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The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c7.s5: XIX. The Idea of Causality

The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c7.s5

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Contents

XIX. The Idea of Causality

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THE problems raised in the last chapter find their solution in the metaphysical teaching of the Vedânta concerning nature, according to which the world was perceived to be, not something different from Brahman, or existing apart from Brahman, but identical with Brahman, who appears in the form of existing nature. The identity of the two does not, therefore, mean that Brahman is like the world, but only that the world is like Brahman (p. 431, 13). Examined more closely, Brahman and the world stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect. But cause and effect are identical in their inner nature. Therefore our authors' teaching of identity is based upon an examination of the idea of causality; and this circumstance is not affected by the fact that in the work before us the doctrine of the identity of Brahman and the world 2, 1, 14, is first presented with mainly theological proofs, and then, as it were, as a corollary to this, 2, 1, 15-20, we find the logical evidence of the inner identity of cause and effect. The logical order is rather the reverse: from the identity of cause and effect, follows the identity of Brahman and the world, and not only does this follow of necessity, but it is plainly expressed at the end of the section p. 471, 2: "Therefore the effect is identical with the cause, and consequently (ataç ca) as the whole world is an effect of Brahman, they also are identical." - According to this, we shall first follow out the investigation of the idea of causality, and then the doctrine of identity which is based on this. But we have first to remark as follows:

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However natural it may be to mankind, to conceive the relationship between Being-in-itself and the phenomenal world from the point of view of causality, and so to regard God as cause and the world as effect,—nevertheless this view is false. For causality, which has its root in the organisation of our intellect, and nowhere else, is the bond which binds all the phenomena of the phenomenal world together, but it does not bind the phenomenal world with that which manifests itself through it. For between Being-in-itself and the phenomenal world there is no causality but identity: the world is the Thing-in-itself (das Ding an sich) as it displays itself in the forms of our intellect.—This truth has been correctly grasped by the Vedânta, which cannot free itself, however, from the old error of looking upon God as the cause of the world, and seeks to reconcile the two by interpreting the idea of causality as that of identity. To this end it forms too wide a concept of causality, in that it not only comprehends under this idea the bond of variations which only have to do with the qualities, forms, and conditions of substance, but also the bond between substance and qualities, and also between substance and substance. The continuity of substance forms the chief argument in these discussions, which we will now place before the reader in order, as we find them on pages 456—471.

1. The Cause persists in the Effect

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Only while the cause continues, can the effect be perceived, but not when it does not continue. Thus the clay continues in the vessel, the thread in the cloth. In things which are different, the perceptibility of the one is not conditioned by the persistence of the other: for example, a horse can be perceived without the presence of a cow. So cause and effect are not different (p. 456, 12).

2. The Effect exists before its manifestation, namely, as Cause

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When it is said: "This was Existent in the beginning" (above p. 230), the statement means that the world was already existent before its manifestation, in the form of the Existent, its cause. For where a thing is not already, according to its nature, it cannot arise: no oil can be pressed out of sand. But if the effect before manifestation was already identical with the cause, it remains so even after manifestation. As Brahman is never anything other than the Existent, so also the world is never anything other than the Existent. The Existent, however, is of like nature with itself (p. 459).

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3. What is the difference between the effect before and after manifestation?

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It is true that the Scripture also says: "This was in the "beginning non-Existent" (above p. 129). But this non-Existence is no absolute one but means only a difference of qualities (*dharma*). As the effect now consists in its quality as developed in name and form, so it existed before its manifestation in its quality of not being developed in name and form; it existed as the same but in the form of its cause (p. 460, 2).

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4. The effect is prefigured in the cause.

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Sour milk comes only from milk, never from clay; while jars come only from clay, not from milk. This could not be so, if the effect did not exist before its manifestation; rather, in that case, anything could arise out of anything. But there lies in the cause a certain extension beyond itself (*kaçcid atiçayaḥ*) towards the given effect--as of milk to sour milk, and of clay to the jar; and this forbids our regarding the effect as non-existent before its manifestation. For each cause has its peculiar power (*çakti*) and this power brings the given effect into manifestation, and no other. Therefore we may not regard cause and effect, substance and qualities, as different, like horses and oxen, but must regard them as of like nature (p. 461, 3--462, 5).

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This is followed first by a criticism p. 462, 5--464, 8 of the apprehension of causality as an inherent relation, most probably directed against *Kaṇāda*, and, like most of the polemical expositions of the work, of more interest for the teachings controverted than for the Vedānta.

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5. The Activity of becoming manifest must have a Subject.

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If the effect did not exist before its manifestation, the activity of manifestation would be without an agent, and therefore without a subject (*nirātmaka*). But every activity must necessarily have an agent. If the jar becomes manifest, who is the agent in this action, if not the jar itself?--The potter, perhaps? But then the potter would become manifest from his action, and not the jar. Or do you maintain that the effect originates and receives a self, after it has been previously connected with the Being of the cause?--But connection can only take place between two things which are, and not between what is and what is not.--And just as unthinkable is the limit which you set to the non-existence of the effect, by the moment of becoming manifest: for only what is, and not what is not, can have a limit.--And through no activity can the non-existence of the effect become existent, as little as the son of the barren woman can be made existent by any effort (p. 464, 8--466, 7).

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6. The Activity of the agent is not superfluous.

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If the effect was already existent before its becoming manifest as much as the cause, and was identical with it, surely it as little requires an agent as the cause itself, in order to become manifest?--Certainly not. The mission of the agent is to transform the cause into the form of the effect; though it is to be firmly maintained that also the form of the effect is already contained in the being of the cause; for that which has no self, cannot, as we saw, attain to one. --For the rest, a thing is not changed by difference in outward appearance: Devadatta remains Devadatta, whether he opens his arms or folds them (p. 466, 7--467, 7).

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7. Generality of the Identity of Cause and Effect.

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If you only admit the identity of cause and effect in that which is not altered by manifestation and dissolution, we dispute this: for does not milk change into sour milk before our eyes? When, too, manifestation, like the springing of plants from seeds, is only a becoming visible of what was already existent, conditioned by the accumulation of like particles; and, in exactly the same way, dissolution is only a becoming invisible, caused by the disappearance of these same particles. If we were to recognise a transition from non-Existence to Existence in them and from Existence to non-Existence, then the embryo would be other than the subsequently born man, the youth would be other than the greybeard he becomes, and the father of the one would not be the father of the other (p. 467, 7—468, 4).

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8. The Activity of the agent must have an object.

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If the effect were not in existence before its manifestation, the activity of the agent respecting it would be without an object, like sword-cuts through the air. Or is its object not the effect, but the inherent cause? Then the object would be different, and the result would also be different. Or is the effect an extension beyond itself of the cause which is inherent in it? Then the effect would be there already, and would not require to be first brought about (p. 468, 4—9).

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9. Result.

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"Then it comes to this, that the substances themselves "persist, *e. g.*, milk, through its existence as sour milk, etc.; "that they take the name of effect, and that we cannot think "of the effect as different from the cause, even if we tried "for a hundred years. And as it is the original cause which, "up to the last effect, appears in the form of this or that "effect, like an actor in all possible parts, it is thereby logically proved that the effect exists before its manifestation and "is identical with the cause" (p. 468, 10—469, 1).

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Here follow other arguments of a theological character, p. 469.

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10. Illustrative Examples.

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1) So long as a cloth is rolled up, we cannot see whether it is a cloth or something else, and even if it be seen that it is a cloth, its real length and breadth are still unknown; if, however, it be unrolled, we perceive what it is, and how long or broad it is; as the rolled up and unrolled cloth are identical, so are cause and effect (p. 470, 1—10; the words 470, 7—9 seem to be an interpolation).

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2) As, when we hold our breath, in-haling and ex-haling only continue in the form of the cause (*prâna*, life, breath), and produce as effect, life only, but not the muscular movement of breathing; but if the breath be set free, besides life, movement of the muscles is produced; and as the so-called life-breaths are not different from life (*prâna*), of which they are branches, because the nature of both consists in animation (*samîranam*), so also effect is not different from cause (p. 470, 12—471, 2).