[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Studies](https://indike.org/pramana/ins) › [Polity, law and society](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity) › [The Military System of the Marathas, with a Brief Account of Their Maritime Activities](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928) › c9 # The Military System of the Marathas, with a Brief Account of Their Maritime Activities c9: Chapter V: Forts The Military System of the Marathas, with a Brief Account of Their Maritime Activities c9 - **Language:** English ### Chapter V: Forts ### [c9.2](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.2) SHIVAJI’s name has been associated with almost all the old forts of his country. Some he had obtained by deliberate use of bribes, others by clever stratagem, and the rest by well planned assaults. Not content with the possession of the old fortresses, he had built new ones and the hills of Maharashtra offered him excellent sites for them. Not a pass was left undefended, not a peak was left unfortified, and every Taluka¹ was provided with one or more strongholds, and the whole country was secured by a network of forts. As one drives today by the high road from Poona to Satara through the pass of Katraj, through the mango groves of Shivapur and the ancient town of Shirwal, one sees on the right and left no less than ten famous hill forts well known to the Maratha ballad singers; Sinhgad, rendered famous by Tanaji Malsure, Purandar, and Vajragad that once witnessed the heroism of Murar Baji; Sajjangad, hallowed by the memory of Saint Ramdas; and Satara, once the capital of the Maratha empire. Shivaji was famous for his forts, as a popular Maratha writer informs us, and well did he deserve his fame. The military architecture of the Marathas had not attained a high standard in Shivaji’s time, and he does not seem to have made any attempt to improve it. Indeed, no such effort was called for. His enemies possessed but poor artillery, their knowledge of mining did not go very far, an inaccessible site and a massive wall defended by a few resolute men even with primitive arms and crude missiles could defy for months the utmost efforts of the strongest besieging force. Only hunger and bribery could reduce a fort. All that was needed therefore was a good site, a strong rampart, sufficient provision, and plenty of military stores. ### [c9.3](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.3) ¹ Taluka is a sub-division of a district. ### [c9.4](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.4) The sites were generally well selected. Raigad could be reached by one narrow steep and difficult footpath that zigzagged along an inaccessible precipice and every care had been taken to provide for its defence. No less strong was the site of Lohagad. In fact Lord Valentia was of opinion that defective knowledge of fortification had considerably impaired its natural strength.¹ ‘We examined’, he says, ‘the gateways as we came down, and I am quite convinced, that the whole of the artificial works much lessen the natural strength of the place. Each high side of the way forms a sheltering place, secure against all attacks from the top, whether of musquetry or their more usual weapons, large stones rolled down from above. The gateway and the parapets have the same effect. Had the whole been scalped off, and only a strong work at the top, I believe no earthly power could have taken it.’ But progress in military engineering as in everything else is also influenced by the laws of demand and supply. Had the artillerymen and miners of the time been more efficient, there might have been a greater necessity on the part of the military architects to use their brain and improve upon the traditional scheme of fortification they had inherited from their ancestors. ### [c9.5](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.5) ¹ Valentia, \*Voyages and Travels to India, Ceylon, and the Red Sea, Abyssinia and Egypt\*, Vol. II, pp.168-9. ### [c9.6](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.6) Shivaji’s forts therefore were defended by a stout stone wall. The hill side was rendered more inaccessible by the usual bush of thorny opuntia cactus that forms the common feature of the country. Besides the barracks for men and officers every fort was provided with a \*Darukhana\* or powder house; an \*Ambarkhana\* or granary and a storeroom for oil and \*ghi\*, a necessary ingredient for the daily food of a Maratha. The water supply was not forgotten, and even a small fort like Satara can boast of more than one tank and well that yield excellent drinking water even today after a century of neglect. Raigad had quite a number of tanks, and Grose was told that it was ‘the most completely impregnable place in the universe, for the enclosure of it is large enough, independent of the stores accumulated there, to grow grain sufficient for the maintenance of its garrison, which, were it but a handful of men, could with pleasure defend it against the greatest armies that could be brought to take it’.² The \*Ambarkhana\* of Panhala with its three enormous stone and cement granaries, named after the three life-giving holy streams, Ganga, Yamuna, and Saraswati, was designed to hold 25,000 \*Khandis\* of grain.³ If the material needs of the garrison were thus provided for, supernatural aid, in which soldiers and civilians equally believed in that age, was not overlooked. The main gateway was defended by a miniature figure of Hanuman, the valiant monkey general, and inside the ramparts were built a temple and a mosque, and Mr. C. A. Kincaid says that below the foundation of the walls of Lohagad were found some skeletons, whose unfortunate owners were probably sacrificed to render that fortress invincible.¹ The defensive value of these forts had been amply demonstrated during Aurangzib's invasion. Each fort cost the Mughal Emperor an enormous loss of men, money and time. ### [c9.7](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.7) ² Grose, \*A Voyage to the East Indies\*, p. 137. ### [c9.8](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.8) ³ D. B. Parasnis, \*Panhala\*, p. 61. ### [c9.9](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.9) ¹ See his article in Ishtur Phakde. The Peshwas never failed to perform propitiatory ceremonies whenever anything of evil omen happened in a fort. See Sen, Administrative System of the Marathas, p. 402. ### [c9.10](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.10) If Shivaji had perceived the advantages of these strongholds he was not blind to their perils in a hilly region like Maharashtra. If they were easy of defence, they could be easily used against him by the petty chiefs as he himself had demonstrated in his war against Bijapur. He therefore demolished all the adulterine castles as soon as his authority was fairly established in the country and no private person was permitted to build a castle, or a fort, or even a house with a bastion. But this alone was not sufficient. It was necessary to guard against all risks. He wanted to be sure that his forts must always be held in his own interests and should never be used against him. The standard of public morality was not very high. He himself had often used the silver bait with success and he knew that what had happened once might happen again. ### [c9.11](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.11) The first precaution he took was a judicious selection of the garrison. Every man was selected after a personal examination, and a shrewd judge of man though Shivaji was, he did not rely upon his personal judgement alone. Each man must furnish a surety for his good faith before he could be enrolled, and Krishnaji Anant Sabhasad says that generally someone of the royal personal staff was expected to stand surety for the new recruit.² But this was not all. In the army Shivaji had aimed at unity of command; in the fort he deliberately avoided it. No single officer was entrusted with the sole charge of the fort, it was therefore impossible for any single officer to betray it. ### [c9.12](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.12) ² Sen, Siva Chhatrapati, p. 29. ### [c9.13](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.13) In every fort there were three officers of the same status and conjoint authority. Of course they had their special departments and responsibilities but in everything of the least importance touching the fort they had to consult one another. The chief of these three officers was the \*Havaldar\*. He was the head of the garrison, the \*Sabnis\* was in charge of the accounts in general and the muster-roll in particular and the \*Karkhannis\* was mainly responsible for commissariat work. But their duties were so adroitly apportioned and so cleverly adjusted that nothing could be accomplished without the knowledge of all the three. The \*Havaldar\* was specially entrusted with the keys of the fort. It was his personal duty to see the gates bolted and locked after nightfall and he alone could open them at daybreak. But this work could not be delegated to anybody else, and Shivaji had particularly enjoined his \*Havaldars\* not to open the gates at night on any account. Malhar Ramrao Chitnis says that Shivaji had put the reliability of his \*Havaldars\* to the severest test. He went out on a tour of inspection, approached a fort at night, and asked the commandant to admit him. Some \*Havaldars\* were caught unawares, they thought that the law-maker was above his law and admitted Shivaji into the fort. They were sternly censured and degraded. But the \*Havaldar\* of Panhala successfully withstood the test. He was in turn cajoled and threatened, he was told that his master was being hotly pursued by his Musulman enemies, and he was in grave personal danger, but nothing could induce him to deviate from Shivaji’s regulations. He would provide for the personal safety of his prince, but the gates of the fort he would not unlock before the appointed time. The next morning he threw himself on the mercy of Shivaji who applauded his sense of duty and promoted him on the spot.¹ ### [c9.14](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.14) ¹ Chitnis Bakhar, ed. Kirtane, p. 108. ### [c9.15](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.15) The official duties of the \*Sabnis\* and the \*Karkhannis\* have been enumerated in a memorandum drawn up in the first year of the Coronation era. The \*Sabnis\* was in charge of accounts, and he was to put his signature on every order under the \*Karkhannis’s\* seal. All orders involving expenditure were issued by the \*Sabnis\*, but they were not valid without the signature of the \*Havaldar\* and the sign of approval of the \*Karkhannis\*. The daily accounts of the two departments were drawn up under the joint supervision of the two officers, but while the cash was indicated on the account by the Sabnis, the Havaldar had to put his seal and the Karkhannis his sign of approval on the papers. The muster-roll of the garrison was taken by the Sabnis while the Karkhannis’s department verified it. Similarly, the distribution of the stores was made by the Karkhannis but in the presence of a clerk of the Sabnis’s staff. The Sabnis had to explain all accounts to the superior audit officers, but the Karkhannis had to be present on the occasion to help his colleague.¹ We need not go into further details of this arrangement. From what we have seen it is sufficiently clear that while co-operating with one another in their official duties the three officers were at the same time serving as effective checks on each other. Even in his official correspondence the Havaldar had to take his colleagues into his confidence, for the letters were drafted and written by the Sabnis, and they could not be despatched until they had been entered in the daily ledger by the Karkhannis. ### [c9.16](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.16) ¹ Mawjee and Parasnis, \*Sanads and Letters\*, pp. 130-2. ### [c9.17](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.17) The system of appointing three officers in a fort was neither new nor unknown in Southern India, for it had been advocated, and probably practised by Muhammad Adilshah; but Shivaji went further. He definitely laid down that the Havaldar should be a Maratha of good family, the Sabnis should be a Brahman known to his personal staff, and the Karkhannis should be a Prabhu.² The Marathas were doubtless good soldiers and the Brahmans and the Prabhus were well versed in accounts and clerical work, but their professional proficiency alone does not explain Shivaji’s reasons for making military appointments on a caste basis; for good Brahman generals were not wanting in those days, and a Prabhu could very well be expected to perform the duties of a Sabnis as efficiently as those of a Karkhannis.³ Shivaji had clearly laid down that the three officers must be dissimilar in caste. This would at once minimise the chance of their joint action against the king and placate the three principal castes of Maharashtra by an equitable distribution of state patronage in a manner best suited to the peculiar genius and traditions of each. The Brahman was not well disposed towards the Prabhu, the Prabhu had no kindly feeling for the Brahman who had bitterly opposed his claims to Vedic rites, and a Maratha could be ordinarily expected to be more loyal to the king of his own caste than to his colleagues of superior castes. Thus Shivaji utilised the best abilities that the three castes could provide, at the same time that he exploited their dislikes and differences to his own advantage. ### [c9.18](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.18) ² Sen, \*Siva Chhatrapati\*, pp. 29-30. ### [c9.19](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.19) ³ There are instances of Prabhu Sabnises in the Peshwa period. ### [c9.20](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.20) But he had to provide against another danger, that of vested interest. A \*Havaldar\* or a \*Sabnis\*, if posted at the same place for a sufficiently long time, could, if he was so inclined, easily form a party of his own. The Bijapur Government recognised the hereditary rights of some officers called \*Naikwaris\*. These often created trouble and sometimes prevented the admission of a new governor into the forts for months, if their interest was in any way adversely affected.¹ Shivaji, therefore, transferred his officers from one fort to another, as his civil governors were frequently transferred from one district to another, and his ministers from one office to another, and, as in the army and civil departments, he recognised no hereditary rights in the forts. Every officer was appointed by the king to serve during his pleasure and his sons or relatives had not the least claim to the office left vacant by his death. ### [c9.21](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.21) ¹ Carwar letter dated 20 September 1671. Factory Records, Surat, Vol. 106, fol. 14. ### [c9.22](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.22) But in spite of these elaborate precautions Shivaji could not completely prevent treason and corruption. During his absence in the camp of Jai Sing the entire charge of the fort of Raigad had for the time being fallen on Keso Narayan Sabnis, as there was no \*Havaldar\*; the \*Sabnis\* availed himself of this opportunity for misappropriating a large sum of money from the public funds.² In 1663 Shivaji was compelled to postpone an expedition he had planned against the Konkan by the disquieting information of a rebellion in the fort of Sinhgad. In a letter dated 2 April, 1663, Shivaji wrote to Moro Trimbak Peshwa and Abaji Sondev that he was thinking of marching against Namdar Khan in the Konkan, but news arrived from Sinhgad that a revolt had lately taken place in the fort. He had, therefore, to give up his project of marching into the Konkan for the time being. The two officers were requested to march at once to Sinhgad with their troops and milita and take charge of the fort. They were further required to make an enquiry about the rebels and report their names to the King.¹ ### [c9.23](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.23) ² Rajwade, Marathyanchya Itihasachin Sadhanen, Vol. VIII, pp. 7-8. ### [c9.24](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.24) ¹ Ibid, p.11. ### [c9.25](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.25) Besides the three principal officers every fort had one or more \*Tat Sarnobat\* according to its size. The \*Tat Sarnobat\* was in charge of the defence and supervision of the rampart, or a section of it, if it was too big for a single officer, and every unit of nine soldiers in the garrison was commanded by a petty officer called a \*Naik\*.² The size of the garrison varied according to the size and the importance of the fort and according to the exigencies of the times. In times of special danger a fort was reinforced with men, provision, and stores, but the nominal strength of a garrison probably did not go above five hundred.³ These men were armed with swords and spears, bows and arrows, matchlocks and muskets. Against their assailants they also used rockets, which probably caused little harm to men, except when they by some lucky chance set fire to their powder store, but frightened away the war elephants. A more effective missile was the bomb, which was used in the defence of Purandar. In artillery Shivaji’s forces must have been very poor, for he had to depend entirely upon the European merchants for his supply of guns and ammunition, and what cannons he purchased from his French and Portuguese friends were certainly not of the best type. When a particular fort was threatened, Shivaji had to supply it with artillery from other places. But while he was weak in firearms, his enemies were not better equipped, and the garrison could often repulse an assault by rolling down huge pieces of rock as their assailants laboriously climbed up the steep hillside. Fryer saw ‘on the tops of the Mountains, several Fortresses of Seva Gi’s, only defensible by Nature needing no other Artillery but stones, which they tumble down upon their Foes, carrying as certain destruction as Bullets where they alight’.⁴ The use of stones for defensive purposes was by no means confined to Southern India or to Shivaji’s times. Sir Hector Munro and his men were violently assailed by stones when they attempted to capture Chunar,⁵ and Lord Valentia mentions the use of stones in the first decade of the last century when he found a range of useless and decayed cannon left in neglect near the important fort of Lohagad.¹ Ten years later Fitzclarence still found stones heaped near the forts of the Deccan when he passed through the country on his way to Bombay during the Pendhari war. ### [c9.26](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.26) ² Sen, \*Siva Chhatrapati\*, p. 29. ### [c9.27](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.27) ³ Fryer, \*A New Account of East India and Persia\*, p. 127. ### [c9.28](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.28) ⁴ Ibid, p. 123. ### [c9.29](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.29) ⁵ Caraccioli, quoted by Sir G. Forrest, \*The Life of Lord Clive\*, Vol.II, p. 273. ### [c9.30](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.30) ¹ Valentia, \*Voyages and Travels to India, Ceylon, The Red Sea, Abyssinia and Egypt\*, Vol. II, pp. 166-7. ### [c9.31](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.31) It may be mentioned here that a fort could be captured in two ways only — by effecting a breach in the walls by means of mines or cannonade and by escalading by means of rope ladders. Shivaji's men mined the ramparts of Phonda in 1675² and Tanaji recaptured Sinhgad by escalading its steep ramparts under the cover of darkness of night. For this purpose the Marathas sometimes employed an ingenious method. They tamed and trained the big monitor lizard or iguana, called Ghorpad in Marathi, and sent it to climb up the most difficult hillsides or ramparts with a rope round its body. It soon found a convenient cleft whereto it drove its nails and steadfastly clung and enabled a man to climb up the rope that hung loosely down.³ The rest of the operation was comparatively easy unless the intruders were surprised by the watchmen of the place. ### [c9.32](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.32) ² Factory Records, Surat, Vol. 88, Part II, fols. 48-9. ### [c9.33](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.33) ³ For an instance see Acworth and Shaligram, \*Aitihasik Povade\*, p. 44. ### [c9.34](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.34) In the defence of a fort vigilance alone was greatly needed. If the enemy ran mines the garrison had to countermine, but strong hill forts could not be easily or effectively mined. The only other danger against which the commander had to be careful was surprise. An open assault he generally tried to beat back by artillery, bombs and rockets supplemented by a heavy shower of stones. Sometimes he had to make a sally, as did Murar Baji Prabhu when Diler Khan tried to storm Purandar.⁴ But, generally, a fort was reduced by a lengthy blockade, and failure of provision alone led to capitulation. ### [c9.35](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.35) ⁴ Sen, \*Siva Chhatrapati\*, p. 53. ### [c9.36](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.36) Shivaji generally had his forts well stored with provision and ammunition, but the reduction of Panhala by Sidi Johar made him more careful. In 1671-72 he decided to have a reserve fund of one lakh and twenty-five thousand Hons, or nearly five lakhs of Rupees, to meet the extraordinary needs of beleaguered forts. This reserve fund was not to be touched if money was available from the ordinary sources. The paper that announced this decision runs as follows: ‘Rajashri Chhatrapati Saheb has decided to raise money from each mahal in his provinces and watans. This money should form a (reserve) fund and should be spent only when war with the Mughals would break out, and the Mughals would lay siege to forts, and money would not be available from any other source; otherwise this money should not be spent for any other government work. So has the Saheb (His Majesty) decided and it has been settled that a sum of one lakh and twenty-five thousand Hons should constitute the reserve fund, and should be raised from the following mahals and personages at the following rate:— ### [c9.37](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.37) | Kudal | .. | .. | 20,000 | | Rajapur | .. | .. | 20,000 | | Kolen | .. | .. | 20,000 | | Dabhol | .. | .. | 15,000 | | Poona | .. | .. | 13,000 | | Nagoji Govind | .. | .. | 10,000 | | Jawli | .. | .. | 5,000 | | Kalyan | .. | .. | 5,000 | | Bhiwandi | .. | .. | 5,000 | | Indapur | .. | .. | 5,000 | | Supa | .. | .. | 2,000 | | Krishnaji Bhaskar | .. | .. | 5,000 | ### [c9.38](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.38) It has been decided that the sum of one lakh and twenty-five thousand Hons (thus raised) should be set aside as a reserve fund’.¹ ### [c9.39](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.39) ¹ Rajwade, \*Marathyanchya Itihasachin Sadhanen\*, Vol. VIII, pp. 16-17. ### [c9.40](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.40) If the provisioning of the forts was necessary, their repairs demanded no less care; and in the same year another fund of one lakh and seventy-five thousand Hons was constituted for repairing his principal forts.² From the English factory records it appears that Shivaji often tempted workmen from Bombay with offers of better wages and better lodgings.¹ A shrewd man, he knew quite well that good work cannot be obtained without good pay and kind treatment. In the paper that announced the constitution of this fund, Shivaji observed that as the workmen did not get their wages regularly, they grew discontented and building and repair works suffered in consequence. He therefore set aside the sum of one lakh and seventy-five thousand Hons for building and repair work alone, which was allotted as follows: ### [c9.41](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.41) ² Ibid, pp. 181-9. ### [c9.42](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.42) ¹ We read in a Bombay letter : ‘Sevagee being abuilding and giving great wages, hath tempted several of our workmen to run away’ (February 1671-72). Factory Records, Surat, Vol. 106, fols. 73-4. ### [c9.43](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.43) | Raigad | .. | .. | 50,000 | | Sinhgad | .. | .. | 10,000 | | Sindhudurg | .. | .. | 10,000 | | Vijaidurg | .. | .. | 10,000 | | Suvarnadurg | .. | .. | 10,000 | | Pratapgad | .. | .. | 10,000 | | Purandar | .. | .. | 10,000 | | Rajgad | .. | .. | 10,000 | | Prachandagad | .. | .. | 5,000 | | Prasiddhagad | .. | .. | 5,000 | | Vishalgad | .. | .. | 5,000 | | Mahipatgad | .. | .. | 5,000 | | Sudhagad | .. | .. | 5,000 | | Lohagad | .. | .. | 5,000 | | Sabalgad | .. | .. | 5,000 | | Shrivardhangad } | .. | .. | 5,000 | | Manranjan | .. | .. | | | Korigad | .. | .. | 3,000 | | Sarasgad | .. | .. | 2,000 | | Mahidhargad | .. | .. | 2,000 | | Manohargad | .. | .. | 1,000 | | Miscellaneous | .. | .. | 7,000 | | Total | .. | .. | 1,75,000 | ### [c9.44](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.44) It does not appear that this huge sum was designed to be spent in a single year, for labour in those days was cheap and Shivaji had practically finished building his principal forts by the year 1671 when this fund was constituted. We shall not, therefore, be wrong if we hold that this also was somewhat in the nature of a reserve fund, as the previous one, to be used when money from the normal sources were not forthcoming to ensure regular payment of masons and artisans employed in the forts, although it is not explicitly mentioned in the paper quoted. ### [c9.45](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.45) The men who formed the garrison and their officers were not very highly paid. Although the chronicles are silent on this point, a few figures can be compiled from some contemporary letters that have come down to us. It appears that a \*Havaldar\* usually enjoyed a remuneration of 125 Hons a year. One Nagoji Bhonsle was appointed \*Mudradhari\* or \*Havaldar\* of Fort Utlur in 1677 on a salary of 150 Hons per year; out of this sum, however, he was expected to retain two servants on 25 Hons each.¹ Krishnaji Surevanshi was appointed \*Sarnobat\* of the above mentioned fort in the same year on an annual salary of 100 Hons. The \*Havaldar\* in charge of the buildings in the fort got the same pay as the \*Mudradhari\* and his \*Majumdar\* was paid at the rate of 36 Hons per year. Four \*Tat Sarnobats\* were sent by Shivaji to take charge of the ramparts of Kot Utlur and they were each engaged on an annual salary of 12 Hons (4 ordinary Hons and 8 Kaveripak Hons). Along with them had been despatched seven \*Bargirs\* on a yearly pay of 9 Hons (3 ordinary Hons and 6 Kaveripak Hons) per head. We can, therefore, assume that this represented the usual remuneration of a private serving in a fort. In a document dated 26 July, 1677, we find that Timaji Narayan, a clerk, was appointed as an extra hand for the office work in Fort Valgudanur, on a monthly allowance of 3 Hons.² Besides the usual remuneration, each officer got, according to his rank and the importance of his charge, an additional allowance for palanquin, torch-bearers, personal attendants, sunshades and pages. ### [c9.46](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.46) ¹ Rajwade, \*Marathyanchya Itihasachin Sadhanen\*, Vol. VIII, pp. 28-31. ### [c9.47](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.47) ² Ibid, p. 29. ### [c9.48](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.48) The outposts guarding the outskirts of a fort were left in charge of Ramoshis, Bhils and other predatory tribes. Their knowledge and better lodgings.¹ A shrewd man, he knew quite well that good work cannot be obtained without good pay and kind treatment. In the paper that announced the constitution of this fund, Shivaji observed that as the workmen did not get their wages regularly, they grew discontented and building and repair works suffered in consequence. He therefore set aside the sum of one lakh and seventy-five thousand Hons for building and repair work alone, which was allotted as follows: ### [c9.49](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.49) ¹ We read in a Bombay letter : ‘Sevagee being abuilding and giving great wages, hath tempted several of our workmen to run away’ (February 1671-72). Factory Records, Surat, Vol. 106, fols. 73-4. ### [c9.50](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.50) | Raigad | .. | .. | 50,000 | | Sinhgad | .. | .. | 10,000 | | Sindhudurg | .. | .. | 10,000 | | Vijaidurg | .. | .. | 10,000 | | Suvarnadurg | .. | .. | 10,000 | | Pratapgad | .. | .. | 10,000 | | Purandar | .. | .. | 10,000 | | Rajgad | .. | .. | 10,000 | | Prachandagad | .. | .. | 5,000 | | Prasiddhagad | .. | .. | 5,000 | | Vishalgad | .. | .. | 5,000 | | Mahipatgad | .. | .. | 5,000 | | Sudhagad | .. | .. | 5,000 | | Lohagad | .. | .. | 5,000 | | Sabalgad | .. | .. | 5,000 | | Shrivardhangad } | .. | .. | 5,000 | | Manranjan | .. | .. | | | Korigad | .. | .. | 3,000 | | Sarasgad | .. | .. | 2,000 | | Mahidhargad | .. | .. | 2,000 | | Manohargad | .. | .. | 1,000 | | Miscellaneous | .. | .. | 7,000 | | Total | .. | .. | 1,75,000 | ### [c9.51](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.51) It does not appear that this huge sum was designed to be spent in a single year, for labour in those days was cheap and Shivaji had practically finished building his principal forts by the year 1671 when this fund was constituted. We shall not, therefore, be wrong if we hold that this also was somewhat in the nature of a reserve fund, as the previous one, to be used when money from the normal sources were not forthcoming to ensure regular payment of masons and artisans employed in the forts, although it is not explicitly mentioned in the paper quoted. ### [c9.52](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.52) The men who formed the garrison and their officers were not very highly paid. Although the chronicles are silent on this point, a few figures can be compiled from some contemporary letters that have come down to us. It appears that a Havaldar usually enjoyed a remuneration of 125 Hons a year. One Nagoji Bhonsle was appointed Mudradhari or Havaldar of Fort Utlur in 1677 on a salary of 150 Hons per year; out of this sum, however, he was expected to retain two servants on 25 Hons each.¹ Krishnaji Surevanshi was appointed Sarnobat of the above mentioned fort in the same year on an annual salary of 100 Hons. The Havaldar in charge of the buildings in the fort got the same pay as the Mudradhari and his Majumdar was paid at the rate of 36 Hons per year. Four Tat Sarnobats were sent by Shivaji to take charge of the ramparts of Kot Utlur and they were each engaged on an annual salary of 12 Hons (4 ordinary Hons and 8 Kaveripak Hons). Along with them had been despatched seven Bargirs on a yearly pay of 9 Hons (3 ordinary Hons and 6 Kaveripak Hons) per head. We can, therefore, assume that this represented the usual remuneration of a private serving in a fort. In a document dated 26 July, 1677, we find that Timaji Narayan, a clerk, was appointed as an extra hand for the office work in Fort Valgudanur, on a monthly allowance of 3 Hons.² Besides the usual remuneration, each officer got, according to his rank and the importance of his charge, an additional allowance for palanquin, torch-bearers, personal attendants, sunshades and pages. ### [c9.53](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.53) ¹ Rajwade, Marathyanchya Itihasachin Sadhanen, Vol. VIII, pp. 28-31. ### [c9.54](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.54) ² Ibid, p. 29. ### [c9.55](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.55) The outposts guarding the outskirts of a fort were left in charge of Ramoshis, Bhils and other predatory tribes. Their knowledge of the jungle byways made them excellent watchmen, and as they were people of nocturnal habits, they were specially efficient in keeping vigilance at night. Tradition says that Shivaji was the first sovereign to employ Ramoshis as watchmen of his fortresses, and they seem to have performed their duty with loyalty and zeal.¹ Their work made it imperative for them to live outside the ramparts, and as their standard of living was abnormally low, they were contented with a small salary and some insignificant perquisites. Whether the latter was granted in Shivaji’s time we do not precisely know; but these soon became the \*watan\* of the Ramoshis, Bhils and Kolis who kept watch around the hill forts, and, like everything else connected with the Marathas, their office also became hereditary. ### [c9.56](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.56) ¹ Captain Alexander Mackintosh, \*An Account of the Origin and Present Condition of the Tribe of Ramoossies\*, pp. 56-7. ### [c9.57](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.57) The elaborate machinery designed by Shivaji to ensure his authority in the forts survived till the close of the Peshwa period, but it ceased to function with effect soon after his death. He had demolished the adulterine castles, but the new barons took possession of the very forts Shivaji had built or captured, and they served to strengthen the disintegrating forces of feudalism instead of uniting the country under a strong central government. They were no doubt still held on behalf of the King but not for him. ### [c9.58](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.58) When Shivaji died his kingdom was defended by two hundred and forty forts and strongholds and not one of them was held by a hereditary noble. But a complicated system, such as he had adopted in the administration of forts, required constant and vigilant supervision on the part of the King, and this was not forthcoming in Sambhaji’s time. He did not do away with his father’s institutions; but he did not possess his father’s foresight or his father’s industry. After his death things became worse. It was then possible for one single officer to betray the important fortress of Rairi which could and did stand a siege for months together. With the revival of feudalism in Rajaram’s time the chief officers of the State became the custodians of the forts. The celebrated fort of Purandar was held by the Sachiv; and in 1710-11 Parashram Pratinidhi was in charge of no less than thirty-five forts, of which the most important were Vishalgad, Pratapgad, Chandan, Wandan, Satara, and Kolhapur.² ### [c9.59](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.59) ² \*Peshwas’ Diaries\*, Vol. I, p. 54. ### [c9.60](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.60) It became customary for every military officer to secure at least one strong fort for the residence of his family, and Balaji Vishwanath pursued the same practice when he obtained from the Sachiv Shankraji Narayan the fort of Purandar. After the expansion of the Maratha empire into Malwa and Hindustan the Peshwa’s officers began to garrison the fortresses of the newly conquered province on their own account, and the contamination naturally spread among their subordinates as well. Thus there arose not only a number of hereditary military officers, but they were furnished with forts and strongholds where they could with impunity defy the authority of the central government. ### [c9.61](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.61) Under the Peshwa’s Government the three old officers were not only retained but they had all become \*Darakhdars\* or hereditary officers. Under normal circumstances they were not only succeeded by their sons or other legal heirs but even in their lifetime they could absent themselves from the fort, while an agent nominated by them carried on the duties of the office. The pay of a \*Havaldar\* or \*Sabnis\* or \*Karkhannis\* would naturally vary according to the importance of his charge, but when he lived in the fort with his family he got an additional allowance. In the year 1763-64 the \*Havaldar\* and the \*Sarnobat\* of fort Bahula got Rs. 125 each per year, while the \*Sabnis\* and the \*Fadnis\* were paid at the rate of Rs. 200; the \*Subhedar\* got Rs. 250 per year.¹ The \*Havaldars\* of Chawand and Ahmadnagar, however, got Rs. 360 and 300 respectively.² It will, however, be a mistake to suppose that this constituted their total salary, as they received a stipulated quantity of clothes in addition, and in those days of rampant feudalism some officers, at least, preferred to be paid by hereditary \*inam\* lands instead of cash. The \*Sabnis\* of Sinhgad in 1750-51 had an annual salary of 600 Rupees besides 100 Rupees worth of clothes, but he had two rent-free villages for his services, and the difference between his salary and the income derived from the two villages alone was paid in cash.³ ### [c9.62](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.62) ¹ Peshwas’ Diaries, Vol. IX, p. 347. ### [c9.63](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.63) ² Ibid, Vol. IX, pp. 356-7. ### [c9.64](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.64) ³ Ibid, Vol. III, p. 192. ### [c9.65](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.65) It is needless to say that these officers had lost under the new system much of their old importance. The expenses of a fort were paid out of the revenue of a number of villages attached to it for that purpose, and all the forts in a province were placed directly under the authority of the provincial governor. Thus we find that in 1774-75 the eighteen forts in the province of Bassein were all placed under the control of Visaji Keshav, the \*Mamledar\* of that province.¹ The fortress of Anjanvel, a naval station, was under the joint control of the \*Havaldar\* and the provincial governor, and while the latter had in his custody the key of the outer gates, that of the inner gates was in the possession of the former.² Such an arrangement naturally did not work satisfactorily, and in 1794-95 a dispute took place between Bapuji Shinde, the Governor of the province, and Babu Rao Salokhe, the \*Havaldar\* of the fort of Dharwar.³ The \*Karkhan-nis\* was sometimes so ill-paid that he did not care to live in the fort and attend to his official duties, and the Peshwa's Government had, therefore, to send inspectors not only to examine the stores and accounts of the forts but also for the distribution of ration and the payment of the salary of the garrison.⁴ In the Peshwa period forced and unpaid labour was employed for the building and repair works of the forts. Timber was supplied from the neighbouring forests and the neighbouring villages supplied the carpenters and unskilled labourers. And here again we notice a departure from Shivaji's practice. ### [c9.66](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.66) ¹ \*Peshwas' Diaries\*, Vol. VI, p. 199. ### [c9.67](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.67) ² Ibid, pp. 208-10. ### [c9.68](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.68) ³ Ibid, pp. 213-14. ### [c9.69](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.69) ⁴ Ibid, p. 211. ### [c9.70](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.70) The numercial strength of the garrison as before varied in different forts and at different times. In 1773-74 the garrison of Satara was reinforced by an addition of fifty new men owing to the troubled state of the country.⁵ The garrison of Lohagad, when that fort was held by one Dhondji in Nana Fadnavis's interest, varied from one to three thousand men according to circumstances.⁶ The salary of the private serving in a fort seems to have steadily improved since Shivaji's days. During the administration of Balaji Baji Rao the payment of a private varied from three Rupees to five Rupees and eight annas a month, and when he was transferred to a new fort, an increment¹ was given, but during the regime of Madhav Rao I, a private’s pay had risen as high as seven Rupees a month.² But it ought to be noticed here that during the Peshwa period an ordinary soldier did not get more than eleven and sometimes ten months’ wages for twelve months’ service, and he was generally long in arrears. From the time of Shahu Chhatrapati a new practice, that of paying the private in rent-free land, had come into vogue, and in 1774-75 such soldiers were allowed to serve in the forts by rotation, for they had to look after the cultivation of their lands as well.³ Sometimes they rendered no service to the State and had to be dismissed. In the closing years of the Peshwa period Sir Thomas Munro noticed a peculiar practice prevailing in the Southern Maratha country. Some small forts were provided with a hereditary garrison, and their commander alone with a few followers were sent from Poona.³ This was no doubt the extreme logical result of the feudal principles then in operation. ### [c9.71](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.71) ⁵ Ibid, p. 198. ### [c9.72](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.72) ⁶ Valentia, \*Voyage and Travels to India, Ceylon, The Red Sea, Abyssinia and Egypt\*, Vol. II, p. 171. ### [c9.73](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.73) ¹ Peshwas’ Diaries, Vol. III, pp. 198-200. ### [c9.74](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.74) ² Ibid, Vol. IX, p. 358. ### [c9.75](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.75) ³ Gleig, Life of Sir Thomas Munro, Vol. II, p. 268. ### [c9.76](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.76) ⁵ Ibid, Vol. III, pp. 190-1. ### [c9.77](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.77) The Peshwas not only encouraged but sometimes compelled the garrison to bring their families into the fort. This was probably a wise precaution. Shahu had compelled Sheikh Mira to betray his trust by putting under arrest his wife and children who were living in an unprotected village outside the fort, and the Peshwas rightly feared that such a pressure could be brought to bear upon their officers as well by an invading enemy. During the troubles created by the pretender Sadoba the Peshwa’s Government therefore not only permitted the garrison in the troubled area to bring their families within the fort, but also granted them an extra allowance and exempted them from some newly imposed taxes.⁴ ### [c9.78](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.78) ⁴ Peshwas’ Diaries, Vol. VI, pp. 203-4. ### [c9.79](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.79) The provisions of the forts were annually renewed. Old grain was sometimes given to the garrison in lieu of pay and sometimes sold, and new grain was bought out of the proceeds. Sometimes the Government went so far as to store in the forts ordinary spices and even tobacco.⁶ ### [c9.80](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.80) In the Peshwa period the forts were well supplied with artillery so far as quantity went. The artillery men were mostly foreigners, and they were better paid than the ordinary private. Rockets were still in use and rocketers were still employed in the forts, but stone had not been discarded. Big guns in a fort were cleaned once a year and small guns and muskets once a month, but it does not appear that they were very effectively served, for fort after fort was captured by the English in 1818 and 1819 without much difficulty. ### [c9.81](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.81) The process of denationalisation that we have noticed in the army, did not leave the forts unaffected, and when Baji Rao II fought against the English, most of his fortresses were mainly garrisoned by Arabs and non-Maratha Indians. ### [c9.82](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.82) What happened in the forts under the direct control of the Peshwa also happened in the forts held by his feudal subordinates. Only they were less efficiently garrisoned and provisioned when the feudal chief in question was not financially well off. In times of danger such a chief could in theory expect relief from the Peshwa; in practice the tardy arrival of reinforcement caused irreparable loss to the feudal baron and consequently to his master. So, in spite of the great natural strength of the country, it offered but a feeble fight when the Peshwa’s territories were finally conquered by the British. ### [c9.83](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.83) William Henry Tone reported to a Madras officer in the last decade of the eighteenth century that the Peshwa ruled over ‘a country of great natural strength, interspersed with mountains and defiles, all of which are defended by fortresses that are reserved as depots for treasure, or as retreats in the event of ill success or defeat. Perhaps no country on earth is better calculated for the purposes of defensive war; so that, whatever be the fortune of the Mahrattas in the field, we may safely pronounce, that in their own country, they will always be impregnable. I have counted in a day’s march through Candeish, nearly twenty fortresses, all in sight in different directions, Chandore, Unky Tunky, Saler Rouler, Nassick Trimmuck, Golna, and Mongy Tongy are all places of this description. A country so strongly situated is unconquerable; and of this truth the Emperor Aurangzibe, who made some attempt to subjugate it appeared latterly to be convinced.’¹ ### [c9.84](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.84) ¹ Tone, Illustrations of some Institutions of the Mahratta People, p. 16. ### [c9.85](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9.85) But the prophecy of Tone was belied, not because he had exaggerated the natural strength of the Maratha country or overestimated the defensive value of the Maratha forts, but because he had overlooked the primitive character of these strongholds, in architecture, in management, in their defensive and offensive arms. Since Shivaji’s days no improvement had been made in the military architecture of the forts; the feudal system that had since been revived had positively undermined the efficiency of the garrison as well as of the command; the artillery was not only not improved, but in the days of Baji Rao II, hopelessly neglected in places like Lohagad, while the English were far in advance of Aurangzib in organisation, artillery and military science. ## Linked texts (8) - [Korigad](https://indike.org/pramana/inp.monument.korigad) - [Lohagad](https://indike.org/pramana/inp.monument.lohagad) - [Vishalgad](https://indike.org/pramana/inp.monument.vishalgad) - [Pune](https://indike.org/pramana/inp.site.pune) - [Vijaydurg](https://indike.org/pramana/inp.monument.vijaydurg) - [Jawali](https://indike.org/pramana/inp.site.jawali) - [Supa](https://indike.org/pramana/inp.site.supa) - [Ciṭṇīs bakhar](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darkages.maratha.bakhar.chitnis-bakhar) — Malhār Rāmrāv Ciṭṇīs 1810, Marathi --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.polity.sen-1928.c9) · Pramāṇa