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History and Doctrines of the Ajivikas: A Vanished Indian Religion c22.s2: The Development of the Niyati Doctrine

History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas: A Vanished Indian Religion c22.s2

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The Development of the Niyati Doctrine

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For the early Ājīvikas Niyati is the ruling principle of the cosmic process. This concept of process, of the slow evolution of all entities along rigidly determined lines, is clearly stated in the Pāli and Ardha-māgadhī sources. The universe is, in fact, a dynamic one. But the Tamil texts which treat of Ājīvikism show that other views existed.

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niyamyate. S’ ápy anyayā, s’ apy anyay’ êty evam anavasthā. Śilāṅka, op. cit., fol. 289.

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We have seen that the atomic doctrines ascribed in the *Sāmañña-phala Sutta* to Pakudha Kaccāyana, which certainly had their effect on Southern Ājīvikism,¹ maintained that the elementary categories were as firm as mountains, neither moving nor developing nor in any way affecting one another.² The author of this passage conceives a static, not a dynamic universe. Similarly, Mahāvīra tried to convince Saddālaputta that his action in punishing a careless or immoral workman would be a real action, and not a mere illusion.³ Hoernle translates the phrase *niyayā savvabhāvā* not, as might be expected, as "all things are determined", but as "all things are unalterably fixed",⁴ which makes better sense of Mahāvīra's argument. Here are the germs of the static view of the universe ascribed to the Ājīvikas in *Nīlakēci*.

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¹ V. supra, p. 91.

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² V. supra, p. 16.

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³ V. supra, p. 230.

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⁴ Uv. Das., vol. ii, p. 132.

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We have no information as to the process of thought which led to the emergence of the new doctrine of *Avicalita-nityatvam*, or a completely static universe. It was probably imported into the Ājīvika system by the school of Pakudha, which seems to have played a significant part in the formation of the doctrines of the Southern Ājīvikas. The doctrine could easily be harmonized with the determinism of Makkhali Gosāla, and is, in fact, a logical development of the latter. We conceive the train of thought which led the Ājīvika teachers of the South to accept the doctrine to have been as follows: If all future occurrences are rigidly determined and there is no room for novelty in the universe, coming events may in some sense be said to exist already. The future exists in the present, and both exist in the past. Time is thus on ultimate analysis illusory, and if so all motion and change, which take place in time, must be illusory also. Thus, we have almost arrived at the system of Parmenides.

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This is the doctrine of the Ājīvika teacher in *Nīlakēci*. "Though we may speak of moments," he declares, "there is (really) no time at all."⁵ This sentence clearly shows that the Ājīvikas were well versed in the doctrine of the two orders of reality, which we have already suggested as the Ājīvika solution to the paradoxes of the Niyati theory.¹ In his sermon, however, the theory of the static universe is not explicitly stated. Such a theory is, however, criticized at length by his interlocutor, and commented on by Vāmanamuni, so it seems certain that it was held.

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⁵ Kaṇam ē-y eṉiṉ umm oru kālam ilai. Nīl. 677.

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¹ V. supra, p. 230.

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From this passage we obtain a clear idea of the theory, called by the commentator Avicalita-nityatvam, or unchanging permanence, which, for the Ājīvika, is said to obscure all knowledge of the truth.² Every phase of a process is always present. Just as the stars still exist after the sun has risen, so in a soul which has attained salvation its earthly births are still present.³ Nothing is destroyed, and nothing is produced.⁴ Events are rigidly fixed.⁵ The doctrine of Niyati had developed far from that of Makkhali Gosāla in the Pāli scriptures. Not only are all things determined, but their change and development is a cosmic illusion.

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² Avicalita-nityatvam keṭum ādaliṉ, uṇakku-t tattuvañāṉam illai-y ām. To Nil. 694.

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³ Nil. v, 695.

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⁴ [Text obscured]

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⁵ [Text obscured]

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This static view of the universe is countered by several arguments from human experience and common sense. If souls in a state of salvation retain their old incarnations in latent form the saint must from time to time show characteristics of the boar, and eat filth.⁶ If the passage of time is illusory the food we eat must already be excreta.⁷ The pragmatic argument is also used. The doctrine of unchanging permanency destroys all moral sanctions—the ascetic is still a householder, and may behave as such.⁸ The obvious unreality of the doctrine is illustrated by a number of homely examples. If it be true, ghee is on fire, and the child has already conceived. If all change is illusory, how can the elements rise and fall, as the Ājīvika doctrine itself claims ? ⁹ According to Avicalita-nityatvam a horse trots while still in its stable.¹⁰ How can the ripening of fruit be explained ? ¹¹ How can boats be hollowed from logs, or bowls be beaten from sheets of metal ? ¹² Even words undergo grammatical change.¹³ Causation must exist, for the child will not grow unless its growth is caused by adequate nourishment and care.¹ These examples show conclusively that the school of Ājīvikism treated by this text had a metaphysic very similar to that of the Eleatics.

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⁶ Ibid., comm. to 695.

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⁷ Ibid., 696.

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⁸ [Text obscured]

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⁹ Ibid., 698.

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¹⁰ Ibid., 699.

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¹¹ Ibid., 700.

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¹² Ibid., 701.

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¹³ Ibid., 703.

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¹ Ibid., 710.

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The other Tamil sources do not mention the doctrine of unchanging permanence. But the length at which it is treated in *Nilakēci*, and the reliability of that work, together with the traces of such a theory to be found in Northern works, are sufficient evidence that it was held by some Ājīvikas at least. Vāmana, the 13th-14th century commentator on the work,² seems to have understood the doctrine, and greatly expands and elucidates the elliptical verses of the text. From this we may infer that the static world view was held by some Ājīvikas until the sect lost its independent existence. It was probably conceived and elaborated by the ascetic leaders of Ājīvikism, and had little influence upon the laymen.

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² V. supra, p. 200.

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*Maṇimēkalai* and *Civañāṉa-cittiyār* stress the Ājīvikas' atomic doctrines rather than their determinism. Indeed the Ājīvika teacher in *Maṇimēkalai* is scarcely aware of the doctrine of *Niyati*, and merely states in a single line that Fate (*ūḻ*) is responsible for existence.³ *Civañāṉa-cittiyār* understands the doctrine, but here it is referred to in only one of the ten verses in which Ājīvika teaching is propounded, and in the six verses of refutation determinism is not explicitly mentioned. The text states that wealth and poverty, pain and pleasure, living in one country and travelling to another, are ordained beforehand in the womb, and that the world moves subject to a sure Fate.⁴ The reference to the womb in this verse suggests that with the school of Ājīvikas represented by this text, which is almost the latest of our sources, the orthodox Hindu and Jaina view was in process of replacing the traditional Ājīvika doctrine of *Niyati*. By this time the distinction between *Niyati* and *karma* had almost gone. In fact one verse of the *Civañāṉa-cittiyār* states that *kaṉma* is the cause of the incarnation of the soul.⁵ Ājīvika doctrine never wholly excluded *karma*, but insisted that it operated in an automatic and determinate manner.⁶ It seems that the status of karma rose as that of Niyati fell. This is strongly indicated by the commentary of Tattuvappirakācar to Civañāṉa-cittiyār, which interprets ūḻi (Fate, Sanskrit Niyati) as viṉai (action, Sanskrit karma).

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³ *Muṇnuḷa-v ūḻ' ē piṉṉum uru-v ippatu*. *Mani*., xxvii, 164.

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⁴ *Tēriya-v ūḻir paṭṭu-c celvat' ivv ulakam*. *CÑC*., p. 265, v. 9.

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⁵ *Caṇittant' ak-kaṉmaṭṭāl ē naṉṉiṭum urukkaḷ āki*. Ibid., p. 261, v. 6.

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⁶ V. supra, p. 225.

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It seems that within the later Ājīvika sect at least two schools emerged. With the first, typified by the Ājīvika teacher in Maṇimēkalai, Niyati was pushed more and more into the background. With the second, whose doctrines are discussed in Nilakēci, the Niyati doctrine developed into Avicalita-nityatvam, and new features emerged, which will be discussed in the following chapters.

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Just as the simpler Buddhists must have found the Theravāda teachings unpalatable and difficult to understand and developed for themselves a more emotional approach to their religion, taking some of their logicians and metaphysicians with them, so with the Southern Ājīvikas the sterile doctrines of Niyati and Avicalita-nityatvam seem to have been put on one side by some branches of the sect and replaced by more attractive and more intelligible teachings.

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With the decline of Niyati in importance the idea of the futility of human effort probably slipped into the background also. Nilakeci seems aware of the doctrine, and counteracts it with the usual argument, that it leads to antinomianism.¹ But Maṇimēkalai states that those who do not wish for destruction (aḻiyal vēṇṭār) will obtain the supremely white birth, and salvation.² This suggests not a mere acquiescence in Destiny, but a definite effort of will on the part of the believer. Indeed it is probable that the rigid determinism of Ājīvika theory never greatly affected Ājīvika practice, and that its influence on day-to-day life was negligible.

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¹ Nil, 697.

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² Maṇi. xxvii, 156.

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