The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c5.s5.t3: 3. The Revelation of the Veda

The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c5.s5.t3

Language: English

3. The Revelation of the Veda

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To mitigate the severity of these declarations, we must call to mind the details given in Chap. II, 2 (reading especially the passage in n. 32, above p. 56), according to which all empirical means of knowledge, and all the world produced by them, belong to the realm of *Avidyâ*, as also, on the other hand, that in the Veda, especially in the Upanishads, there are philosophic conceptions which have their like neither in India, nor, perhaps, anywhere else in the world. Therefore we can well understand our author's view that the Veda is of superhuman origin (*apaurusheya* p. 170, 2); that it is infallible (p. 618, 1); that, as we saw above p. 69 ff., the Gods are created, but the Veda, on the contrary, is ever-present in the spirit of the creator of the world, as the timeless rule of being; that it was "out-breathed" by him⁵⁷, concerning which the two chief passages are (p. 47, 2): "The great canon of scripture beginning with the Rigveda, which, enforced by many branches of knowledge, lights all things like a lamp, and in a certain measure is omniscient, has the Brahman as its origin and cause. For such a canon as the Rigveda and the rest, which is endowed with the quality of omniscience, can come from none but an omniscient source." And further (p. 48, 4): "The great being which, according to the scripture [Brih. 2, 4, 10] brought forth unwearying in sport, like the outbreathing of a man, the Rigveda and the rest, as a mine of all knowledge, which is the basis of the division into Gods, animals, men, castes, *Âçramas* and the like, this being must possess an unsurpassable omniscience and omnipotence."

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⁵⁷ We have thus in India, as analogy of our Inspiration, an Expiration, through which the Vedic texts were revealed to their composers, who are therefore called *Rishis*; the Mantras and Brâhmanas "appear" (*pratibhânti*) to them, are "seen" (*drishta*) by them; cf. p. 301, 6: "Çaunaka and the other [composers of Prâtiçâkyas] teach, that the Decades [of the Rigveda] were seen by *Madhucchandas* [the composer of the opening hymns of the Rigveda] and the other *Rishis*." In the same way, according to p. 314, 13, the Brâhmanas were also seen by the *Rishis*: *rishînâm mantra-brâhmana-darçinâm*; cf. p. 119, 3: *mantra-brâhmanayoc ca ekârthatvam yuktam, avirodhât*.

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As the Brahman itself is free from all differences, so also is the knowledge of the Brahman, as we gain it from the Upanishads, uniform throughout and without contradiction (p. 834, 4): "Has it not been established that the Brahman, the object of knowledge, is free from all differences, as before, behind, and the like, uniform, and, like the lump of salt [Brih. 4, 5, 13], of one taste? How, then, can the thought arise of a difference or non-difference of knowledge? For that, like the variety of [pious] works, a variety with reference to the Brahman could be taught by the Vedânta, can by no means be affirmed, since the Brahman is one and uniform. And if the Brahman is uniform, then the knowledge of the Brahman cannot be manifold; for the assumption that the subject can be one thing and the knowledge of it another, is necessarily erroneous. And if, on the other hand, there were to be taught different doctrines of the one Brahman in the Vedânta, of which some were true and others false, we should have the case of disbelief in the Vedânta [that is, the Upanishads] [cf. p. 104, 1],—therefore one cannot assume that there are in the Vedânta differences in the knowledge of Brahman." In conformity with this principle, the numerous contradictions in the Upanishads are explained away (1, 1, 27 may serve as an example), or hidden under the broad mantle of exoteric doctrine, of which we shall speak in the next Chapter. However, occasionally minor contradictions in the parallel texts of the Upanishads are admitted with the remark, that they are not important.⁵⁸ Where the sense of the scripture is doubtful, the rule of experience (laukiko nyâyaḥ) decides, p. 1064, 5: "But still it is unseemly to check the view of the scriptures by a rule of experience? To this we answer: this is so, where the sense of the scripture is certain; but where it is doubtful, it is permissible to have recourse to a rule of experience, for the sake of clearing up the question;"—as generally the worldly means of knowledge are helpful to the investigation of the sense of the scriptures (p. 40, 6): "The knowledge of the Brahman is gained by the sense of the word of the Veda “being considered and determined; it is not gained by other means of knowledge, such as inference (*anumānam*) &c. But “although it is the Vedānta texts which inform us of the “cause of the world’s coming into existence &c., yet, to make “sure that we have grasped their sense [correctly], an inference “which does not contradict the words of the Vedānta is not “excluded as a means of knowledge. For by the scripture “itself [Bṛih. 2, 4, 5. Chând. 6, 14, 2] reflection is called in as “a help.”—(p. 42, 3): “For in the investigation of the Brahman, “the scripture is not, as in the investigation of duty [the Pūrva-“*mīmānsā*], the exclusive authority, but the authorities here “are, according to circumstances, the scripture and the [inner] “perception (*anubhava*) and the like. For the knowledge of “the Brahman reaches its final point in perception, as far as “it refers to a really existing subject.”—(p. 44, 6): “But does “not the Brahman, so far as it is something really existing, “alone belong to the province of other means of knowledge, “and is not the consideration of the words of the Vedānta “consequently aimless? By no means the Brahman, for, as “it is not an object of sense, the [causal] connection with “the world would not be grasped [with certainty]. That is to “say, the senses, according to their nature, have as their object “external things, and not the Brahman. If the Brahman were “an object of sense, then the world might be grasped as an “effect connected with Brahman. Now, we only perceive the “effect, so that [without revelation], it cannot be decided whether “the world is connected with Brahman [as cause], or with “something else [for the same effect can have different causes].”

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⁵⁸ For example p. 222, 2. 849, 11. 855, 6: *na hi etâvatâ viçeṣeṇa vidyâ-ekatvam apagacchati.*—418, 12 *çrutînâm paraspara-virodhe sati, ekavaceṇa itarâ nîyante.* This especially holds good in the case of contradictions in things where the aim of man (*purusha-artha*) does not come into question, p. 374, 7.

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Of the possibility here suggested, of bringing in reflection as an aid, our author makes a far more extensive use than might appear from these expressions. Since this side of Ṣaṅkara’s work has for us the chief interest, we will, as far as possible, pass over his endless quotations from the Veda, but, on the other hand, bend our whole attention to the philosophic reflection. The perfection of the latter, as it meets us in Ṣaṅkara’s Commentary, may itself speak for the fact that we have to do here with a monument of Indian antiquity not merely theological, but also in the highest degree philosophical.