Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c7.s4: XVIII. Cosmological Problems

The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c7.s4

Language
English

Contents

XVIII. Cosmological Problems

c7.s4.1

The doctrine of the empirical origin of the world from Brahman, set forth in the two preceding chapters, gives rise, in the course of the discussion, to a series of doubts; their solution is sought from the empirical standpoint, which can only partially solve them; their full solution is to be reached only by having recourse to the doctrine of Identity,—the special metaphysical teaching of the Vedânta. We shall now gather these various objections together, under three chief heads.

1. The Problem of Causality

c7.s4.t1.1

Sûtras 2, 1, 4. 5. 8.

c7.s4.t1.2

a) The Difference of Essence (*vilakṣaṇatvam*) between Brahman and the World.—Between two things which are different in essence, there can be no causal relation: the golden ornament can not have clay as its cause, and the earthen vessel cannot have gold as its cause (p. 419, 10); now, between Brahman and the world, there is a difference in essence, in so far as Brahman is pure and spiritual, and the world, on the contrary, is impure and unspiritual (p. 419, 8). For this world is impure, in that it consists, according to its essence, of desire, pain, and illusion (*moha*) from which joy, sorrow, and despair arise, and spread thoughout heaven and hell (p. 420, 4); it is unspiritual, first of all, because it is in the service of the enjoyer (the individual soul) and, according to its nature, it is only the means to produce the effects necessary for enjoyment, and such a relation of service can never exist between two spiritual beings: for where one spiritual being serves another, for instance, in the case of a slave and his master, he does not do this as a spiritual being, but in virtue of his unspiritual part, consisting of Buddhi [Intellect, which in itself is unspiritual, a mere instrument] etc. (p. 420, 7—14). And if we deny the unspirituality of the world, by regarding wood, earth, etc. as transformed spirit, whose spirituality is hidden out of sight, as is the real spiritual, in sleep and swoon (p. 421), the impurity of the world still remains, and proves its difference in essence from Brahman (p. 422, 1). Further, the scriptures maintain the unspirituality of the world, in so far as they separate knowledge from Ignorance, from which it follows that the unspiritual exists (p. 422, 6); and when the same scriptures sometimes ascribe spiritual functions to the unspiritual, in so far as they say: "the earth spoke" (Çatap. Br. 6, 1, 3, 4), "the waters conceived the idea" (Chând. 6, 2, 4, above p. 230) etc., we must understand here, not the elements, but the spiritual deities which are their representatives (p. 423, 5). --From this it is clear that the world differs in essence from Brahman and cannot therefore proceed from him (p. 424, 7).

c7.s4.t1.3

b) The Contamination of Brahman by the World.—If the world proceeds from, and returns to, Brahman, then, on its return, through its qualities of materiality (sthaulyam) articulation, unspirituality, limitation, impurity, etc. it must defile Brahman; therefore it is absurd to regard Brahman as the cause of the world (p. 429, 15 ff.).

c7.s4.t1.4

c) The Impossibility of a new Differentiation.—Further, it is absurd, because (p. 430, 6) after the world has been absorbed into the undifferentiated Brahman, no reason could exist for it to go forth again, differentiated into enjoyer and enjoyed [which is contradicted by the actual existence of these differences in each new world-period].

c7.s4.t1.5

d) The Danger of a Return for the Liberated.—The basis of the ever repeated return of the world lies in the works performed in former lives which (apart from the liberated, whose works are annihilated) must be atoned for. In the case of a return of the world into Brahman, all works would disappear by absorption into unity. If, however, after this destruction of works, a return be possible, then we cannot perceive what should prevent the liberated also from being born again [p. 430, 9; whereby a doubt is cast on the most precious jewel of Indian faith—the certainty of liberation].

2. The Problem of the One and the Many

c7.s4.t2.1

Sûtras 2, 1, 26. 30. 31.

c7.s4.t2.2

a) Total or partial Transformation. — In the transformation of Brahman into the world, we must of necessity assume one of two things: that either the whole, or only a part, of Brahman, changes into the world. In the first case, the root of Brahman would be destroyed, search after it would be aimless, for it would lie before our eyes as the world, beyond which there would be nothing, and the passages of scripture which declare that Brahman is unborn, etc., would be subverted (p. 480, 3). — If, on the contrary, we assume that only a part of Brahman becomes the world, then Brahman becomes subject to division, which is contradicted by the express words of the scriptures which forbid us to assume that Brahman has members, parts, or differences (p. 479, 9); and were Brahman divisible, the necessary consequence would be, that He is not eternal [p. 480, 8; that which is subject to the laws of space, is subject also to those of time; compare n. 43, above p. 68—69].

c7.s4.t2.3

b) One Brahman with many Powers. — As we saw in Chap. XVI, 4 (above p. 227), in order to create the world, Brahman must unite with many powers. This assumption contradicts the teaching of the unity of Brahman, on the basis of which the scripture in the words: "it is not so, it is not so," negates in Brahman all and every difference (p. 487, 13). Compare with this, the characteristics of the esoteric Brahman in Chap. XIV, 3 (above p. 210ff.).

3. The Moral Problem

c7.s4.t3.1

Sûtras 2, 1, 34. 21.

c7.s4.t3.2

a) The Creator of the World as the Author of Evil. — (p. 491, 5): "God cannot be the cause of the world, for then "he would be unjust and unmerciful. Some, like the gods, he “would have destined to the enjoyment of infinite pleasure; “others, like the animals, to the endurance of endless pain; “and still others, like mankind, to a mixed condition; according to this, God would have brought forth an unrighteous “creation, would be affected by love and hate, like an individual being, and the purity of his nature maintained by “Scripture and Tradition would suffer injury.¹⁰³ And therefore good men also (reading akhala, p. 491, 10) would be “afraid of his mercilessness and cruelty (which would be contrary to Bṛh. 4, 4, 15 na tato vijugupsate), because he inflicted pains on them, and swallowed up all beings. So, “because of the injustice and mercilessness which would be “attached to him, God cannot be the cause of the world.”

c7.s4.t3.3

¹⁰³ śruti-smṛti-avadhārita-svacchatva-ādi-īśvara-svabhāva-vilopaḥ prasajyeta. Or if we divide svacchatvād: “and in the case of purity, “though Scripture and Tradition make (the contrary) certain, a contradiction would exist in the nature of God.”

c7.s4.t3.4

b) The Creator of the World as the Cause of Evil. The conception of sin which is so accentuated in the Hebrew world, from the very beginning (Genesis vi, 5. viii, 21) is wanting in such a decided form, in Indian antiquity. Accordingly, the most effective argument against a divine creator of the world, namely, that he would be the (direct or indirect) cause of sin, is not brought clearly forward; the term “not good” (ahitam) in the passage 2, 1, 21, which we have under consideration here, rather holds the middle ground between the ideas of evil and of wickedness; it is more especially the first, with a tendency, however, to the latter, which becomes clearer from the answer to be brought forward later, to the objection which has its place here in the system, and substantially runs as follows: according to the Scriptures, God is not separated from the individual soul; by means of it he himself (above p. 231) has entered into nature (p. 471, 13). If he were the Creator of the world, then, as his character of creator, he is free, he would have created good for himself, and not evil, such as birth, death, sickness, old age, etc. For no one who is free to do what he wishes, builds a prison, and then enters it himself (p. 472, 4). Again, as the absolutely pure, he would not enter the body, the absolutely impure, with his own self (p. 472, 5), and had he done so, he would leave it, remembering that he himself had made it. Without trouble the soul (in whose form God entered the world), would put an end to the world, just as the magician does to the glamour produced by himself. As this does not occur, it follows that the world cannot be created by a spiritual being who knows what is good for himself (p. 472, 6—13).

Cites (5)