Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c6.s8: XIV. Esoteric Theology

The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c6.s8

Language
English

Contents

XIV. Esoteric Theology

1. Preliminary Remark

c6.s8.t1.1

However sublime are the ideas of the Brahman, which up to this we have gained from the Upanishads in pursuance of the selection made (not always quite happily) by Bâdarâyaṇa and Çaṅkara, yet, in their figurative character, they fall short of satisfactorily fathoming to the full the being of the Godhead. Because this was felt, to the theological part of the Brahmasûtras is added a supplement, which has as its subject the esoteric Brahman, and, along with two other (psychological) supplements, is found in the second Pâda of the third Adhyâya, that is, after the Cosmology, Psychology and doctrine of transmigration. Even if here and there a greater intelligibility is thereby gained, yet this gain is more than counterbalanced by the disadvantages inseparable from the treatment of the same subject in two widely severed passages; for this reason, we here, as frequently, in our arrangement depart from that of the original work.

c6.s8.t1.2

The fundamental thought of the esoteric theology (cf. above p. 102 ff. 115) is this, that Brahman strictly taken is without all differences (viçeṣa), attributes (guṇa), limitations (upâdhi) and forms (âkâra).—This undifferentiated Brahman, as we may briefly call it, has, however, two contraries: first the forms of the phenomenal world, as which Brahman, conditioned by Upâdhis, appears; then the imperfect figurative ideas, which we form of the Godhead, in order to bring it nearer to our understanding and our worship (upâsanâ). It is strange that between these two contraries of the undifferentiated Brahman, however wide apart they naturally are, Çankara draws no sharp distinction, and even if according to one passage (p. 807, 5) it seems as if he saw in the phenomenal forms the basis (*ālambanam*) of the presentation-forms, yet from the continual intermingling of the two, not only in the passage under consideration, but also in many other passages in the work ⁹¹ it follows that our author never became clearly conscious of the difference between them. Perhaps this was done more by other Commentators, who, of the one Adhikaraṇam 3, 2, 11—21, make two, of which the first (3, 2, 11—14) seems to have been directed against the manifoldness of phenomenal forms, and the second (3, 2, 15—21) against the plurality of the characteristics of Brahman, which Çankara (p. 812) discards as aimless (*vyartha*), without our having been able completely to gather the opinion of the Opponent from his words.

c6.s8.t1.3

⁹¹ Thus the same confusion is already found in the considerations which introduce the theological part (p. 110—114), and again very clearly p. 245, where in antithesis to the spaceless *param brahma* (p. 245, 7) appears as the *aparam brahma* the *prāṇa* which rules the body (p. 245, 10).

c6.s8.t1.4

Here, therefore, we are limited to reproducing Çankara's view, and the shortcoming indicated compels us to consider only from a certain distance the two contraries of the undifferentiated Brahman, which he confuses; this makes a clear insight into all details impossible. In other respects our course is such that we do not unnecessarily depart from the line of thought as arranged by our author.

2. The differentiated and undifferentiated Brahman

c6.s8.t2.1

Sûtras 3, 2, 11—21.

c6.s8.t2.2

Concerning Brahman there are, so Çankara expresses himself, passages of scripture of two kinds; the passages of one kind teach Brahman as possessing differences, for example, when it is said: "All-working is he, all-wishing, all-smelling, all-tasting" (above p. 153), the others as devoid of differences, as in the passage: "That is not coarse nor fine, nor short nor long" (above p. 133). Now the highest Brahman in itself cannot be both, for it is not possible that one and the same thing in itself should be formed and formless (p. 803, 10). It is true that we might think that Brahman in itself is undifferentiated and becomes differentiated by Upādhis (under which is to be understood everything which brings Brahman 1. to phenomenal existence, 2. to presentation in the mind). But one thing cannot become another, by the fact that it appears to be connected with limitations: the crystal remains clear, even when it is painted with red colour (p. 803, 14); as it is only an error if it is taken to be red in itself, so in the case of Brahman also the limitation rests only on Ignorance (p. 804, 1). Therefore it is to be firmly held, that Brahman is free from all differences and perfectly unchangeable and not the contrary (p. 804, 3).

c6.s8.t2.3

How does it happen then, that, in many passages of scripture, manifold forms are attributed to Brahman, since He is called sometimes four-footed, sometimes of sixteen parts, sometimes dwarflike, sometimes having as body the three worlds, etc.? [p. 804, 9. Here and in what follows, the continual oscillation between phenomenal forms and forms of presentation should be noted.] Should we not perhaps admit that by the limitation a difference of form is actually brought about? For otherwise what is the purpose of the passages of scripture, which attribute differentiation to Brahman? To this it is to be replied first, that every time that limitations appear, it is further said that Brahman is not affected by them [p. 805, 1: for this an isolated example is adduced; in reality it is most frequently not the case]; and that in many passages (Kāṭh. 4, 11. Bṛih. 4, 4, 19. Çvet. 1, 12) it is expressly asserted that there is no plurality, and that he who is predestined, what is predestined, and he who predestines are one in Brahman (p. 805, 13). At the same time it is to be noted that only the passages concerning the undifferentiated Brahman have as their aim, to teach the Being of God (p. 806, 7), while the passages concerning Brahman possessed of forms have another aim, namely worship (p. 806, 10).

c6.s8.t2.4

A few similes may elucidate the relation of Brahman to His phenomenal forms. As the light of the sun or the moon, when it falls on the finger, shares in the finger's limitations, and in conformity with this, seems crooked when it is crooked, straight when it is straight, without in itself being crooked or straight, so also Brahman, when it is united with the limitation of the world of appearances, for example, of the earth, assumes its form, and on this is based (p. 807, 5) the apprehension of Brahman under different forms, as it is taught for the purpose of worship. It is therefore by no means purposeless; for all the words of the Upanishads have a purpose and are authoritative (p. 807, 8). But this does not prevent this view from resting on Ignorance all the same; for on inborn Ignorance depends worldly action as well as that prescribed by the Vedas (p. 807, 12).

c6.s8.t2.5

Another simile is found in the *Moksha-çâstras*:

c6.s8.t2.6

"Like as this sun, whose being is the light,
"Appears as manifold, in many streams,
"By limitation multiplied in space,
"E'en so it is with the unborn Âtman."

c6.s8.t2.7

And the following:

c6.s8.t2.8

"One soul of beings dwells in every being,
"One and yet many, like the moon in waves."

c6.s8.t2.9

It is true, that the sun and the moon are formed and separated in space from their mirrored images, the Âtman, on the contrary, is not formed (read *mûrto* p. 810, 7) and not spatially separated from the limitations, but omnipresent and identical with all (p. 810, 8), but no simile can be applied any longer, if we abandon the *tertium comparationis* (*vivakshitam aṅçam*); for if it were identical with the thing compared, there would be no more comparison (p. 810, 13). It only affirms that Brahman, which is in the true sense unchanging and a unity, when it enters into limitation like the body and the rest, takes part, as it were, in the qualities of these limitations (p. 811, 6).

c6.s8.t2.10

But if Brahman in itself is so perfectly devoid of differences, how are we to explain the passages of scripture concerning Brahman as possessing differences (p. 813, 12)?—Some think they also teach the undifferentiated Brahman, since the required annihilation of the phenomenal world must also be applied to the forms of Brahman taught by them (p. 814, 3). Yet this procedure is only permissible when they appear in a passage which treats of the esoteric teaching (*paravidyā*), (p. 814, 4), but not where precepts of worship are spoken of (p. 814, 8). The passages which teach the nature of Brahman and those which prescribe worship of Brahman, must be kept separate throughout (p. 815, 6). The former aim at liberation, the latter have as their fruit, according to the object, purification from sins, attainment of lordship, or gradual liberation (p. 815, 5). And while the latter passages belong to the canon of precept, the former exclude all imperative elements, and aim only at the knowledge of the subject (p. 815, 10).

c6.s8.t2.11

What should the precept prescribe in the case of knowledge of Brahman? Perhaps, to annihilate plurality, as one is ordered, by illuminating an object, to drive away the darkness (p. 816, 6)?—Then it must be asked: how is this annihilation of plurality to be thought of? Is it a real process, something like annihilating the hardness of butter, by putting it on the fire (p. 816, 10)?—But such an actual annihilation cannot be brought about by a mere man, and therefore cannot be ordered (p. 816, 15). Moreover in this case the whole plurality of earth etc. would have been annihilated by the first man who reached liberation, and the Universe would stand empty (p. 817, 2).

c6.s8.t2.12

It must therefore be assumed, that the purpose is only to annihilate Ignorance which attributes to the one Brahman the plurality of appearances. But Ignorance is got rid of through teaching alone and without command (p. 817, 6), while a hundred commands without the teaching cannot remove it (p. 817, 9). Therefore, neither for the knowledge of Brahman nor for the annihilation of plurality are commands of any use; on the contrary both are accomplished by teaching alone (p. 817, 12).

c6.s8.t2.13

And for whom should the command to annihilate plurality hold good? For the individual soul? But it is annihilated along with it! Or the highest soul? But it cannot be commanded (p. 818, 1—4).

c6.s8.t2.14

It is true that it is said in the higher knowledge also: "this is to be seen!" (above p. 174). But the command here only means that it is to be brought before the eyes, and made the object of attention, not that it is to be known (p. 818, 7). Whether the latter happens or not, does not depend on a command, but on the quality of the object and the capacity for knowledge (p. 818, 12). If this were not so, if knowledge depended on will, it would be inexplicable that any one should go astray (p. 819, 1); but it depends not on the man, but on the object, and can, therefore, not be commanded (p. 819, 4).

c6.s8.t2.15

If the scripture only commanded, then all in it that is not command, would have no meaning; it would, therefore, not explain (*avyâcakshita*, optative with a *privativum*, p. 819, 8), that the knowledge of Brahman as soul cannot be commanded, but would command it to the man: but by this not only would one canon of commandments follow two opposite aims (works and teaching) and therefore be in contradiction with itself [it is difficult to see exactly why], but also liberation would be assigned to the sphere of meritorious works (*adrishta*) and therefore to something transitory (p. 820, 1). Finally, if the whole contents of the Veda were included under the idea of commandment, this commandment would be in contradiction with itself, since on the one hand it would enjoin annihilation of plurality, and on the other a partial maintenance of it. Therefore the imperative passages concerning differentiated Brahman and the non-imperative concerning undifferentiated Brahman must be kept separate from each other (p. 820).

3. Characteristics of the esoteric Brahman

c6.s8.t3.1

Sûtras 3, 2, 16. 17. 22.

c6.s8.t3.2

When Vâshkali besought Bâhva to teach Brahman to him, the sage was silent. A second and third time this request was repeated. At last Bâhva said: "I am teaching it to thee, "but thou understandest it not; this Âtman is silent."

c6.s8.t3.3

This narrative which Çañkara p. 808, 11 gives as Çruti, though its origin is unknown to us (cf. note 24, above p. 37), finds its elucidation in different passages of scripture quoted along with it (p. 808); thus when it is said (Taitt. 2, 4):

c6.s8.t3.4

"From him all words turn back
"And thoughts, not finding him,"—

c6.s8.t3.5

and in another passage (Kena 1, 3):

c6.s8.t3.6

"Other is it than all we know,
"And higher than the unknown, too;"

c6.s8.t3.7

as also when the *Smṛiti* (Bhag. G. 13, 12, echoing Rigv. 10, 129, 1) indicates Brahman as "neither the Existent, nor the non-Existent." But the full unknowableness of the original basis of things is most sharply expressed by the formula: "*Neti, neti!*"—"it is not thus, it is not thus",⁹² which occurs in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka-Upanishad* no less than five times (2, 3, 6. 3, 9, 26. 4, 2, 4. 4, 5, 15 and in a slightly different application 3, 2, 11). In the first of these passages it follows a statement of the two phenomenal forms (*rūpe*) of Brahman, of which one is called "formed, mortal, at rest, being," the other "formless, immortal, in motion, belonging to the Beyond." The latter comprises the wind and the atmosphere, breath and the space within the body, the former everything else in nature and man. Both, according to *Śaṅkara* (who subjects this passage to a lengthened consideration at 3, 2, 22 p. 821—826), are denied of Brahman by the formula "*neti, neti*"; the knowledge of its true form consists in this, that all forms are denied to it (p. 824. 12), whether we refer the repeated *na iti* to the two already adduced phenomenal forms (p. 825, 9) or to the phenomenal forms and the presentational forms (p. 825, 10) or in general to everything that can be perceived (p. 825, 11). Therefore all objective existence is negatived of Brahman and only its non-objective existence as the inner Soul remains (p. 825, 14). This negation of all distinctions in Brahman means, however, [as Brahman alone is true being] a negation of the whole phenomenal world falsely imposed on Brahman (p. 825, 15); therefore the formula *neti, neti* in Brih. 2, 3, 6 is explained by the words: "for outside him—therefore it is said 'it is not so'—there is no other 'beyond;" but he himself is not not (p. 826. 6).

c6.s8.t3.8

⁹² *itir idam-arthe*: "*idam na, idam na*" (Govindānanda p. 78, 21).

c6.s8.t3.9

Accordingly Existence remains as the sole characteristic of Brahman, and an Existence which is opposed to all empirical Existence, so that, in comparison with this, it can just as well be indicated as Non-existent (cf. above p. 129).

c6.s8.t3.10

But what are the positive characteristics of this esoteric Brahman which presupposes the negation of all differences? The later Vedānta names three of them, which form the famous name of Brahman: Sac-cid-ānanda, that is “Existence, Intelligence, and Bliss;” this compound which, as far as I know, occurs first in the Nṛisiṁha-tāpanīya-upaniṣad (Ind. St. IX, 60. 84. 143. 147. 148. 154) is nowhere found in Ṣaṅkara’s Commentary, and appears to be as yet unknown to our author. It is true that he repeatedly explains that, where Brahman is spoken of as Bliss, this limitation refers to the esoteric, attributeless Brahman (p. 127, 16. 868, 11), but here, in the strictly esoteric part, this is not spoken of, perhaps, because Ṣaṅkara counts it among the negative limitations as freedom from suffering; thus besides Existence, as the only positive quality of the esoteric Brahman, remains intelligence; p. 808, 2: “The scripture explains, that the undifferentiated Brahman is “pure intelligence and free from all that is different from it, “for it says (Bṛih. 4, 5, 13): ‘as a block of salt has no [dis- “tinguishable] inside nor outside, but through and through “consists only of salt taste, so also this Ātman has no [dis- “tinguishable] inside and outside but consists throughout “altogether of intelligence.’ That is: this Ātman is through- “out nothing but intelligence; intelligence is its exclusive “(nirantara) nature, as the salt taste is, of the lump of salt.”

c6.s8.t3.11

What relation have the only two remaining characteristics of Brahman, Existence and Intelligence (bodha), to each other?—The treatment of this question, expounded by other Commentators of the Brahmasūtras, Ṣaṅkara dismisses as purposeless (p. 812, 10) and on this point remarks as follows: (1) Brahman cannot be Existence without Intelligence, because this contradicts the passage of scripture (just quoted), and because otherwise he would not be the self of the individual soul, which is by nature intelligent; (2) not Intelligence without Existence either, because this is impossible; (3) and just as little Existence and Intelligence in their separate characters, because this would give rise to a plurality, which cannot exist in the case of Brahman; it therefore only remains that (4) Existence is the same as Intelligence, and Intelligence the same as Existence (*sattâ eva bodho, bodha' eva ca sattâ*, p. 813, 7), so that between the two there is no mutual exclusion. "Thus one might say," adds Çaṅkara, passing over, as secondary, this question which is so interesting for us.

c6.s8.t3.12

We may, however, point out in connection with this, that both ideas in the End are resolvable into that of Force. All existence, in its essence, is nothing but a manifestation of Force and all Knowledge may be considered as a reaction against the crowd of impressions, and therefore as an activity of Force. That the Indian *caitanyam* comes very close to this idea, we have already remarked above (p. 59), and we shall encounter the proofs of it again in the course of the work.

4. On the Possibility of Knowing the esoteric Brahman

c6.s8.t4.1

Sûtras 3, 2, 23—30.

c6.s8.t4.2

However much we may agree with the Vedânta, when it holds that a fathoming of Being-in-itself is only possible in our own "I", and, in its metaphysics, pushes aside everything objective, and relies on the Subject only, we can as little agree with it when, disregarding the objections of the opponent, which we became acquainted with above p. 135 ff. it finds the last basis of Being in the Subject of Knowledge. The consequence is, that the Vedânta denies itself an immediate insight into the essence of things; for the subject of knowledge can never become the object for us, precisely because in every cognition it must take the place of subject.—We shall see now how, notwithstanding this, the Indian was able to find a way of perceiving the subject, the spirit, Brahman.

c6.s8.t4.3

At first our authors admit the objections thus raised as to the perceptibility of Brahman: Brahman is the Unmanifest (*avyaktam*), not perceptible, because in all perception it is assumed as the witness (*sâkshin*), that is, the knowing subject of knowledge (p. 827, 3). Yet there remains a possibility of knowing God: the *Yogin*, that is, here, he who has become one with God, sees him in the condition of *Samrâdhanam*, literally: perfect satisfaction, which Çañkara explains as a sinking oneself (*pra-ṇi-dhânam*) in pious meditation (p. 827, 10). This condition the scripture (Kâṭh. 4, 1) describes as follows:

c6.s8.t4.4

“The Self-existent pierced the openings
“Of senses outwards, therefore a man looks
“On outward things, not on the inner soul;—
“A wise man saw, with backward-turned eye,
“The inner Self, longing for deathlessness.”

c6.s8.t4.5

But does not the division of subject and object exist here also, between him who sinks himself, and that in which he sinks himself (p. 828, 6)?—Our authors answer this question with a negative, but, as the basis of their view, can only bring forward similes and passages of scripture. They begin by reminding us that this division only exists in virtue of the limitations (*upâdhi*) (p. 828, 11), and that these rest on Ignorance, after the dissipation of which the individual soul is identical with the highest soul (p. 829, 3); they compare this identity with that of the serpent and its coils (p. 830, 1), the sun and its light (p. 830, 5), they insist that the liberation, which consists in thus becoming one, would be impossible, if we held the separation to be in the strictest sense real (p. 830, 13) and conclude from the scripture, that, with the annihilation of plurality, only the knower in us, and therefore the Âtman, remains as the unit (p. 831, 7);—but an explanation of this unification of subject and object (as it actually takes place in the phenomena of æsthetic contemplation and religious devotion) cannot be obtained from their discussions.

c6.s8.t4.6

5. On certain figurative Expressions used of Brahman.

c6.s8.t4.7

For sake of completeness, we may here briefly touch on the section 3, 2, 31—37, in which, in the form of an appendix, are discussed certain expressions, which apparently do violence to the negation of all Being outside Brahman, and to Brahman’s permeating all, and being omnipresent.

c6.s8.t4.8

¹ Brahman is called “the bridge which holds these worlds asunder,” (above p. 162, cf. p. 133), and by a bridge is generally understood an aggregate of wood and earth, for the

c6.s8.t4.9

purpose of crossing a continuous mass of water (p. 832, 2); even a traversing of this bridge is spoken of, and all this seems to presuppose something else outside Brahman (p. 832, 4).—To this it is to be answered, that Brahman is only compared to a bridge, because He holds asunder (p. 834, 12) the world and its boundaries (or orders, such as castes, Âçramas, etc., p. 258, 1), as the bridge does the banks [according to the primitive idea just quoted, however, it does not]; and the traversing of the bridge (above p. 162) means only the attainment of Brahman, as it is said: "he has gone through the grammar," in order to express the fact that he has gained mastery of it (p. 834, 15).

c6.s8.t4.10

2. Further, Brahman has numbers and measures repeatedly applied to Him, such as "four-footed, eight-clawed, of sixteen parts," which seems to presuppose a limitation, for everything that can be measured is of limited size (p. 839, 9).—But this is only to bring it nearer to our [limited] understanding, as Bâdarâyaṇa says, our worship, as Çaṅkara adds in explanation (p. 835, 1. 4); for it is not possible for man to seize the unchanging, the endless (p. 835, 7).

c6.s8.t4.11

³ A connection between the highest and the individual soul and again (in the passage discussed in Chap. IX, 6, above p. 140) a division (conditioned by it) within Brahman is repeatedly spoken of, in virtue of which two parts of it are defined along side of each other like the kingdoms of Mâgadha and Vaideha (p. 832—833).—But both exist only from the point of view of the Upâdhis, the relation of which to Brahman has already been discussed (p. 836, 7). The connection of the individual soul with Brahman is in reality an entering of the soul into its own Self (p. 836, 15), and the division within Brahman is no more real than that between cosmic space and the space within the body (p. 837, 5). Therefore it is proved that outside Brahman nothing is (p. 837, 10), that Brahman is in everything (p. 837, 16) and omnipresent (p. 838, 3).

Linked texts (8)