The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c8.s3.t4: 5. Brahman and the Upâdhis
The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c8.s3.t4
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5. Brahman and the Upâdhis
c8.s3.t4.1
In reality (*paramârthatas*) there is nothing else besides Brahman alone. If we imagine we perceive a transformation (*vikâra*) of Him into the world, a division (*bheda*) of Him into a plurality of individual souls, this depends on *Avidyâ*. But how does this happen? How do we manage to deceive ourselves into seeing a transformation and a plurality, where in reality Brahman alone is?—On this question our authors give no information.
c8.s3.t4.2
Since *Avidyâ* is, as we saw above (p. 55) innate, and our birth depends on the works of a previous existence, one might imagine the innate obscuration of our knowledge was a result of previous offences reaching back *ad infinitum*. But the system gives no real ground for this assumption. Avidyâ cannot properly be a result of Samsâra, for on the contrary the reverse is the case and the whole of Samsâra depends on Avidyâ. Under these circumstances nothing remains but to recall the negative character of the idea of Avidyâ. It needs no explanation so far as it is not a positive defect, but only Ignorance, the absence of knowledge. It is true something very positive depends on Avidyâ; viz. the whole existence of the world and of the individual soul. It is however just the meaning of this reference of all empirical existence to Ignorance, that this whole world, the whole beginningless and endless Samsâra, is only for us something positive and real, but is in actuality non-Brahman and (as Brahman alone is the Existent) non-Existent, a mere mirage (mâyâ, mṛigatṛishṇikâ), a product of Ignorance.
c8.s3.t4.3
The extension of the world and the plurality of wandering souls, this hybrid which is neither Being nor non-Being (tattva-anyatvâbhyâm anirvacanîyam) and comparable to an hallucination or to a dream, is produced by Ignorance by virtue of the Upâdhis, the limitations, literally "the ascription" (with the secondary idea of the unpermitted) by means of which we "ascribe" to Brahman what does not naturally belong to him, and through which, as we shall show in detail, he becomes 1) a personal God, 2) the world, 3) the individual soul. All this depends on the Upâdhis, and the Upâdhis on Avidyâ. Avidyâ alone is the cause of the origin of the Upâdhis (they are avidyâ-kṛita p. 1133, 12, avidyâ-nimitta p. 692, 14, avidyâ-pratyupasthâpita pp. 199, 5. 690, 5) and is the cause of their persistence so far as the essence of Avidyâ is the non-discrimination of Brahman from the Upâdhis (upâdhi-aviveka p. 473, 17. 689, l. 98, 8, cf. 185, 10); Brahman himself on the other hand is not in the least affected or changed by the Upâdhis, just as little in fact as the crystal by the red colour with which it is painted p. 265, 7. 803, 14. It is in this sense that a contact of the Upâdhis (upâdhi-samparka p. 389, 2. 794, 7) and a contamination (p. 389, 2) by them is spoken of. Brahman is merged in the Upâdhis (upâdhi-antarbhâva p. 811, 5. 9) and thereby his nature is hidden (svarûpa-tirobhâva p. 837, 2) and his natural omniscience (in his existential form as soul) suffers a limitation (the knowledge of the soul is *upâdhi-paricchinna* p. 231, 1).
c8.s3.t4.4
On this connection of the Brahman with the Upâdhis depend, as we have said, three phenomena, and it is characteristic that all three are included under this conception without distinction: 1) Through the Upâdhis the higher Brahman becomes the lower, the object of worship p. 111, 3. 662, 13. 1142, 9; the Upâdhis of the Îçvara are however perfect (*nir-atiçaya*) in contrast with those of the individual soul which are imperfect (*nihîna*) (p. 688, 1); details of this distinction are not given. 2) The extension of nature too (*nâma-rûpa-prapañca*) which is commonly referred directly to Avidyâ (e.g. 1132, 10. 507, 1. 473, 17. 787, 13) seems occasionally to be reckoned among the Upâdhis of Brahman; this is the case p. 803, 12. 807, 4 (*prithivî-âdi-upâdhi-yoga*), 391, 2 (*upâdhi-âçraya-nâmarûpam*), 1133, 12 (*nâmarûpa-upâdhika*) just as external objects (*vishaya*) also appear among the Upâdhis of the soul (p. 265, 6, cf. 787, 10. 1056, 1. 739, 7). This description of nature however as Upâdhi of Brahman is uncertain and at any rate seldom. 3) But so much the more frequently is everything regarded as Upâdhi, which makes Brahman into a Jîva or Çarîra, *i.e.*, individual soul, whose existence as a being different from Brahman depends solely on the Upâdhis, p. 735, 3. 244, 13. 360, 2. 199, 8. 836, 8. 799, 5. 982, 5. 173, 16. 162, 16. The best explanation of this relationship is the comparison of the Upâdhis with vessels which limit cosmic space locally (cf. note 106 above p. 277). In this sense can be considered as Upâdhis firstly all psychic organs or Prâṇas (*Mukhya prâṇa*, *Manas*, and the *Indriyas*; for details see chap. XXVII) together with the subtle body and the moral determination of the soul (p. 1091, 9) which all share together in transmigration; further the gross body which only exists until death (*kârya-karaṇa-saṅghâta* or *deha*, cf. 473, 17. 199, 5. 787, 13. 389, 2. 98, 4. 9. 692, 14. 811, 5. 9); and finally to these are added occasionally external objects and sensation (*vishaya-vedanâ* p. 265, 6. 787, 10. 1056, 1, where it must be taken as a Dvandva). In waking and dreaming contact with the Upâdhis (*upâdhi-samparka*) takes place, in deep sleep release (*upaçama*) from them (p. 794, 7. 836, 6). Frequently only such are to be understood as Upâdhis as share in transmigration; then for example p. 793, 14, where veins and pericardium are termed receptacles of the Upâdhis (*upâdhi-âdhâra*); thus the definition of the Upâdhis fluctuates and must in each case be settled by the context.