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The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c5.s4: IV. Qualifications of those called to the study of the Vedânta

The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c5.s4

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IV. Qualifications of those called to the study of the Vedânta

1. The Study of the Veda

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An indispensable condition of our science, the impossibility of fulfilling which in the case of the Çûdra, as we saw, (p. 58 ff.) excluded him from the saving doctrine, is the study of the Veda, and this requirement, or at least the appearance of it, seems to have been continually more exaggerated in course of time. Thus it is said in Sadânanda's Vedântasâra, a later compendium of the Vedânta, § 5: "He who is called to the study must have regularly studied the Veda and the Vedângas (that is, the six subsidiary sciences of the Veda: phonetics, grammar, etymology, metre, ritual and astronomy, as they are already enumerated Muṇḍ. 1, 1, 5) so, that he may be able to understand the full sense of the Veda ex tempore (âpâtataḥ),"—a requirement which, considering the extent of the Veda⁴⁶ and the great difficulty of many Vedic texts, in the strict sense of the word no one except Brahmán can have fulfilled, while men must have satisfied themselves, in the case of each hymn for instance, with imprinting accurately on their memories the metre, poet, deity and ritual purpose, and at the same time, perhaps, also understanding something of the sense.⁴⁷ Of such exaggerations we find no trace in Çaṅ- kara: he contents himself with simply indicating the study of the Veda and a knowledge of its contents as an indispensable condition (p. 24, 4. 316, 9); what he actually presupposes, apart from the occasional quotations of other Vedic texts (cf. p. 32), is hardly more than an accurate knowledge of the eleven older, or, as we might almost say, of the genuine Upanishad's (*Aitareya* and *Kaushîtaki*; *Chândogya* and *Kena*; *Taittirîya*, *Kaṭhaka*, *Çvetâçvatara* and *Brihadâranyaka* with *Îçâ*; *Muṇḍaka* and *Praçna*), with quotations from which he everywhere deals very liberally; generally quoting only the opening words with the "etc." which is unfortunately so common in Indian texts, and which sometimes slips from him even where there is nothing more to follow (cf. p. 269, 4), and greatly injures the precision of treatment. As we cannot in general assume in our readers such an acquaintance with the Upanishad texts as the Indian could in his, we shall interweave in our presentation an anthology embracing a series of the most beautiful and important passages of the Upanishad's, even if we do not select them according to a standard of our own, but in accordance with the texts of the scriptures employed by Bâdarâyaṇa and Çankara.⁴⁸

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⁴⁶ There is no question of a limitation to one's own çâkhâ (cf. p. 979, 4: samasta-veda-artha-vijñânavataḥ), and such a limitation would also not include all the Upanishad texts presupposed by the Vedânta.

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⁴⁷ Cf. Colebrooke, Misc. Ess.¹ p. 20, and in Çaṅkara's work (p. 301, 8) the quotation from the Ârsheya-brâhmaṇam p. 3: "For whoever employs a hymn for sacrifice or study without knowing the Rishi, Metre, Godhead, and ritual use of it, knocks against the trunk of a tree, or falls into a pit."

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⁴⁸ The most important part of what has already been done for the Upanishad's, excepting editions of texts (by Roer, Weber, Cowell, Poley and others) is as follows: Anquetil Duperron, *Oupnek'hat*, Argentorati 1801-1802, a Latin translation of 50 Upanishad's from the Persian into which Sultan Daraschakoh, 1656 A.D., had had them translated, contains: Vol. I, p. 15 *Tschehandouk*, 98 *Brehdarang*, 294 *Mitri*, 375 *Mandek*, 395 *Eischavasieh*, 400 *Sarb*; Vol. II, p. 1 *Naraïn*, 5 *Tudiw*, 12 *Athrsar*, 27 *Hensnad*, 35 *Sarbsar*, 68 *Kok'henk*, 94 *Sataster*, 128 *Porsch*, 152 *Dehian band*, 157 *Maha oupnek'hat*, 162 *Atma pra boudeh*, 165 *Kioul*, 171 *Schat roudri*, 197 *Djog sank'ha*, 200 *Djogtat*, 204 *Schiw Sanklap*, 207 *Abrat (athrb) sak'ha*, 213 *Atma*, 217 *Brahm badia*, 221 *Anbrat bandeh*, 229 *Tidj bandeh*, 232 *Karbheh*, 241 *Djabal*, 249 *Maha naraïn*, 266 *Mandouk*, 271 *Pankl*, 274 *Tschehourka*, 279 *Pram hens*, 286 *Arank*, 291 *Kin*, 299 *Kiouni*, 328 *Anandbli*, 338 *Bharkbli*, 346 *Bark'heh soukt*, 351 *Djounka*, 355 *Mrat lankoul*, 358 *Anbratnad*, 366 *Baschkl*, 372 *Tschhakli*, 378 *Tark*, 380 *Ark'hi*, 387 *Pranou*, 403 *Schavank*, 412 *Nersing'heh atma*; for the corresponding Sanskrit names see below. A German translation of this translation of a translation has appeared Dresden 1882.—Ram Mohun Roy, Translation of several principal books, passages and texts of the Veds, ed. II, London 1832 (contains *Muṇḍaka*, *Kena*, *Kaṭhaka*, further refs. cf. now my “Sechzig Up. des Veda übersetzt mit Einleitungen und Anmerkungen, Leipzig 1897.”

2. The four Requirements

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As further conditions for the study of the Vedânta, Çaṅkara mentions (p. 28, 3), in conformity with the Vedântasâra, the four requirements which we shall now consider more closely.

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Îçâ).—Colebrooke, Misc. Ess.¹ I, p. 47-54. 62-71. 76-79. 83-88. 91-98. 110-113.—F. W. Windischmann, Sancara, Bonnae 1833, p. 49-186.—The same in his father's "Philosophie im Fortgange der Weltgeschichte," Bonn, 1832-34, p. 1388-90. 1448-49. 1540. 1585-91. 1595-98. 1613-23. 1655-60. 1673-76. 1689-1719. 1737-40.—Poley, Kâthaka-Oupanichat (with Muṇḍaka) translated into French, Paris 1837.—Roer, the Taittirîya, Aitareya, Çvetâçvatara, Kena, Îçâ, Katha, Praçna, Muṇḍaka and Mâṇḍukya Upanishads, translated, Bibl. Ind., Calcutta 1853.—The same, the Brihadâraṇyaka Up. transl. Calc. 1856.—Râjendralâla Mitra, the Chândogya-Up., transl. Calc. 1862.—Cowell, the Kaushîtaki-brâhmaṇa-upanishad, ed. with an Engl. Transl., Calc. 1861.—The same, the Maitri Up., Calc. 1870.—A. Weber, Analyse der in Anquetil Duperron's Übersetzung enthaltenen Upanishad, Ind. Stud. I, p. 247-302. 380-456. II, 1-111. 170-236 IX, 1-173, Berl. 1849. 1853. Leipz. 1865; the only thorough treatment of the material existing up to the present (1883). An index (wanting in the Ind. Stud.) is added here for more convenient reference: Vol. I: p. 254 Chândogya, 273 Brihadâraṇyaka, 273 Maitrâyaṇî, 279 Muṇḍaka, 298 Îçâ, 301 Sarvopanishatsâra, 380 Nârâyaṇa, 381 Tadeva, 382 Atharvaçiras, 385 Haṃsanâda, 387 Sarvasâra (Aitareya-Up.), 392 Kaushîtaki, 420 Çvetâçvatara, 439 Praçna; Vol. II, p. 1 Dhyânavindu, 5 Mahâ, 8 Âtmaprabodha, 9 Kaivalya, 14 Çatarudriyam, 47 Yogaçikhâ, 49 Yogatattva, 51 Çivasamkalpa, 53 Atharvaçikhâ, 56 Âtma, 57 Brahmavidyâ, 59 Amritavindu, 62 Tejovindu, 65 Garbha, 71 Jâbâla, 78 Mahânârâyaṇa, 100 Mâṇḍukya, 170 Çakalya (?), 170 Kshurikâ, 173 Paramahaṃsa, 176 Âruṇika, 181 Kena, 195 Kâthaka, 207 Ânandavallî (= Taitt. 2), 230 Bhriguvallî (= Taitt. 3); Vol. IX, p. 1 Purushasûkta, 10 Chûlikâ, 21 Mrityulâṅgûla (?), 23 Amritanâda, 38 Vâshkala, 42 Châgaleya (?), 46 Târaka, 48 Ârsheya (?), 49 Praṇava, 52 Çaunaka (?), 53 Nrisinha.—The same, Die Vajrasûcî des Açvaghosha, Berl. 1860.—The same, Die Râmatâpanîya Up., Berl. 1864.—The same, Ind. Lit. 2, p. 54-57. 77-81. 103. 106-109. 139-154. 170-190.—A. E. Gough, The Philosophy of the Upanishads, Calcutta Review, CXXXI, 1878-1880.—P. Regnaud, Matériaux pour servir à la l'histoire de la philosophie de l'Inde, Paris 1876-78; cf. Weber's Critique of the first part, Jenaer Liter.-Z. 1878 Nr. 6, p. 81ff.—F. Max Müller, The Upanishads, translated, part. I, Oxford 1879 (Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 1); the first volume includes the Introduction and Chândogya, Kena, Aitareya, Kaushîtaki, Îçâ; the second (Vol. XV, 1884) contains Kâthaka, Muṇḍaka, Taittirîya, Brihadâraṇyaka, Çvetâçvatara, Praçna, Maitrâyaṇa. For 1) The first is “discerning between eternal and non-eternal substance” (*nitya-anitya-vastu-viveka*); by eternal substance Brahman is meant, and by non-eternal, every thing else. As this discernment in the full sense of the word is really the last result of our science, we are to understand by it here, where it appears as condition precedent, only the general metaphysical disposition in virtue of which one has a consciousness of an unchanging being, in contrast with the changeableness of all worldly things and relations; in this sense the said condition of the Vedânta agrees exactly with the question with which Plato begins his exposition of metaphysics, and which also pre-supposes the consciousness of the same difference: “τί τὸ ὂν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν ἀεί, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε” (Tim. p. 27 D).

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2) The requirement which Çankara, and (better, because without *artha*) Sadânanda, mention in the second place, gives us a high conception of the earnestness of Indian thought: it is “Renunciation of the enjoyment of reward here and in the other world” (*iha-amutra-[artha-]phala-bhoga-virâga*). Only as far as we pursue philosophy without the consciousness of following material aims at the same time, do we pursue it worthily and rightly,—and he only can hope to find an explanation of the highest questions of being who has learned to raise himself above all hopes and longings of the heart to pure objectivity of spirit.

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3) There is more misgiving about the third requirement, as which Çankara gives “the attainment of the [six] means, peace, restraint, etc.” (*çama-dama-âdi-sâdhana-sampad*). This is based on a passage in the Brih. Up., where, at the end of a wonderful description of the *Akâmayamâna*, that is, the man who already in this life, through the power of knowledge, has reached freedom from all desires, it is said in conclusion (Brih. 4, 4, 23): “Therefore he who knows this is “peaceful, restrained, resigned, patient and collected; only in “the Self he sees the Self, he beholds all as the Self (the Soul, “*âtman*); evil vanquishes him not, he vanquishes evil; evil burns “him not, he burns evil; free from passion and free from “doubt, he becomes a Brâhmaṇa, he whose world is the “Brahman.” Fitting as all this is, when said of the saint who has overcome the world, it is strange when the Vedântists, relying on the passage, enumerate the possession of the following six means as conditions precedent to knowledge:—
1. *Çama* Tranquillity,
2. *Dama* Restraint,
3. *Uparati* Renunciation,
4. *Titikshâ* Resignation,
5. *Samâdhi* Concentration,
6. *Çraddhâ* Belief.

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The explanation of these conceptions by Çankara (on Brih. loc. cit.), Govindânanda and Sadânanda, with numerous divergencies in detail, amounts to this, that, under No. 4, they all understand an apathy towards contraries like heat, cold, and the rest, in the sense of the Stoics; under Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, on the other hand, an inner concentration along with a full withdrawal of the senses from the objects of the outer world. Neither of these will fit the picture that we form of the true philosopher to-day. In contrast to the Stoic sages (whose model was certainly not Heraclitus, the real father of the Stoic doctrine), we imagine the philosophic genius rather as a profoundly excitable, nay, even passionate nature; and, in spite of all concentration and meditation, we demand from him, as from the empiric investigator, a full interest in the visible world and its wonderful phenomena, only that he must see them with other eyes than the empiric, in a word, to use an expression of Plato’s (Scholia in Ar. ed. Brand., p. 66 B 48), not only with the eye which sees the ἵππος, but also with that which sees the ἱππότης. And just as little will the requirement demanded from the pupil under No. 6 commend itself to us, since we have learnt from Descartes, that the beginning of wisdom consists in this, *de omnibus dubitare*.

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4) As fourth and last requirement for the study of the Vedânta, Çankara and Sadânanda name *Mumukshutvam*, “the longing for liberation.” And rightly so. For he who enjoys the day of life with childlike, Hellenic, cheerfulness, however high a flight his genius may take in other respects, will only touch in passing the last and highest problems of being, as did the Greeks; to seize them fully and clearly requires a deep feeling of the vanity and nothingness of all this life, and a corresponding longing to pass *from the non-existent to the existent*, *from darkness to light, from death to immortality* (Brih. 1, 3, 28), a longing by which, as the passage quoted leads us to believe, the Indians were inspired even in ancient times, and which remained the true motive principle of their philosophy; so that, exceptions apart, the question of liberation forms the corner-stone of all the philosophic systems of India.

3. Relation of the System to that of Justification by Works

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The already enumerated requirements in the elect are, according to Çankara, the only ones which are indispensable. As soon as (anantaram) they are fulfilled, the “investigation of the Brahman” can begin (p. 29, 4); and it is not necessary that the “investigation of duty,” that is, the study of the Mîmânsâ of Jaimini (cf. above p. 20), should precede it (p. 28, 4); on the contrary it may just as well follow as go before (p. 25, 1), since the contents and aim of the two systems are independent; the investigation of duty demands observance, as Çankara (p. 27) remarks; and refers to a future, dependent on the action of men, and has, as its fruit, *abhyudaya* (going upward, happiness, both transitory in heaven, and also earthly in a future birth), but the investigation of the Brahman, on the contrary, has as its fruit *niḥçreyasam* (literally: *quo nihil melius*, *summum bonum*), that is, liberation; it refers to a something which has always existed, not dependent on the action of men; it does not command, like the other, but only teaches, “as if, in teaching concerning any thing, it is brought before the eyes” (p. 28, 1, cf. 818, 7); therefore all imperatives, even if they are taken from the scriptures, are, when directed to the knowledge of Brahman, as blunt as a knife with which one would cut a stone (p. 76, 3); therefore also all the commands of the scripture, that we should investigate the Brahman, have only the meaning that they turn the thoughts from their natural tendency towards outward things (p. 76, 6) and the egoistic aims bound up with them (p. 76, 7), through which the eternal goal of mankind is not reached (p. 76, 8), and give them a direction towards the inner soul, in order then to teach them about the existence of the soul (p. 77); as also further, for him who knows the Brahman, all commands and prohibitions cease to be in force: "for this is our ornament and pride (*alaṃkāra*), that after the knowledge of the soul as the Brahman all obligation of action ceases, and all past actions are annihilated" (p. 77, 7).

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However freely, as is visible in these quotations, our science raises itself above the whole legal system with which the Brahmans had succeeded in fettering the spirit of the Indian peoples, yet it hardly ventures at all to carry this into practice. Only for him who has won the knowledge of the Brahman, as we shall see further on more in detail, do all laws cease 49; but, as long as this point is not reached, the four *Ācramas*, or stages of practice in which, according to Brahmanical law, the life of each twice-born has to traverse the steps of Brahman pupil, householder, hermit and beggar (above p. 15 ff.), along with the works prescribed in them, remain in force (p. 1008, 5): "For [only] full-grown knowledge requires "nothing else for the perfecting of its fruit [liberation]; yet it "certainly requires other things, in order that it may first "grow. Why? Because of the passage of scripture which "speaks of sacrifice and so forth. For thus says the scripture "(Bṛih. 4, 4, 22): 'The Brahmans seek to know this [the "highest spirit], by reading the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, "by penances, by fasts'; and this passage shows that sacrifice "&c. are a means of knowledge; and, as it is therein said, "they seek to know,' therefore this limits them to being a “means for the growth [of knowledge].” In the same way, by the passages Chând. 8, 5, 1, Kâth. 2, 15 and others it is “shown that the works of the Âçramas are a means of knowledge” (p. 1009, 4). Their difference from the means, tranquillity &c., enumerated above, consists only in this, that the latter continue even for those who have gained knowledge, and thereby form the more immediate (pratyâsanna) means, while sacrifice &c. are to be considered as the external (vâhya) means, since they exist only for those who are striving after knowledge (p. 1012, 4). These external means, sacrifices, gifts, penances, fastings, are to be followed by every one with the exception of those who have reached knowledge, whether desiring liberation or not (p. 1017, 9); in the latter case the obligation to fulfil them lasts the whole life, in the former, for a time only (p. 1019, 2), since they are only helpful in gaining knowledge, but, this once gained, become superfluous. For thus teaches scripture (p. 1008, 9. 1019, 4), it also shows, how he who possesses the means of Brahma-scholarship &c., will not be overcome by affections (kleça), such as love [and hate] (p. 1021, 3). In what their collaboration towards knowledge further consists, is not more definitely determined; according to p. 1044, 4, they are to collaborate towards the knowledge which arises from the hearing of the scriptures, by destroying the hindrances which may exist; these hindrances consist in this, that other works of a former birth may come to ripeness, whose fruit may be a hindrance to knowledge; if the power of the stated means be the stronger, it overcomes the other fruits of works, and knowledge is gained (p. 1043, 4); but if, on the other hand, the hindrances are stronger, the pious practices, in virtue of the metaphysical power (atîndriya çaktiḥ) which dwells in them, as in all works (p. 1044, 1), bring forth knowledge in the next birth, in which, as was the case, for instance, with Vâmadeva (Ait. Up. 2, 5. Brih. 1, 4, 10), it may occasionally exist even from the mother’s womb (p. 1044, 10).

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⁴⁹ p. 1007, 1: "For knowledge [alone] is the cause through which the goal of man is reached; therefore, after this goal has been gained through knowledge, the works of the *Ācramas*, such as kindling the fires &c., are not [further] to be observed."

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But how stands it with those who, on account of wretched circumstances, lack of means and the like, cannot fulfil the religious duties of the Âçramas, and thus stand, as it were, in the middle, 50 between the twice-born and the Çûdras (p. 1021, 8)? They also, thus declares the answer, as is seen, for instance, in the case of *Raikva* (cf. n. 37), are called to knowledge (p. 1022, 1), although it is better to live in the *Âçramas* (p. 1024, 2). For those whose condition is wretched, we must admit that, either on the ground of ordinary human actions, such as repetition of prayers, fasts, worship of the gods (p. 1023, 1), or also in consequence of the works of the *Âçramas* performed by them in a former birth, the grace (*anugraha*) of knowledge is bestowed on them (p. 1023, 6). And here we touch a very remarkable conception, concerning which we shall try further on to reach perfect clearness, but the material for which we shall introduce here, in order to direct the reader's whole attention to it.

4. Liberation through "the Grace" of Knowledge

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How is the knowledge that leads to liberation, that is, the recognition of the Brahman, produced in men? To begin with, we must remember that it is not a question of gaining something which we did not possess; to gain it is impossible, since the Brahman is actually nothing else than our own self (p. 71, 7). But what have we to do, in order to become conscious of this? This is briefly answered by the passage, p. 69, 7: "The knowledge of the Brahman is not dependent on the action of man, but on the contrary, just like the knowledge of a thing which is an object of perception and other means of knowledge this also depends only on the object [that is, on the Brahman]." One must also not think that the recognition of the Brahman is an effect of the action of investigating (p. 69, 10), or of worshipping (p. 70, 3); and even the scriptures are its source only so far as they destroy Ignorance concerning the Brahman (p. 70, 7), just as they have no further significance for the state of awakening (*prabodha*) (p. 1060, 11); nay (p. 70, 10), all investigation and knowledge, so far as subject and object are thereby separated, is a direct hindrance to the recognition of the Brahman, as says the scripture (Kena-Up. 2, 11, recalling the Gospel according to Matthew, XI, 25):

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⁵⁰ *Antarâ* 3, 4, 36, explained by *Çankara* as *antarâle*; if we understand the expression rightly, it means, what we were before (n. 13) not able to conclude with certainty from *Manu*, that the *Âçramas* were obligatory on all three *Dvija* castes.

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"Who doth not know, he knoweth it
"And he who knoweth it, doth not;
"Unknown it is to him who knoweth
"And known to him who doth not know."

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Under these circumstances, according to the mode of expression of the exoteric, theological teaching, in which the philosophy of our system is framed,⁵¹ the birth of knowledge and the liberation connected with it, appears as a grace of God (literally: of the Lord îçvara), as becomes clear from the two passages which we here quote:

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⁵¹ That in the conception of grace (as in general in the whole apprehension of Brahman as Îçvara) we have to do only with an exoteric personification, which is not to be taken strictly, becomes also clear from the fact that p. 1023, 9 the Samskârâh (moral purifications) are likewise spoken of personified, as anugrahîtâro vidyâyâh. Cf. on the teaching of grace, besides the two above quoted chief passages, also p. 662, 1, where the para âtman is spoken of as cakshur-âdi-anavagâhya and jñâna-prasâda-avagamya; to the teaching of creation refers the parameçvara-anugraha p. 300, 3. 301, 2. There are no further passages as far as we know, in which the conception of grace occurs.

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P. 682, 3: "For the individual soul, which is impotent, in "the condition of Ignorance, to distinguish [from the soul] "the aggregate of the organs of activity [appearing as the "body], and is blind through the darkness of Ignorance, from "the highest soul, the overseer of the work, the onlooker "dwelling in all being, the Lord who is the cause of spirit, "from him, by his permission, comes the Samsâra, consisting "in the states of doing and enjoying (suffering), and through "his grace, is caused knowledge, and, through this, "liberation."

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P. 786, 7: "Granted, that the soul and God are related "as the part and the whole, yet it is evident that the soul "and God are of different character. How stands it, then, "with the identity of God and the soul? Does it exist, or "does it not?--In truth it exists, but it is hidden; for Ignorance "hides it. But, although it is hidden, yet, when a creature “thinks on and strives towards the highest God, just as the “faculty of sight in one who has become blind, after the “darkness is shaken off by the power of remedies, in him, in “whom the grace of God perfects it, does it become mani- “fest, but not naturally in any being whatsoever. Why? “Because through him, through God as cause, the binding “and loosing of the soul are accomplished, binding when it “does not recognise the essence of God, and loosing, when it “does. For thus says the scripture (Çvet. 1, 11):

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“When God is known, all fetters fall away,
“All torments cease; birth is no more nor death;
“And he who knows him, when his body dies,
“Has for his lot blest freedom and release.”

Cites (13)