference in the value of the saranjam is to be attributed to the difference in the personal allowance granted to each chief, which was settled on the merit of each case; and this principle (or want of it) prevailed as much in Central India as in the Deccan. Malar Rao Holkar was granted a saranjam of ninety-five lakhs of Rupees for maintaining a cavalry force of 22,000, but Ananda Rao Pawar received no more than forty-five lakhs for a force of 15,000.² ### [c7.21](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.21) ¹ Itihas Sangraha, Peshave Daftarantil Nivadak Kagadpatra pp 44-6. ### [c7.22](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.22) ² Ibid. ### [c7.23](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.23) On paper the scheme looked quite simple and eminently practical. The burden of the civil administration and the military defence of the major portion of the empire was thrown on these saranjamholders. Their interest thus became, or was expected to be, strictly identified with those of the State. They were to work a ready-made and clearly defined scheme and a number of civil officers whom they could not dismiss were deputed to assist them or see that they did not in any way deviate from the line laid down by the Peshwa's Government. As under the earlier scheme of Balaji Vishwanath, the chief Sardars could (with the Peshwa's permission) lead expeditions of conquest and annexation, which would at once enhance their own importance and contribute to the expansion of the empire. The terms were generally precise and unambiguous, as we find in the \*sanad\* granted to Mahipat Rao Kavde in 1762-3. Mahipat Rao had previously obtained a \*saranjam\* for 2,500 horse. Under the terms of the new grant he was expected to maintain an additional force of 1,000. Each horseman was to receive a salary of 250 Rupees a year, all charges included. And out of the income of his fief Mahipat Rao was to maintain the following civil staff on an annual salary indicated below: ### [c7.24](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.24) | Diwan | .. | .. | Rs. 5,000 | | Khasnis | .. | .. | ,, 5,000 | | Fadnis | .. | .. | ,, 950 | | Sabnis | .. | .. | ,, 400 | | Daftardar | .. | .. | ,, 350 | | Chitnis | .. | .. | ,, 400 | | Parasnis | .. | .. | ,, 250 | | Jamdar | .. | .. | ,, 300 | ### [c7.25](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.25) These were the \*darakhadars\* or feemen designed as a check on the \*saranjamdar\*, who was expected to keep an additional staff of three clerks at an annual salary of 350, 300, and 250 Rupees each. As he was a chief of some importance, it was rightly surmised that he would have some \*saranjamdars\* of his own; and he would have to make provision for their civil staff, an extra sum of 2,000 Rupees was granted for that purpose.¹ ### [c7.26](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.26) ¹ Sane, \*Patre Yadi Bagaire\*, pp. 547-8. ### [c7.27](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.27) The \*saranjamdar\* himself obtained a village for the residence of his family. He was to allow the muster of his stipulated quota and receive an acknowledgement after the muster had been taken. Then he had to deduct from the revenue the sum due for the civil staff and the cavalry force in his employ, as well as his personal allowance, which was fixed at 25,000 Rupees. The balance was to be paid to the Government treasury. ### [c7.28](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.28) In practice, however, these Sardars failed to identify their interests with those of the State. They did not maintain the stipulated force. They did not always pay their men according to the scale laid down by the Peshwa¹ and the number and quality of their horses were generally below the required standard. ### [c7.29](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.29) ¹ Peshwa’s Diaries, Vol. IX, pp. 310-14. ### [c7.30](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.30) The Peshwas had their own method of classifying horses as first class, second class, third class and useless. We read in a paper² of Balaji Baji Rao’s time that, ‘A horse worth Rs. 400 should be classed as superior, that worth Rs. 200 as middling and that worth Rs. 100 as inferior. Any horse worth less than Rs. 100 should not be counted in the muster. A horse classed as superior but having a bad rider should not be counted in the muster’. The standard was obviously lowered in Baji Rao’s time, for we find in the \*sanad\* granted to Bapuji Ganesh Gokhle³ in 1813-14 that a horse worth Rs. 300 was to be regarded as first class and a horse worth Rs. 150 as second class, and it is clear from the few papers that have come down to us that in a \*saranjamdar’s\* force first class animals formed a small proportion, and third class mounts largely preponderated though they were often expressly forbidden to employ third class and useless horses. In 1764-5, during the Karnatak expedition a muster of Khande Rao Pawar’s cavalry was taken at Galagnath on the banks of the Tungabhadra and out of the 963 horses of his forces: ### [c7.31](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.31) ² See Harivamshachi Bakhari, p. 88. ### [c7.32](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.32) ³ Peshwa’s Diaries, Vol. III, p. 183. ### [c7.33](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.33) Or in other words only 25 per cent. of the animals came up to the required standard.⁴ Nor was this an exceptional case; for three years later a muster was taken of the cavalry force under Gopal Govinda Patwardhan⁵ and the figures given below show that the majority of the animals were below standard. The total strength of his cavalry was 11,525 and of these: ### [c7.34](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.34) ⁴ Itihas Sangraha, Peshave Daftarantil Nivandak Kagadpatra, p. 88. ### [c7.35](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.35) ⁵ Ibid, p. 61. ### [c7.36](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.36) 2,950 horses were first class 5,653 ,, ,, second class 2,566 ,, ,, third class 356 ,, ,, useless In 1784-5 Chintaman Panduranga Patwardhan¹ attended the muster with 1,283 sawars or horsemen, of these:— 133 rode first class horses. 1,088 ,, second ,, ,, 62 ,, third ,, ,, In this instance the number of third class animals employed was negligible but the proportion of first class horses was by no means high. ### [c7.37](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.37) ¹ Ibid, p. 72. ### [c7.38](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.38) If the horses were bad, the riders could not be expected to be much better; for they were seldom regularly paid. The salary of a horseman in the Peshwa days generally varied from 250 to 300 Rupees a year. In 1802-3 Baji Rao II authorised one Muhammad Jamaluddin to raise a force of 2,000 Pathans at 600 Rupees per annum per man,² and although this sum included compensation for fallen animals and allowance for wounds incurred in action, as well as the cost of ammunition, it must be regarded as unusually high. The Peshwa found himself compelled to raise forces on any terms and probably conceded whatever was demanded by the Pathan officer, for in a paper dated 1804-5 we find that 38 Rupees per month was considered an exceptional salary for a horseman.³ But whatever the salary allotted in the \*sanad\*, the ordinary soldier seldom expected to draw it regularly. We read in the \*Harivanshachi Bakhar\* that one of the Patwardhan chiefs deducted one month’s salary every year and he should be considered very moderate,⁴ when the Peshwa’s agent at Maheshwar writes that Holkar had failed to pay his soldiers regularly for five consecutive years. They were at last content to write off a part of their arrears, while the remainder was paid partly in cash, partly in kind and partly by \*varat\* or assignment.⁵ Even this settlement was only made after Holkar had been subjected to a rigorous \*dharna\*.⁶ ### [c7.39](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.39) ² Ibid, p. 75. ### [c7.40](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.40) ³ Ibid, p. 75. ### [c7.41](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.41) ⁴ The chief used to draw from the State eleven months’ pay, so his men were actually expected to serve for twelve months and were paid for ten. ### [c7.42](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.42) ⁵ \*Itihas Sangraha, Maheshwar Darbarchin Batmi Patren\*, Vol. II, p. 225. ### [c7.43](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.43) ⁶ \*Dharna\* was an extreme form of dunning. ‘The person who adopts this expedient for the purpose mentioned, proceeds to the door or house of the person against whom it is directed, or wherever he may most conveniently ### [c7.44](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.44) The reason was obvious. The saranjam-holder had a twofold duty to perform. He was not only a military commander, but also a civil administrator and in this latter capacity he had to finance the army under his command. Whenever he was called upon to lead or take part in an expedition, he mobilised his army, enlisted new recruits if necessary, and took the field as early as possible. Before, however, he could leave his headquarters, he had to advance his \*Silhedars\* a part of their pay under the style of \*nalbandi\*. He had to purchase arms and ammunition and cattle for transport purposes. The Peshwa's Government did not advance the necessary funds and the saranjam-holder had generally to raise it as best as he could. As a rule he contracted a loan which he expected to pay out of the proceeds of war; but all campaigns were not equally profitable, and, when the campaign was concluded, he had to submit his accounts to the examination of the Peshwa's accounts department. But even when it was clearly established that he was entitled to financial relief, the \*saranjamdar\* could not hope for anything but an addition to his \*jahgir\*. He was by the terms of his appointment bound to render an account of his civil stewardship as regularly as possible and to give a muster of his forces; but this was done at long intervals. Thus was created a vicious circle whereby military needs affected the efficiency of the civil administration and the inefficiency of the civil government reacted disastrously upon military efficiency. Both Sindhia and Holkar found it necessary to raise money by mortgaging the future revenue of their provinces and selling governorships to their creditors.¹ But even these makeshifts could not indefinitely postpone the final disaster and there came a day when the great chiefs found themselves unable to meet the just ### [c7.45](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.45) ¹ Several instances of this practice are given in \*Itihas Sangraha\*, \*Maheshwar Darbarchin Batmi Patren\*. See Vol. II, p. 110 and p, 240. ### [c7.46](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.46) intercept him; he there sits down in \*dherna\*, with poison, or a poignard, or some other instrument of suicide, in his hand; and threatening to use it if his adversary should attempt to molest or pass him. In this situation the Brahmin fasts; and by the rigour of the etiquette, which is rarely infringed, the unfortunate object of his arrest ought also to fast; and thus they both remain until the institutor of the \*dherna\* obtains satisfaction.' Lord Teignmouth, quoted by Forbes, \*Oriental Memoirs\*, Vol. II, pp. 24-5. On the occasion alluded to above, Holkar was compelled by his creditors to abstain from food and drink for three consecutive days. ### [c7.47](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.47) demands of their soldiers on the one hand and to render any satisfactory account of their revenue to the supreme Government on the other. On one occasion Sindhia had to submit seven years’ accounts at one time, when it was found that the papers had not been properly kept.¹ The financial difficulties of Holkar led to the gradual dissolution of his forces, so that in September 1785, he had only fifteen hundred men for four thousand horses shown on paper.² Some of the chiefs tried to solve the difficulty by employing only a small force in times of peace and raising fresh levies when called upon to join the Peshwa’s banner. The Government often encouraged this practice, as the Peshwa on his part wanted to save the revenue by the reduction of the standing army which the fief-holder was expected to maintain. The Government at the same time expected the fief-holders to credit to its coffers the monetary equivalent for the services of which it was thus deprived. In extreme cases an indigent chief sometimes failed to render any military service or to compensate for it in cash and such failure or delinquency often escaped the stern punishment it deserved. In 1768 the Peshwa Madhav Rao ordered the confiscation of the fief of Maloji Ghorpade of Mudhol,³ as he had failed either to render military service or in the alternative to pay compensation therefor. But it does not appear that the order was executed; for a year later we find him still in possession of a large fief with an income of 1,73,900 Rupees, and in 1794 he served with a cavalry force of 775 men against the Nizam at Kharda. Once feudalism was re-established, the Maratha tradition concerning the sanctity of the watan stood in the way of any effective military reform. In February 1787, Murar Rao Jadhav was deprived of his fief and command, as being of no use to the State;⁴ but his sister-in-law was permitted to adopt a young man of the family whom she had brought up from childhood, and this youth was invested with the command of which his uncle had been deprived. It is needless to remark that such a shifting of command in itself could hardly improve the state of affairs, but as the Peshwa derived his authority from feudal customs, he could not abolish them when they happened to militate against his personal wishes and plans. ### [c7.48](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.48) ¹ Sane, \*Patre yadi Bagaire\*, p. 318. ### [c7.49](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.49) ² \*Itihas Sangraha\*, \*Maheshwar Darbarchin Batmi Patren\*, Vol. II, p. 84. ### [c7.50](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.50) ³ \*Itihas Sangraha\*, \*Peshave Daftarantil Nivadak Kagadpatra\*, p. 60. ### [c7.51](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.51) ⁴ Ibid, p. 92. ### [c7.52](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.52) More than once attempts were made to reduce recalcitrant chiefs to submission, but beyond obviating one or two more salient shortcomings, they failed of effect and tended rather to establish more firmly the fundamental error of the system. Baji Rao I fought against Trimbak Rao Dabhade and defeated him, thus affording the strange spectacle of two servants of the same master engaged in mutual hostilities. The Senapati’s power collapsed not so much by reason of that single defeat as from the fact that he had no able successor. Yet it was not possible to take full advantage of the victory by depriving the Dabhades of their extensive fiefs immediately after the battle of Dubhoi. Similarly Damaji Gaikwad was defeated by the Peshwa’s forces when he hastened to the support of Tarabai; yet it was found impracticable to crush the Gaikwads as the Dabhades had been. In his conflict with these old Sardars or military chiefs the Peshwa relied on the support of his own adherents. These in their turn were rewarded with rich fiefs and became the founders of new families. At first their gratitude held them steadfastly to their master’s side, but the baneful example of the master himself was too tempting for the next generation. The Peshwa continued to multiply fiefs unchecked, and fired by his example, the rulers of various Maratha principalities introduced widespread sub-infeudation by rewarding their own immediate adherents and followers in the same manner. ### [c7.53](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.53) But the Peshwas were not altogether blind to the possibility of the sons and grandsons of their loyal vassals growing weary of their allegiance. This they tried to prevent by playing on their mutual jealousy. Sindhia and Holkar were designed to be the two stout pillars of the Maratha empire in the north; but not infrequently they failed to agree with one another, and a day came when they became openly hostile and turned their arms against one another. The policy of the Poona Government was to effect a breach and to keep it open, not merely between two neighbouring chiefs but even between brothers of the same family. Thus they exploited the differences between Manaji and Sambhaji Angria, Govinda Rao and Fatte Sing Gaikwad, Sabaji and Mudhoji Bhonsla. But a military power based on suspicion and jealousy cannot last long; ### [c7.54](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.54) the policy recoiled against its originators when the feudal chiefs on their part exploited the dissension and disunion in the Peshwa’s family. When the State, weakened by civil war, was threatened by a foreign enemy Sindhia and Holkar did not fail to increase their power at its expense and Bhonsla confined himself to a policy of prevarication at a moment when active co-operation in a concerted scheme of defence and offence was imperatively demanded. ### [c7.55](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.55) Feudalism was not the only evil which the Marathas suffered from. With the expansion of their empire they gradually but completely lost the early impulse, the original idea which had converted a disunited race into an imperial power. Shivaji had given the Marathas a common cry; and none appreciated the potency of that cry more clearly than Peshwa Baji Rao I. Shivaji’s military reforms he would not or could not revive, but he stood forth, as Shivaji had done, as champion of Hinduism. Circumstances had suffered considerable change since Shivaji’s days. The Marathas were no longer confined within their own province; they had crossed the Narmada and the whole of Hindustan stretched before them. Baji Rao, therefore, declared that his aim was to found a Hindu empire or \*Hindupad Padshahi\*, as he called it. It was a Hindu empire that Shivaji also wished to establish; but it was to be a Maratha state as well, for he appealed not merely to the religious feelings but also to the racial sentiments of the Marathas. Baji Rao, on the other hand, had to win the sympathies of Hindus outside Maharashtra, and he wisely forebore to emphasise the racial character of his mission. The Hindus of Central and Northern India saw in him a new deliverer. They had not forgotten the humiliations imposed upon them by Aurangzib’s religious intolerance, and they willingly ranged themselves on Baji Rao’s side at considerable sacrifice. Raja Jai Sing Sawai of Jaipur secretly favoured Baji Rao’s cause and influential Zemindars like Nandalal Mandloi¹ openly joined him. The Mughal Government had the wisdom to send two Hindu Viceroys to Malwa, Girdhar Bahadur and Daya Bahadur, at the time when Baji Rao was gradually accomplishing its conquest and annexation. The two Viceroys did their utmost to win the Hindu nobles of Malwa back to the Mughal side. But the latter were inspired by a new spirit, which finds expression in a letter addressed by Raja Jai Sing Sawai to Nandalal Mandloi on 26 October 1731.¹ ‘News of Malwa affairs, written on your behalf, have reached me and I have taken note of them. And Baji Rao Ballal Peshwa Pradhan of the Deccan has written on 29th Rabilakhar that, as desired by you, victory has been won in Malwa on the 21st (21-10-1731) and Viceroy Daya Bahadur fell in action. On that occasion Rao Sahebji, Thakur Narhardasji and Mayaramji Vakil, had voluntarily assisted with their own person, wealth, brothers, sons and officers but the Emperor’s Subha had made such (excellent) arrangements on the pass of Mandava, three mines had been run across the route and 25,000 soldiers were stationed there and the casualty among the Marathas as they attempted to ascend the pass was very great and if they had ascended a few steps more, the defenders of Mandava would have fired the mines and the entire army would have been lost. At such a crisis Rao Saheb sent us information and changing the route of Mandava he got the army safely across another route, that of Bheron Ghat, and his own people, son, brothers and officers were blown by mines on the ghat and were killed before his eyes. I am unable to describe what assistance he rendered. Such is the information I have received, but you had not given me these details. Thousand praises to you that relying on my words alone you chiefs of Malwa have ousted the Muhammadans from Malwa so that the welfare and the prosperity of our religion may be secured.’ ### [c7.56](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.56) ¹ For Daya Bahadur’s letters to Nandalal Mandloi, see G. S. Sardesai, \*Marathi Riyasat, Madhya bibhag\*, Vol. I, pp. 325-7. The authenticity of these letters has recently been questioned as a search among the Mondloi papers failed to locate them. But the papers are in extreme disorder and no conclusion should be made from a casual scrutiny. ### [c7.57](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.57) ¹ G. S. Sardesai, \*Marathi Riyasat\*, Madhya bibliag, Vol. I, p. 328. ### [c7.58](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.58) It may be noted here that most of Baji Rao’s wars could be invested with a religious character. In the conquest of Malwa he had secured the alliance of the Hindus, in his war against the Sidis he was avenging the desecration of Hindu temples; in his war against the Portuguese he was undoubtedly fighting for Hinduism, in as much as the Inquisition in Portuguese India made it impossible for Hindus to profess their faith in peace. And when the Bundela chief Chhatrasal found his principality threatened by the Pathan Nawab of Farrukhabad, he turned for protection to Baji Rao as the acknowledged leader of the Hindus in India. The lover of Mastani knew well how to appeal to the religious sentiments of his co-religionists although he could scarcely be considered an orthodox Brahman. ### [c7.59](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.59) Balaji Baji Rao was perhaps a better Brahman than his father, but as a statesman and soldier he was much inferior to Baji Rao I. The Pan-Hindu policy of the second founder of the Maratha empire was deliberately abandoned by his son. Baji Rao had pursued both in Malwa and in the Konkan a policy of conquest and annexation. A policy of annexation is at the beginning expensive and does not yield immediate financial profit. Mill had no difficulty in proving that the annexations of Wellesley were financially unprofitable, and the same criticism could be levelled against Baji Rao’s progressive and aggressive campaigns. The Marathas, however, unlike the English, looked upon war as a normal source of revenue and Baji Rao suffered from a chronic lack of funds. Perpetually harassed by his creditors, he hardly knew any peace and his anxieties have often found expression in his letters to Brahmendra Swami.¹ Balaji Baji Rao, therefore, decided to abandon his father’s policy and to make war profitable. In one letter he styled himself a disciple of Shivaji Maharaj, apparently because he thought he was treading in the footsteps of the great Maratha in making war pay for war. But he forgot that while Shivaji had no alternative but to foster his annual mulukhgiri expeditions as a normal and regular source of revenue, he himself might very well have improved his finances by developing the natural resources of the tolerably large dominions bequeathed to him by his father. The policy of annexation, which Baji Rao systematically pursued both in the north and in the west, was abandoned by his son, nor did the excellent idea of rallying the Hindus against the Muhammadan rulers of India appeal to him. When he sought an interview with Sawai Jai Sing, it was to extort money from that friendly potentate; and the main, if not the sole, purpose of his numerous expeditions was the recuperation of his exhausted coffers. This fact is clearly indicated in the following lines written by him to Nana Purandhare.² ‘My father, like Bhagirath made a stream of gold flow from the north to the south for twenty four years. Thanks to his blessings, that stream is still in ever increasing flow and has completely satisfied the rulers of the provinces, the leaders of the army and my sincere friends. The golden stream has added to thirst only. Raghuji and Fatte Sing Baba had in the past brought a golden stream from the south but its flow was interrupted at places. For many days in the interval the stream from the south did not flow. By God's grace the stream of wealth is flowing well in this army this year but there are many dry lands on the way to Poona and it will be entirely absorbed (in transit) on that account. If the northern and the southern streams could in their high flood be united at Poona without any absorption on their way, then I could get rid of my debts and secure rewards of my labour both in this world and the next. The Ganges flows to the sea but saves the whole world; in the like manner do these northern and southern rivers flow in the present age and benefit many people. All rivers and streams flow to the ocean, the Kaveri alone has been brought to the service of men. So do these rivers of wealth render but little service to the main interest, though they do immense good to other people. It is proper that people with an insight should take into consideration the rights and the wrongs of this matter and so act that the sterility of Poona may be removed.' The Peshwa's meaning is quite transparent, and the policy adumbrated in the letter was bound, when followed to its logical end, to produce one result only—namely, the wholesale alienation of his father's Hindu allies and the complete denationalisation of the Maratha army. ### [c7.60](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.60) ¹ Rajwade, Marathyanchya Itihasachin Sadhanen, Vol. III, pp. 20-1. ### [c7.61](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.61) ² Sardesai, Marathi Riyasat, Madhya bibhag, Vol. II, pp. 59-60. ### [c7.62](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.62) Balaji Baji Rao like his predecessors still professed to be a champion of Hinduism. He wrote respectful letters to Brahmans of known sanctity, granted them pensions and allowances, and sometimes remitted their rent, and in his letters he often expressed an ardent desire to recover from the Muhammadans the holy places of Benares and Muttra. But Brahmans and holy men were not the only Hindus; and while they might shower their blessings on the Peshwa and his family, the Hindu princes alone could assist him in his wars against the Muhammadans. Evidently Balaji Baji Rao cared more for their money than for their armed forces, for it is during his regime that the Maratha arms fell heavily on their Rajput co-religionists. Hitherto the Rajputs had welcomed this new power from the south as the avenger of Hindu wrongs in the north; but Balaji and his principal Sardars, Sindhia and Holkar, made the Rajput princes realise that Maratha supremacy meant for them nothing but a change of masters, and the change was by no means for the better. So when the Marathas stood in urgent need of men and money in 1760 and 1761 the Rajputs remained sternly aloof, while all the Muhammadan princes and nobles of Northern India, including the Nawab of Oudh whom the Marathas had done their utmost to conciliate and gratify, rallied to the Afghan banner. Nor were these the only evil effects of the selfish policy of plunder and raid. It caused disunion and dissension within the Maratha empire. The Peshwa, in want of money, did not hesitate to sell his assistance to the Nawab of Bengal against Raghuji Bhonsla of Nagpur. Raghuji, indeed, was not well-disposed towards Balaji; but the moral effect of fighting a Maratha Sardar, while employed in a Muhammadan province, was simply disastrous. Baji Rao did not seek foreign aid in his fight against the Senapati; but Balaji extended his protection to Bengal against a Sardar of the Empire; he joined the English in order to bring about the destruction of the Angria; and his son simply emulated his example when he coalesced with Nizam Ali against Janoji Bhonsla. Thus the unhappy Raghoba certainly committed no unprecedented offence when he sought foreign military aid to secure the musnad of Poona. Balaji lamented the differences between Sindhia and Holkar and earnestly urged them to pursue a common policy in Rajputana, but he conveniently forgot that with the example he had set in Bengal the only common policy they could be expected to adopt was one of self-aggrandisement. ### [c7.63](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.63) It is needless to remark that although the bulk of the Maratha army consisted of feudal levies, the Peshwa had an additional force of his own. The composition of this personal force was naturally affected by the change of political ideal and political outlook. Shivaji aimed at the foundation of a Maratha empire, and his army was mainly, if not wholly, composed of Marathas. The Pathan regiment, he enlisted, probably consisted of Deccani Musulmans, who were for all practical purposes children of the soil and were by no means favourably inclined towards the Mughal empire. It is noteworthy that on one occasion Shivaji politely rejected the services of a Bundela chief. Baji Rao’s proclaimed ambition was the restoration of Hindu supremacy in India and he naturally tried his best to win the moral and material support of Hindus all over the country for military purposes; but we have no documentary evidence that the non-Maratha elements formed by any means a predominating proportion of his army. Balaji’s sole aim was to cause the two rivers of gold from the north and the south to unite and flow into the reservoir of Poona, and this policy connoted constant fighting and a vast army. The Marathas were not very eager to spend the whole year away from their home provinces and Balaji enlisted mercenaries from all parts of India and outside India. Sikhs, Rajputs, Sindhis and Karnatakis on the one hand, and Rohillas, Arabs, Abyssynians and Portuguese of pure or mixed birth and even the so called Portuguese,¹ or the native converts from Goa were welcomed in his army. They were by no means better soldiers, and were certainly more unscrupulous and less faithful. Yet they obtained from the Peshwa and his feudal chiefs better pay and better treatment than the Marathas proper. Consequently the Maratha army was now gradually, but completely, denationalised. In the Peshwa’s personal force² the Arabs and other foreigners outnumbered the Marathas; ### [c7.64](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.64) ¹ Robert Orme had a very poor opinion of their fighting qualities. See his Military Transactions in Indostan (1763 edition), Vol. I, p. 81. ### [c7.65](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.65) ² Tone says: ‘In the various Mahratta services there are very little more than a bare majority who are Mahrattas by caste; and very few instances occur of their ever entering into the infantry at all.’ Illustrations of some Institutions of the Mahratta People, 1818, p. 44. We get the following significant figures about the army that opposed Colonel Munro near Sholapore. ### [c7.66](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.66) | Arabs | .. | .. | 2,000 | | Mohillas (Rohillas) | .. | .. | 1,500 | | Sindees | .. | .. | 1,000 | | Gosaens | .. | .. | 700 | | Major Pinto’s infantry | .. | .. | 1,000 | | Hindostani Deccan and infantry | .. | .. | 4,000 | | | | Total | 10,200 | | Cavalry | .. | .. | 1,500 | | | | Grand Total | 11,700 | ### [c7.67](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.67) G. R. Gleig, The Life of Sir Thomas Munro, Vol. I, footnote p. 494. ### [c7.68](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.68) in Holkar’s army the Pendharis¹ preponderated over the paid mercenaries; and in Sindhia’s forces there were more Purvias than Maratha soldiers.² They were bound by no common ideals or common interests and were utterly ruthless in their methods. It was these non-Maratha mercenaries who made the Maratha name dreaded and hated throughout the length and the breadth of the Indian sub-continent. Briefly, then, it may be said that Shivaji had organised a national army; in Rajaram’s time the army was feudalised; and it was left to Balaji Baji Rao to denationalise it. This denationalisation with its consequent demoralisation inevitably led to the final overthrow of the Maratha empire. Feudalism in itself was bad, but the employment of foreign mercenaries was, as we shall see, even more disastrous. ### [c7.69](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.69) ¹ An expeditionary force sent by Holkar, under an officer named Chimaji Rao Bule, in 1783 consisted of 1,000 to 1,500 gardis, 2,000 to 2,500 cavalry and 6,000 Pendharis. See \*Maheshwar Darbarchin Batni Patren\*, Vol. II, p. 40. In 1787 Sindhia requested Holkar to send a reinforcement of 1,000 \*sawars\*, and 10,000 Pendharis (Ibid, p. 121). This gives a general indication of the preponderance of the Pendharis in Holkar’s army. ### [c7.70](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7.70) ² \*Maheshwar Darbarchin Batmi Patren\*, Vol. I, pp. 10-11 and Vol II, p. 117. ## Linked texts (1) - [Itihāsa-saṅgraha](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darkages.maratha.daftar.itihasa-sangraha) — Marathi --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c7) · Pramāṇa