The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c5.s3.t4: 4. Episode: on the vedântic philosophy of language
The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c5.s3.t4
- Language
- English
4. Episode: on the vedântic philosophy of language
c5.s3.t4.1
[The Opponent, who defends the Sphoṭa, says:] “An origination of individuals, such as gods etc., from the eternal words [of the Veda] is not possible, on the assumption that the letters [of the word are the bearers of its meaning], for they as soon as they appear, pass away. Not only so but the letters which pass away as soon as they have appeared are continually apprehended differently according to their pronunciation. Thus it is possible, for example, to recognise a man with certainty, even without seeing him, when we hear him read aloud, by his voice, and to say ‘Devadatta is reading,’ or ‘Yajñadatta is reading.’ And this diversity of apprehension of the [same] letters is, however, not based on error, because there is no apprehension which could refute it.—It cannot, therefore, be assumed at all that the meaning of a word is recognised [merely] from the letters. For [firstly] it cannot be assumed that each single letter in itself makes known the sense, because they are different from each other; [secondly] [the sense of the word] is also not [merely] a conception of the sense of the letters, because they succeed each other [so that the earlier have already passed away when the latter are pronounced]. It is perhaps [thirdly] that the last letter, assisted by the impression [samskāra], which the perception of the preceding letters has produced, makes the sense known?—This also is impossible. For [only] the word itself, presupposing the apprehension of the connection [of the letters], makes the meaning known, as in the case of smoke [whose vanishing and continually reproduced particles alone are not able to give the conception of smoke]. Further, an apprehension of the ‘last letter, assisted by the impression which the perception of the preceding letters has produced,’ is not possible, because the impressions are not [any longer] perceptible.—Is it then perhaps [fourthly] the last letter, assisted by the impressions [of the preceding] perceived in their after effect, which makes the sense known?—Not this, either; for the recalling also, as it is the after effect of the impressions, is again a series [of presentations in time,—which has already been discussed above, under the second head].—Therefore it only remains possible that the word [as a whole, that is, its sense] is a Sphoṭa [an outbursting], which, after the percipient has received the seed of the impression through the apprehension of the single letters,
c5.s3.t4.2
“and has brought it to ripeness by means of the apprehension of the last letter, flashes before him suddenly in its unity as a single conception. “And this single conception is no reminiscence, referring back to the letters; for the letters are several, and cannot, therefore, be the object of the single conception. This |Sphota, the soul of the word, as we might say,] is [only] recognised again, [not produced], on the occasion of its pronunciation, and is therefore eternal [as well as a unity,] because the conception of the manifold refers only to the letters. Thus the word, [that is, its sense] in the form of the Sphota is eternal, and from it, as that which names, goes forth as that which is to be named, the world, consisting of deed, doer and fruits.”
c5.s3.t4.3
“In reply, the venerable Upavarsha” [an old Mîmânsâ and Vedânta teacher, cf. above, Note 17, and Colebrooke Misc. Ess.³ I, 332] “maintains that only the letters are the word.”
c5.s3.t4.4
[Opponent:] “But I have said, however, that the letters, as soon they appear, pass away.”
c5.s3.t4.5
[Upavarsha:] “This it not so, because they are again recognised as the same.”
c5.s3.t4.6
[Opponent:] “That they are recognised again, depends in their case on the fact that they resemble [the former], somewhat as in the case of hairs (cf. on Brih. 743, 2).”
c5.s3.t4.7
[Upavarsha:] “O no! For that it is a recognition [of the same, not merely of like], is not refuted by any other recognition.”
c5.s3.t4.8
[Opponent:] “Recognition is grounded on species (âkṛiti).” [When I say a repeatedly, it is not the individual a, but the species a, which recurs in different individuals.]
c5.s3.t4.9
[Upavarsha:] “No; it is a recognition of individuals. Yes, if in speech other letters were continually apprehended, as in the case of other individuals, for example, cows, then recognition would be grounded on species; but this is not so; for only the individual letters are recognised again in speaking, and [if the same word, for example, ‘cow,’ is repeated,] then it is assumed that the word ‘cow’ has been spoken, twice, not two words ‘cow’ [once].
c5.s3.t4.10
[Opponent:] “But the letters are still [as argued above] apprehended as different, according to the difference of pronunciation; for when the reading aloud of Devadatta and Yajñadatta can be recognised by the tone, merely by hearing them, it results from the fact that a difference is apprehended.” [Therefore the recognition of a letter must be that of the species, not of the individual differing according to pronunciation.]
c5.s3.t4.11
[Upavarsha:] “Without detriment to the exactness of the recognition in the case of the letters, letters may be pronounced [more] joined or [more] separated; hence the different apprehension of the letters is “grounded on the difference of pronunciation, not in the nature of the letters. Further: he also, who transfers the difference to the individual letters [instead of the manner of pronunciation], must, if a recognition is to be possible, [first] settle species for the letters, and then assume, that these [species] are differently apprehended owing to foreign influences; and here it is preferable to assume, as simpler, that, in the case of the individual letters, the apprehension of the difference is conditioned by foreign influences, while, on the other hand, their recognition is conditioned by their own nature. For the assumption that there is a difference in the letters, is refuted precisely by the fact that a recognition of them takes place.”
c5.s3.t4.12
[Opponent:] “But how can it happen that the sound *ga* which is one, is at the same time different, when several pronounce it at the same time, and [likewise] when it is pronounced with the acute, grave, or circumflex accent, or without the nasal?”
c5.s3.t4.13
[Upavarsha:] “But this difference of apprehension is not caused by the letters, but by the tone (*dhvani*).”
c5.s3.t4.14
[Opponent:] “What is tone?”
c5.s3.t4.15
[Upavarsha:] “That which reaches the ear, when one hears sounds from a distance, and does not perceive the difference of the syllables, and which prompts one sitting near to attribute his own differences of stupidity and sagacity to the letters [which he hears]. And from this [the tone] depend attached the differences of accentuation with the acute etc., and not the nature of the letters. But the letters are recognised just as they are pronounced [independently of the tone]. If this be assumed, then the perceptions of accentuation have a basis, otherwise not; for, as regards the letters, they are only recognised again, and do not differ [in themselves]; therefore we should have to assume that the differences of accentuation lie in their connection and separation; but connection and separation are not perceptible, and we cannot take our stand on them, in order to arrive at an explanation of the difference of the letters; consequently the perception of accentuation etc. would have no basis [without the assumption of tone].—We must not fall into that error either that, because the accentuation is different, the letters to be recognised are also different. For because one thing shews differences, another, which is not different does not need to shew them also; as, for example, one does not conclude that the species is different, because individuals differ among themselves. And as it is thus possible to recognise the sense from the letters, the hypothesis of the *Sphota* is unnecessary.”
c5.s3.t4.16
[Opponent:] “But the *Sphota* is no hypothesis, but an object of perception. For in the understanding (*buddhi*), after it has received [different] impressions through apprehension of the single letters, [the sense of the word] flashes out suddenly.”
c5.s3.t4.17
[Upavarsha:] “This is not so: for this understanding [of the sense of the word] also refers to the letters. For after the apprehension of the separate letters [of the word ‘cow,’ for example,] has preceded in time, there follows this single concept (buddhi)—‘cow,’ whose object is the totality of the letters and nothing else.”
c5.s3.t4.18
[Opponent:] “How do you prove this?”
c5.s3.t4.19
[Upavarsha:] “By the fact that with the concept which thus comes into being [cow], the letters C etc., and not the letters T etc., are connected; for if the object of this concept were a Sphoṭa, something different from the letters C etc., then the letters C etc., would have just as little to do with it as the letters T etc.; but this is not so; and therefore this simple concept [of the idea] is [not a Sphoṭa, but] only a reminiscence connected with the letters.”
c5.s3.t4.20
[Opponent:] “But how is it possible, that the different letters are the object of the simple concept?”
c5.s3.t4.21
[Upavarsha:] “To this we answer: a thing which is not simple can also be the object of a simple concept, as is seen in examples like: series, forest, army, ten, hundred, thousand, and the like. For the understanding of the word ‘cow’ as a unity, since it is conditioned by the extracting of one sense from many letters, is a metaphorical one (aupacâriki), just as is the understanding of forest, army, and the like.”
c5.s3.t4.22
[Opponent:] “But if the mere letters, by entering, in their totality, into the sphere of a simple concept, formed the word, then no difference would be made between words like jâ-râ (paramours) and râ-jâ (king), ka-pi (ape), and pi-ka (cuckoo), for the letters are the same, yet in a different connection they give a different sense.”
c5.s3.t4.23
[Upavarsha:] “To this we answer: even when all the letters perceived, just as ants can only form our idea of a row, when they are in a row, so the letters can only form the concept of a word, when they keep their sequence [this is only an evasion of the opponent's objection] and there is no contradiction in the fact that, even when there is no difference in the letters, a difference in the words may be perceived in consequence of a different order of letters. Therefore since certain letters perceived in their order etc. are, according to the traditional usage of language, connected with a given meaning, apprehended [through them], though they are perceived in their own proper function as single letters, our unifying understanding becomes conscious of them simply as this or that, and they thereby convey this or that given sense. —Therefore the assumption that the letters [are the bearers of the sense] is the simpler, while the assumption of a Sphoṭa leaves the sensible and hypostatises the supersensible, by which it is assumed that these given letters, perceived in order, reveal the Sphoṭa and this Sphoṭa reveals the sense; which is certainly complicated enough. Admitting “therefore that the letters, according as they are pronounced, are different in each case, it must yet undeniably be assumed, that as that on which recognition rests is an identity existing in the letters, and that in the case of the letters the deliberate design of communicating the sense is transmitted in this identity.”
c5.s3.t4.24
Author’s note. The truth in this controversy probably lies between the two extremes. The Opponent is right, in so far as philosophy cannot dispense with the acceptance of ideas (for ideas are reasonably to be understood by the Sphoṭa), and Upavarsha is right, in so far as ideas exist only so far as words exist (retained by memory). Moreover, the relation between idea and word is certainly no mere external, conventional one, but originally inner and organic; but why just these sounds express just this idea, is a problem which philosophy, comparative philology and physiology have hitherto worked at in vain, yet the solution of which can and will never be abandoned by science.
Cites (1)
- Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad — Sanskrit