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The Philosophy of the Upanishads c12.s2.t2: 2. Origin of the Doctrine of Emancipation

The Philosophy of the Upanishads c12.s2.t2

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English

2. Origin of the Doctrine of Emancipation

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Albrecht Weber in one of his very remarkable expositions² gave utterance to the conjecture that the doctrine of emancipation is necessitated by the dogma of transmigration. The idea that for the deeds of this brief life either eternal reward or eternal punishment must follow in the other world would have jarred upon the gentle disposition and thoughtful mind of the Indian. From this dilemma he tried to save himself by the dogma of transmigration. In reality however he only became deeper entangled, since on the eternal retribution *a parte post* is imposed yet another *a parte ante*. He therefore eventually saved himself by "cutting the knot," by representing the destruction of the entire individual existence as effected in emancipation; so that now that which in the olden time was reckoned as the severest punishment appears as the supreme reward of all endeavour. Apart however from the fact that the emancipation of pre-Buddhistic times was from beginning to end no annihilation, but rather the precise opposite, a transcending of that which was in itself worthless, this ingenious explanation fails to harmonise with the course of historical development, for the additional reason that, as we shall see, the doctrine of emancipation is older than that of transmigration, and cannot therefore be a consequence of the latter.

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² Zeitschr. d. D. M. G., ix. 239.

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The attempt has often been made to understand man's longing for deliverance from another side as the result of the heavy pressure upon the Indian people of the Brâhmanical system. Thereby, according to the view suggested, the ancient delight in existence had been ruined and lost in consequence of the subservience of the mind to the Brâhmans, and the body to the Kshatriyas. But not to mention that the conditions of life in the rich valley of the Ganges were in all probability hardly worse than formerly in the Panjâb, and that the idea of emancipation had certainly arisen not in the circle of the oppressed but rather in that of the oppressors, a disposition to pessimism, such as the theory assumes, was not at all peculiar to the times in which the doctrine of emancipation arose.¹ It is true that by emancipation suffering also with all its possibilities was removed; but Buddhism was the first to transform that which was a mere consequence into a motive, and by conceiving emancipation as an escape from the sufferings of existence, to make selfishness the ultimate mainspring of existence,—even if not to the extent that was done later by Islâm, which is never weary of depicting to the people the glories of heaven and the terrors of hell.

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¹ sup. pp. 140 f., 254 f.

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The doctrine in question cannot be derived from these or any other motives that have their seat in the will, for the very reason that it is the abrogation of all desire (yatra kâmâḥ parâgatâḥ), and that certainly as early as its very first appearance. Accordingly it remains to seek for its original motive in the sphere of the intellect; and here we shall find the doctrine of emancipation to be so entirely the necessary consequence and final consummation of the doctrine of the âtman, that it is to be regarded only as a personal and so to speak practical application of the Upanishad view of the universe as a whole, which we have hitherto been engaged in expounding. This we now propose to show.

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It is a natural idea that finds expression in all the systems of philosophy, when men regard that which for them is the first principle of things and the ultimate basis of the universe as at the same time the highest aim of personal endeavour. In olden times this was the gods, and thus union with the gods after death was the supreme wish of the ancient Vedic ṛishis, in order to attain to fellowship (sâyujyam), companionship (salokatâ), community of being (sarûpatâ) with Agni, Varuṇa, Indra, Aditya, etc. Later on the (impersonal) Brahman was exalted above the gods. This then became the final goal; and the gods were only the doors, through whom Brahman might be attained. “By Agni as the door of Brahman he enters in. When by Agni as the door of Brahman he enters in, he gains fellowship (sâyujyam), and companionship (salokatâ) with Brahman.”[1] In the final step the creative principle of the universe was conceived to be the âtman, the self, and as was to be expected union with the âtman became now the aim of all endeavour and longing. This took place before anything was yet known of transmigration, but only of a renewed death in the other world, as the following passages prove. “Only he who knows him (the purusha) escapes from the kingdom of death; by no other road is it possible to go";¹ "He who knows him, the wise long-emancipated youthful âtman, no more fears death";² "The self (âtman) is his pathfinder, he who finds him is no longer stained by action, that evil thing."³ The last expression in particular shows that here the thought of emancipation is already present in all its entirety. So also in the following passage, which has been already quoted above for another purpose:—"Himself (the âtman) is free from desire, in possession of all that he desires, no desire for anything whatever (tempts) him. With reference to this is the following verse:—

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¹ S'atap. Br. 11. 4. 4. 1.

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¹ Vâj. Saṁh. 31. 18.

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² Atharvav. 10. 8. 44.

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³ Taitt. Br. 3. 12. 9. 8.

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By knowledge they climb upwards
Thither, where desire is at rest;
Neither sacrificial gift reaches thither,
Nor the penance of the ignorant.

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For yonder world cannot be attained by sacrificial gifts or by asceticism by the man who does not know this. For that state belongs only to him who has this knowledge."⁴ The rejection of work and asceticism, the emphasising of knowledge, and the suppression of all desire, are proofs that this passage has in view emancipation as a union with the âtman. But this union is still represented in harmony with traditional ideas as an ascent to heavenly regions,—as though the âtman were to be sought elsewhere than in ourselves. Thus a few pages further on in the passage S'atap. Br. 10. 6. 3, already translated above,⁵ which teaches that destiny in the other world is determined by the degree of insight (kratu) which men have attained here below; and which then as the deepest insight imparts the knowledge of the âtman, who, filling all space and pervading all the universe, is greater than heaven and earth, and yet smaller than a grain of rice or millet, dwells in the inner self. In conclusion it is said:—"He is my soul (*âtman*); thither to this soul on my departure hence shall I enter in."¹ Who does not feel the inner contradiction of these words, and that if the *âtman* is really my soul, no further entrance into it is needed!

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⁴ S'atap. Br. 10. 5. 4. 15.

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⁵ Allgemeine Einleitung u. Philosophie des Veda, p. 264.

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¹ S'atap. Br. 10. 6, 3.

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A slight barrier only remained to be thrown down in order to see that that which is ever being sought at an infinite distance is nearer to us than anything else, and that the emancipation desired as union with God, union with Brahman, union with the *âtman*, does not require to be attained for the first time in the future after death, but is actually attained already here and now and from the very beginning,—by him "who knows this."

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It is Yâjñavalkhya of the Bṛihadâraṇyaka who meets us again as the man who drew this final consequence of the doctrine of the *âtman*.

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