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The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c8.s5.t1: 1. Preliminary

The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c8.s5.t1

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1. Preliminary

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It may repeatedly be observed how psychological problems familiar to us reappear in a different form in Indian philosophy. The question as to the size of the soul gave us some informations as to the relation of the soul to the body; the question as to how the soul is related to its actions includes an enquiry into the will. Essential to the soul is as we saw (chap. XXIII, 2) intelligence; but this intelligence is at the bottom imaginary; for the Indians, as will be more exactly shown later, separate the whole apparatus of perception from the soul and unite it to the physical (i.e. dependent on Avidyâ) part of man, which indeed shares in transmigration but is extinguished by liberation. Now what is the position with regard to the will? Must we recognize in it perhaps an eternal absolutely inseparable determination of the soul?—The negation of this question which will appear in what follows, may at first seem strange to him who has accustomed himself to see in Will the final origin of Being. The denial however, as will be shown, comes to this, that besides the Velle another state of the soul is possible, viz. a Nolle; and it makes in the end no great difference whether this for us quite incomprehensible state is characterised in our fashion as a Negation of all volition, or in the Indian manner as an imaginary cognition, which, as may be seen by the sketch of the Akâmayamâna (chap. XII, 4, f, above p. 194), presupposes this Negation of all volition.

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2. Reasons for Supposing the Soul to be essentially an Agent (i.e. exercising Volition).

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1. The canon of Scripture with its commands and prohibitions presupposes that the soul is an agent, for it prescribes for it a certain course of action. If the soul were not an agent, these prescriptions would be purposeless, which cannot be assumed to be the case (p. 668, 5).

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2. Of the soul in the state of dreaming it is said (Brih. 4, 3, 12, above p. 190):

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"Immortal soars the soul where'er it will."

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This presupposes that the soul is an agent (p. 669, 4).

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3. On the same presupposition depends the absorption ascribed to it in the passage (Brih. 2, 1, 17): "The soul ab"sorbs [in deep sleep] by virtue of its intelligence the intelligence "of those vital spirits [into itself]" (p. 669, 8).

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4. Taitt. 2, 5 says:

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"Intelligence performs the sacrifice, and does the works"

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By intelligence (vijñânam) the soul is here to be understood, not the Buddhi (p. 670, 5); for otherwise the word "intelligence" would have to be in the instrumental (p. 670, 7) and the passage would have to read: "it (the soul) by means of in"telligence performs sacrifice and works."—Therefore the soul is an agent.

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It might be objected: if the soul independently of the Buddhi [without the Upâdhi, and therefore as it really is] is an agent, why does it not, as it is in this state free (svatantra), bring about only what is pleasant and profitable to it? For experience shows that it often brings about the contrary of what is good for it (p. 670, 11).—Answer: the soul is free too with regard to perception and yet perceives what is pleasant and what is unpleasant. So it is too with action (p. 670, 16).—But in perception the soul is influenced by the causes of perception and is therefore not free (p. 671, 1)!—Answer: That is not so! The causes of perception only determine the objects of perception but not the act of perception, for the soul is in this by virtue of its spirituality free [! p. 671, 2; the difference between receptivity which is present in perception, and spontaneity which is present in thinking and acting, is here completely overlooked; in the same way empirical psychology asserts for both a common faculty, the *Manas*. Besides in action the soul is not absolutely free but is determined by differences of time, space, and causality (*deça-kāla-nimitta* p. 671, 4; the same formula is found pp. 38, 3. 40, 2. 482, 1. 579, 5. 671, 4. 684, 9. 775, 2. 3. 4. 781, 3. 4. 1043. 6. 7. 10. 1075, 17. 1078, 9. 1129, 11); the soul is however all the same an agent, just as the cook remains a cook, though he makes use of fuel and water (p. 671, 5).

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5. If you insist that not the soul but the Buddhi is the agent, you make the latter an agent instead of an organ; but in that case the Buddhi must also be an object of Self-consciousness (*ahampratyaya*) without which no action is possible; it takes the place of the agent, and therefore needs something else as its organ, and so the whole dispute is about a name (because you call Buddhi what we call soul); p. 671, 9 to 672, 7.

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6. Moreover the meditation on the highest soul demanded by the Vedānta is impossible if the soul is not an agent (for that too is an action); p. 672, 12.

Cites (2)