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History and Doctrines of the Ajivikas: A Vanished Indian Religion c24.s3: The Soul

History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas: A Vanished Indian Religion c24.s3

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The Soul

c24.s3.1

Nīlakēci’s criticism of Ājīvika doctrines contains a verse giving surprising information about the nature of the soul (uyir, Skt. jīva). As we have seen, the material atoms were thought of as being too minute to be visible to mortal eyes.¹ Jīva, however, was the colour of a pālai fruit, and reached to the height of 500 yojanas.² We are nowhere told how the Ājīvikas justified this bizarre theory, which is quickly and easily disposed of by Nilakeci as being inconsistent with reason and common sense. The strange doctrine is not found in other Tamil sources, and we would be tempted to dismiss it as a fantastic invention of the Ājīvikas’ opponents, if it were not for the fact that the identical theory is to be found in a statement of heretical doctrine in the Pāli scriptures.

c24.s3.2

¹ V. supra, p. 265.

c24.s3.3

² Pālai-ppalaṭṭin irattaṇa vāy ppala māṭṭ’ oṭu kaṇ Nālē-t tunaiy um ak aṇr’ aintu nūrum pukai-y uyarntu Ñalatt’ iyaṇ ṟana nall-uyir eṇpatu nāṭṭukiṉṟay. Nil. 712. The pālai is blue (Chakravarti, Neelakesi, p. 240).

c24.s3.4

In the Buddha’s day speculation about the nature of the soul was widespread. The Brahmajāla Sutta of the Dīgha refers to heretics who declare the soul to have form and to be unharmed after death, while others maintain its formlessness.³ Buddhaghosa declares the Ājīvikas and others to be in the former category, while the Nigaṇṭhas or Jainas were in the latter.⁴ His obscure phrase ādisu kasiṇa-rūpam attā, may imply that the former school thought of the soul as having a complete form, or that Ājīvikas on the lower levels of spiritual development endowed it with form as a kasiṇa, or help to meditation. We have seen already that the Ājīvika soul theory did in fact differ from that of the Jainas in the manner stated by Buddhaghosa.⁵ The Petavatthu passage, which we have already mentioned in various contexts,⁶ confirms his statement.

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³ Rūpī attā hoti arogo param maraṇā saññī. Dīgha, i, p. 31.

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⁴ Sum. Vil. i, p. 119.

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⁵ V. supra, p. 267.

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⁶ Petavatthu, iv, 3, p. 57. V. supra, pp. 20, 146.

c24.s3.9

This passage contains reminiscences of the fatalism of Makkhali Gosāla, the antinomianism of Pūraṇa, and the positivism of Ajita; it also contains a reference to the seven-element theory elsewhere ascribed to Pakudha. It is impossible to slay another being, because the sword-cut passes between the interstices of the seven (scil. elements), which are thus literally atomic in structure. Life (jīva) cannot be cut or split, it is of eight parts, or octagonal (aṭṭhaṃso), circular, and 500 yojanas in extent.¹ Thus we find the enormous size of the soul according to the Tamil text confirmed by an independent source from a different sectarian tradition. Since the doctrine is not mentioned in other parts of the Pāli canon, and only occurs in one of the three chief Tamil sources, we may infer that it was only held by a small sub-sect of the community. If it had been widely held this fantastic theory would surely have attracted more attention than it actually did.

c24.s3.10

¹ Acchejjabhejjo jīvo aṭṭhaṃso guḷaparimaṇḍalo Yojanāni satā pañca. Ko jīvaṃ chetum arahati? Petavatthu, iv, 3, v. 29, p. 57.

c24.s3.11

The term aṭṭhaṃso is rendered "octagonal" in the English translation of the text.² No corresponding word or phrase occurs in the Tamil source; and it will be seen that it involves contradiction, since the soul is in the next word said to be guḷa-parimaṇḍalo, which must mean "round like a ball". The commentary to the Petavatthu tries to solve the paradox by explaining that according to this theory the soul is sometimes octagonal and sometimes circular.³ The commentary further states that the immense size of the jīva is found only in souls in their last stage before nirvāṇa.⁴ It is possible that the author of Nīlakēci intended to express this by the nall' (good), which is prefixed to the word uyir in the relevant verse.⁵ A further contradiction is to be found in the Pāli reference in the word -aṃso, which implies divisibility, while in the same line the soul is said to be indivisible (acchejjabhejjo). The Ājīvika soul theory is so strange that it may indeed have included these paradoxes, but since they are only to be found in one source they must be accepted with great caution.

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² Vimānavatthu and Petavatthu, tr. J. Kennedy and H. S. Gehman, p. 233.

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³ Aṭṭhaṃso guḷaparimaṇḍalo ti eso pana jīvo kadāci aṭṭhaṃso hoti, kadāci guḷaparimaṇḍalo. Paramattha-dīpanī, iii, p. 253.

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⁴ Yojanāni satā pañca ti kevalī-bhāvaṃ patto pañca yojana-sat'-ubbhedo hoti. Ibid.

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⁵ V. supra, p. 270, n. 2.

c24.s3.16

Equally questionable is the Tamil statement of the soul's blue colour, which is not confirmed by the Pāli text. That the *jīva* should have a permanent colour is scarcely compatible with the doctrine of the six spiritual colours, especially as blue, according to *Nīlakēci* the soul's natural colour, occurs very low in the list of *abhijātis*.¹

c24.s3.17

¹ V. supra, p. 243.

c24.s3.18

The enormous size of the soul, whether at all times or in the last stages of its progress, is identical in both sources, and may therefore be accepted. *Jīva* seems to have been thought of as an aura, extending far beyond the individual's body. Its structure was atomic, and, as we have seen, atoms could not interpenetrate. It is difficult to suggest how the Ājīvikas accounted for the fact that living bodies were capable of approaching one another; doubtless some answer was found to this problem, but it is now lost to us.

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