Vaishnavism, Shaivism and Minor Religious Systems v2.c13.348
Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems v2.c13.348
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v2.c13.348.1
We have noticed above the manner in which Bādarāyaṇa removes the inconsistency between God's developing himself into the world, while at the same time he is transcendent, and his being a simple spirit without parts. Śaṃkarācārya fairly explains, I think, Bādarāyaṇa's view. But raising a further objection he brings in his own doctrine eventually, that the so-called development of Brahman into the world is fancied by ignorance and is not true, that is, the world is an illusion. There are two doctrines indicative of the relation of God to the world, the so-called Pariṇāmavāda and the Vivartavāda. The former implies real development and the latter, an illusive development. This last is the doctrine of Śaṃkarācārya, wherefore his system should be called Singularism rather than spiritual monism; while the first is that clearly held by the author of the Sūtras. This is evident from his very definition of Brahman as that from which everything originates, in which everything lives, and into which everything resolves itself in the end, and from the manner in which in the first Pāda of the second chapter he answers the objections based upon the theory that an intelligent being cannot develop into non-intelligent or insensate matter;
v2.c13.348.2
and Śaṃkarācārya himself acknowledges at the end of his comment on II, 1, 14 that the author of the Sūtras follows the Pariṇāma doctrine, though to save his theory he imagines without any grounds that Bādarāyaṇa has in view the ordinary or illusory condition of things in doing so. Śaṃkarācārya’s Vivartavāda it was which the later schools of Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism contended against; for even according to him it leaves no scope for the relation of the ruler and the ruled, i. e. God and the devotee in the condition of reality when all illusion is dispelled and one spirit alone exists (II, 1, 14). Most of them adopted Bādarāyaṇa’s Pariṇāmavāda, but the distinctness of God, man and the world, which was necessary for the validity of their doctrines of worship and devotion, they secured by qualifying the mode of development. By this qualification they also steered clear of the inconsistency pointed out by Bādarāyaṇa in II, 1, 26, so that his mode of satisfaction was not necessary for them. Rāmānuja lays down that the rudiments of the individual souls and of the insensate world exist in God himself as his characteristics or body, and with these he develops into the world, thus giving rise to the three distinct substances, the material world, the individual soul, and God as the controller.
v2.c13.348.3
Nimbārka maintains that the other two substances do not characterise God or form his body, but are dependent upon him for their existence, and in a subtle form constitute his power or capacity, which develops into the animate and inanimate world. Viṣṇusvāmin, and therefore Vallabha, hold that the highest God, or Parabrahman, manifests himself as the material world, the individual soul, and the supreme controller, but in the course of development his attributes of intelligence and joy are concealed by his mysterious power, and thus is produced the material world, while, his joy alone being concealed, individual souls come into existence, and when the three are manifest or unconcealed, he becomes the supreme controller. Vallabha adds two other forms of Parabrahman or Puruṣottama, as mentioned in the section on his system. Madhva rejects the doctrine of God being the constituent cause of the world and consequently that of his development, and lays down the five eternal distinctions between God, man, and the world and between different individuals and objects involved in the last two. Of the older Śaiva schools, the Pāśupata brings in the Pradhāna of the Sāṃkhyas with its developments as the material cause of the world with Paśupati as the efficient cause. Śrikaṇṭha Śivācārya in his comment on Br. S.
v2.c13.348.4
II, 2, 38 states that according to his predecessors a certain branch of the philosophy based on the sacred texts revealed by Śiva (Agamas) held Śiva to be only the efficient cause of the world. This must be a reference to the Śaiva school which, as we have already stated, was a dualistic or pluralistic school. The Vāyavīyasaṃhitā according to him states that Śakti, or power, first originates from Śiva, thence Māyā, thence Avyakta (I, 7, 3). By Māyā is to be understood the wonderful creative power of Śiva, as is evident from the following verse 4; and Avyakta means the Pradhāna, as appears from that verse as well as verse 7. He gives another verse which sets forth that everything from the Śakti to the earth is produced from the essence of Śiva, so that Śiva through the Śakti is both the efficient and the constituent cause of the world. This Śakti is brought in by those who hold creation to be the development of Śiva, while it is not wanted for those Śaiva philosophers who would keep the creative principle Māyā or Pradhāna as distinct from Śiva and undergoing independent development. Śrīkaṇṭha explains the expression ‘Śiva alone existed’ occurring in ŚU. IV, 18, under I, 4, 27, by ‘Śiva, with whom the Śakti (the power) in the form of the animate and the inanimate world was united, alone existed so as to form one entity’, so that he here understands Śiva as possessed of the Śakti to be the constituent cause. In this respect his doctrine is similar to that of Nimbārka.
v2.c13.348.5
But immediately afterwards he speaks of the Cit and the Acit forming the body of Śiva and thus puts forth the same theory as that of Rāmānuja. Practically he makes no distinction between the two. The theory of the Liṅgāyats is the same as the first form of the theory set forth by Śrīkaṇṭha Śivācārya. Śiva as qualified by the Śakti is the creator, that is, is the efficient and the constituent cause of the world. The Kaśmīr Śaivism attributes the production of the world to the will of God without any material cause or affirms that God makes the world appear in himself.