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The Philosophy of the Upanishads c10.s4.t2: 2. The Doctrine of Mâyâ in the Upanishads

The Philosophy of the Upanishads c10.s4.t2

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2. The Doctrine of Mâyâ in the Upanishads

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There are in the literature of the Upanishads some texts which, judged by all external and internal criteria, claim a higher antiquity than others; as for example the chapters of the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad, where Yājñavalkhya's views of the universe are developed.¹ We shall see how in these chapters more distinctly than in any other place the doctrine of the sole reality of the ātman and the unreality of a manifold universe outside of the ātman is enunciated. First however we propose to show how, as early as the ancient Vedic philosophy that preceded the Upanishads, the seed was sown which by Yājñavalkhya, whoever he may have been, was developed into the great fundamental thought of the Upanishads, which occupies the attention of all succeeding ages.

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¹ Bṛih. 2. 4, and 3. 1–4. 5.

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We saw² how as early as the later hymns of the Ṛigveda the thought was introduced, which here as always marks the first step in philosophy, the thought of the unity of existence. It involves, if only in germ and half unconsciously, the knowledge that all plurality—consequently all proximity in space, all succession in time, all interdependence of cause and effect, all contrast of subject and object—has no reality in the highest sense. When it is said in Rigv. I. 164. 46:—*ekam sad viprâ bahudhâ vadanti*, “the poets give many names to that which is only one,” it is implied therein that plurality depends solely upon words (“a mere matter of words,” as it is said later),¹ and that unity alone is real. In the attempt also to define more closely this unity, as we have traced it through the period of the Hymns and the Brâhmaṇas, the thought more or less clearly finds expression that it is not plurality that is real, but only unity;—“the one, besides which there was no other”;² “the one, inserted into the everlasting nave, in which all living beings are fixed.”³ When also it is said:—“This entire universe is the purusha alone, both that which was and that which endures for the future,”⁴ it is implied that in the entire universe, in all past and future, the one and only purusha is the sole real. The common people however do not know this; they regard as the real not the stem, but “that which he is not, the branches that conceal him”;⁵ for that “in which gods and men are fixed like spokes in the nave,” the “flower of the water” (*i.e.* Brahman as Hiraṇyagarbha), “is concealed by illusion.”⁶ This idealism, which denies the existence of the manifold universe, gained strength and complete definition by the introduction and ever firmer grasp of the conception of the âtman or self. This conception, as has often been pointed out, is essentially negative, and to that end claims to strip off from an object all that can be stripped from it, which therefore does not belong to the inalienable substance of its self, and is accordingly not-self. So long as only the âtman of an individual was taken into consideration, this not-self might perhaps be the self of another individual, and consequently real; so soon however as the conception of the âtman of the universe, the “great omnipresent âtman,”¹ which is “greater than heaven space and earth,”² was attained, that which as not-self was excluded from the âtman was by that very fact excluded from the sum of being, and therefore from reality. This cosmical âtman moreover, which admits no reality outside of itself, was at the same time present, small as a grain of rice,” etc.,³ whole and undivided in a man’s own self; and this identity of the cosmical and the psychical principle was always visibly preserved by the word âtman:—the self in us is the pathfinder of the great omnipresent Âtman.⁴ It is precisely this thought that is the starting-point of the teaching of the Upanishads, as it recurs almost word for word in the first instance in one of the oldest texts, Bṛih. 1. 4. 7 (which rests on the authority of Yâjñavalkhya, Bṛih. 1. 4. 3):—“this therefore is the trace of the universe, which is the âtman here (in us), for in it man recognises the entire universe, . . . therefore is this dearer than a son, dearer than a kingdom, dearer than all else; for it is closer than all, for it is this soul (âtman).”

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² Allgemeine Einleitung u. Philosophie d. Veda, pp. 103–127.

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¹ Chând. 6. 1. 3.

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² Rigv. X. 129. 2.

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³ Rigv. X. 82. 6.

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⁴ Rigv. X. 90. 2.

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⁵ *asac-c’hâkhâm pratishṭhantîm*, Atharvav. X. 7. 21 ; cp. also Dhyânab. 10.

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⁶ *mâyâ*, Atharvav. X. 8. 34 ; on passages like these, and the verse Rigv. VI. 47. 18, interpreted in a similar sense as early as Bṛih. 2. 5. 19,—*indro mâyâbhiḥ pururûpa’ îyate*,—the later introduction of the term *mâyâ* into philosophy in S’vet. 4. 10 may depend.

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¹ Taitt. Brâh. 3. 12. 9. 7.

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² S’atap. Brâh. X. 6. 3.

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³ S’atap. Brâh. X. 6. 3.

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⁴ Taitt. Brâh. 3. 12. 9. 7.

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A further amplification of this thought, which as already said goes back probably to the authority of Yâjñavalkhya, is found in the discourses of Yâjñavalkhya with his wife Maitreyî, the high antiquity of which is testified both on internal grounds and by the double recension of it, in two collections which antedate our Upanishad, and were first united with it at a later period.¹ Yâjñavalkhya begins his instruction with the sentence:—"In truth, not for the husband's sake is the husband dear, but for the self's sake is the husband dear." The same is then asserted, with constant repetition of this formula, of wife, sons, kingdom, Brâhman and warrior castes, world-regions, gods, living creatures, and the universe; they are all dear, not on their own account, but for the sake of the self. By the self is to be understood here, as the conclusion of the paragraph shows,² the consciousness, the knowing subject within us. And the thought is that all objects and relations of the universe exist for us, and are known and loved by us only in so far as they enter into our consciousness, which comprehends in itself all the objects of the universe, and has nothing outside of itself. Therefore it is said further:—"The self in truth we should comprehend, should reflect upon, O Maitreyî. He who has seen, heard, comprehended and known the self, by him this entire universe is known." As the notes of a drum, a conch-shell, or a lute have no existence in themselves, and can only be received when the instrument that produces them is struck, so all objects and relations of the universe are known by him who knows the âtman.³ In the âtman as the knowing subject space with all its contents is interwoven;⁴ all the heavenly regions are its organs;⁵ the universe of names forms and works, "although it is threefold is one, that is the âtman"; he is the immortal, which is concealed by the (empirical) reality,⁶ he is the reality of reality;⁷ from him spring forth, as sparks from the fire, all the vital spirits, all worlds, all gods, all living creatures;¹ in him they all are fixed, like spokes in the nave of a wheel;² “he oversteps in sleep this universe, and the forms of death”;³ only “as it were” he plans and moves;⁴ only “as it were” is there a duality;⁵ only “as it were” does another exist;⁶ he stands as spectator alone and without a second;⁷ there is in no wise a plurality:⁸—

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¹ Bṛih. 2. 4 and 4. 5 ; cp. Deussen, Upan., pp. 376-378.

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² Bṛih. 2. 4. 14.

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³ Bṛih. 2. 4. 7-9.

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⁴ Bṛih. 3. 8. 11, 4. 4. 17.

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⁵ Bṛih. 4. 2. 4.

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⁶ amritam satyena c'hannam, Bṛih. 1. 6. 3.

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⁷ satyasya satyam, i.e. that of the reality which is truly real.

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¹ Bṛih. 2. 1. 20.

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² Bṛih. 2. 5. 15.

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³ mṛityo rûpâṇi, Bṛih. 4. 3. 7.

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⁴ Bṛih. 4. 3. 7.

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⁵ Bṛih. 2. 4. 14.

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⁶ Bṛih. 4. 3. 31.

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⁷ Bṛih. 4. 3. 32.

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⁸ Bṛih. 4. 4. 19.

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In thought should it be heeded,
Here is no plurality anywhere;
By death is he bound fast to death
Who here contemplates plurality.

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The passages quoted belong almost entirely to the oldest Upanishad literature that we possess, and thus we meet, not for the first time in the later stream of this literature but equally at its beginning, a distinct entirely self-consistent idealism, connected with the name of Yâjñavalkhya, and according to which the âtman, *i.e.* the knowing subject, is the sustainer of the universe and the sole reality; so that with the knowledge of the âtman all is known. This thought which first makes its appearance in the discourses of Yâjñavalkhya in the Bṛihadâraṇyaka is never again surrendered, and dominates, it is true with certain empirical modifications of which it will be necessary subsequently to treat, the entire development of the doctrine of the Upanishads up to its conclusion with Bâdarâyaṇa and Śaṅkara. In the Upanishads we find it appearing in different forms. Thus upon it depends the question, which stands at the commencement of the Muṇḍ. 1. 3:—“What is that, most worthy sir, with the knowledge of which this entire universe becomes known.” The same question moreover, going back to Bṛih. 2. 4. 5 (and 1. 4. 7), forms also the starting-point of a text so old as Chând. 6. 1. 2:—“Have you then sought for the instruction according to which (even) the unheard becomes (already) heard, the uncomprehended comprehended, the unknown known?” The expressions *śrutam, matam, vijñâtam* recurring here already in the same form suggest a dependence of this passage on Bṛih. 2. 4. 5.

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In another way also we seem to be able to render this dependence very probable. We have already above found the Chândogya Upanishad reproducing word for word the passage in Bṛih. 3. 8. 9 touching the âtman as holding apart the phenomenal forms of the universe, as it was condensed in the description of the âtman as “the bridge that holds apart from one another,”¹ and betraying its dependence on the first passage by the fact that it no longer correctly interprets the meaning of the repeated words, since immediately after it represents the bridge separating the phenomenal forms of the universe as a bridge uniting the present world with the next. The case is exactly similar when the assertion of Bṛih. 2. 4. 5 that with the knowledge of the âtman all is known reappears in Chând. 6. 1. 2 in the request for the instruction by which even that which is still unheard, uncomprehended, unknown becomes already heard, comprehended, known. For the true answer to this request clearly consists in the fact that, as Bṛih. 2. 4. 5 and Muṇḍ. 1. 1. 3 agree in stating, with the knowledge of the âtman all is known. The author however of Chând. 6. 1 f.

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does not give this answer, but develops instead of it his theory of the three primitive elements, heat water and food, with the knowledge of which everything in the universe is known, because it is only a compound of these;¹ and further, in the three similes of the (white) clay, the (red) copper, and the (black) iron,² this tracing back of the white red and black element in things to water heat and food is already foreshadowed. The author therefore has failed to understand the meaning of the request for that with the knowledge of which all is known (i.e. for the one âtman); or rather, has intentionally altered it, and that in a sense which, while he sees the unchangeable not only in the “one without a second,” but in his triple classification also into heat, water and food, abandons the monism of the doctrine of the Upanishads and arrives at a triad of invariable essences combined in unity, thereby laying the earliest foundation for the Sânkhya doctrine of prakṛiti and the three guṇas combined in it.

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Otherwise and apart from this resolution of the unity into a triad, he holds fast to the fundamental proposition of Yâjñavalkhya, asserting that all change is “a mere matter of words, a simple name,” and that in truth there are only heat, water and food,³ although these last also, according to his own theory,⁴ are merely transformations of the “one without a second.” Therefore as a matter of inference in any case the qualification “depending on words and a mere name” would seem to underlie his judgement. All this shows that here the fundamental monistic position of Yâjñavalkhya has been taken over from tradition, but its bearing is no longer perfectly understood.

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¹ Bṛih. 4. 4. 22 :—*esha setur vidharaṇa’ eshâm lokânâm asambhedâya* ; cp. *sa setur vidhritir eshâm lokânâm asambhedâya*, Chând. 8. 4. 2.

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¹ Chând. 6. 4.

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² Very different from the similes of Bṛih. 2. 4. 7 f.

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³ Chând. 6. 4.

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⁴ Chând. 6. 2.

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We meet further on with the same fundamental principle of the sole reality of the âtman (the knowing subject) and the unreality of all else, when it is said in Taitt. 2. 6 of the empirical reality :—“for this men call reality”; and when in Ait. 3. 3 it is explained that all the phenomena of the universe are “guided by consciousness, founded in consciousness”; and when in Kaush. 3. 8 the proposition “this also is still a plurality” is interpreted to mean that as the spokes in the nave so “the elements of being are fixed in the elements of consciousness, and the elements of consciousness in the prâṇa,” seeing that it is the self of consciousness and bliss, undecaying and immortal.

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In later Upanishads we have to note that the emphatic denial of plurality in the verse quoted from Bṛih. 4. 4. 19 is repeated and amplified in the verses Kâṭh. 4. 10–11; and that finally, in S’vet. 4. 10, the advance of the realistic spirit of the Sânkhya is opposed by the assertion that the whole of prakṛiti is mere mâyâ. Faithful to the fundamental principle of Yâjñavalkhya, the Îs’â Upanishad in its opening words requires us “to sink the universe in God,” and adds to the denial of plurality in verses 12–14 the denial of change. Muṇḍ. 1. 1. 3 makes inquiry, as has been shown, for the âtman as that with the knowledge of which all is known. Mâṇḍûkya 7 describes the âtman as “effacing the entire expanse of the universe, tranquil, blissful, free from duality.” And even the late Maitr. Up. 6. 24 explains the proposition that all plurality is mere appearance by the brilliant comparison of the âtman with an alâtac’akram, a spark which, made to revolve, appears as a fiery circle. An expansion of this illustration is given by Gauḍapâda in the Mâṇḍûkya Kârikâ 4. 47–52; and this entire work is in general an eloquent exposition of the thought of the sole reality of the âtman, which is traced back to the oldest Upanishad texts, and is thenceforward uninterruptedly maintained.

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