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The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c8.s2: XXIII. Origin and Nature of the Soul

The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c8.s2

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XXIII. Origin and Nature of the Soul

1. Origin of the Soul

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Sûtras 2, 3, 16–17.

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ONE could imagine, says Çankara, that the soul (*jīva*) also originates and perishes like all else, because experience shows how man is born and dies and even celebrates his birth by special ceremonies (p. 641, 6). But that idea is contradicted by the Scripture which accompanies its commands and prohibitions with promises and threats, and they are only accomplished in a future existence (641, 9). Therefore being born and dying refer only to the body; for the soul on the other hand they mean no more than the entering into the phenomenal world as body and passing out of it again (*prâdurbhâva* and *tirobhâva*, p. 642, 4); therefore birth is only to be regarded as the union of the soul with the body, death as the separation from it (642, 8). But by this only the independence of the soul from the gross (material) origin and dissolution is demonstrated; the question is, what is the relation of the soul to Brahman, does it originate from him or not (642, 11)?—

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—It is clear that up to the present we have been speaking exoterically of the soul involved in transmigration. We might expect to find further the proof that it does not originate from Brahman on the ground that when in deep sleep and death and at the end of the world it enters into him, it persists in the form of seed-force (cf. above pp. 228 ff. 238. 276. 279). Instead of this in what follows Çankara passes over to the esoteric doctrine in order to prove the non-origination of the soul from the fact of its identity with Brahman.

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The origination of the soul from Brahman might be maintained on the following grounds: *Firstly*: If Brahman is recognised, it is said in Mund. 1, 1, 3, all is recognised. This passage forbids us to assume anything existent outside Brahman.—*Secondly*: Brahman and the soul are different in essence; Brahman is free from all evil [e. g. origination and dissolution] and the soul is not.—*Thirdly*: Everything divided and manifold in the world is transformed (not original); when the soul does good and evil and feels pleasure and pain, it is individualised according to the bodies and manifold; therefore it must have an origin (cf. note 43).—*Fourthly*: It is equally true of enjoyers (*bhoktar*) and of the things to be enjoyed (*bhogyam*), i. e., the Prāṇas and Elements, that they proceed from Brahman as sparks spring from a fire (above p. 131 ff.); by this passage other passages are to be supplemented and explained; thus the passage as to the entrance of Brahman into the elements (Taitt. 2, 6. Chând. 6, 3, 3; cf. above p. 280).—Therefore the soul has originated from Brahman (p. 643, 7 to 644, 11).

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To the *fourth* assertion is to be replied first that in most passages an origination of the soul is not taught [as for the others, they will be treated immediately]; and then that an origination is impossible because in many passages (Çaṅkara cites no fewer than ten) the eternal nature of the soul is maintained.—To the *third* of the above assertions that the soul must have originated because it is manifold, it is to be replied, that the soul in itself (*svatas*) is by no means manifold (p. 645, 8), for it is said (Çvet. 6, 11):

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"One God alone in every being hid,
"Pervadeth all, the inner soul of each."

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The plurality of the soul is only phenomenal and is conditioned by the Upâdhis such as Buddhi etc., just as the plurality of space by the vessels (note 106) which bound it. In the same way we must take it as referring to the Upâdhis when the Scripture occasionally seems to speak of an origin and dissolution of the soul; this means only an origin and dissolution of the Upâdhis; *e. g.* in the passage (above p. 175) "after death there is no consciousness." 109—By the identity of the soul with Brahman the first of the above assertions is met.—Lastly, as regards the second it is to be remarked that the difference in essence of the soul and Brahman refers only to the Upâdhis, as is to be seen by the passage Chap. XII, 4, in which all qualities of Samsâra are denied to the soul "consisting of knowledge." Thus it is proved that the soul 110 does not originate nor perish (p. 644, 12—647, 5).

2. Nature of the Soul

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Sûtram 2, 3, 18.

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How is the nature of the soul to be imagined? Is it, as Kanâda maintains, in itself not intellectual, so that its intelligence is only accidental (*âgantuka*), or must we assume with the Sânkhyas that the Soul is in its essence an eternally intellectual being (p. 647, 7)?—

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For the first eventuality, that the intelligence of the soul is accidental and produced by its association with the Manas, just as the heat of the pot is produced by its connection with the fire, we may adduce the fact that were the soul essentially intellectual it ought to be so in the case of sleepers, fainting persons, and madmen (*graha-âvishta*); but they affirm that in this condition they have had no consciousness. Therefore, since the intelligence of the soul is only temporary, we must assume that it is not essential but accidental (p. 647, 9 to 648, 2).

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To this we reply: the soul is an eternally intellectual being; this follows from the fact that, as we have proved, it does not originate but is the highest unchangeable Brahman itself, which when disguised by the Upâdhis appears as the individual soul. Now the highest Brahman is as we have proved (chap. IX, 4 above p. 134 ff.) naturally intellectual; consequently to the soul also intellectuality is as essential as heat and light to fire. Yet the organs of perception are not for this reason superfluous; for they are the gates through which the intellect receives the specifically different sense-impressions, e. g. the perception of smells by the sense of smell etc.—If sleepers etc. do not perceive, this is to be explained by the passage: "If he then sees not, yet is he seeing, though he does not see" etc. (above p. 191); i. e., the soul does not then perceive, not because perception is wanting but because the objects are wanting; just as light does not become visible in space, as long as there are no objects to be illuminated (648, 2—649, 13).

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¹⁰⁹ Here p. 646, 8 and 391, 3 an annihilation of the Upâdhis, *upâdhi-pralaya* is taught. But according to the system only the gross body is annihilated; the remaining Upâdhis (the subtle body and the Prânas) did not originate and (except in liberation) are imperishable; but by them the plurality of souls is conditioned, from which the opponent concluded their origination. His objection therefore remains unanswered.

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¹¹⁰ That is, as we must add, the soul which the esoteric doctrine recognises as identical with Brahman.—The indestructibility of the soul affected by Upâdhis follows on moral grounds as is developed *e. g.* above p. 112 ff.

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