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The Philosophy of the Upanishads c12.s3.t1: 1. Introduction

The Philosophy of the Upanishads c12.s3.t1

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English

1. Introduction

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Every theory of the universe includes judgements on the relative value or worthlessness of objects, and thereby secures an influence on our practical conduct. Every philosophical system therefore has an ethical side, whether it be matured or not into a special ethical system; and it is precisely this side to which our feeling attaches so great importance that we are inclined to estimate the value of a philosophical theory of the universe by the ethical consequences which have resulted or may be derived from it. We allow ourselves to be guided in these matters by the old adage,—"By their fruits ye shall know them."³ Even this saying however cannot be taken without limitations. For to continue the illustration employed by Jesus, it may happen that a tree is good and yet bears no, or no good fruit,—possibly because its blossoms are prematurely touched by the cold breath of the knowledge of the truth.

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³ Matt. 7¹⁶.

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This may in fact have been the case in India. Eternal philosophical truth has seldom found more decisive and striking expression than in the doctrine of the emancipating knowledge of the âtman. And yet this knowledge may be compared to that icy-cold breath which checks every development and benumbs all life. He who knows himself as the âtman is, it is true, for ever beyond the reach of all desire, and therefore beyond the possibility of immoral conduct, but at the same time he is deprived of every incitement to action or initiation of any kind; he is lifted out of the whole circle of illusory individual existence, his body is no longer his, his works no longer his, everything which he may henceforth do or leave undone belongs to the sphere of the great illusion, which he has penetrated, and is therefore of no account. Accordingly he lives îdṛis'a eva, “as it happens,”¹ and though he wish for a hundred years of life and enjoyment, no action will defile him, or will defile you, evam tvayi, “when you are thus,” i.e. when the universe is for you plunged in the abyss of the divine being. Only painfully and artificially has the Bhagavad Gîtâ the skill to derive from these premisses a demand for heroic action, as we shall see in a later part of our work. When the knowledge of the âtman has been gained, every action, and therefore every moral action also, has been deprived of meaning.

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¹ Bṛih. 3. 5. 1; he is yâdṛicchika, Mâṇḍûkya-K. 2. 37, Paramahaṁsa Up. 4.

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Moreover moral conduct cannot contribute directly, but only indirectly, to the attainment of the knowledge that brings emancipation. For this knowledge is not a becoming something which had no previous existence, and might be brought about by appropriate means, but it is the perception of that which previously existed, existed indeed from all eternity. It is compared (as early as the later Upanishads) with awakening,¹ and like that follows of itself² and not by design:—

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² Îs'a. 1. 2.

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¹ *prabodha*, Haṁsa Up. 1, Âtmaprabodha 1, Gauḍap. 1. 14, 3. 40, 4. 92, 98 ; cp. *prabuddha*, Bṛih. 4. 4. 13 ; *pratibodha*, Kena 12 ; *jâgrata*, Kâṭh. 3. 14 ; *boddhum*, Kâṭh. 6. 4 ; *nityaḥ*, *śuddho*, *buddhaḥ*, Nṛisiṁhott. 9.

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² Kâṭh. 2. 23.

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In the infinite illusion of the universe
The soul sleeps; when it awakes
Then there wakes in it the Eternal,
Free from time and sleep and dreams.³

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³ Mâṇḍûkya-Kâr. 1. 16.

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It was first at a later period, when the method of empirical knowledge took entire possession of the doctrine of emancipation, and conceived it as has been shown under the category of causality, that the knowledge through which deliverance is attained came to be regarded as a becoming something, as an effect of definite causes, which might therefore be brought about by promoting such causes. Thus emancipation was conceived, again empirically, in accordance with the external signs which it manifested. These signs were principally two:—
(1) The removal of all desire.
(2) The removal of the consciousness of plurality.

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It was worth while therefore to produce or at least to expedite emancipation by artificial means, and the result was two remarkable manifestations of the culture of India, which are contained in germ in the older Upanishads, and in a series of later Upanishads pass through a complete development.
(1) The Sannyâsa.
(2) The Yoga.

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The former seeks by artificial measures to suppress desire, the latter the consciousness of plurality, and thus to secure the attainment of the knowledge through which deliverance is wrought, as far at least as its external signs are concerned. Practical philosophy is comprised in these two manifestations of culture, which pursue their course on parallel lines, and often touch; and it has been developed out of the thoughts of the Upanishads (empirically conceived). This we have yet briefly to treat, as far as the materials afforded by the Atharva Upanishads will allow us. First however we propose to gather together here the most important ethical ideas which present themselves in the Upanishads, not so much arising from the âtman doctrine as holding a place by its side.

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