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The Philosophy of the Upanishads c10.s2.t3: 3. Freedom and Constraint of the Will

The Philosophy of the Upanishads c10.s2.t3

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3. Freedom and Constraint of the Will

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In connection with the doctrine of Brahman as ruler of the universe, we propose briefly to consider the question of the freedom and constraint of the human will. Since the entire universe, so far as in general it has any existence, is only the self-manifestation of the âtman, there can be as little question in the Upanishads as with Spinoza of a freedom of the will within the range of nature. Such a freedom would assume a different character of the âtman. The standpoint of the Upanishads therefore is a rigid determinism :¹—" Man is altogether fashioned out of desire (*kâma*); according to his desire is his discernment (*kratu*); according to his discernment he does his work (*karma*)." ² "At the bidding of this imperishable one, O Gârgî, men praise the bountiful givers, the gods desire the sacrificer, the fathers the offerings to the dead." ³ They all, men, gods and fathers, cannot act otherwise than is in harmony with their nature. "For just as men here below pursue the aim after which each aspires, as though it were done at command, whether it be a kingdom or an estate, and live only for that (so in their aspiration for heavenly reward they are the slaves of their desires)." ⁴

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¹ Bṛih. 4. 4. 5.

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² Compare the similar remark in S'atap. Br. X. 6. 3, and Chând. 3. 14. 1.

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³ Bṛih. 3. 8. 9.

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⁴ Chând. 8. 1. 5.

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The words that immediately follow stand in sharp contrast to this statement. Just as Kant, after having in the most decisive manner affirmed the empirical constraint of the will by the eclipse of the sun which may be calculated beforehand, forthwith asserts in the very same line "that man is free," ⁵ so it is said further on in the passage quoted :—" Therefore he who departs from this world without having known the soul or those true desires, his part in all worlds is a life of constraint; but he who departs from this world after having known the soul and those true desires, his part in all worlds is a life of freedom." ⁶ The meaning of this contrast is evident; as sharers in the continuity of nature we are, like it, subject to necessity; but we are free from it as soon as, by virtue of the knowledge of our identity with the âtman, we are set free from this continuity of nature. That the âtman is exempt from the constraint of causality we have already seen (p. 154 ff.). Each of us is this eternally free âtman. We do not first become the âtman, but we are it already, though unconscious of the fact. Accordingly we are already free in reality, in spite of the absolute necessity of our acts, but we do not know it. “Just as he who does not know the hiding-place of a treasure of gold does not find it, although he may pass over it again and again, so none of these creatures find the world of Brahman, although they daily enter into it (in deep sleep); for they are constrained by unreality.”¹ “Those therefore who find this world of Brahman by Brahmacâryam (a life spent as a Brahman student in study and self-mortification), of such is this world of Brahman, and such have part in all worlds in a life of freedom.”² The constraint of the will, absolute as it is, yet belongs entirely to the great illusion of the empirical reality, and vanishes with it. The phenomenal form is under constraint, but that which makes its appearance in it, the âtman, is free. The real consistency of the two points of view is expressed in the words:—“It is he who causes the man whom he will lead on high out of these worlds to do good works, and it is he who causes the man whom he will lead downwards to do evil works.”³ How this thought assumes the form of a doctrine of predestination, in proportion as the âtman is conceived as a personal god, has been already shown (p. 172 ff.). But the entire doctrine of predestination, like the theism on which it depends, is in the Upanishads only an attempt to express in empirical forms what is essentially foreign to them. The eternally free âtman, who determines our doing and abstaining, is not another, contrasted with us, but our own self. Therefore it is said of the âtman :—" He fetters himself by himself (*nibadhnâti âtmanâ âtmânam*), like a bird by its nest."¹ And in Pras'na 3. 3 the answer to the question, how the âtman enters into this body is given :—" he enters into this body *manokṛitena*," which if we follow S'ankara would here mean "by the action of his will," although grammar requires a different conception (as *mano-'kṛitena*, "unconsciously"), an objection which (in spite of Ṛigv. I. 187. 7) it is difficult to pass by with a *sandhir ârshaḥ* (as Anandajñâna says).

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⁵ Krit. d. prakt. Vernunft, p. 120, Kehrb.

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⁶ Chând. 8. 1. 6; cp. the similar statements in Chând. 7. 25. 2, 8. 5. 4.

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¹ Chând. 8. 3. 2.

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² Chând. 8. 4. 3.

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³ Kaush. 3. 8.

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¹ Maitr. 3. 2.

Cites (6)