The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c8.s5.t2: 3. The Soul is naturally not an Agent (exercising Volition)

The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c8.s5.t2

Language: English

3. The Soul is naturally not an Agent (exercising Volition)

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The section in question—one of the most important in Çankara’s work—we translate literally:

(p. 673, 3:) “Activity cannot be the real nature of the soul, “because then no liberation would be possible. For if activity “were the real nature of the soul there would be no release from “it, just as fire cannot lose its heat;¹¹³ but without release “from activity the attainment of the goal of man is impossible,

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¹¹³ The contradiction with the last sentence of p. 1130 (translated above p. 113) is resolved by the soul being spoken of there in an exoteric sense but here in an esoteric.

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“for activity is naturally painful (kartṛtvasya duḥkha-rūpatvāt).”

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“But cannot the goal of man be attained if one avoids the effects by shunning the occasion of activity even when the power of activity continues; just as with fire the effect of burning does not follow if wood is withdrawn, though the fire still possesses the power of burning?—By no means! For it is impossible to avoid the occasions altogether because they too are connected potentially¹¹⁴ [with the soul].”

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¹¹⁴ p. 673, 9: nimittānām api çakti-lakṣaṇena sambandhena sambadhānām atyanta-parihāra-asambhavāt; cf. note 65, above p. 113; the passage to which it refers must probably be understood in this sense.

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“But cannot liberation be attained by employing the means (sādhanam) necessary to it?—No! Because what depends on means, is not eternal.”

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“Moreover the consummation of liberation is said to follow from the teaching as to the eternal, pure, wise and free soul [identical with Brahman]; but the teaching that the soul is of this nature is not possible if activity is its proper nature.”

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“Therefore the activity of the soul depends only on the qualities of the Upādhis being ascribed to it (upādhi-dharma-adhyāsena) and not on its own nature.”

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“And so the Scripture teaches when it says (Bṛh. 4, 3, 7, above p. 189): ‘it is as though it reflected, as though it moved unsteadily’ and in the passage (Kāṭh. 3, 4):

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“Bound up with Manas, senses, and the body,
“The sages call it ‘the enjoying one.’”

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“where it asserts that the soul passes into the specific state of enjoyment [and activity] only by the connection with the Upādhis. For in the opinion of competent persons there is no agent and enjoyer different from the highest soul and termed ‘individual soul’ (Jīva), because the Scripture says: ‘besides him there is no other seer,’ etc. (Bṛh. 3, 7, 23, translated above p. 149, cf. above pp. 133, 191).”

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“But if besides the highest soul there is no individual soul endowed with intelligence, which exists after the withdrawal of the aggregate of Buddhi, etc., it follows that the highest “soul is itself a wanderer, agent, and enjoyer?—O no! For “enjoyment and activity are based on Ignorance. For so “teaches the Scripture (Brih. 4, 5, 15, translated above p. 175): “ ‘For where a duplicity exists as it were, one sees the other;’ “and after it has shown in these words that activity and en“joyment exist for Ignorance, it denies the existence of the “activity and enjoyment for knowledge, continuing: ‘but where “ ‘all has become for a man as his own self, how should he “ ‘see anyone?’—In the same way the Scripture shows (Brih. “4, 3, 19, translated above p. 190), how the soul in the states “of dreaming and waking in consequence of the contact (sam“parka) with the Upâdhis grows weary like a hawk soaring “in the air, but in deep sleep on the other hand, where it is “embraced by the Self of knowledge there is no weariness: ‘this “ ‘indeed is that nature of his, in which his desire is satiated, “ ‘in which he is himself his desire, without desire and free “ ‘from sorrow;’ and further (above p. 191) summarizing: ‘this “ ‘is his highest goal, this is his highest happiness, this is his “ ‘highest world, this is his highest bliss.’—This is just what “the teacher [Bâdarâyana in the Sûtram in question] says: “ ‘and as a carpenter in both ways’ where ‘and’ has the same “meaning as ‘but’ [a remark which possibly hints at fun“damental differences between Bâdarâyana and Çankara]. I.e., “we must not believe that activity is in the proper nature of “the soul, like heat in that of fire. On the contrary, as in “life a carpenter busies himself with the axe and other tools “in his hand, and feels pain, but afterwards goes home, lays “aside the axe and other tools and in his natural state “rejoicing and at ease feels pleasure, so too the soul, as long “as it is affected by the duality founded on Ignorance, is “busied in the states of dreaming and waking and feels pain; “but when it enters into itself, to throw off weariness, into the “highest self, it is freed from the complex of the organs of “work [the body], is not an agent and feels pleasure in the “state of deep sleep; it is the same in the state of liberation “where it is pure soul (kevala), reposes and is happy after “the gloom of Ignorance is driven away by the torch of know“ledge. The simile of the carpenter is to be taken as follows:

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“the carpenter is, in respect of various kinds of work such as “fitting, etc. with regard to certain tools such as his axe, etc., “an agent, but a non-agent so far as his body goes; so too “the soul in its exertions with regard to the organs, *Manas*, “etc. is an agent, but a non-agent in its own self. The soul “as opposed to the carpenter has not like him limbs with “which it could take up the organs, *Manas*, etc. or lay them “aside, as the carpenter with his hands takes up and lays “aside his tools [for all these organs belong to the *Upâdhis* “which are attributed to the soul only by Ignorance].”

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Then follows a refutation of the arguments brought forward in the preceding section, so far as they maintain an activity of the soul dependent not on the *Upâdhis* but on its own nature (p. 673, 1). We go through these briefly in order, according to the numbers above on p. 316.

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1. Certainly the Canon of Scripture presupposes an activity; it is not part of its real nature however but one which is founded on Ignorance (p. 676, 13).

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2. If the soul is still an agent in the dream-state, this depends on its being in this state not yet [as in deep sleep] wholly free from the *Upâdhis*, in so far as the sense-organs are at rest in the dream-state while the *Manas* remains active, as the Smriti (Mahâbhâratam 12, 9897) says:

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“When senses rest, and understanding wakes,
“And plays its part, this state is called a dream.”

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it is further to be noticed that action in dreams is a matter of appearance only (*vâsanâ*) and not real in the full sense (p. 678, 1).

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3. When it is said that the soul by means of intelligence absorbs intelligence in itself, no activity of the soul delivered from its organs is to be recognised but only a phrase like “the king fights by means of his soldiers” where it is meant that only the soldiers fight (p. 678, 9). Further in the passage in question what is spoken of is only an entering into rest, not an activity properly so called.

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⁴ In the passage Taitt. 2, 5 by “intelligence” not the soul but the Buddhi is to be understood, as is further proved pp. 679, 3—680, 1 from the context.—Çankara does not here

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return to the controversy as to the freedom of the soul in perception and action.

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5. "There is in no sense a change of functions on the part of the Buddhi if we ascribe activity to the organs; for all organs are in respect of their functions necessarily agents; but the activity of these organs demands in addition apperception (upalabdhi) and this belongs to the soul; but activity is not thereby ascribed to it; for its essence is eternal apperception (nitya-upalabdhi-svarûpatvât). It is true self-consciousness (ahaṅkâra) precedes activity, but it is not antecedent to apperception, for it is itself apperceived." [Only the individual, active and enjoying soul is on the one hand ahaṅkartar and pratyayin, on the other hand aham-pratyaya-vishaya, p. 73, 5; the upâdhi-less soul is neither the one nor the other but in its state of freedom is opposed to them as sâkshin or pure upalabdhi; cf. note 30, above p. 54].

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6. Finally as to meditation (samâdhi), it certainly assumes an activity of the soul but only in the same sense as the other prescriptions of the canon discussed under no. 1, of which it is a part (p. 680, 8).

Linked texts (4)

Kaṭhopaniṣad — Sanskrit
Taittirīyopaniṣad — Sanskrit
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad — Sanskrit
Mahābhārata — Vyāsa, Sanskrit