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The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c5.s3.t3: 3. Admission of the Gods; their rôle in the Vedânta system

The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c5.s3.t3

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3. Admission of the Gods; their rôle in the Vedânta system

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One would err if one held the being of the Gods (*deva*, *devatâ*) to be incompatible with the strict monistic teaching of our system of the Brahman as the Lord (*îçvara*) the omnipresent (*sarvagata*), the one without a second (*ekam eva advitîyam*). On the contrary, they are as real as the rest of the world: the phenomenal existence which the latter has, they also have, and the Gods of the Indian popular creed (whose retention was besides already necessitated by the recognition of the *Karma-kâṇḍa* and the *Karma-mîmânsâ* cf. above p. [18 ff.]), are as little denied by the Vedânta as the Gods of Greece were by Plato or Epicurus, even if, as in the latter case, they play no particular rôle, and the ideas of them which are occasionally found cannot very well be made to agree.

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In general the Gods, at whose head as a rule, Indra is mentioned,⁴¹ are, for our authors, still what they were in the Rigveda, personifications of natural forces and natural phenomena; and an attempt to resolve them into the corresponding natural elements⁴² is rejected in the following way (p. 309, 11):

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⁴¹ *Indra-âdayaḥ* p. 281, 8. 9. 282, 5. 7. 287, 4, etc.—From quite different ideas came the sporadically occurring *Hiraṇyagarbha-âdaya’ îçvarâḥ*, who at the disappearance of the world do not disappear like the other Gods and beings, but, as it seems, only pass the time in sleep, and at the new creation of the world, help the *îçvara*; p. 300, 3. 4. 9. 301, 1. 303, 9; cf. *Hiraṇyagarbha* as *prathamaja* p. 339, 3, as *adhyaksha* in the lower world of *Brahma* p. 1121, 13; *mahân* (*Kâṭh. 3, 11*) as *Hiraṇyagarbhî buddhiḥ* p. 343, 3; *sarva-karaṇa-âtmani Hiraṇyagarbhe brahma-loka-nivâsini* p. 247, 6; *samashṭi-vyashṭi-rûpeṇa Hiraṇyagarbheṇa prâṇâtmanâ* 724, 8; and the (*râja-*) *Vaivasvata-âdaya’ îçvarâḥ* p. 397, 8.

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⁴² (P. 307, 4). "To the disk of light dwelling in the heaven, which "lightens the world, mightily wandering by day and night [and the other "corresponding natural phenomena] apply the words which speak of Gods "as *Âditya* [the sun-god] and the like, as the ordinary use of the word, "as also the consistent sense of the passages shows; and it is not fitting "to ascribe to the light-disk individuality (*vigraha*) with a heart etc., "spirituality and needs and the like, as it is clear that, like the earth etc., "they are without spirit (*cetana*). This holds good also for Agni [Fire "and God of fire] and the others."

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“The names of the Gods, like *Âditya* and so forth, even if “they refer to light etc., compel us, according to the scriptures, “to assume spiritual beings corresponding [to the elements] “gifted with *aiçvaryam* (ruling power); for they are thus “used in the Mantra’s and Brâhmaṇa’s; and the Gods have, in “virtue of their *aiçvaryam*, the power of remaining as the “Self (*âtman*) of light etc., or, according to their pleasure, of “taking this or that individuality (*vigraha*); for the scriptures “say, in explaining the *Subrahmaṇyâ* formula [Shaḍviṅça-br. “1, 1]: ‘*O ram of Medhâtithi,*’—that is as ram he [Indra, as “Çaṅkara adds] once stole Medhâtithi, the scion of *Kâṇva*;’ and as the Smṛiti relates [Mahâbh. 1, 4397], *Âditya*, as a man “visited Kuntî; also the earth etc. have, according to the “scriptures, spiritual overseers, for it is said [Çatap. Br. 6, 1, “3, 2, 4] ‘the earth said’—‘the waters said’; and, even if the “natural elements, as the light in the sun, and so on, are “without spirit, still they have, to judge by the part they play “in the Mantra’s and Brâhmaṇa’s, God-like beings as their “spiritual overseers.”

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As such “overseers” and “disposers,” the Gods act especially in the life-organs (p. 186, 6: *devatâ-âtmâ indriyasya adhi-shṭhâtâ*, p. 728, 9: *karaṇânâm niyantṛishu devatâsu*), in which they entered according to Ait. 1, 2, 4, *Agni* as speech, *Vâyu* as breath, *Âditya* as eye, and so on (p. 423, 14); for, though the organs in themselves are capable (*çakta*) of doing their own work, yet they do it only like a cart, which must be drawn by an ox (p. 727, 1); however, the Gods do not therefore take part in the enjoyment [and suffering] which in the body is the lot only of the individual soul (p. 727, 13;—the Gods are only *bhoga-upakaraṇa-bhûta*, the soul alone is *bhoktar*, enjoyer, p. 379, 4), for the soul alone is stained by good and bad, affected by pleasure and pain (p. 728, 3), while the Gods are free from all evil (p. 728, 6); as also at death they do not wander forth with the life organs and the soul, but withdraw their assisting power (p. 745, 8), partly in order to hold intercourse on the moon with the (temporarily) blessed (p. 750, 5), partly, to show the way through the different heavenly regions, to the soul entering into the Brahman (p. 1117, 11).

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III. Who is called to the study of the Vedânta?

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As for the rest, the Gods dwell in the highest region of sovereignty (parasmin aiçvarye pade p. 728, 4), but all their aiçvaryam is dependent on the Parameçvara (p. 217, 7), the “highest lord,” that is the Brahman: this is the Âtman (the (Self), as in everything else, so also in the Gods (Âtmâ devânâm Chând. 4, 3, 7); it is the Antaryâmin (inner ruler), which, according to Brih. 3, 7, inwardly rules all beings, all organs, and so also all Gods without their being conscious of it themselves, being for that reason, in this sense, different from their empirical self (devatâtman, p. 196, 6). The Îçvara (Lord), as the Brahman is called by preference in these exoteric discussions, is further the power that creates Gods, men and beasts, being guided in doing so strictly by the merit and demerit of the soul in a previous existence (p. 492, 12), and in accordance with this, has destined animals to unending suffering, men to a middle state, and the Gods to “unending enjoyment” (p. 491, 6). But this “unending enjoyment,” like everything except the Brahman, comes at last to an end; the immortality of the Gods is a relative one (âpekshikam p. 326, 4. 241, 14) and means only longevity (p. 193, 12); they are also entangled in the Samsâra (the circle of transmigration), are mere products (vikâra p. 195, 13. 280, 3) doomed to transitoriness and want; for, as the scripture (Brih. 3, 4, 2) says: “whatever is different from Him is subject to sorrow” (p. 241, 15), and for this reason the Gods also are called to the saving knowledge, as we shall now consider more closely.

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First it is to be noted that the Gods are nowhere in the scriptures excluded from the Brahmavidyâ (p. 281, 1). They have, it is true, no part in the Upanayanam (initiation by a teacher), but they do not require this; for the aim of this ceremony is merely admission to the study of the Veda, which is of itself revealed (svayam-pratibhâta) to the gods (p. 281, 3). Moreover, there are even instances of gods and Rishis becoming Brahman pupils, like Indra of Prajâpati (Chând. 8, 7—12) and Bhrigu of Varuna (Taitt. 3, 1). In the hearts of the Gods too (according to Kâth. 4, 12) dwells the Purusha (Brahman) “a thumb’s breadth in height,” for the purpose of knowledge,—

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naturally in the case of the gods, we are to understand the breadth of a God's thumb (p. 282, 1).

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Moreover, the Gods are capable of liberation, because, according to the witness of the Mantra's, Brâhmaṇa's, Itihâsa's, Purâṇa's and popular belief, they possess individuality (*vigrahavattvam*) (p. 280, 9), and need liberation, because their power (*vibhûti*) belongs to the sphere of the changeable and is therefore transitory (p. 280, 7).

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Now against these two assumptions very serious difficulties are raised.

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First objection: The asserted individuality of the gods, says the opponent, is neither real nor possible. It is not real, because, although the gods are present when sacrifices are offered to them, they are not perceived (p. 282, 7), and it is not possible, because individuality cannot be in several places at the same time; but the gods can so, since Indra for instance is often recipient of offerings in several places at the same time (p. 282, 8).

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To this it is to be rejoined: The gods are not seen at sacrifices, because they have the power to make themselves invisible (p. 284, 5), and they can be in several places at the same time, because they are able to divide their being (*âtman*) into different forms (p. 284, 4); for even the Yogin, according to the *Smṛiti* (Mahâbhâratam 12, 11062), can multiply his body a thousand-fold, in order to enjoy the things of sense in one form, and to undergo frightful penances in another (p. 283, 9), how much more to the gods, who, according to one Vedic passage (Bṛih. 3, 9, 1), are first counted as 303 and 3003, that is 3306, and then as only 33, with the explanation that the greater number indicates only their powers (*mahimânas*), as the 33 are again reduced to one only, since the being of them all is *Prâṇa*, the Life (that is, here, the Brahman) (p. 283).

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Second objection: If the gods are, like ourselves, individuals, they must also, like ourselves, be born and die⁴³; now the Veda is eternal (in the spirit of the Creator, who "breathed it out" as the Vedânta affirms, p. 48, 6 after Bṛih. 2, 4, 10), and the Veda speaks of the gods. How is this possible if the gods are not also eternal (p. 285, 8)?

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⁴³ P. 285, 7; a quite correct deduction, which is also not contested by Çankara, but is in another place expressly stated by him (p. 598, 11).

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This objection forces the composer of the commentary, and, perhaps, even the composer of the Sûtra's (cf. 1, 3, 30), to a very remarkable theory, which comes very close to Plato's doctrine of ideas; and, as we have no ground at all for supposing that either side has borrowed from the other, this bears witness to the fact, that there is something in the nature of things, which tends towards Plato's teaching, to lead to which the teaching of the Indian can be of use.

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It is true, he says, the individual Gods are transitory, and the word of the Veda, which speaks of them, is eternal; but the words of the Veda, for instance the word "cow" occurring in the Veda, does not refer to individuals (to any separate cow), but to "the object of the words: cow etc." (çabda-artha p. 286, 6), that is, to the species; and in just the same way the word "Indra" means, not an individual, but a certain position (sthâna-viçeṣa), something like the word "General;" whoever occupies the position, bears the name (p. 287, 5).

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Therefore we must make a distinguish between the individuals (vyakti, p. 286, 7, and also p. 464, 5, literally: "manifestation"), which are transitory, and the species (âkṛiti, that is "form," "shape," "εἶδος,") which are eternal; p. 286, 7: "For though the individuals, as cows etc. originate, their species do not thereby originate; for in substances, qualities and activities originate the individual appearances (vyakti), not the forms of the species (âkṛiti), and only with the species, not with the individuals are the words [of the Veda] connected, "for with the latter, on account of the eternity [of the Veda],

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yadd hi loke iyattâ-paricchinnaṃ vastu ghaṭa-âdi, tad antavad dṛiṣṭam) with a profound feeling that what is limited in space must be so in time also; of which the sole exception, perhaps is matter (that is) if its quantity in space is limited, (which we do not know), which, however, as such, is an abstraction without individual existence.—Among the Greeks this thought was expressed by Melissos, ap. Simplic. in Aristot. Phys. fol. 23b: οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνυστὸν, ὅ,τι μὴ πᾶν ἐστι.

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“no connection can be admitted. Therefore, though the individuals originate, the species, in words like cow etc., are eternal; “therefore there is no contradiction; in just the same way there “is no contradiction in the case of names [of the gods] like “Vasu and the like, because the species of the gods are eternal, “even when an origin is admitted for the individuals.”

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These eternal species of things, as they are stored up in the Veda as the everlasting repository of all wisdom and knowledge, are, however, for our author not mere forms (*ākṛiti*, *εἶδος*), but the conception of them, exactly as in Plato (Soph. p. 247 D. ff.) approaches that of the efficient powers (*çakti*, *δύναμις*), from which the universe, after its disappearance, originates again and again; p. 303, 1: “This world in truth “disappears, but in such fashion that the powers remain, and “these powers are the root from which it comes forth anew; “for otherwise we should have an effect without a cause. Now “it cannot be assumed that the powers [from which the world “comes forth anew] are different in kind [from those from which “it formerly came forth]. Therefore it must be granted that, “in spite of the constantly repeated interruption [of the course “of the world], a necessary determination (*niyatatvam*) exists “in the beginningless *Samsāra* for the [newly] developing series “of worlds, as the earth etc., for the series of groups of living “beings, gods, animals and men, and for the different con“ditions of castes, *Āçrama’s*, duties and rewards, like the “necessary determination in the correlation of the [five] sense“organs with the [five] elements: for in the case of these “also, we cannot admit as possible a difference for each new “creation, so that there might be a sixth sense-organ and “element.⁴⁴ While therefore the process of the world in all “world-periods (*kalpa*) is similar and makes it possible [in a “new creation] to be guided according to the process in the “former world-period, therefore at every creation the differences “of the same names and forms are present in the mind of the “creators (īçvarāḥ cf. n. 41), and in consequence of the likeness “of names and forms it happens that, even if a return of the “world by means of a collective evolution and a collective “disappearance is maintained, yet the authority and so forth “of the word of the Veda suffers no injury.”

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⁴⁴ P. 303, 7: *shashṭha-indriya-vishaya*; in the same way, as an example of impossibility p. 415, 1: *shashṭhasya iva indriya-arthasya*.—Of other scholastic examples, to indicate impossibility, there occur in our work: *bandhyā-putra* (the son of the barren) p. 570, 12 and *çaça-vishāṇam* (hare's horn) p. 564, 1. 4. 8. 565, 7. Cf. 332, 8: *sa prāçīm api diçam prasthāpitaḥ pratīcīm api diçam pratishṭheta* (for “for him all things are possible”); the same image as Xenoph. Memorab. 4, 2, 21.

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Thus the word of the Veda, with its whole complex of ideas of the world and its relations, forms an eternal rule of guidance for the Creator, outlasting every disappearance of the world. The Creator “remembers,” while he shapes the world, the words of the Veda (p. 297, 10), and thus the world originates with its constant forms (niyata-ākṛiti) as the gods and the rest, from the word of the Veda (p. 298, 2). Naturally this coming forth of the gods etc. from the Veda is not, like the evolution from the Brahman, to be taken in the sense of a causa materialis (upādāna-kāraṇam), but it means only “a coming forth of the individuals of things in conformity with the use of the words of the scriptures” (çabda-vyavahāra-yogya-artha-vyakti-nishpattiḥ, p. 287, 9), which were there before the world, not only according to the witness of scripture and tradition (p. 288), but also because they are the necessary pre-supposition of creation. For if one wishes to make anything, one must first call to mind the word that indicates it (p. 289, 3), and thus also before the creation the Vedic words were present in the spirit of the Creator, and, according to them, he shaped all things (p. 289, 5).

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But what are we to understand by “word” in this world-creating sense (p. 289, 9)?—Perhaps we might answer: the concepts corresponding to the words. But this answer the Indian cannot give, because he never reached a conscious separation of concept and perception. He answers in the first place: By word he understands 45 here the Sphoṭa (the bursting forth, the sudden coming to consciousness of the idea on hearing the letters of the word); and this conception leads to a discussion which is not without interest, and which, as a contribution to the Philosophy of Language, we here translate as accurately as possible in the form of an episode.

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⁴⁵ Who? is not said. It is the opponent, but not Çankara, as Cowell assumes in Colebr. M. E.³ p. 373 n. 1; what Cowell quotes is only the Pūrvapaksha, not the Siddhānta, which Upavarsha afterwards maintains; probably Çankara took the whole discussion from his commentary (cf. n. 17).

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