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The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c7.s2: XVI. Brahman as Creator of the World

The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c7.s2

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XVI. Brahman as Creator of the World

1. The Motive of Creation

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Sûtras 2, 1, 32–33.

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WE have learnt to know Brahman as an intelligent being; as such, he seems to require a motive for his actions. For we see in life that an intelligent being, who thinks before he acts, for example a human being, prepares for no undertaking, whether great or small, unless a motive leads him to it (p. 488, 12). The application of this rule of experience to Brahman is, as it seems, confirmed by the scriptures, when they teach (above, p. 173) that the world is dear to him not for the world's sake, but for the sake of his own self (p. 489, 2).—If we ascribe to God a motive which determined him to create, this contradicts his all-sufficiency (paritriptatvam), but if we do not ascribe such a motive to him, creation becomes impossible (p. 489, 6). —Or shall we take it for granted that Brahman, like a thoughtless man, proceeded to create at random, and without a motive? This again would contradict his omniscience (sarvajñatram).

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We must then take it for granted that, as a prince or some great man who has all that he requires, undertakes something without a motive, purely for sport and pastime (p. 490, 1), or as outbreathing and inbreathing go on by themselves, without external motive (p. 490, 2), so too God created the world of himself and without a motive, purely for sport (lîlâ; cf. the παῖς παίζων of Heraclitus); for a further motive is not to be found by reflection or revelation of the scriptures 94 and it is impossible to ask God himself about it (p. 490, 6). Moreover it is only to us that the arrangement of this terrestrial disk appears such a difficult thing, for God, on the contrary, through the power of his immeasurable omnipotence, it is mere sport (p. 490, 8). And if in life a slight motive must be present even for sport, for God we need assume nothing of the sort, for the scripture forbids us to attribute any desire to him (p. 490, 9). That he could not for this reason proceed to act, is contrary to the teaching of the scripture concerning creation; that he acted without thought, and by chance, is contrary to the teaching concerning his omniscience (p. 490, 11).

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⁹⁴ Such a motive is certainly to be found in the system, and our author does not find it only because he cannot separate the idea of a motive from that of personal (egoistic) interest. According to the Vedânta,

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Above all (thus Çankara concludes this section), we must not forget that the whole teaching as to creation refers to this world of names and forms, founded on Ignorance, and it has really only the aim of teaching the identity of nature with Brahman (p. 491, 1);—an observation that will also hold good for what we have to put forward further, and which arises from the endeavour to hold fast to the exoteric teaching of the scripture as completely valid.

2. Brahman is the efficient and at the same time the material Cause of the World

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Sûtras 1, 4, 23-27.

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Brahman was defined at the outset of this work (1, 1, 2) as "that by which the world originates, etc. (subsists, and perishes)," (cf. the definitions above p. 123), and therefore as the cause of the world. The word "Cause", however, may mean two things, either the material cause (*prakṛiti*, *upâdânam*), or the efficient cause (*nimittam*); so the cause of the vessel is, on one hand, the clay, and on the other the potter, that of the golden ornament is on one hand the gold,

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it is the inner destination of this world to become the stage for the reward of the deeds of an earlier existence, and the chain of these existences stretches back for each individual *ad infinitum*. According to these earlier deeds alone, God apportions weal and woe; and in them alone is to be sought the reason that he must create the world anew after each disappearance; for the fruit of deeds done outlasts that disappearance and requires each time a new creation for their explanation.

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and on the other the goldsmith (p. 396, 10).—The question is, in which sense is Brahman to be regarded as the cause of the world?

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It might be thought that Brahman can only be held to be the efficient cause of the world, because it is said of him, before he proceeds to create: "he intended" (above p. 135), and because he is called "the Lord" (īçvara); both these seem only to apply to an efficient cause (p. 397, 5, 8).—To this is added, that cause and effect must be of like nature; the world, however, is manifold, unspiritual, and unclean (p. 397, 10), which does not apply to Brahman and seems to require a material cause besides him, which shall possess these qualities.

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The answer to these considerations is, that Brahman is both the efficient and material cause of the world (p. 398, 3).

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The proof of this assertion, in the introductory passage of the Cosmology which we here treat of, is purely theological (based on references to passages of the Vedas) and, from the point of view which we now occupy, cannot be otherwise, because (quite apart from the consideration raised, as to the unlikeness of nature of the world and Brahman, which is here passed over by our author, and only taken up again, and brought under consideration, in a later discussion, cf. Chap. XVIII, 1, a) a solution of the idea of matter, from the empirical standpoint, which we have not yet transcended here, is impossible, for the only true consequence of this standpoint would be the eternal duration of matter.

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Under these circumstances, it is comprehensible that Çaṅkara here contents himself with references to the scripture according to which, with the knowledge of Brahman, all is known, and in which Brahman is compared to the clay, all the transformations of which are also clay; as, for example, it is expressly said: Before the beginning of creation, there was one only, without a second, Brahman desired to become manifold, he himself made himself, he is the birthplace of beings, he limits them from himself, and reabsorbs them into himself, as the spider with her thread, etc. etc. (p. 398—403). In conclusion, our author disposes of the objections given above, and the appeals to experience, by the explanation (translated above p. 93), that we need not here remain in accord with experience, for here we have not to do with an object of rational knowledge (anumânam), but with revelation (403, 7), and further refers to subsequent investigations.

3. Brahman creates without Instruments

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Sûtras 2, 1, 24--25.

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Widely separated from the enquiry treated of above, although in fact standing in close relationship with it, and even in part coinciding with it, is the question of the instruments which Brahman uses. As the demonstration was reached there by quotations from the Veda, so it is here reached by examples from nature; if it is (from the cause stated above p. 224) no less inadequate on this account, it still possesses a certain interest, because it contributes to make clear the view of nature held by the Hindus; for this reason we give the Adhikaranam in question 2, 1, 24--25 (p. 475--479) almost word for word:

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It might be objected that it is not feasible to assume the spiritual Brahman alone and without a second as the cause of the world, because in order to mould anything, all kinds of instruments are needed; thus in actual life the potters etc. when they wish to make vessels take all kinds of things, as the clay, the stick, the wheel, or thread as instruments, and thus we cannot assume that Brahman created the world without instruments. We reply to this, that creation takes place by the specific quality of the substance (dravya-svabhâva-viçeshâd, that is, Brahman) in much the same way that the change of milk into curds or water into ice takes place without exterior instruments. Certainly warmth assists in turning milk sour, still the milk follows nothing but the laws of change inherent in itself, and the process is only hastened by the warmth. Were the power to become sour not already in the milk, the warmth could not help it to change; since, for example, wind or ether cannot be changed to curds by warmth. The addition of the means only completes the process; but even such a completion is not needed in the case of Brahman, for he possesses all the necessary powers (*çakti* of which immediately) perfect within himself.

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It is true that milk etc. are unintelligent substances, and we see that beings with intelligence, like potters etc., call in the aid of instruments. Thus we may suppose it to be with Brahman, as he also is an intelligent being.—To this can be opposed the fact that gods also, and ancestors, and Rishis, who are certainly beings possessed of intelligence, through their own power, without external means, according to their innate sovereignty, and through meditation alone, creat many variously shaped bodies, palaces, carriages etc., as the Hymns and Brâhmaṇas as well as the epic and mythological works attest. Further, we must remember that the spider puts forth her thread from herself, that female cranes become fertilised without seed, and that lotus-flowers wander from one pond to another without outward means of transit. The applicability of these comparisons may be contested, because the gods accomplish their deeds only by taking bodily forms to aid them, and not by the spiritual Self alone, because the saliva of the spider, after it has been stiffened by eating smaller creatures, becomes threads, because the female cranes are fertilised⁹⁵ when they hear the voice of the thunder, because the lotus-flowers do not wander among the ponds by means of their unintelligent bodies, but precisely because they are endowed with intelligence, as climbing plants find their way to trees;—but to all this we can reply that the creatures named do not, like the potter, use [external instruments in

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⁹⁵ p. 477, 15: *balâkâ ca antareṇa eva çukram garbham dhatte*; p. 768 6: *balâkâ api antareṇa eva retaḥ-sekam garbham dhatte*, *iti loke rûḍhiḥ*; p. 478, 8: *balâkâ ca stanayitnu-rava-çravaṇâd garbham dhatte*. These indications may serve to clear up the passage *Meghadûta* v. 9, which, as appears from Stenzler's note on page 29, has hitherto been understood differently:

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*garbha-âdhâna-kṣaṇa-paricayân nûnam âbaddha-mâlâḥ*
*sevishyante nayana-subhagam khe bhavantam balâkâḥ*

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"Surely wilt thou [O Cloud], when thou floatest in the air, rejoicing the "eye, be honored by the female cranes in their serried ranks, because "they conclude (*colligunt*) [from thy arising] that the moment for receiv-"ing the fruits of the body [in the tempest] draws near."

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their activity, and that, like them, Brahman does not, in creating, use any outward means to assist himself, which is what we wished to arrive at.

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—The defective knowledge of nature, and the weakness of the arguments on this ground require no further comment, besides the examples we have given.

4. Brahman and the Powers of Nature

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Sûtras 2, 1, 30 and 1, 3, 30.

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In all considerations of this section, it is well to keep in mind that the Indian idea of creation differs essentially from our own. For whilst by creation, we understand something done once for all, and therefore at a given time, the consciousness of the Vedântin is dominated by the concept that from eternity to eternity the world periodically emerges from and again returns to Brahman; and it emerges and returns times without number: "the past and future world-periods (kalpa) are measureless," as the Purâna passage quoted on p. 495, 10, declares.

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But how comes it that the world, through all its new creations, remains the same in character?—This question compels us to seek the basis of this uniformity in Brahman himself.

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Further: how can the manifold manifestations of the world arise from the uniform Brahman?—For this multiplicity, there must also be a sufficient reason in Brahman.

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In these postulates we must seek for the motive of the manifold powers (çakti), which Brahman contains, the resemblance of which to the Platonic teaching of ideas we have already referred to, above pp. 69—70.

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This valuable thought is unfortunately only slightly developed in our system; it only appears sporadically, and its position is uncertain; sometimes the powers of Brahman appear simply as the expression of his omnipotence, sometimes they mean the fructifying power of those things which, at the destruction of the world, enter as a germ into Brahman, to come forth again at the new creation. We will briefly gather together what is to be found scattered here and there, on this subject.

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"That the uniform Brahman produces the diverse manifestation of the phenomenal world," so is stated on p. 486, 10, "is to be explained through His providing Himself with various powers." To prove this, certain Vedic passages are mentioned, which, however, do not appear to assert anything more than the omnipotence of Brahman ('all-working is he, all-wishing, all-smelling, all-tasting'): Brahman is furnished with all powers (p. 1125, 8), is connected with the unfolding of many powers (p. 445, 11), the Îçvara possesses innumerable powers (p. 490, 8), as appears from his being the cause of the origin, subsistence, and destruction of the world (p. 1126, 1); these powers without which Brahman could not create (p. 342, 6), are deduced from the multiplicity of their effects (p. 486, 2); as to their relation to Brahman, from the expression used on p. 476, 8, that Brahman "is filled with powers," (*paripūrṇaçaktikam*), we may conclude that these powers are believed to be immanent in Brahman.

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The Scripture (Çvet. 1, 3) leads to the assumption of one power of the highest God, which orders and creates the whole world (p. 358, 5). It is this godlike power not unfolded in name and form, which is the original state (*prāg-avasthā*) of names and forms (p. 358, 10); in this original state, the now manifested world existed before manifestation, in a state of seed-force (*vīja-çakti-avasthā*, p 341, 9); "if" (it is said on p. 342, 2 in the polemic against the Sāṅkhyas) "we acknowledged a self-subsisting original state of the world as cause, we should make room for the assumption of a material cause (of the world); we assume though that this original state of the world was not self-subsisting, but dependent on the highest God. Such we must of necessity take it to be, and on good grounds. For without it, the creative work of God is impossible, for an activity of God devoid of his powers is unthinkable... This unmanifested (*avyaktam*) seed-force, as it is called, resting in the highest God, is in its inherent character Ignorance (*avidyā*), a deep sleep produced by glamour (*māyā*) in which lie those wandering souls, who have “not awakened to the knowledge of their real nature [the “knowledge of their identity with Brahman].”

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According to these passages, it appears that 1. the creative power of Brahman, 2. the seed-forces of things, and 3. individual souls existing by means of their subtle bodies, are all confused together in the indeterminate idea of the powers of Brahman. We have already seen (above p. 70) that these powers were not annihilated at each destruction of the world, but remained in existence as its root (p. 303, 1), and in such a way that their character remained unchanged (p. 303, 2). From this, it follows, that in spite of the continual destruction of the world, the same elements (earth, etc.), the classes of beings (gods, men, animals), and the worldly distinctions (castes and Âcramas), come forth anew (p. 303, 4).

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The multiplicity of these powers does not contradict the unity of Brahman who contains them, since the power of multiplying (*vibhâga-çakti*), before and after the existence of the world, as well as the tendency to multiplicity (*vibhâga-vyavahâra*), during the existence of the world, rest on false perception (*mithyâjñânam*) (p. 433, 13); as we shall see more in detail, in the esoteric cosmology.

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