The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c7.s3.t2: 2. The Origin of Space (Ākāça)

The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c7.s3.t2

Language: English

2. The Origin of Space (Ākāça)

With unconcealed irony, Çaṅkara mentions those who follow in the footsteps of the illustrious Kaṇabhuj, (a nickname for Kaṇāda): "that we cannot conceive an origin of space" (p. 608, 6).—We will see how far this irony is well founded, by picking out from the chaos of discussion, the essential arguments and counter-arguments.

c7.s3.t2.3

Space can have had no origin, says Kaṇāda, for the following reasons: (1) How can one conceive the causal relation between space as an effect, and its cause? The cause (kāraṇam), of an effect (for example, a textile fabric) has three moments, as samavāyi-asamavāyi-nimitta-kāraṇam, that is, inherent cause (the threads), non-inherent cause (the union of the threads), and efficient cause (weaver and loom). The inherent cause consists of a substance, which is (a) homogeneous (ekajātīyaka), (b) manifold (aneka) [like the atoms of Kaṇāda]. "Now for space, there is no homogeneous and manifold substance, from which, as inherent cause, together with the union of the same (that is, of its particles), as non-inherent cause, space could originate. And if this does not exist, much less can we think of an assisting efficient cause for space" (p. 608, 8 ff.).

c7.s3.t2.4

(2) In the case of created elements (for example, fire) we can picture to ourselves a difference between the time before, and the time after they had come into being. This difference we cannot conceive in the case of space [na sambhāvayitum çakyate p. 609, 4), that is, therefore, we cannot picture a condition in which space was not]. "For how can a man assume that before the creation there was no place, no vacuity, no opening?" (p. 609, 5).

c7.s3.t2.5

(3) Space did not originate, for it is of a different nature (vidharma) from the earth, &c., in so far as its distinctive character is, that it penetrates all things (vibhutvam) etc. (p. 609, 6).

c7.s3.t2.6

(4) Lastly, in the scripture itself, space is called “undying, all-present, eternal” (p. 610, 3).

c7.s3.t2.7

According to all this, we must assume that before the creation, when, as the scriptures say, there was “one only, without a second,” space must have formed an all-penetrating, formless unity with Brahman, like water mixed with milk; and this separated at the creation in such a way that space remained immovable, while Brahman exerted itself (yatate) to produce the world (p. 612, 3).

c7.s3.t2.8

After Śaṅkara has pointed out that water and milk, although mixed, yet remain different essentially, whilst for the existent before the creation, an essential unity was required (p. 617, 15), he sets himself to refute Kaṇāda’s arguments; first however he gives the following positive proof of the origination of space:

c7.s3.t2.9

(p. 618, 13) “Whenever we see anything that has originated through transformation, whether it be pitchers, pots, and pails, or bracelets, clasps, and rings, or needles, iron arrowheads, and swords, we see division also in the world. On the contrary, a thing without origin can never be thought of as divided. The division of space is, however, shown by the earth, etc. (that is in space); therefore space also must be a transformation” (that is: all that has an origin is divisible; but space is divisible; ergo—!).

c7.s3.t2.10

Probably from a perception of the weakness of this argument, our author at once passes from it to the domain of metaphysics, where he is more at home: Ātman, he says, is not divided by the earth, or anything else; for space (the principle of division) originates in Ātman; consequently Ātman is no transformation. With this thought, which takes its root in the profound perception that that which exists in itself is spaceless, Śaṅkara goes on to the fine statement of the Self-existence of Ātman, which we translated in Chapter VIII, 6 (above p. 127). He then turns to the arguments of Kaṇāda mentioned above, to refute them one after another.

c7.s3.t2.11

(1) The cause need not necessarily be homogeneous and manifold; (a) not homogeneous: for the threads and their combinations need not be homogeneous, and still less the efficient cause, the loom (but no one ever maintained this).— Or is homogeneity to be asserted of the inherent cause only? That cannot be maintained unconditionally. For a single cord is twisted out of yarn and cow-hair; and many cloths are woven from thread and [unspun] wool. Or does the homogeneity of the cause only demand that it must be one being and one substance? That is self-evident, and the requirement is superfluous. (b) Further, the cause need not be manifold. For also the atoms of Kaṇāda work each for itself. It is not necessary that the cause should consist of several factors; for the effect can also be the result of transformation, since a substance passes into a different condition, and is then called the effect. The substance in this case may be manifold, as the earth and the seed that go to form plants, or uniform, as milk, which becomes curds. And so, according to the scripture, from the uniform Brahman, the manifold world, with space and all creatures, has sprung (p. 621, 5—623, 4).

c7.s3.t2.12

(2) It is absurd to assert, with reference to space, that a difference cannot be imagined between the time before, and the time after creation; for that space, with all bodies, is there now, and that nothing was there before, is precisely the difference. [But here Kaṇāda is not even understood, much less disproved.] Besides, the scripture expressly declares (Brih. 3, 8, 8, translated above p. 133), that Brahman, amongst other things, is spaceless (anākāçam, “not-ether,” as we translated above p. 133) (p. 623, 5—12).

c7.s3.t2.13

(3) It does not hold good, either, that space had no origin, because it is different in essence from the earth and the other elements. For, firstly, where the scripture contradicts this, a logical conclusion of the impossibility of its origin is fallacious, and, secondly, its origination follows even as a logical conclusion: for space is not everlasting, because it possesses qualities which are not everlasting (sound perhaps?—that would, however, under no circumstances be an essential quality of space;) therefore we must postulate a beginning for it, as for vases, etc. Do you maintain that, in this, it is not distinguished from Âtman?—For of Âtman, no one has ever yet demonstrated to a follower of the Upanishads that he is the bearer of non-eternal qualities. Furthermore, it has never been proved that space is all-pervading (vibhu) (p. 624, 5; the same monstrous assertion p. 700, 4).

c7.s3.t2.14

(4) When space is said by the scripture to be immortal, it is only in the (relative) sense in which the gods also are said to be immortal (on this, above p. 67). When, however, it is said of Brahman, that he is, "like space, omnipresent, eternal;" that is simply a simile, as when it is said: "the sun flies like an arrow," whereby it is not meant that it has only the same speed as an arrow; then also it is said of Brahman: "greater is he than space" (above p. 163) and "what is separate from him, is afflicted" (above p. 142).—Thus the origination of space is proved (p. 624, 6—625, 7).

Linked texts (1)

Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad — Sanskrit