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The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c5.s5.t2: 2. Insufficiency of the secular Canons of Knowledge

The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c5.s5.t2

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2. Insufficiency of the secular Canons of Knowledge

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Like the Pûrva-mîmânsâ, the Vedânta also accepts six canons of knowledge, according to Colebrooke (loc. cit. p. 330), who appeals for support to the (modern) Vedântaparibhâshâ. As far as our Vedânta-sûtras are concerned, there is, neither in the text nor in the Commentary, any discussion of the Pramânas at all; on the contrary they are everywhere presupposed as well known, and set aside as inadmissible for the metaphysics of the Vedânta, and in reality a fundamental account of the fact that metaphysics attains its contents only through a right use of the natural means of knowledge, is very difficult, and presupposes a greater ripeness of thought than we find in the Vedânta, which helps itself out of the difficulty by the short cut of substituting a theological for the philosophical means of knowledge, as we shall now further show.

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⁵¹ p. 49, 2: "Only from the canon of scripture as means of knowledge "is the Brahman known as the cause of the coming into being and "[existence and passing away] of the world;" p. 488, 1: "only through

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As for Bâdarâyaṇa, he expresses his rejection of the secular means of knowledge, *Pratyaksham* and *Anumânam* with the drastic brevity which characterises him, in this, as we have already remarked (above p. 23), that he uses the two words to indicate something altogether different, namely the *Çruti* and *Smriti*; thus in the Sûtras 1, 3, 28. 3, 2, 24. 4, 4, 20 (supposing, naturally, that Çankara has explained them correctly). The *Çruti*, therefore, the holy scriptures, in the narrower sense the *Brâhmaṇas* and *Upanishads*, but also the *Mantras* presupposed by them, that is, hymns and formulas,⁵⁵ are for Bâdarâyaṇa the *Pratyaksham*; the revealed is for him self-evident, needing no further authority. It is otherwise with the *Smriti*,⁵⁶ under which name Çankara quotes testimonies from the Sâṅkhya and Yoga systems, from the law-book of Manu, from the Mahâbhâratam and Purâṇas, as also from the Vedic Sûtra literature. For while the Veda, like the sun, which has its own light, possesses unconditional authority (*nirapeksham prâmâṇyam* p. 414, 6), the *Smriti* is called *Anumânam* because, as Çankara, p. 287, 11, explains, for its support another basis of authority (*prâmâṇyam*) is necessary. As, namely, the secular "the scripture can one plunge into this deepest, highest Brahman; one "cannot plunge into Him by reflection." Of passages where the *Pramâṇas* are mentioned, we have noted, besides these the following: the *pramâṇâni, pratyaksha-âdîni* are *avidyâvad-vishayâṇi* (p. 17, 13); they are frail (p. 448, 1); are common to us and animals (p. 19, 6): *pratyaksham* is *rûpa-âdi, anumânam* &c. is *liṅga-âdi* (p. 426, 8. 438, 1); of different character is *anubhava*, permissible, according to 42, 4, in the investigation of Brahman, cf. 419, 2 *anubhava-avasânam brahma-vijñânam*; the monstrosity of an absolute perception (subject without object) occurs on p. 671, 2; cf. 96, 5.

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⁵⁵ Thus, for example, passages of the Ṛigveda-Saṃhitâ are quoted as *Çruti* p. 208, 13. 212, 1. 304, 4; on the contrary the *mantra* is opposed to the *çruti*, p. 303, 4.

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⁵⁶ As also with the *Âcâra* (above p. 24); cf. p. 990, 1: *smṛiti-âcârâbhyâm, na çruteḥ*.

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*Anumânam* rests on the *Pratyaksham*, and only has the force of proof so long as it is rightly inferred therefrom, the *Smriti* also is only so far valid as an authority, as it confirms the *Çruti* by its testimony, and completes it by right inference. Therefore it is frequently quoted in confirmation, but not seldom also rejected; as for instance 4, 2, 21, in reference to the departure of the soul, the ideas of the *Smriti* (Bhagavadgîtâ 8, 23) are only so far rejected as they are in contradiction to the *Çruti* (p. 1109, 5). For the rest Bâdarâyaṇa declares himself, 2, 1, 11, as opposed in principle to any possibility of basing the metaphysical verities on reflection (*tarka*), which is commented on by Çaṅkara as follows (p. 435, 11):—"And, therefore, mere reflection (*kevalas tarkaḥ*) must not be quoted in opposition in a matter which is to be known by [sacred] tradition (*âgama*); for reflections which, without [sacred] tradition, rest only on the speculation (*utprekshâ*) of men, are untenable, since this speculation is unbridled. For instance the reflections thought out by some experts after great trouble are recognized by others, still more expert, as [merely] apparent, and those of the latter in the same way by others. Therefore one cannot rely on it, that reflections have stability, because the opinions of men vary.

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But [it may be objected], when there is a man of recognised greatness, a Kapila or another, who has made a reflection, one could at least rely on it as well-founded. Even here a sound foundation is lacking, since even the recognised pioneers (*tîrthakara*) such as Kapila, Kaṇâda and the like, openly contradict each other." To this the opponent objects: "Yet one can, perhaps, come to a well-founded reflection, in reflecting in a different way, for that there can be no well-founded reflection at all is in itself a law based on reflection alone (p. 436, 7); and because one reflection is false, the other need not also be false; the opinion that all reflection is unreliable, would make an end of all worldly action resting thereon (p. 436, 10)." Reflection, he says, might have in view the consideration of the words of scripture, in order to reach in this way the full truth (p. 437, 1); even *Manu* (12, 105) recommends, besides the tradition of scripture, perception and inference; and the excellence of reflection is precisely this, that, unbound by previous reflections, in case they are untenable, other reflections may be made (p. 437, 7). To this Çañkara replies (p. 437, 10): "Even though it appear that in many provinces reflection is well-founded, yet, in the province here spoken of, reflection cannot be freed from the reproach of baselessness;

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for it is impossible to know at all this extremely profound essence of being (*bhāva-yâthâtmyam*), without the [sacred] tradition, connected with liberation; for this subject does not fall within the province of perception (*pratyaksham*), because it is without form and the like, and therefore also not within the province of inference (*anumânam*) and the other [Pramâṇas], because it has no characteristics [*liṅgam*] and the like." Here, as our author further develops the question, where the full truth and the liberation which results from it—as all admit--are being considered, the subject of knowledge must be identical, and the knowledge of it uncontradictable. But reflections do not fulfil these conditions, because they contradict each other, and what the one maintains, another overthrows, and what the latter puts in its place, yet another overthrows (p. 438, 9). Besides, the Sâṅkhya system is not in any way recognised by everyone as the highest, and in any case it is impossible to bring together all the thinkers of all lands and times, to establish firmly the final truth of reflection among them. But, on the other hand, the Veda, as a source of knowledge, is eternal; its subject stands fast; the full knowledge of it formed therefrom cannot be turned aside by all the reflecters of the past, present and future (p. 439, 5).

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By this the full validity of the Upanishad teaching is proved, and by this it is established, "in virtue of the [sacred] tradition and the reflection which follows it" that (which was to be proved) the spiritual Brahman is at once the *causa efficiens* and the *causa materialis* of the world (p. 439, 7).

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Çañkara expresses himself even more strongly in discussing the same point in another place. To the objection that the Brahman can only be *causa efficiens* and not also *materialis*, because experience (*loka*) shows that only a *causa efficiens*, as for instance, the potter, can be endowed with knowledge.¹ he answers (p. 403, 7): "It is not necessary that it should be here the same as in experience; for this subject [Brahman] is not known by inference (anumânam), but only by revelation (çabda), and it is therefore [only] necessary here that [which is to be proved] it should be in accordance with revelation, and this shows that the knowing Îçvara (Lord) is the causa materialis [of the world]" (cf. p. 1144, 13).

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In these circumstances it is possible occasionally to make such statements about the Brahman as would be, according to worldly standards, absolutely contradictory; for example, that the Brahman does not wholly enter into the phenomenal world, and yet is without parts: (p. 481, 13) "in the scripture the Brahman is rooted; in the scripture it has its ground of knowledge, not in sense-perception and the like; therefore it must be taken as scripture gives it; and scripture teaches of the Brahman both that it is not wholly [used up in forming the world of appearances], and that it is yet without parts. Nay, even in the case of worldly things, such as amulets, spells, drugs and the like, it happens that, in virtue of difference of place, time, and cause, they manifest powers with various contradictory effects, and even these cannot be known by mere reflection without instruction, nor can it be determined, what powers, with what accompaniments, referring to what, for what available, a given thing may have,—how can it then be possible to know the nature of the Brahman, with its unthinkable perfections of might, without the scripture?"

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This advantage, however, of being allowed occasionally to ignore experience, holds good only in the case of the Vedânta teacher, but not of his opponent (p. 595, 8): "The follower of the Brahman investigates the being of the cause [of the world] and the like, relying on the [sacred] tradition, and it is not unconditionally necessary for him to accept every thing in accordance with perception (na avaçyam tasya yathâ-drishtam eva sarvam abhyupagantavyam); but the opponent, who investigates the being of the cause [of the world] and the like, relying on the examples of experience (drishtânta), must accept everything according to experience,—that is the difference."

Cites (5)